«t»*rrinmw««MMrt<»wifftf<w»^ifia*a<>»>»>»f*»>>^ 


f  - 


M5fe7 


BOOK    943.604.M567    2M   c.  1 
MALLESON    #    METTERNICH 


3  T1S3  0Q222flM2  T 


3LIFE 


OF 


PRmCE  METTEMICH. 


BY 


COLONEL  a  B.  MALLESON,  C.S.L 


PHIIiADEIiPHlA: 

J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY. 

1888 


PREFATOEY  NOTE. 


In  writing  this  sketch  of  the  statesman  whose  career 
occupies  so  great  a  space  in  the  history  of  Europe  for 
fifty  years  I  have  consulted,  amongst  others,  the  following 
works  :  (1)  "  The  Autobiography  of  Prince  Metternich  "  ; 
(2)  Binder's  "  Fiirst  Clement  von  IMctternich  und  scin 
Zeitalter,    1836";     (3)    '^  Neuer    Plutarch,"    vol.     v.; 

(4)  Thiers'   "Histoire   du    Consulat   et   de   I'Empire " ; 

(5)  Capefigue's  "  Diplom.ates  Contemporains  "  ;  (6)  Ger- 
vinus's  Geschichte  des  neunzehnten  Jahrhunderts " ; 
(7)  Maurice's  "Revohitions  of  1848-49";  (8)  Alder- 
stein's  « Chronologisches  Tagebuch  der  Magyarischen 
Revolution  "  ;  (9)  "  Napoleon  and  his  Detractors." 

G.  B.  M. 


CONTENTS. 


PAGI! 

CHAPTER  L 
Early  Training.    1773-1806 1 


CHAPTER    n. 
The  Embassy  to  Paris.     1806-1809 15 

CHAPTER    III. 

Froji   the  War  of  1809    to    the    Retreat  from    Moscow. 

I8U9-1812 :      46 

CHAPTER    IV. 

From  the  Winter  op  1812  to  the  Armistice  op  Pleiswitz, 

1812-1813 80 

CHAPTER    V. 

From  the  Armistice  op  Pleiswitz  to  the  Renewal  op  Hos- 
tilities.   June-August,  1813         .         .        •        •        .     104 

CHAPTER    VI.  ^ 

From  the  Rupture  op  the  Armistice  op  Pleiswitz  to  tiik 

Fall  of  Napoleon.    August,  1813,  to  March,  1814       .     120 

CHAPTER    VII. 

The  Crisis  before  the  Hundred  Days — and  after.    March, 

1814,  to  November,  1815 129 


vi  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER    VIII. 

The    Continental    System    of    Metternich  ;    its   Rise   and 

Pkoguess.     1S15-1830 14-2 

CHAPTER    IX. 

The  Decline  and  Fall  op  Metternich's  System  in'  Europe. 

1830-1848 171 

CHAPTER    X. 
Conclusion — Character.     1848-1859     .         ,         »         .         .     191 

Index  .••••••••••     198 


LIFE  OF 
PEINCE    METTEENIGH 


CHAPTER  I. 

EARLY  TEAINING. 
1773-1805. 

During  the  first  moiety  of  the  present  century,  that  is, 
from  the  year  1800  to  the  year  1848,  Continental  Europe 
was  alternately  ruled  by  two  men.  One  of  these,  he  who 
ruled  from  1800  to  1814,  made  his  hand  so  heavy  on  the 
nations  he  had  subdued  and  crushed,  tliat,  on  the  first 
great  opportunity,  they  rose  against  him,  and,  by  a 
stupendous  effort,  cast  him  down  from  his  place  of 
supremacy.  To  ensure  the  potential  character  of  that 
etlbrt,  to  render  it  absolutely  decisive,  no  one  contributed 
more  than  the  second  of  the  two  men  to  whom  I  have 
referred.  He  had  his  reward.  When  Waterloo  had 
completed  the  overthrow  which  Leipsig  had  initiated, 
Prince  Metternich  stepped  quietly  into  the  seat  whence 
Napoleon  had  been  hurled,  and,  for  the  three-and -thirty 
years  that  followed,  directed,  unostentatiously  but  very 
surely,  the  policy  of  the  Continent.  Throughout  that 
period  his  was  the  central,  the  omnipotent,  figure,  to  which 


2  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICH. 

sovereigns  referred  for  advice  and  guidance,  and  before 
which  nations  bowed.  His  system  differed,  in  its  essen- 
tials, from  that  of  the  great  conqueror  to  whose  seat  he 
had  succeeded.  The  despotism  of  Napoleon  was  the 
despotism  of  the  conqueror  who  had  swept  away  the  old 
syslem,  and  who  terrorised  over  its  former  supporters. 
The  despotism  of  Metternich,  not  less  actual,  used  as  its 
willing  instruments  those  very  supporters  upon  whose 
necks  Napoleon  had  placed  his  heel.  His  system  was  the 
more  dangerous  to  human  freedom  because  it  was  dis- 
guised.  He  was  as  a  Jesuit  succeeding  an  Attila ;  and 
when,  after  enduring  it  long,  the  peoples^  of  Europe 
realised  its  result  In  the  crushing  of  every  noble  aspira- 
tion, of  every  attempt  to  secure  real  liberty,  we  cannot 
wonder  that  they  should  have  asked  one  another  whether 
it  was  to  obtain  such  a  system  that  they  had  combined  to 
overthrow  Napoleon.  When  the  awakening  was  com- 
]>lete,  retribution  speedily  followed.  The  peoples,  who, 
led  In  1813  by  the  kings  upon  whom  Napoleon  had 
trampled,  had,  after  completing  their  mission,  trusted 
their  leaders,  rose  in  1848  to  rid  themselves  of  those 
very  leaders.  During  the  earlier  epoch,  Metternich  had 
been  the  leading  spirit  to  inspire  the  uprising  ;  in  the 
later,  he  was  the  first  victim.  His  system,  established  by 
the  successful  "  rising  of  the  nations,"  was  destroyed  by 
the  "  rising  of  the  peoples."  But  it  had  lasted  over  thirty 
years.  It  had  procured  for  Europe,  wearied  by  twenty 
years  of  constant  war,  if  not  internal  repose,  at  least 
external  tranquillity.  Contrasted  with  the  system  on  the 
ruins  of  which  it  rose,  it  thus  captivated,  for  a  period,  the 
generous  spirits  who  had  contributed  to  establish  it.  Men 
were  long  unwilling  to  believe  that  so  much  blood  had 
been  shed,  so  nmch  enthusiasm  evoked,  only  to  substitute 
a  veivet-gloved  despotism  for  the  despotism  of  the  sword ; 


EARLY  TRAINING.  3 

that  the  one  result  of  the  "  rising  of  the  nations  "  had 
been  to  ensure  the  more  psrfect  triumph  of  absolutism. 
When,  at  length,  they  did  realise  that  one  more  crime 
had  been  committed  in  the  name  of  liberty,  they  hastened 
to  avenge  the  chief  profaner  of  the  sacred  temple.  But 
the  time  required  for  the  general  awakening  was  long. 
The  despotic  reign  of  Napoleon  had  lasted,  dating  from 
Marengo,  barely  fourteen  years.  The  despotism  of 
Metternich  endured  thirty-three.  It  is  the  object  of  this 
little  book  to  pourtray  the  qualities  and  character  which 
made  such  a  result  possible ;  to  show  how  a  young 
German  diplomatist  became  so  great  a  force  in  Europe 
as,  on  more  than  one  occasion,  to  hold  in  his  hands  the 
fate  of  the  most  famous  man  the  world  has  ever  seen  : — on 
one,  especially  critical,  to  bind  together  the  combination 
which  ensured  his  overthrow;  finally,  to  rise  on  his  ruin; 
to  occu})y,  virtually,  his  seat  ;  to  hold  it  for  thirty-three 
years;  and  then  to  descend  from  it  at  the  indignant  call 
of  the  people  he  had  betrayed  ;  and — a  contrast  to  his 
predecessor — to  be  forgotten  ever  after.  The  name  of 
Napoleon  still  lives',  supreme  as  a  warrior,  great  as  a 
statesman,  great  in  the  enthusiasm  it  may  even  yet  evoke. 
The  name  of  Metternich  arouses  no  recollection  but  that 
of  the  aphorism  to  which,  in  the  plenitude  of  his  power, 
he  is  said  to  have  borrowed  from  Louis  XV. :  "  Aiores 
moi  le  deluged 

The  career  of  Metternich  divides  itself  naturally  into 
ten  epochs.  The  fii'st,  from  his  birth  to  the  embassy  to 
Paris  in  180() ;  the  second,  from  I8O6H0  the  outbreak  of 
the  war  in  1809  ;  the  third,  from  the  war  of  1809  to  tlie 
retreat  from  Moscow  ;  the  fourth,  from  the  winter  of  1812 
to  the  armistice  of  Pleiswitz  ;  the  fifth,  from  the  armistice 
of  Pleiswitz  to  the  renewal  of  hostilities  ;  the  sixth,  from 
the  rupture  of  the  armistice  to  the  fall  of  Napoleon  in 

B  2 


4  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICH, 

1814  ;  the  seventh,  during  the  crisis  before  the  Hundred 
Days — an  1  after  ;  the  eighth,  the  rise  and  progress  of  the 
Continental  system  he  established ;  the  ninth,  the  decline 
and  fall  of  that  Continental  system;  the  tenth,  the 
conclusion  of  his  career.  I  shall  begin,  without  further 
preface,  with  the  first. 

Clement  Wenceslas  Nepomuk  Lothair  Metternich 
/belono^ed  to  an  old  noble  family  located  on  the  Lower 
Rhine.  His  father,  Francis  George  Metternich,  a  diplo- 
matist of  some  repute,  had  married  Maria  Beatrix  Aloisa, 
Countess  of  Kageneck,  and  of  this  marriage  the  subject 
of  this  sketch  was  the  first  issue.  Clement  Metternich 
was  born  at  Coblentz  the  15th  of  May,  1773.  Until 
he  attained  the  age  of  fifteen  he  was  educated  at  home  with 
his  brother,  eighteen  months  younger  than  himself,  by 
three  successive  tutors.  |  In  1788  he  proceeded  to  complete 
his  studies  at  the  University  of  Strasburg.  The  year  he 
went  there,  he  tells  us  iii  his  memmrs',  the  youthful  Napoleon 
Bonaparte  had  just  left.  "  We  had,"  he  adds,  "  the  same 
professors  for  mathematics  and  fencing.''!  At  the  Univer- 
sity, Metternich  went  through  the  usual  course,  but  he 
had  not  yet  completed  his  studies  when,  in  October,  17^0, 
he  was  summoned  by  his  father  to  Frankfort,  to  assist 
there  at  the  coronation  of  the  Emperor  Leopold.  After 
this  ceremony  he  resumed  his  studies,  not  at  Strasburg, 
but  at  the  L^niversity  of  Mayence,  to  read  law  and  juris- 
prudence. He  was  then  only  seventeen,  l»ut  already  he 
had  seen  something  of  the  world,  for,  at  Frankfort,  he 
had  made  the  acquaintance  of  the  Archduke,  who 
subsequently  became  the  Emperor  Francis,  and  many 
other  members  of  the  Imperial  family.  He  had  alsoi 
taken  his  first  step  as  an  official,  for  he  was  chosen  there  f 
by  the  Catholic  Imperial  Courts  of  the  Westphalian 
Bench  to  be  their  Master  of  the  Ceremonies.    The  French 


EABLY  TBAINING.  5 

Revolution  was  then  in  its  early  initiatory  stages.  "  From 
that  moment,"  he  writes,  "  I  was  its  closest  observer,  and 
subsequently  became  its  adversary ;  and  so  I  have  ever 
remained."  At  Mayence,  Metternich  divided  his  time 
between  his  studies,  and  a  society  of  which  he  writes,  that 
it  was  **  as  distinguished  for  intellectual  superiority  as  for 
the  social  position  of  its  members."  This  society  was 
composed  mainly  of  French  emigrants  of  the  higher 
classes,  whose  exile  was  voluntary.  Association  with 
them  confirmed  the  hatred  of  the  Revolution  previously 
imbibed.  He  evidently  regarded  these  emigrants  as  the 
true  representatives  of  the  French  nation,  for  he  writes  of 
them  :  "  In  this  way  also  I  came  to  know  the  French  ;  I 
learned  to  understand  them,  and  to  be  understood  by  them," 

From  Mayence,  Metternich  was  summoned,  in  1792, 
to  proceed  to  Frankfort  to  attend  the  coronation  of  the 
Emperor  Francis,  who  had  been  elected  successor  to  his 
brother  Leopold.  Again  was  he  selected  to  perform  the 
same  ceremonious  offices  as  had  been  entrusted  to  him  on 
the  previous  occasion,  and  again  did  he  improve  his 
acquaintance  with  the  frequenters  of  the  courtly  circle. 
Amongst  these  he  notes  especially  Prince  Anton  Ester- 
hazy,  the  principal  ambassador  of  the  Emperor  ;  and  the 
Princess  Louise  of  Mecklenburg,  afterwards  Queen  of 
Prussia.  This  illustrious  lady,  mother  of  the  late 
Emperor  of  Germany,  was  two  years  younger  than 
Metternich,  but  he  had  known  her  from  childhood,  for 
her  grandmother,  by  whom  she  had  been  brought  up 
at  Darmstadt,  had  been  on  intimate  terms  with  his 
mother. 

From  the  University  of  Mayence,  Metternich  proceeded, 
first  to  Coblentz,  and  then  to  Brussels,  in  the  University 
of  which  city  he  became  a  student.  But  his  occupations, 
at   this   period,    would   seem    to   have   been    of  a  very 


6  LIFE  OF  PPJNCE  METTERNICB:. 

desultory  character.     The  French  armies  were  invading 
the  Low  Countries,  and  Metternich  relates  that  his  studies 
were  interrupted  by  having  to  pass  to  and  fro  between 
Brussels  and   the  Austrian  army,   sometimes  with  com- 
missions from   his  father,  sometimes  to  see  his  friends. 
In    this   manner,    visiting   also    the    scenes  of    military 
operations,    he    passed  the  winter  of   1793-4.      In   the 
beginning  of  the  latter   year  he  accompanied  the  chief 
treasurer  of  the  Netherlands  Government  on  a  mission  to 
London.     There,  not  only  was  he  received  by  the  King 
"  with  unusual  kindness  and  affability,"  but  he  came  to 
know,  personally,   William  Pitt,  Fox,  Burke,  Sheridan, 
Grey,  and  other  leading  men.    He  frequented  the  sittings 
of  Parliament,  and  followed  with  the  deepest  attention  the 
trial  of  Warren   Hastings.     He  adds :  "  I  endeavoured 
to  acquaint   myself  thoroughly  with    the   mechanism  of 
the   Parliament,  and   this  was  not  without   use   in   my 
subsequent    career."      Amongst    those    with    whom    he 
became  intimate  was  the  Prince  of  Wales,  "one  of  the 
handsomest  men  I  ever  saw,"  and  of  whose  abilities  he 
formed  a  high  opinion.     Whilst  in   London,  the  young 
diplomatist  received  from  his  Court  his  nomination  to  the 
post  of  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and  Minister  Plenipo- 
tentiary at  the  Hague.     The  passage  to  the  Continent 
was   difficult,    as   a   French   fleet  was   in    the   channel. 
Metternich  proceeded  then  with  the  sanction  of  the  King, 
to  see  the  English  fleet  which  had  assembled  at  Ports- 
mouth to  sail,   under    Admiral   (soon  to  become  Lord) 
Howe,  against  the  enemy.     The  sight  of  this  fleet,  and  of 
a  laro-e  convoy  of  merchant  ships  under  its  wing,  from,  the 
top  of  the  hill  behind  Cowes,  on  which  Metternich  had 
posted  himself,  was,  he  relates,  the  most  "beautiful  sight 
I  have  ever  seen — I  might  say,  indeed,  the  most  beautiful 
that  human  eyes  have  ever  beheld !  "     So  impressed  was 


EARLY  TRAINING.  7 

he,  that  he  requested  the  Admiral  to  allow  him  to  rcmahi 
on  board  his  ship,  to  see  the  impending  fight ;  but  the 
Admiral  would  not.  Two  days  later  was  fought  the 
famous  battle  of  the  1st  of  June. 

The  journey  of  Metternich  to  the  Continent  was  accom- 
panied by  many  circumstances  attended  with  danger,  but  he 
finally  reached  Holland,  visited  Amsterdam,  part  of  North 
Holland,  and  the  Hague,  and  thence  proceeded  to  the 
Lower  Rhine  to  take  up  his  post,  the  French  armies 
having  rendered  a  prolonged  stay  in  the  Netherlands 
impossible. 

The  progress  of  the  French  arms  continuing,  and  the 
Metternich  estates  on  the  Rliine  having  been  confiscated, 
Metternich  was  called  by  his  father  to  Vienna,  and,  a 
little  later,  was  sent  to  Bohemia  to  manage  the  family 
property  in  that  kingdom — the  only  property  remainino- 
to  them.  After  settling  this  property  he  returned  to 
Vienna,  where  he  found  his  parents  busily  en'mo-ed  in 
arranging  for  his  marriage  with  a  grand-daughter  of  the 
famous  Prince  Kaunitz.  This  marriage  was  celebrated, 
Sept.  27,  1795,  at  Austerlitz — a  place  destined,  ten  years 
later,  to  become  so  famous. 

By  this  time  the  experience  he  had  acquired  of  dlplo^ 
macy  had  quite  disgusted  ^Metternich  witn  his  careeil 
He  had  detennined,  he  says,  "  to  remain  in  private  lift^ 
and  to  devote  my  time  to  the  cultivation  of  learning  and 
science."  But  events  were  too  strong  for  him,  or  possibly, 
the  disgust  was  only  of  a  passing  character.  ThougliJbr 
two  years  he  adhered  to  his_resolu-tion,  devoting  himself 
to  science  and  the  society.iif  scientific  men,  the  request 
made  to  him  by  the  Counts  jaf  the  Westphalian  "Colle- 
gium "  to  represent  them  at  the  Congress  of  Rastadt 
drew  him  back  to  the  world  of  di})l()macy  and  politics. 
He  accompanied  thither  his  father,  the  first  plenipoten- 


8  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICE. 

tiary  of  the  German  Empire,  and  remained  there  till  the 
middle  of  March,  1799.     Then  he  returned  to  Vienna, 
his  respect  for  diplomatists  and  diplomacy  not  apparently 
increased,  and  resumed  his  scientific  studies.     His  life  at 
this  period,  he  writes,  "  was  that  of  a  man  who  sought 
exclusively  good  society.      The    day  was  usually  given 
entirely  up  to   business,   and   the    evening  was   divided 
between  work  and  recreation.     I  frequented  those  salons 
by   preference    in   which    I    was  sure  to    find   pleasant 
conversation,   convinced  that  such  conversation  tends  to 
sharpen  the  intellect,  correct  the  judgment,  and  is  a  source 
of  instruction  to  those  who  know  how  to  keep  it  from 
degenerating  into  mere  babbling."     It  was  at  this  period 
that  he  made  the  acquaintance  of  Pozzo  di  Borgo,  then 
employed  as  a  secret  agent  by  the  English  Cabinet,  and 
remarkable  at  a  later  time  for  the  rancorous  hatred  he 
bore  to    Napoleon ;    of  the   Prince   de    Eigne ;    of  the 
Princess  Eiechtenstein  ;  and  of  others  moving  in  the  same 
circle.     Still  mrtintaining  his  attitude  of  reserve  on  the 
subject  of  ofl[icial  employment,  he  yet  occasionally  visited 
the   Foreign    Minister,   Baron   Thugut,    and   sometimes 
waited  on  the  Emperor.     The  latter  lost  no  opportunity 
of  rallying  him  on  what  he  termed  his  "  indolence."     On 
one    occasion,   however,   just    before    the   retirement   of 
Thuo-ut  in  1801,  Francis  said  to  him:  *'You  live  as  I 
should  be  very  happy  to  do  in  your  place.     Hold  yourself 
ready  for  my  orders;  that  is  all  I  expect  from  you  at 
present." 
/      The   retirement   of  Thugut   in  1801   in  consequence 
of  the  conclusion  of  the   Peace  of  Luneville,   rendered 
necessary  a  complete  redistribution  in  the  personnel  of 
the  Imperial  diplomatic  service.     One  of  the  secondary 
posts,  that  of  Dresden,  was  offered  to  Mettermch,  with 
the  alternative  of  that  of  Copenhagen,  or  of  remaining  at 


EABLY  TB AWING.  9 

home  as  Minister  for  Bohemia  in  the  German  Eeichs- 
tag.  After  some  consideration,  Metternich,  warning  the 
Emperor  that  he  submitted  to  his  commands  to  enter  a 
sphere  for  which  he  beheved  he  had  no  vocation,  selected 
Dresden,  as,  "  being  one  stage  on  the  way  to  Berlin  or 
8t.  Petersburg,"  it  was  "  a  post  of  observation  which  might 
be  made  useful." 

Nominated  in  January,  1801,  Metternich  did  not  join 
his  new  post  till  the  close  of  that  year.  Though  peace 
nominally  prevailed,  a  considerable  agitation,  based  on 
apprehension  regarding  the  future,  pervaded  all  the  great 
countries  of  Europe.  Under  the  First  Consulship  of 
Napoleon  the  French  Eepublic  existed  only  in  name  ;  the 
German  Empire  was  visibly  approaching  its  dissolution  ; 
the  violent  death  of  the  Emperor  Paul,  in  March  of  that 
year,  had  increased  the  general  tension.  At  Dresden, 
however,  none  of  this  anxiety  was  felt.  The  city,  and 
especially  the  Electoral  Court,  formed  a  contrast  to  the 
universal  agitation.  "To  judge  from  this  Court  alone," 
wrote  Metternich,  "  one  might  have  believed  the  world 
was  standing  still."  "  If  etiquette,  costume  and  precise 
regulations,  could  be  a  solid  foundation  for  a  kino-dom. 
Electoral  Saxony  would  have  been  invulnerable." 

As  a.  post  of  observation  on  the  Northern  Courts, 
Metternich  found  that  he  had  not  exaggerated  the  value 
of  the  embassy  to  Dresden.  He  kept  his  eyes  and  ears 
open,  and  was  thus  able  to  transmit  to  his  Court  exact 
intelligence  of  all  important  matters  that  were  discussed. 
The  Elector,  Frederick  Augustus,  appears  to  have  im- 
pressed him  as  a  man  of  solid  ability,  better  fitted,  how- 
ever, for  a  peaceful  era  than  for  the  stormy  times  in  which 
he  lived.  On  the  whole,  we  may  gather  that  the  period 
of  about  eighteen  months  passed  in  Dresden  by  the 
budding  diplomatist  was  a  period  usefully  employed,  and 


10  LIFU  OF  P BINGE  METTEBNICE, 

that  the  experience  acquired  there  was  helpful  to  him  in 
his  subsequent  career. 

That  he  gave  satisfaction  to  his  own  Court  was  proved 
by  his  nomination,  in  the  summer  of  1803,  to  the  embassy 
of  Berlin.  Leaving  Dresden,  he  proceeded  first  to 
Ochsenhausen,  to  take  possession  of  the  abbey-lands 
which  the  Emperor  had  granted  to  his  father  as  a  com- 
pensation for  the  hereditary  estates  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Ehine  confiscated  by  the  Frencli  Eepublic  ;  thence  to 
Vienna  ;  and  thence,  after  a  short  stay,  at  the  end  of  the 
year,  to  Berlin. 

The  situation  in  Berlin  during  the  year  1804  required 
the  exercise,  on  the  part  of  the  representative  of  Austria, 
of  tact  and  judgment  of  no  ordinary  character.  This 
was  especially  the  case  when,  in  May  of  that  year. 
Napoleon  was  proclaimed  Emperor  of  the  French.  France 
was  at  war  with  England,  and,  whilst  threatening  an 
invasion  of  that  country,  was  preparing  for  that 
Continental  struggle  which  no  man  more  than  the 
Emperor  knew  to  be  inevitable.  England,  at  the  same 
time,  was  doing  her  utmost  to  stir  up  Austria  and 
Prussia  to  join  her  in  the  struggle  she  was  making,  as 
her  statesmen  believed,  against  the  subjugation  of 
Europe.  She  had  found  at  Vienna  willing  listeners  ; 
sovereign,  ministers,  and  people  in  full  sympathy  with 
her ;  eager  to  begin,  whilst  anxious  to  obtain  the  co- 
operation of  Prussia.  At  Berlin,  however,  the  task  was 
not  so  easy.  There,  there  were  two  parties — the  one,  the 
patriotic  party,  led  by  Hardenberg,  anxious  for  the  Anglo- 
Austrian  alliance,  which,  they  foresaw,  could  alone  save 
the  country  and  Europe  from  the  domination  of  one  man  ; 
the  other,  under  the  inspiration  of  Count  Haugwitz, 
desirous  of  maintaining  a  selfish  neutrality,  partly  from 
fear  of  Napoleon,  partly  from  the  conviction  that  by  con- 


EABLY  TBAINING,  11 

niving  at  the  despoiling  of  Austria,  they  would  increase 
the  relative  importance  of  Prussia,  and  might  even,  per- 
chance, receive  the  bone  of  Hanover  as  a  reward  for  their 
neutrality.  Such  was  the  situation  in  Europe,  and  such 
the  state  of  parties  at  Berlin,  when  Metternich  arrived  in 
that  capital. 

XhiLtask  entrusted^to  Metternich  wasnaturally  thai  of 
convincing  the  Prussian  CourtllTatTts  interests  would  best 
be  servedL.bj:.„a^Gurdi^Lco-Qperation  with  England  and 
Austria.  And  not  alone  with  those  two  powers.  The 
Emperor  Alexander,  anxious  to  take  a  gi'eat  part  in  the 
affairs  of  continental  Europe,  and  desirous  to  wipe  out  the 
recollection  of  the  disastrous  result  of  the  last  campaign 
of  Suwarrow,  was  bound,  heart  and  soul,  to  Austria.  He 
was  now,  by  means  of  his  ambassador,  urging  the  Court 
of  Berlin  to  declare  itself.  Attributing,  after  a  time,  the 
long  hesitations  of  that  Court  to  want  of  energy  on  the 
part  of  his  representative,  he  endeavoured  to  persuade 
Metternich  to  supply  by  his  advocacy  the  deficiencies  of  that 
official.  Tired  out,  at  last,  by  the  continued  evasiveness  of 
the  language  employed  by  the  Prussian  cabinet,  Alexander, 
to  force  its  hand,  pushed  on  his  army  to  the  frontiers  of 
Prussia.  Still  the  King  vacillated.  Nor  could  the  pro- 
spect of  an  interview  with  the  Czar  bring  him  to  a  decision. 
War  with  Austria  had  by  this  time  broken  out,  and  the 
catastrophe  of  Ulm,  though  they  knew  it  not,  was  impend- 
ing. The  utmost  that  could  be  wrung  from  the  King,  in 
reply  to  the  urgent  solicitation'^  of  the  Czar,  at  this  period, 
October  6,  1805,  was  the  assurance  that  he  had  offered 
the  neutrality  of  Prussia  to  the  belligerent  Powers,  and 
that  he  should  consider  himself  at  war  with  the  Power 
which  should  violate  that  neutrality.  How,  in  making 
this  declaration,  the  King's  mind  was  acted  upon  by  dread 
of  Napoleon,   was  proved  by  the  fact  that  v.hen,  a  few 


12  LIFE  OF  FBINCE  METTEBNICH. 

hours  later,  he  heard  that  the  French  army,  to  outflank 
the  Austrian  army  concentrated  at  Uhn,  had  violated  the 
territory  of  Anspach,  he  did  not  declare  war  against 
France,  but  contented  himself  with  informing  the  Czar 
that  the  frontiers  of  his  kingdom  were  open  to  him. 

On  receiving  this  message  Alexander  set  out  for 
Potsdam.  Then  began,  not  only  the  negotiations  for  the 
entrance  of  Prussia  into  the  alliance  existinor  between  the 
two  Imperial  Courts ;  but,  what  is  more  germane  to  this 
narrative,  the  intimacy,  speedily  increasing  to  friendship, 
between  the  Emperor  Alexander  and  Metternich.  From 
this  period,  in  fact,  dates  the  influence  which,  after  the 
fall  of  Napoleon,  the  Austrian  statesman  exercised,  with 
the  most  important  results,  on  the  mind  of  Alexander. 

Never  was  more  necessary  the  exercise  of  that  supreme 
tact  which  it  is  given  only  to  a  very  few  to  possess.  For 
whilst,  on  the  one  hand,  Metternich  had  to  impose  a  curb 
upon,  to  moderate  the  impetuosity  of,  Alexander ;  he  had, 
on  the  other,  to  meet  the  tortuous  suggestions  of  Count 
Haugwitz  and  the  French  party.  In  his  interesting 
autobigraphical  memoirs  he  states  very  frankly  how  he 
was  beset.  ''  From  the  first  moment,"  he  writes,  "  the 
Emperor  and  I  fell  under  the  ill-will  of  the  Prussian 
negotiators.  With  ill-concealed  anger  they  resorted  to 
every  imaginable  pretext  to  protract  the  arrangements 
which,  in  face  of  the  calamitous  circumstances  of  the  war 
on  the  Danube,  grew  more  and  more  urgent."  At  length, 
after  a  too  great  delay,  the  King  of  Prussia,  yielding^ 
apparently  to  the  arguments  and  representations  of 
Alexander  and  of  Metternich,  signed  on  November  3rd  41 
treaty  of  alliance  with  Eussia  and  Austria.  But,  as  if  heij 
thought  that  he  had  gone  too  ftir,  the  King,  always^ 
temporising,  despatched  Count  Haugwitz  to  the  French' 
head-quarters,  avowedly  to  inform  Napoleon  that  such  a 


EABLY  TEAINING.  13 

treaty  had  been  signed,  and  that  Prussia  would  inevitably 
join  the  allies  unless  the  French  armies  should  halt  in  their 
victorious  career.  In  entrusting  this  communication  to  a 
partisan  of  the  French  alliance  the  King  might  feel 
tolerably  secure  that  circumstances  would  be  allowed  to 
decide  as  to  whether  it  should  be  delivered  or  withheld. 

So,  indeed,  it  happened.  Haugwitz,  who  delayed  pur- 
posely his  departure  for  eight  days  beyond  the  time  agreed 
upon,  joined  Napolecm  at  Briinn,  beyond  Vienna.  Once 
in  the  presence  of  Napoleon,  Haugwitz  did  not  dare 
to  deliver  the  message  in  its  entirety,  but  gave  to  it  a 
character  purely  complimentary.  Napoleon,  not  deceived, 
sent  back  Haugwitz  to  Vienna,  there  to  wait  events. 
Those  events  were  precipitated  by  the  rashness  of 
Alexander,  who  pressed  forward  to  Austerlitz,  and  there 
met  his  fate — for  the  time.  Haugwitz  presented  himself 
to  the  Emperor  on  his  return  as  a  conqueror  to  Vienna — 
and  offered  him  his  congratulations.  To  the  Emperor's 
sarcastic  question  as  to  whether,  if  he  had  returned 
defeated  he  would  have  spoken  to  him  of  the  friendship 
of  the  King,  his  master,  Haugwitz  made  no  reply.  He 
bargained,  however,  for  the  cession  of  Hanover,  and  this, 
Napoleon,  to  embroil  Prussia  with  England,  and  to  under- 
mine the  bases  on  which  the  German  Empire  rested,  not 
unwillingly  granted. 

Thus  it  happened  that  the  labours  of  Metternich  at 
Berlin  were  to  a  great  degree  fruitless.  Thanks  to  the 
vacillation  of  the  King  of  Prussia,  and  to  the  duplicity  of 
Haugwitz,  the  treaty  negotiated  by  th^  Emperor  Alexander 
and  himself  proved  powerless  to  change  the  current  of 
events.  But,  for  himself,  the  qualities  he  had  displayed 
had  not  been  displayed  in  vain.  They  procured  for  him, 
as  I  have  said,  the  lifelong  friendship  and  esteem  of  the 
Czar.     His  own  sovereign,  too,  the  Emperor  Francis,  had 


14  LIFE  OF  PRINCE  METTFBNICH. 

noted  with  approval  the  tact,  the  talent,  and  the  quick 
decision,  displayed  by  his  envoy  under  circumstances  of 
great  difficulty.  He  marked  that  approval  by  conferring 
upon  the  young  Minister  the  Grand  Cross  of  St.  Stephen, 
and  by  nominating  him  to  represent  the  Austrian  Empire 
at  the  Court  of  Europe  which  required,  above  all  others,  in 
an  ambassador,  the  possession  of  acuteness,  tact,  firmness, 
and  penetration — the  Court  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon. 


(    15    ) 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  EMBASSY  TO  PARIS. 

1806-1809. 

The  battle  of  Austerlitz  had  been  followed  by  the  Peace 
/of  Pressburg.     Tiiat  treaty  ceded  to  Italy,  Venetia  ;  the 
/  principality  of  Eichstadt,  part  of  the  Bishopric  of  Passau, 
I  the  city  of  Augsburg,  Tirol,  the  possessions  of  Austria  in 
\  Suabia,    in    Brisgau,     and    Ortenau,    to    Bavaria    and 
;  Wiirteinberg,  the  rulers  of  which   were   created   kings. 
The  Peace  of  Pressburg,  in  fact,  completed  the  dissolution 
of  the  old  German  Empire,  and  secured  for  France  a  pre- 
dominating influence  in  central  and  southern  Germany. 

At  Vienna,  it  followed  naturally  that  the  Ministers 
who  had  instigated  a  war  which  resulted  in  so  disastrous 
a  peace  should  no  lunger  hold  office.  Count  Stadion, 
then,  who  had  been  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburo,  was 
directed  to  replace  Count  Colloredo  at  the  Foreign  Office  ; 
and,  at  the  express  instance  of  the  Emperor  Alexander, 
Metternich  was  ordered  to  succeed  Stadion.  For  the 
embassy  at  Paris,  Count  Philip  Cobenzl  had  been  named, 

but    Napoleon    objected    to bim^.aiid    had_  indicated 

Metternich  as  the  man  mostsuitabla>J,a,^ti:eno;then  the 


relations  he  was  anxious  tn  spp.  _^c,ta,b]ishpf^   b^t^'p^n  the 
twoT  Ebq^^sT     Metternich  learned  this   change  in  his 


16  LIFE  OF  PniNOE  METTEBNICB. 

destination  only  when  he  had  reached  Vienna  on  his  way 
to  take  up,  as  he  believed,  the  embassy  at  St.  Petersburg. 

To  himself  the  change  was  most  unwelcome.  It  came 
upon  him,  he  tells  us,  "  like  a  thunderbolt."  We  cannot 
wonder.  The  relations  between  himself  and  the  Czar 
had  been  of  a  most  cordial  character,  and  he  had  looked 
forward  with  j;;eal  pleasure  to  a  residence  in  a  country 
with  the  sovereign  of  which  he  had  so  many  sympathies. 
For,  alike  at  this  time  and  always,  Metternich  hated  the 
French  Revolution  and  all  its  ofFspfing.  He  regarded 
Napoleon,  he  tells  us,  as  its  "  incarnation."  Alexander, 
at  that. time,  completely  shared  his  views  on  this  point. 
He  had  not  been  discouraged  by  Austerlitz ;  not  even 
sufficiently  humiliated  to  recognise  as  an  Emperor  and 
an  equal  a  man  whom  he  regarded  only  as  a  Corsican 
adventurer.  All  that,  and  more,  were  to  come.  But,  in 
the  beginning  of  1806,  the  Czar  still  employed  the  con- 
temptuous utterances  regarding  the  great  Emperor  which 
the  jackals,  who  for  ten  years  grovelled  before  him,  used 
after  his  fall. 

Well,  indeed,  might  Metternich,  holding  the  views  he 
did,  and  animated  by  the  prejudices  which  influenced  him 
all  his  life,  shrink  from  the  embassy  to  Paris.  But  the 
sacrifice  of  his  personal  wishes  had  become  a  necessity. 
Though  Austria  had  been  vanquished,  she  had  not  been 
wholly  discouraged.  So  much,  in  war,  depends  on 
fortune,  and  the  Emperor  Francis  felt  that  fortune  had 
been  unkind.  The  selection  of  Mack  to  be  Commander- 
in-chief  had  been  a  mistake  such  as  would  never  be 
repeated.  Then,  from  a  military  point  of  view,  the  Czar 
liad  been  the  evil  genius  of  the  campaign.  Francis  had 
always  urged  that  no  battle  should  be  fought  at  Auster- 
litz, but  that  the  French  should  be  lured  on  to  the 
extremities  of  the  Empire,  when  an  attempt   should  be 


THE  EMBASSY  TO  PABIS.  17 

made  to  destroy  their  loDg*  line  of  communication ;  but 
Alexander  would  insist  on  fighting.  Though  the  allies 
had  been  beaten,  then,  the  Austrian  Court  was  not  dis- 
couraged. All  that  they  wanted  was  time — time  to  rally, 
time  to  reorganise,  time  for  recuperation ;  and  Francis 
felt  that  he  could  most  surely  obtain  that  time  by  sending 
to  Paris  as  his  ambassador  a  man  agreeable  to  the  French 
Emperor,  and  yet  upon  whose  tact  and  knowledge  of  the 
M'orld  he  could  thoroughly  depend.  When,  therefore, 
Napoleon  expressed  his  desire  to  see  Metternich  at  Paris, 
Francis,  who  knew  Metternich  well,  very  readily  complied. 
He  received  him  on  his  arrival  in  Vienna  with  his  usual 
kindness  ;  praised  him  for  his  conduct  in  Berlin  ;  and  set ' 
before  him  the  necessity  of  accommodating  himself  to 
what  he  called  his  destiny,  with  expressions  which  made 
it  impossible  for  him  to  oppose  his  wishes. 

But  the  soft  words  of  his  sovereign  did  not  hide  from 
JMetternich  the  difficulties  which  would  await  him  at  Paris. 
France  was  stilly  at.  war  with  England ;  no  peace  had 
been  made  with  Eussia ;  a  very  guarded  conduct  was 
necessary  for  the  Austria  whose  interests  he  would 
represent.  Then,  too,  there  was  Prussia,  grovelling  at 
the  feet  of  Napoleon  ;  rejoicing  in  her  heart  of  hearts  at 
the  humiliation  of  her  ancient  rival ;  and  yet  dreading 
lest  the  next  blow  should  fall  on  her.  If,  argued  Metter- 
nich, hostilities  might  be  averted  till  Austria  could  recoup 
herself,  then  all  might  go  well ;  if  not,  the  next  state  of 
Germany  would  be  worse  than  that  then  existing.  Still 
he  did  not  despair.  He  had  belief  4n  himself :  belief  in 
his  power  to  win  the  confidence  of  others,  without  betraying 
his  own  secret  views.  He  would  enjoy,  moreover,  the 
opportunity — golden  to  a  cold,  determined  nature  such 
as  he  possessed — to  study  the  character  of  the  man  who 
held  in  his  hand  the  fate  of  Europe,  and  to  keep  his 

0 


18  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  3IETTERNICR, 

master  well  informed  as  to  the  chances  which  might 
befall; 

The  new  ambassador  quitted  Vienna  for  his  destination 
in  July,  1806.  At  Strasburg  he  was  delayed  for  a  time, 
as  Napoleon  was  then  endeavouring  to  arrange  terms  of 
peace  with  Russia,  and,  apparently,  he  did  not  wish  that 
Metternich  should  arrive  until  the  Russian  agent  should 
have  departed-  Consequently  it  was  not  till  the  first 
week  in  August  that  he  reached  Paris.  The  first  im- 
portant personage  he  called  upon  was  the  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  the  courtly  Talleyrand.  The  impression 
he  received  of  that  statesman  was  favourable.  He  found 
him  courteous  and  inclined  to  meet  the  views  he  put 
forward.  For  he  at  once  asserted  his  own  position, 
explaining  to  the  minister,  when  he  spoke  of  his  desire 
to  cultivate  friendly  relations  with  Austria,  what  the 
Emperor  Francis  understood  by  friendly  relations, 
"  which,"  he  added,  "  must  not  be  confounded  with 
submission." 

This  interview  Metternich  himself  calls  the  beginning 
of  his  public  life.  "  All  that  had  gone  before,"  he  writes, 
"  might  have  shown  the  independence  of  my  character. 
As  a  man  of  principles,  I  could  not  and  I  would  not  bend 
when  it  came  to  the  point  of  defending  them.  Within  a 
short  space  of  time  destiny  had  placed  me  face  to  face 
with  the  man  who  at  this  epoch  ruled  the  affairs  of  the 
world ;  I  felt  it  my  duty,  and  I  had  the  courage,  never  to 
offer  to  mere  circumstance  a  sacrifice  which  I  could  not 
defend  to  my  conscience  both  as  a  statesman  and  a 
private  individual.  The  voice  of  conscience  I  followed  ; 
and  I  do  not  think  it  was  a  good  inspiration  of  Napoleon's 
v/hich  called  me  to  functions  which  gave  me  the  oppor- 
tmiity  of  appreciating  his  excellence,  but  also  the  })ossi- 
bility  of  discovering  the  faults  which  at  last  led  him  to 


THE  EMBASSY  TO  PABIS.  19 

ruin,  and  freed  Europe  fi-ora  the  oppression  under  which 
it  languished." 

Metternich  was  right.  Napoleon^neyer  made  a  greater 
mjsta^^^  than  when  _h^^^  to   his   Court   this  most 

implacable  enemy.  Yet  there  are  few  senteTiCBS"in^the 
Autobiography  of  Metternich  whicK^reveal  his  character 
more  completely  than  that  which  I  have  Jusf  qudfed.  The 
intense  self-appreciation ;  the  allusion  to  the  voice  of 
conscience,  as  if  in  him  the  voice  of  conscience  had 
been  other  than  an  intense  desire  to  rid  Europe  of  the 
incarnation  of  the  hated  revolution.  Those  who  follow 
his  career  will  not  fail  to  recognise  that  from  1806 
to  1814  this  was  the  one  aim,  the  solitary  purpose, 
to  which  the  Austrian  ambassador,  more  Austrian  in 
this  respect  than  his  own  sovereign,  directed  all  his 
efforts.  That  aim  never  left  him.  It  was  with  him 
alike  when  intriguing  with  the  Russian  ambassador  and 
with  Talleyrand,  and  when  apparently  enjoying  the 
friendly  conversation  of  Napoleon  and  the  Empress.  At 
the  Court  of  the  Emperor,  whom  he  never  ceased  to  regard 
as  a  ^parvenu,''  he  had  made  himself  liked— only  that  he 
might  enjoy  better  opportunities  of  studying,  in  order 
to  find  the  weak  points  in,  the  character  of  the  man  who 
was  in  it  the  prominent  figure. 

]\Ietternich  was  extremely  well  received  at  Paris,  alike 
by  Napoleon  and  tlie  members  of  the  Imperial  family, 
and  in  general  society.  Young,  with  a  physiognomy 
which  might  well  be  called  distinguished,  with  the 
courtly  manners  of  the  old  regime,  talking  well  and 
possessing  the  wit  which  is  nowhere  more  appreciated 
than  in  France,  having,  besides,  a  special  interest  in 
making  himself  agreeable,  he  could  scarcely  fail  to  make 
good  his  footing.  His  real  opinion  regarding  Napoleon 
breaks   out  repeatedly  in   his  Autobiography.     He  read 

0  2 


20  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICH. 

him,  he  tells  us,  at  their  first  interview.  The  fact  that 
Napoleon  kept  on  his  hat  on  the  occasion  when  Metter- 
nich  presented  his  credentials ;  that,  possessing,  as  the 
Austrian  ambassador  records,  a  short  broad  figure,  and 
dressing  negligently,  the  Emperor  should  have  endea- 
voured to  make  an  imposing  efi'ect,  "  combined,"  he 
writes,  "  to  weaken  in  me  the  feeling  of  grandeur 
naturally  attaching  to  the  idea  of  a  man  before  whom  the 
world  trembled."  This  first  impression,  he  tells  us,  was 
never  entirely  effaced  from  his  mind. 

What  follows  is  more  curious  still.  The  impression 
thus  formed,  adds  th'^  same  authority,  helped  to  show  him 
the  man  as  he  was,  "  behind  the  masks  with  which  he 
knew  how  to  cover  himself  In  his  freaks,  in  his  fits  of 
passion,  in  his  brusque  interpellations,  I  saw  prepared 
scenes,  studied  and  calculated  to  produce  a  certain  effect 
on  the  person  to  whom  he  was  speaking." 

When  Metternich  tells  us  that  he  discovered  all  this, 
and  imbibed  an  impression  regarding  Napoleon  which 
was  never  entirely  effaced,  from  what  passed  at  their  first 
interview,  we  turn  with  some  curiosity  to  the  recorded 
account  of  that  interview.  W^e  are  fortunately  able  to 
-present  that  record  on  the  authority  of  one  to  whom 
Metternich  himself  would  have  offered  no  objection,  for  it 
is  his  own  story.  "  I  presented  myself  to  Napoleon,"  he 
writes,  "without  delivering  an  address  at  the  first 
audience  I  had  at  St.  Cloud,  as  was  the  custom  of  my 
colleagues.  I  confined  myself  to  stating  that  as,  in 
accordance  with  his  own  wishes,  I  had  been  chosen  to 
represent  the  Emperor  of  Austria  at  his  Court,  I  should 
strive  on  every  occasion  to  strengthen  the  good  relations 
between  the  two  empires  on  that  basis  upon  which  alone  a 
lasting  peace  could  be  established  between  independent 
states.     Napoleon  answered  me  in  the  same  simple  style, 


THE  EMBASSY  TO  PAUIS.  21 

and  our  subsequent  personal  relations  took  their  tone 
from  this  first  meeting."  This  is  the  "  unvarnished " 
account.  The  other  represents  the  version  compiled 
in  later  years,  based  upon  the  violent  antipathy  inspired 
by  the  incarnation  of  the  Revolution  in  the  mind  of  a 
representative  of  the  ideas  which  prevailed  prior  to  1789. 

The  same  spirit  is  displayed  by  Metternich  when  he 
attempts  to  describe,  and  to  ridicule  when  describing?,  the 
hospitalities  of  Fontainebleau.  "  The  aspect  of  the  Court 
at  Fontainebleau,"  he  wrote  in  1807,  "  could  not  but  offer 
many  objects  of  curiosity  to  an  impartial  observer.  This 
Court  sometimes  endeavoured  to  go  back  to  the  old  forms, 
and  sometimes  rejected  them  as  beneath  the  dignity  of 
the  moment.  Tiie  Emperor  hunted  forty  miserable  deer 
which  had  been  brought  from  Hanover  and  other  parts  of 
Germany  to  refill  a  forest  twenty  leagues  round,  because 
the  kings  too  had  their  fixed  days  for  hunting.  He  did 
not  really  care  for  the  sport,  except  for  the  violent  exercise, 
which  suited  his  health ;  and,  besides,  he  merely  went  at 
full  speed,  right  and  left,  through  the  forest  without 
regularly  following  the  hunt."  It  was,  in  fact,  in  the  eyes 
of  the  aristocratic  Austrian,  who  had  imbibed  his  ideas 
in  the  society  of  the  emigres,  the  Court  of  a  jparvenu. 

It  is  easy  to  understand  why,  with  the  feelings  which 
animated  him,  Metternich  was  anxious  that  Napoleon 
should  not  wage  war  with  Prussia.  Austria  lay  disarmed 
and  bleeding,  yet  secretly  determined  to  prepare  to  use 
the  first  fitting  occasion  to  recover  what  she  had  lost. 
Prussia,  full  of  resources,  and  still  possessing  the  prestige 
which  Frederick  II.  had  won  for  her,  was  to  be  humbled 
before  Austria  could  recover.  Such  was  the  Imperial 
programme,  and  Napoleon  set  out  to  execute  it  just  two 
months  after  the  arrival  of  Metternich  in  Paris.  Durinof 
the    war,  then,  which    ended  in  the   dismemberment  of 


22  LIFE  OF  PFJNCE  METTEBNICR, 

Prussia,  Metternicli  remained  in  the  French  capital, 
noting,  he  says,  the  impression  which  the  news  of 
Napoleon's  victories  produced  there.  He  states  that  the 
impression  was  certainly  not  one  of  joy ;  that  it  was 
simply  one  of  satisftiction  that  France  had  escaped  the 
consequences,  and  that  her  internal  peace  was  not  en- 
dangered. When,  at  last,  Napoleon  returned,  "intoxi- 
cated with  victory,"  from  the  banks  of  the  Niemen  to 
Paris,  and  all  the  representatives  of  Foreign  Powers 
crowded  to  his  recepticm  to  welcome  him,  Metternich 
records  how  they  all  had  in  turn  to  hear  unpleasant  things 
from  the  mouth  of  the  conqueror.  He  adds  :  "  I  came  off 
best,  although,"  with  respect  to  certain  negotiations 
reffardino:  the  boundary  between  Austria  and  Italv  which 
had  just  been  concluded — *'  the  feeling  of  Napoleon 
betrayed  itself  in  a  way  anything  but  satisfactory  to  the 
wishes  of  Austria." 

From  that  moment  dates  the  study  of  the  character 
of  Napoleon  which  IMetternich  used  with  so  much  effect 
subsequently  to  1809.  He  had  many  opportunities,  for, 
as  I  have  said,  he  could  make  himself  more  than  agree- 
able, and  Napoleon,  enjoying  his  society,  revealed  himself 
to  him.  Recognising,  as  he  records,  all  the  great  qualities 
of  Napoleon,  his  vivid  intellect,  his  clear  and  precise  con- 
ceptive  power,  his  love  of  action  when  his  resolution  was 
taken,  the  directness  of  his  aims  and  views,  and  yet  his  power 
to  modify  them  at  any  given  moment,  his  marvellous  in- 
sight, the  abstract  justice  of  his  mode  of  arguing,  the  fact 
that  he  was  never  rooted  to  his  own  opinions  when  reason 
could  be  shown  on  the  other  side,  never  influenced  in  public 
affairs  by  affection  or  by  hatred  ;  he  was  keenly  alive,  on 
the  other  hand,  to  his  failings.  Fie  found  him  full  of 
faults ;  a  gambler  on  a  great  scale,  thinking  of  nothing 
but  to  advance,  reckoning  alike  on  the  weaknesses  and 


TEE  EMBASSY  TO  PABIS.  23 

errors  of  his  adversaries.  It  was  the  abuse  of  the  last- 
named  habit  in  which  Metternich  recognised,  even  durino- 
the  time  of  his  embassy  to  Paris,  the  charmed  weapon 
which,  if  Austria  would  but  hold  herself  in  readiness,  could 
be  used  with  deadly  effect  ao^ainst  the  Revolution  and  its 
living  incarnation  ;  which  Austria  did  attempt  to  use  in 
1809,  coming  much  nearer  to  success  than  the  casual 
reader  would  suppose  ;  and  which  .she  did  wield  with 
triurapliant  result  in  1813-4. 

The  triumph  of  Napoleon  over  Prussia  had  culminated 
in  the  Peace  of  Tilsit  and  an  agreement  for  future  action 
with  the  Czar.  Almost  from  the  day  of  his  return  to 
Paris  the  Emperor  began  to  set  in  motion  the  design  he 
had  already  conceived  of  replacing  the  Bourbons  of  Spain 
by  a  member  of  his  own  family.  The  observations  which 
Metternich  had  been  able  to  make  at  this  period  by  means 
of  his  intimacy  with  the  several  ambassadors  at  Paris  had 
convinced  him  that,  to  use  his  own  phrase,  "  France  had  not 
one  friend  in  Europe."  He  did  not  foresee,  no  one  at  the 
moment  foresaw,  the  extent  to  which  the  projected  occupa- 
tion of  Spain  would  swallow  up  the  material,  and  weaken 
the  moral,  resources  of  the  conqueror.  But,  in  his  heart  he 
welcomed  the  new  departure  as  likely  to  give  to  Austria 
a  larger  and  less  scrutinised  field  for  her  preparations  than 
that  which  she  could  enjoy  whilst  Napoleon  was  in  Paris 
watching  her  every  move.  As  time  went  on,  and  the 
nature  of  tlie  abyss — "  the  great  Spanish  ulcer,"  as  he 
called  it  at  St.  Helena — which  Napoleon  was  preparing 
for  himself  became  clearer  and  clearer,  the  hopes  which 
Metternich  had  begun  to  entertain  became  stronger,  the 
preparations  of  Austria  more  decided.  First,  there  came 
as  a  great  encouragement,  the  news  of  the  catastrophe  of 
Baylen,  20th  of  July,  18  )8.  Surely  if  a  French  army,  com- 
manded by  a  general  of  whom  Napoleon  had  so  high  an 


24  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICH. 

opinion  that  he  was  about  to  bestow  upon  hiin  the  staff  of 
a  Marshal,  could  be  forced  to  surrender  by  the  despised 
Spaniards,  there  must  be  hope  for  Austria.  Napoleon 
was  travelling  in  the  south  of  France  when  he  heard 
of  Baylen.  lie  had  received  shortly  before  warnings 
regarding  the  intentions  of  Austria,  and,  knowing  that  the 
news  of  Baylen  would  stimulate  her  to  press  forward  her 
preparations,  he  was  very  eager  to  return  at  once  to 
Paris,  and  demand  cx})lanations  from  ]\[etternich.  But 
he  had  announced  that  after  visiting  the  southern  depart- 
ments he  would  proceed  to  La  Vendee,  and  he  was  un- 
willing to  make  a  change  in  his  programme  which  might 
be  attributed  to  anxiety.  He  therefore  continued  his 
journey  to  Rochefort  and  Rochelle,  to  Nantes  and 
Saumur ;  was  received  everywhere  with  the  greatest 
enthusiasm.  Thence  he  hurried  to  Paris,  arriving  there 
on  the  eve  of  his  fete,  the  night  of  the  1-ith  of  August. 

The  next  day  he  received,  with  great  ceremony,  the 
diplomatic  corps.  What  happened  at  that  reception  has 
been  recorded  by  Metternich  in  his  Autobiography  in  the 
following  acrid  style  : 

"  Just  before  noon  the  diplomatic  corps  was  conducted 
to  the  audience  chamber.  I  took  my  usual  place  in  the 
circle,  having  Count  Tolstoy  on  my  right,  the  rest  of  the 
di})lomatic  corps  being  arranged  in  a  semicircle,  in  the 
centre  of  which  was  the  Emperor.  After  some  minutes 
of  unusual  silence  Napoleon  advanced  towards  me  with 
great  solemnity,  lie  stopped  two  feet  in  front  of  me  and 
addressed  me  in  a  loud  voice  and  pompous  tone  :  '  Well, 
Sir  Ambassador,  what  does  the  Emperor,  your  master, 
want — does  he  intend  to  call  me  back  to  Vienna  ?  '  This 
address  did  not  disconcert  me  ;  I  answered  him  calmly, 
and  in  no  less  elevated  tones.  Our  conversation,  the 
longer  it  lasted,  took,  on  Napoleon's  side,  more  and  more 


THE  EMBASSY  TO  PAIilS.  25 

the  character  of  a  })ublic  manifestation,  Napoleon  raisino- 
his  voice,  as  he  always  did  when  he  had  the  double  end  in 
view  of  intimidating  the  person  he  was  addressing,  and  of 
making  an  effect  on  the  rest  of  his  hearers.  I  did  not 
alter  my  tone,  and  met  his  worthless  arguments  with  the 
weapon  of  irony.  Trom  time  to  time  Napoleon  appealed 
to  Count  Tolstoy  as  a  witness  ;  but  when  he  observed  that 
the  Count  preserved  an  unbroken  silence,  he  turned  round, 
breaking  off  in  the  middle  of  a  sentence,  and  strode  to  the 
Chapel  without  com})leting  the  round  of  the  circle.  This 
scene  lasted  more  than  half  an  hour." 

The  termination  of  the  incident  is  curious,  especially  if 
it  be  remembered  that  the  instincts  of  Napoleon  had  led 
him  to  a  conclusion  which  was  perfectly  accurate,  though 
he  did  not  possess  the  proofs.  "  As  soon,"  continued 
Metternich,  "as  Napoleon  had  left  the  audience-chamber, 
all  my  colleagues  thronged  round  me,  to  congratulate  me 
on  having,  as  they  said,  given  the  Emperor  a  lesson.  A 
few  liours  afterwards  I  went  to  the  hotel  of  Count  Cham- 
pagny,  then  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  who  gave,  a  great 
banquet  in  honour  of  the  day.  On  my  entrance  he  said 
to  me  he  was  ordered  by  his  master,  the  Emperor,  to  assure 
me  that  the  scene  at  the  audience  hiid  nothing  personal 
in  it ;  and  that  his  master's  intention  had  been  merely  to 
explain  the  position.  I  assured  tiie  minister  that  I,  too. 
put  the  same  construction  on  the  incident ;  and,  for  my 
part,  did  not  regret  that  the  Emperor  had  given  me  an 
opportunity  to  explain  before  assembled  Europe  what  the 
monarch  whom  I  had  the  honour  to  represent  wished,  and 
what  he  did  not  wish.  "  Europe,"  I  continued,  "  will  be 
able  to  judge  on  which  side  reason  and  riglit  are  to  be 
found."     Champagny  made  no  answer. 

Before  I  ask  my  readers  to  accept  this  narrative,  I  must 
beg  them  to  recollect  that  it  is  tlie  nariative  of  one  of  the 


26  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICH, 

interested  parties ;  that  it  was  written  long  after  the  date 
of  the  events  purported  to  be  recorded,  and  that,  inasmuch 
as  it  exalts  the  narrator,  and  consigns  to  a  ridiculous 
position  the  great  master  of  legions,  it  bears  improbability 
on  its  face.  Fortunately  we  have  another,  and  certainly 
a  more  probable  account  of  the  same  interview,  written  at 
the  time  by  the  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and 
abridged  for  his  readers  by  a  historian  who  has  occupied 
the  highest  position  in  his  own  country.  The  memoirs  of 
Metternich  are  of  great  importance  to  history,  for  they 
are  the  memoirs  of  an  eye-witness.  But,  inasnmch  as 
many  of  those  memoirs  were  written  after  he  had 
triumphed  ;  after  his  chief  enemy  had  disappeared  ;  as, 
moreover,  there  is  much  confusion  in  their  arrangement, 
and  there  are  abundant  proofs,  one  of  which  I  shall  shortly 
notice,  of  their  having  been  edited  ;  especially,  moreover, 
as  they  invariably  glorify  their  author  and  depreciate  the 
several  adversaries  of  the  author  ; — it  is  only  right  that  the 
traditional  grain  of  salt  should  be  at  hand  when  they  are 
perused ;  that,  whenever  opportunity  oifer,  they  should 
be  tested.  Now,  I  have  set  before  the  reader  the  account 
given  by  Metternich  of  this  famous  interview ;  I  append 
that  recorded  by  M.  Thiers,  based  on  the  memoir  of 
Champagny  above  referred  to. 

'*  Although  Napoleon,"  he  writes,*  "  resting  on  Russia, 
would  have  nothing  to  fear  from  the  Continent,  yet  the 
determination  to  transport  a  portion  of  the  grand  army 
from  the  Vistula  to  the  Ebro  was  so  grave ;  the  displace- 
ment of  his  forces  from  the  north  to  the  south  might  so 
embolden  his  enemies,  that  he  was  resolved,  before  doing 
it,  to  force  Austria  to  explain  herself,  to  know  exactly 
the  view  he  ought  to  take  of  her.  If  she  wanted  war,  he 
would  prefer  to  make  it  immediately,  to  make  it  with  his 

*  Histoire  du  Considat  et  de  VEm^ire,  tome  ix.,  p.  253. 


THE  EMBASSY  TO  PABIS.  27 

full  strength,  without  invoking  even  the  aid  of  the  Russians, 
to  finish  for  ever  with  her,  to  fall  back  then  from  the 
Danube  to  the  Pyrenees  to  subdue  the  Spaniards,  and  to 
throw  the  English  into  the  sea.  But  this  was  only  an 
extreme  measure.  He  preferred  not  to  have  to  wage  a 
new  war.  .  .  .  Thus  it  was  that,  without  wishing  to  pro- 
voke Austria,  he  was  bent  on  obtaining  from  her  the 
clearest  explanations. 

"  Receiving  the  representatives  of  the  Powers  as  well  as 
the  principal  officials  of  the  Government,  on  the  15th 
August,  he  seized  the  occasion  to  have  with  M.  do 
Metternich,  not  a  passionate,  aggressive  explanation,  such 
as  he  had  had  with  Lord  Whitworth,  and  which  had  led 
to  war  with  England,  but  an  explanation,  calm,  quiet,  yet 
peremptory.  He  showed  himself  courteous,  even  gracious, 
with  the  ministers  of  all  the  Court,  engaged  with  M.  de 
Tolstoy,  although  he  had  to  complain  of  his  military 
follies ;  friendly,  frank,  but  pressing  with  M.  de  Metter- 
nich. Without  attracting  the  attention  of  those  present 
by  the  loudness  of  his  voice,  he  yet  spoke  in  a  manner  to 
be  heard  by  some  of  them,  especially  by  M.  de  Tolstoy. 
'Do  you  want  to  make  war  on  us,  or  to  frighten  us?' 
he  said  to  M.  de  Metternich.  JM.  de  Metternich  havino- 
declared  that  his  cabinet  desired  neither  the  one  nor  the 
other,  Na})oleon  replied  at  once,  in  a  calm  but  positive 
tone:  'Then  why  your  armaments  which  agitate  you, 
which  agitate  Euiope,  which  compromise  peace,  and  ruin 
your  finances  ?  '  Receiving  the  assurance  that  these  arma- 
ments were  purely  defensive.  Napoleon  set  himself,  as 
profoundly  cognisant  of  the  circumstances,  to  prove  to 
M.  de  Metternich  that  they  were  of  quite  another 
character.     "  If  your  armaments,"  he  said  to  him, 

•'  were,  as  you  pretend,  purely  defensive,  they  would  be  less  hurried. 
When  one  wants  to  create  a  new  organisation,  one  takes  time,  one 


28  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNIGR. 

does  uot  rush  at  it,  because  one  does  better  tliat  which  one  does  slowl5\ 
But  one  does  not  form  magazines,  one  does  not  order  the  assembling  of 
troop-!,  one  does  not  buy  horses,  especially  art  llery  horses.  Your 
army  is  nearly  400,000  strong  ;  your  militia  number  probably  almost  as 
many.  If  I  were  to  imitate  you,  I  should  have  to  add  4>  0,000  men  to 
my  efteclive,  and  that  would  be  a  senseless  armament.  I  have  no 
need  to  call  out  so  many.  Less  than  200,000  conscripts  will  suffice  to 
maintiin  my  grand  army  on  a  formidable  footing,  and  to  send  100,000 
old  troops  into  Spain.  I  shall  not  then  follow  your  example,  for  in 
that  case  it  would  soon  become  necessary  to  arm  women  and  chil- 
dren, and  we  sliordd  revert  to  a  state  of  barbarism.  But,  meanwhile, 
yonr  finances  suffer,  your  exchange,  already  low,  is  getting  lower,  and 
y(mr  commerce  is  stepped.  And  for  what?  Have  I  asked  anytliing 
ofj'Ou?  Have  I  laid  claim  to  a  single  one  of  your  provhices  ?  The 
trtaty  of  Pressburg  has  smoothf-d  all  differences  between  the  two 
empires  ;  the  word  of  your  n^.aster,  in  the  interview  we  had  together, 
ought  to  have  terminated  all  dispute  between  the  two  sovereigns. 
There  rem:iined  only  some  arrangements  to  make  on  the  subject  of 
Braunau,  which  remained  in  our  hands  ;  on  the  subject  of  the  Isonzo, 
the  ro;id  through  the  valley  of  which  (Thalweg)  had  not  been 
sufficiently  determine  d,  but  which  has  been  settled  by  the  convention 
of  Fontnin;  bleau.  I  ask  nothing  of  you,  I  desire  nothing  of  you  but 
friendly  and  peaceful  relations.  Are  there  any  d  ffi -ulties — is  there 
one  single  difficulty — between  us?.  Let  me  know  what  it  is,  that  it 
may  be  settled  at  once." 

"  M.  de  Metternich  having  again  afRrmed  that  his 
Government  was  not  dreaming  of  attacking  France,  and 
alleo'ino"  as  a  proof  that  it  had  ordered  no  movement  of 
troops,  Nripoleon  replied  to  him  at  once,  with  the  same 
cahnness  but  with  the  same  firmness,  that  he  was  in  error  ; 
that  troops  had  been  assembled  in  Galicia  and  in  Bohemia, 
on  the  borders  of  Silesia,  in  face  of  the  quarters  of  the 
French  army  ;  that  these  raassings  could  not  be  contested  ; 
that  the  immediate  consequence  would  be  to  oppose  to 
-.hem  other  massings  not  less  considerable  ;  that  instead  of 
completing  the  demolition  of  the  strong  places  in  Silesia, 
he  was  going,  now,  to  place  some  of  them  in  a  state  of 
repair,  to  arm  and  provision  them,  to  call  on  the  con- 
tin  i^ents   of    the   Confederation   of    the    Rhine,   and   to 


TEE  EMBASSY  TO  PARIS.  29 

replace  everything  on  a  war  footing.  "  I  shall  not  allow 
them  to  take  me  by  surprise,  you  know  very  well,"  he 
added, 

"I  shall  be  always  ready.  You  count,  perhaps,  on  tlie  Emperor  of 
Eussia,  and  you  deceive  yourselves.  I  am  sure  of  his  adhesion,  of  the 
formal  disapnrobation  he  has  manifested  on  tlie  subject  of  your  arma- 
ments, and  of  ti.e  resolution  which  he  will  take  under  the  circumstances. 
If  I  had  any  doubt,  I  woukl  at  once  wage  war  on  you  and  on  him,  for 
I  do  not  intend  to  allow  the  situotion  of  affairs  on  the  Continent  to  be 
at  all  doubtful.  If  I  confine  myself  to  simple  precautions,  it  is  because 
I  am  absolutely  C(mfident  regarding  the  affairs  of  the  Continent, 
because  I  am  completely  fco  with  respect  to  the  Emperor  of  Russia. 
Do  not  then  imhilge  in  the  belief  that  the  occasion  is  a  good  one  to 
attack  France ;  that  would  be  a  grave  mistake  ou  your  part.  You  do 
not  want  war,  M.  de  Mi  ttern:ch  ;  I  believe  that  of  you ;  I  believe 
it  of  your  Emperor,  and  of  the  eidiglitened  men  in  your  country.  But 
the  German  aristocracy,  discontfnted  with  the  changes  which  have 
come  about,  is  tilling  Girmany  with  its  lia'reds.  You  allow  yourselves 
to  be  touciied  ;  >ou  comniunieate  your  emotion  to  the  masses,  pushing 
ihem  to  arm.  By  degrees,  arming  and  arming,  you  arrive  at  an  extra- 
ordinary situation,  impossible  to  endure  long;  and,  by  little  and  little, 
you  will  be  led  to  the  point  when  a  crisis,  a  solution,  bee  mes 
desirable,  and  this  crisis,  this  solution,  can  only  be  war.  IMoral  nature 
and  physical  nature  al  ke,  when  they  arrive  at  the  pent-up  period 
which  prcce  les  the  stem,  feel  the  need  of  an  e.xp'osion .  to  dear  the 
air,  and  to  bring  back  Ciilm.  That  is  wh-<t  I  fear  from  your  pre-ent 
conduct.  I  repeat  to  you,"  added  Napoleon,  •'  I  do  not  want  anything 
from  you;  I  ask  for  nothing  but  peace,  peaceful  and  sure  relations 
with  you;  but  if  you  continue  to  make  preparations,  I  also  shall  make 
such  as  will  ensure  the  superiority  of  my  arms  to  as  great  an  extent  as 
in  preceding  campaigns,  and  tlien,  to  preserve  peace,  we  shall  have 
brought  about  war." 

The  reader  will  not  fail  to  notice  that  whilst  there  is 
not  a  word  in  this  account  inconsistent  with  the  account 
given  by  Metternich  himself,  there  is  absent  from  this  the 
impression  which  the  other  conveys  that  the  attitude  of 
Metternich  made  the  Emperor  appear  ridiculous.  The 
circumstances  of  the  time  lend  credit  to  the  idea  that  the 
French  record  is  absolutely  true.  Austria  was  resolved 
at  that  very  time  to  take  advantage  of  the  first  turn  in  the 


30  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  MFTTEBNICH, 

fortunes  of  Napoleon  Kapoleon  instinctively  knew  it 
He  was  on  the  eve  of  starting  for  Erfurt  to  hold  there 
with  the  Emperor  Alexander  the  interview  which  should 
consolidate  the  alliance.  From  Erfurt  he  would  proceed 
in  person  to  Spain,  to  finish  with  the  risings  and  the 
English  intervention  in  that  country.  To  attain  such  a 
result  he  would  naturally  diminish  largely  his  garrisons  in 
Germany ;  and  he  foresaw,  as  Metternich  and  the  Em- 
peror Francis  foresaw,  that  his  own  departure,  and  the 
diminution  of  the  army  in  Germany,  would  give  a  Power, 
whose  pride  he  had  lowered,  and  who  was  thirsting  for 
revenge,  opportunities  which  she  might  not  be  able  to  let 
pass.  Tiierefore  on  this  solemn  occasion,  the  day  after 
his  return  from  La  Vendee,  a  month  only  before  his 
departure  for  Erfurt,  on  his  way,  so  to  say,  to  Spain, 
Napoleon  solemnly  warned  Metternich,  in  the  presence 
of  the  whole  diplomatic  corps,  that  he  was  thoroughly 
acquainted  with  the  dispositions  of  the  Austrian  court, 
and  that  a  continuance  of  a  policy  such  as  that  it  was 
pursuing  could  only  lead  to  war. 

W^riting  in  his  Autobiography  of  this  period,  Metternich 
admits  and  justifies  the  course  then  pursued  by  Austria ; 
and  tluis,  in  spite  of  himself,  justifies  also  the  course 
adopted  by  Napoleon  at  this  famous  interview.  Telling 
us  that  under  the  weight  of  the  unhappy  issue  of  the  war 
of  1805  Austria  had  collapsed  ;  that  the  Confederation  of 
the  Rhine  had  taken  the  place  of  the  German  Empire ; 
that  Tirol  had  been  given  to  Bavaria,  and  that  the  duchy 
of  Warsaw  had  been  pushed  in  between  Russia  and 
Austria ;  that  the  peace  of  Tilsit  had  brought  about  an 
alliance  between  Russia  and  France,  "  the  twofold  object 
of  which  was  the  silent  assent  of  the  former  Power  to  the 
attacks  of  the  latter,  and  the  partition  of  the  Ottoman 
Euipire  between  the  two,  adjusted  on  the  supposition  of 


TEE  E3IBASSY  TO  PARIS.  31 

its  impending  fall,"  he  adds  this  confession:  "Austria, 
therefore,  was  not  in  a  position  in  which  she  could  possibly 
maintain  herself." 

Then  peeps  out  the  fear,  which  subsequent  events 
proved  to  have  been  utterly  unsubstantial,  but  which 
pervaded  the  Court  of  Vienna,  and  inspired  all  its  action  : 
"  Napoleon  was  so  convinced  of  it  that  be  looked  upon 
Austria  as  a  prize  in  prospect  for  one  of  his  new  German 
allies."  The  justification  of  Napoleon's  warning  of  the 
15th  August  follows : 

"  Not  only,  then,  was  the  renewal  of  war  in  the  nature  of  things,  but 
it  was  for  our  Empire  an  absolute  condition  of  iis  existence.  The 
question  was  to  imy  mind  settled.  But  the  points  which  remained, 
and,  in  my  view,  required  ripe  considemtion,  were,  the  choice  of  the 
right  moment  for  beginning  the  war,  and  the  settling  of  the  plan  of 
operation," 

Here  wc  have  the  keynote  to  the  policy  of  Metter- 
nich  during  the  entire  period  of  his  embassy  to  Paris. 
It  was  to  cover,  fo  conceal,  to  hide  from  view,  the 
preparations  for  war  made  by  Austria  ;  to  foment,  as  we 
shall  see  later  on,  discontent  and  intrigue  against  the 
French  Emperor  in  Paris  ;  to  knit  friendly  and  confiden- 
tial relations  with  foreign  ministers,  notably,  as  we  shall 
also  see,  with  the  Russian  ambassador,  for  the  same 
purpose;  to  watch  for  the  most  favourable  opportunity 
for  the  commencement  of  hostilities. 

Napoleon  reached  P^rfurt  the  27th  September.  The 
Court  of  Vienna  was  represented  there  by  Baron  Vincent. 
The  Russian  ambassador  at  Paris,  Count  Tolstoy,  whose 
sympathies  were  strongly  allied  to  those  of  Metternich, 
went  thither  also  to  meet  his  sovereign.  Metternich, 
whose  repeated  solicitation  to  be  allowed  to  accompany 
Napoleon  had  been  refused,  remained  at  Paris.  From 
that  city  he  kept  up  a  correspondence  with  his  friends  at 


32  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  MFTTEBNICR. 

Erfurt,  Tolstoy  and  Vincent.  These,  not  well  informed 
themselves,  responded  as  best  they  could.  But,  either 
their  reports  were  faulty,  or  the  conclusions  which  he 
drew  from  them  did  no  credit  to  his  prescience.  He  de- 
clared his  belief  that  the  interview  was  "  a  trap  laid  for 
the  Russian  monarch  on  the  part  of  the  French  Emperor." 
The  "  trap,"  if  laid  at  all,  was  laid,  not  by  Napoleon,  but 
by  Alexander.  It  was  he  who,  in  his  many  conversations 
with  the  French  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburo-,  M.  de 
Caulaincourt,  first  expressed  his  ardent  desire  for  a  fresh 
interview  as  soon  as  possible,  j2:?owr  7ious  entendre,  et 
maitriser  VEwope^  * 

Despite  all  his  efforts  Metternich  was  unable  to  dis- 
cover the  secrets  of  the  conference  at  Erfurt.  Four  persons 
alone  were  present  at  the  political  discussions  which  had 
taken  place  there  :  Napoleon  and  his  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  M.  de  Champagny ;  Alexander  and  the  Chan- 
cellor of  the  Empire,  M.  de  Romanzoff.  To  the  Austrian, 
minister,  Baron  Vincent,  no  confidences  were  made,  and 
when  he  complained,  he  was  told  that  as  Austria  was 
arming,  for  a  purpose  which  she  declined  to  explain,  it 
was  impossible  to  take  her  into  the  confidence  of  two 
monarchs  of  whom  she  might  at  any  moment  declare 
herself  the  enemy.  It  may  safely  be  concluded,  then, 
that  during  the  continuance  of  the  conference,  Metternich 
obtained  no  reliable  evidence  regarding  the  matters 
discussed  there.  On  that  subject  his  Autobiography  is 
virtually  a  blank. 

Returning  to  him  in  Paris,  we  find  that  on  the  30th  of 
that  month  he  wrote  to  Count  Stadion  that 

"  the  return  of  General  de  Vincent  must  have  secured  for  his  Imperia 
Majesty  full  iuformation  as  to  the  conference  at  Erfurt  and  the  turn 


Thiers,  ix.  2G9. 


TEE  EMBASSY  TO  PATHS.  33 

which  matters  have  taken  there.  I  have  the  less  hurried  to  send  otf 
tliis  courier  that  I  might  be  able  to  tell  your  Excellency  of  the  return 
of  the  Emperor  to  his  capital  and  his  departure  for  Bayonne,  for  which 
place  he  started  yesterday  afternoon." 

Napoleon,  in  fact,  had  quitted  Erfurt  the  14th  October  ; 
reached  St.  Cloud  the  18th  ;  made  all  his  arrangements 
to  finish  with  Spain ;  and  had  set  out  for  Bayonne  the 
29th.  Six  days  before  this  departure  he  had  received  the 
diplomatic  corps,  when,  towards  Motternich  personally,  he 
had,  by  the  admission  of  that  ambassador,  shown  great 
politeness. 

During  the  Emperor's  absence  Metternich  renewed  his 
intimacy  with  Count  Tolstoy,  and  his  acquaintance  with 
the  liussian  Chancellor,  Count  Itomanzoff'.  The  latter 
he  describes  as  "  havinfj-  been  cauofht  in  the  nets  of 
Napoleon,"  which  is  as  much  as  to  say  that  he  repre- 
sented, at  that  period,  the  views  of  his  master,  the  Czar. 
Metternich  became,  too,  intimate  with  Talleyrand,  who, 
tow^ards  the  end  of  1808,  had  begun  to  use  his  vast 
faculty  for  intrigue  to  undermine  Napoleon — a  purpose 
he  adhered  to  steadfastly  till  it  had  been  accomplished. 
It  can  easily  be  conceived  how,  in  this  man,  Metternich 
found  a  congenial  spirit ;  how  he  revelled  in  the  revela- 
tions, true  or  false,  which  Talleyrand  made  to  him  of  his 
secret  interviews  with  Alexander  at  Erfurt.  Recordino- 
his  impressions  of  an  interview  with  that  faithless  in- 
triguer at  this  period,  Metternich  thus  writes  in  a  menio- 
rar,dum  he  drew  up  at  the  close  of  the  year : 

"The  first  day  of  his  arrival  (at  Erfurt)  Talleyrand  presented 
himself  to  the  Erapeior  Alexander,  and  said  to  him  the  memorable 
words:  'Sire,  what  are  you  going  to  do  here?  It  rests  with  you  to 
save  Europe,  and  you  can  only  accomplish  this  by  resisting  Napoleon. 
The  French  people  are  civilised,  its  sovereign  is  "not;  the  sovereign  of 
Russia  is  civilised,  and  his  p  ople  are  not ;  it  is  therefore  for  the 
sovereign  of  Russia  to  be  allied  with  the  French  people.'  " 

D 


34  LIFE  OF  PFJNCE  METTEBNICR. 

In  another  interview  he  stated  that  he  had  said  to  him : 
"The  Rhine,  the  Alps,  the  Pyrenees,  are  the  conquests  of 
France.  The  rest  are  the  conquests  of  the  Emperor  of 
France,  and  we  shall  not  hold  them."  Talleyrand,  who 
had  always  been  a  supporter  of  the  Austrian  alliance, 
further  told  Metternich,  on  his  return  to  Paris  from 
Erfurt,  "  that  since  the  battle  of  Austerlitz  the  relations 
of  Alexander  with  Austria  have  not  been  more  favour- 
able ; "  and,  again,  that  Napoleon's  ambassador  at  St. 
Petersburg,  Caulaincourt,  was  entirely  devoted  to  his — 
Talleyrand's — point  of  view,  and  had  been  instructed  to 
second  all  the  steps  of  the  Austrian  ambassador,  Prince 
Sch  warzenberg. 

Full  of  hopes  inspired  by  his  conversation  with  this 
man  and  others  like  him,  wdio,  whilst  wearing  the  livery 
of  the  Empire,  were  doing  their  best  to  undermine  it, 
Metternich  applied  for,  and  was  granted,  leave  to  proceed 
to  Vienna.  He  arrived  there  the  10th  November,*  and 
at  once  saw  Count  Stadion,  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs.  From  him  he  learnt  that  Austria  was  far  nearer 
to  war  than  he  had  thought  when  he  left  Paris.  Met- 
ternich entered  with  his  whole  heart  into  the  scheme,  the 
innermost  secrets  of  which  were  then  revealed  to  him. 
The  day  following  he  saw  the  Emperor.  From  a  con- 
versation which  lasted  several  hours  with  Francis  he  came 
to  the  conclusion  that  whilst  there  was  no  difference  of 
opinion  between  the  Emperor  and  his  Cabinet  as  to  the 
necessity  of  war — a  conclusion  which  amply  justified  the 
prevision  of  Napoleon — the  former  was  not  so  decided  as 
the  latter  as  to  the  right  moment  for  waging  it.  The 
interviev/  ended  with  a  request  made  by  Francis  to  his 
ambassador  at  the  French  (^ourt  that  he  would  examine 

*  In  liis  Autobiography  he  states  "10th  of  October,"  but  that  is 
evidently  a  misprint ;  Metternich  was  in  Paris  all  October. 


THE  EMBASSY  TO  PABIS.  85 

the  question  thoroughly,  and  assist  the  cabinet  with  his 
advice. 

Of  all  tasks  this  was  the  most  cono:enial  to  Metternich. 
Hating,  as  he  did — we  cannot  too  often  repeat  it — the 
R.aYalution  and  its  offspring^Jhe  Napoleonic  system  ; 
believing  that  that  system  was  personified  in  one  man, 
and  that  it  required  only  his  humiliation  to  cause  it  to 
fall  ;  that,  moreover,  it  lay  in  the  power,  and  that  it  was 
the  duty,  of  re-strengthened  Austria  to  ensure  that 
huniiliation  by  choosing  the  opportune  moment  to  strike 
a  blow  with  all  her  force  ;  he  felt  that  the  request  of  his 
sovereign  had  vested  him  with  power  to  decide  the 
selection  of  that  opportune  moment.  Francis  would  no 
longer  resist  the  Cabinet  if  ]Metternicli  could  show  that 
the  policy  of  the  Cabinet  was  based  on  reason ;  the 
Cabinet  would  yield  to  Francis  if  Metternich  could  lay 
before  it  a  justification  of  the  views  of  Francis. 

In  this  spirit  Metternich  began  his  task.  It  resulted 
in  three  memoranda  addressed  to  the  Emperor  Francis. 
In  these  he  entered  very  fully  into  the  relative  conditions 
of  France  and  Austria  at  the  time,  1806,  when  he 
proceeded  as  ambassador  to  Paris  ;  showed  how  the 
Peace  of  Pressburg  had  undermined  the  last  rampart  of 
the  independence  of  Europe,  and  caused  even  the  people 
of  Germany  to  believe  that  Austria's  safety  was  only  to 
be  found  in  a  close  alliance  with  France,  or,  at  least,  in  a 
system  of  the  strictest  neutrality  ;  that  few  statesmen  had 
then  realised  that  "  friendship  and  neutrality  "  are  two 
words  void  of  meaning  to  Napoleon  j  that  the  campaigns 
of  1806-7  proved,  however,  that  the  part  of  a  neutral 
was  not  less  difficult  to  sustain  than  that  of  an  enemy ; 
that  even  before  the  close  of  that  campaign  Napoleon 
had  prepared  the  destruction  of  Spain ;  that  the  resolu- 
tion thus  to  destroy  "  the  oldest,  the  most  tried,  the  most 

D  2 


36  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  3IETTERNICH. 

disinterested  of  the  allies,  not  only  of  Napoleon,  but  of 
all  preceding  Governments  of  France,  must  prove  to  the 
world  that  friendship  is  unavailing  to  preserve  any 
Power,  if  that  Power  cross  the  path  of  the  Emperor  of 
the  French."  * 

This  being  the  preamble,  the  demonstration  that  the 
part  of  enemy,  the  part  of  neutral,  the  part  of  friend, 
were  all  equally  powerless  to  save  a  continental  nation 
from  the  devouring  ambition  of  Napoleon,  Metternich 
proceeded  to  argue  that  the  only  chance  of  being  able  to 
shake  off  a  yoke,  which  in  any  one  of  its  three  diverse 
forms  was  intolerable,  was  to  watch  the  opportunity 
when  the  dominant  Power  should  be  hampered  by  one  of 
the  schemes  into  which  its  insatiable  ambition  would 
certainly  draw  it,  and  then,  having  meanwhile  prepared, 
1-0  strike.  Such  an  opportunity,  he  proceeded,  was  now 
approaching.  "Providence  determines  the  limits  of 
every  usurping  Power.  Spain  w^as  called  to  save 
Europe ;  yet,"  he  added,  "  these  chances,  too,  would 
have  passed  in  vain,  if  we  had  waited  for  them  to  occur 
before  taking  up  the  only  attitude  proper  to  us." 

Proceeding  to  prove,  then,  that  France  was  tired  of 
fighting;  that  the  wars  she  was  waging  were  not  her 
wars,  but  simply  the  wars  of  her  ruler ;  that  a  strong 
party  was  forming  in  France,  guided  by  men  of  the 
intellectual    strength    and    calibre    of    Talleyrand    and 

*  In  the  Autobiography  of  Prince  Mdternich  the  memoirs  from  which 
the  summary  in  the  text  has  been  made  are  tlius  he-aded  :  "  Two 
memoirs  hy  Metternich,  drawn  up  in  Vienna,  December  4,  18(i8." 
Upon  this  I  desire  to  remark  that  though  it  is  possible  they  mny  have 
been  written  in  outline  in  tliat  year,  they  contain  internal  evidence  that 
they  were  considerably  touched  up  aft*  rwards.  Thus,  referring  to  the 
action  of  Napoleon  in  establishing  the  two  Spanish  princes,  Feidinand 
and  Carlos,  at  ValeuQay,  the  property  of 'J'alleyrand,  the  memoir  adds : 
'  vvhere  tlioy  lived  at  tlie  expense  of  the  proimetor,  till  the  day  when 
th(  ir  House  was  restored."     Tiieir  Hcuse  was  restored  in  1814.     Yet, 


THE  EMBASSY  TO  PABIS.  37 

Fouclie,  to  oppose  the  destructive  plans  of  the  Emperor, 
and  to  bring  back  peace  on  terms  consistent  with  the 
well-being  of  the  nations  of  Europe  ;  that  the  interview 
at  Erfurt  had  been  arranged  by  Napoleon  with  the 
express  object  of  persuading  the  Czar  to  take  active 
measures  against  Austria  whilst  he  and  his  army  should 
be  engaged  in  Spain ;  that,  owing  to  the  energetic 
administration  of  the  heads  of  the  departments,  Austria 
was  now  ready  or  nearly  ready  for  war  ;  that  Napoleon's 
war  with  Spain  had  divulged  tlie  fact  that  he  had  but  one 
army,  the  Grande  Armee,  which  had  foui^ht  under  his 
command  in  1805,  18U6,  1807;  that  that  army  had 
suffered  serious  losses  in  Spain,  that,  deducting  those 
losses  and  the  other  troops  he  had  sent  to  that  country, 
he  could  not  put  into  the  held  against  Austria  more  than 
206,000  men,  of  whom  only  107,000  would  be  French  ; 
that  the  war  with  Spain  would  exhaust  him  far  more  than 
his  contests  with  Germany,  the  conditions  of  warfare  in 
that  country  bein^  much  less  favourable  to  an  invader  ; 
Metternich  inquired,  only  that  he  might  answer  the 
inquiry  in  the  negative,  whether  Napoleon  could  abandon 
Spain  in  order  that  he  might  bring  all  his  forces  against 
Austria,  lie  arrived,  then,  at  the  conclusion  that  under 
the  most  favourable  circumstances  for  Napoleon,  his 
forces  would  be  weakened  by  more  than  120,000  men 
necessary  for  the  occupation  of  the  Peninsula;  and  that, 
thus,  "the  forces  of  Austria,  so  inferior  to  those  of  France 
before  the  insurrection  in  Spain,  will  be  at  least  equal  to 
them  after  that  event." 


as  I  have  said,  tlie  memoir  bears  tlie  date  of  1S08.  Tlirongliout  the 
Autobiography  there  runs  a  coiucideuce  of  advice  with  accomplished 
events,  which,  with  such  a  proof  of  editing  as  I  have  g'.ven,  ought  to 
make  the  reader  suspect  the  prescience  which  Metternich  claims  for 
Liui^elf. 


38  LIFE  OF  PEINCE  METTFBNICR, 

But  it  was  not  upon  Austria  alone  that  her  statesmen 
at  that  period  counted.  Count  Stadion  and  his  colleagues 
reckoned  much  on  the  strong  antagonism  to  French 
domination  which  had  risen,  and  was  daily  increasing,  in 
North  Germany  ;  they  were  hopeful,  too,  that  if  they 
could  gain  a  first  striking  success  in  the  field,  Bavaria 
might  remember  that  she  was,  after  all,  a  German  power ; 
and  that,  under  the  same  circumstances,  even  the  Czar 
mif^ht  return  to  his  old  alliances.  Metternich  did  not 
share  those  views.  Austria  must,  he  said,  indulge  in  no 
illusions ;  she  must  trust  to  herself  alone.  His  opinion 
was  shared  by  the  illustrious  prince  to  whom  Austria  was 
about  to  entrust  the  command  in  chief  of  her  armies,  the 
Archduke  Charles.  Meanwhile,  the  opposing  ideas, 
which  I  may  call  the  ideas  of  the  Cabinet,  were  being 
acted  upon.  It  was  only  at  the  last  moment  that  the 
opinion  of  the  Archduke  and  of  Metternich  prevailed, 
and  the  military  plans  were  modified  accordingly.  The 
fatal  result  of  divided  counsels,  and  of  completely 
changing  the  military  plan  within  a  short  time  of  the 
breaking  out  of  hostilities  was  manifested  at  the  moment 
when  Austria,  a  fortnight  too  early,  decided  the  question 
of  peace  or  war,  by  seizing  the  person  of  the  bearer  of  the 
French  despatches. 

Metternich  was  engaged  in  stimulating  the  preparations 
of  Austria,  when  information  reached  Vienna  that  Napoleon 
had  quitted  his  army  when  in  pursuit  of  the  English,  and 
that  he  was  on  his  way  to  Paris.  Knowing  the  speed  at 
which  the  Emperor  travelled,  and  that  his  own  absence 
from  Paris  when  Napoleon  should  arrive  there  might 
precipitate  matters,  Metternich  made  immediate  prepara- 
tions to  return  thither.  The  winter  was  a  severe  one, 
but  in  spite  of  the  rigour  of  the  season,  he  travelled  day 
and  night,  and  reached  Paris  early  on  the  morning  of  the 


THE  EMBASSY  TO  FABIS.  39 

1st  January  (1809).  Napoleon  bad  not  arrived,  but 
the  Empress  held  a  reception,  and  this  the  Austrian 
ambassador  attended.  He  was  cordially  welcomed 
by  the  several  members  of  the  Government  —  with 
whom,  as  well,  let  it  always  be  remembered,  as  with 
the  Imperial  family,  he  was  a  great  favourite — for  his 
return  dissipated  the  apprehensions  which  some  among 
them  had  begun  to  feel  regarding  the  cause  of  his 
prolonged  absence.  He  found  public  opinion  in  Paris 
excited  and  rather  depressed  about  Spain.  An  inter- 
view which  he  had  with  the  Foreign  Minister,  M.  de 
Champagny,  afforded  him  no  information  on  any  subject. 
But,  though  the  utterances  of  the  minister  were  of  the 
vaguest  character,  Metternich  could  read  under  them  the 
earnest  personal  desire  of  Champagny  for  the  main- 
tenance of  peace.  In  his  despatch  to  Count  Stadion, 
dated  a  few  days  later,  11th  January,  however,  he  stated 
that,  from  the  frontiers  of  Austria  to  the  centre  of  Paris, 
he  found  but  one  conviction  prevailing,  and  that  was  that, 
by  the  coming  spring,  at  latest,  Austria  would  take  the 
field  against  France.  Those  who  thus  reasoned,  he 
continued,  base  their  opinion  on  the  fact  that  Napoleon 
was  occupied  at  a  distance  of  600  leagues  from  the 
frontiers  of  Austria  ;  that  the  greater  part  of  his  forces 
were  directed  to  that  distant  point;  that  Austria  was 
strong  and  ready  for  war ;  that  Russia  might  be  induced 
to  change  her  system,  and  join  Austria  ;  and  that  the 
increasing  impatience  of  French  domination  might  lead 
the  North  German  people  to  follow  the  same  course. 

On  the  16th  January,  Metternich  saw  Talleyrand. 
The  interview  was  long  and  interesting,  leaving,  as  it  did, 
no  doubt  on  the  mind  of  the  Austrian  that  the  discarded 
Foreign  Minister  was  plotting  against  his  master.  The 
reader  will  recollect  how  the  Austrian  ambassador  had 


40  LIFE  OF  FHINCE  METTEBNICK 

reported  to  the  Emperor  Francis  the  advice  pressed  upon 
the  Czar  by  I'alleyrand  at  Erfurt ;  he  heaid  him  uow  utter 
similar  sentiments.  In  his  despatch  to  Count  Stadion, 
dated  17th  January,  reporting  this  interview,  he  says, 
referring  to  a  previous  report  on  the  same  subject:  "I 
do  not  know  how  to  add  to  what  I  sent  by  my  last 
courier  about  M.  de  Talleyrand.  I  see  him,  and  his 
friend  Fouche,  always  the  same — very  decided  to  seize 
an  opportunity,  if  one  offer,  but  not  having  sufficient 
courage  to  make  one  "  It  is  clear  from  the  tone  of  this 
despatch  that  the  position  of  the  French  army  in  Spain, 
and  the  uncertainty  regarding  Napoleon  himself,  had 
inspired  Metternich  with  the  absolute  conviction  that  the 
Austrian  projects  would,  if  vigorously  carried  out  at  the 
rio-ht  moment,  have  a  great  chance  of  success. 

On  the  night  of  the  22nd,  Napoleon  arrived.  He  had 
made  a  remarkable  quick  journey,  having  taken  only  six 
days  from  Valladolid  to  Paris.  From  the  former  to 
Buro^os  he  had  ridden  the  whole  way.  On  the  24th  he 
received  the  ambassadors  at  a  diplomatic  audience.  A 
fresh  outburst  against  Austria  had  been  expected ;  but 
the  expectants  were  at  fault-  The  Emperor  addressed 
Metternich  a  few  commonplace  words  on  his  first  round, 
and  not  at  all  on  the  second. 

It  goes  far  to  prove  how  completely  Metternich  had  — 
to  use  a  vulgar  but  expressive  term — "  taken  in  "  Na- 
poleon, that,  despite  his  secret  machinations,  the  private 
relations  of  the  Austrian  ambassador  with  the  Emperor 
and  the  Imperial  family  were  never  more  friendly  than  at 
this  period.  "Napoleon  continued,"  writes  Metternich, 
**to  treat  me  with  his  customary  kindness.  ...  If  the 
Paris  public  judged  from  my  relations  to  the  (^ourt,  it 
miust  have  been  difficult  for  it  to  believe  in  the  impending 
outbreak  of  a  new  war  w  ith  Austria."     This  circumstance 


THE  EMBASSY  TO  PABIS,  41 

tends  to  show  that,  even  at  this  period,  Napoleon  desired 
to  avert  the  hostilities  on  which,  he  was  well  aware, 
Austria  and  her  amhassador  were  alike  bent.  The 
Chancellor  of  the  Russian  Empire,  M.  de  Romanzoff,  had 
accompanied  Napoleon  from  Erfurt  to  Paris,  and  during 
the  Emperor's  visit  to  Spain,  he  had  remained  at  that 
city.  He  was  one  of  the  men  whom  Metternich  had 
failed  to  seduce.  He  believed  in  Napoleon,  and,  in 
common  with  many  others,  thought  that  Austria  would,  if 
she  were  to  declare  war,  rush  upon  her  doom.  Napoleon, 
immediately  after  his  return,  spoke  to  this  Minister  with 
perfect  frankness  on  the  subject.  "  It  would  seem,"  he 
said  to  him  and  to  others  whom  he  trusted,  "  that  the 
waters  which  wash  the  walls  of  Vienna  are  the  waters  of 
Lethe  and  not  the  waters  of  the  Danube.  ...  I  do  not 
desire  war  with  Austria  ;  I  have  no  interests  to  serve  by 
such  a  war  ;  all  my  efforts  are  directed  to  the  field  of 
battle  which  England  has  chosen,  that  is,  Spain.  But, 
unless  she  disarm,  I  shall  have  to  make  upon  her  a  war 
of  destruction,"  A  few  days  later,  wishing  to  prove  to 
the  Russian  Minister  the  sincerity  of  his  desire  for  peace, 
the  Emperor  requested  him  to  communicate  with  the 
Courts  of  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg  his  proposal  to  offer 
to  the  Emperor  of  Austria  the  joint  guarantee  of  France 
and  Russia  for  the  maintenance  of  his  actual  dominions. 
Foreseeing,  nevertheless,  that  Austria  would  neither 
disarm  nor  accept  his  guarantee,  he  made  preparations  for 
every  possible  danger  by  calling  out  80,000  men'  of  the 
reserves ;  then,  in  order  to  warn  Austria  that  he  was 
])repared  at  all  points  for  any  movement  she  might  make, 
he  ordered  the  division  Dupas  from  the  shores  of  the 
Baltic  to  Magdeburg,  replacing  at  the  same  time  by 
Polish-Saxon  troops  the  detachments  of  French  troops  at 
Dantzig,   Stettin,    Custrin,   and   Glogau.      He   ordered 


42  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  3IETTERNICS, 

Marshal  Davout  to  march  from  Saxony  into  Franconia, 
to  fix  his  headquarters  at  Wurzburo-,  and  to  send  a  division 
to  occupy  Bayrcuth.  He  directed  General  Oudinot  to 
obtain  the  consent  of  the  King  of  Bavaria  to  his  march 
from  Hanau  to  Auo^sburg ;  whilst  he  despatched  the 
divisions  Carra  Saint-Cyr  and  Legrand  from  the  environs 
of  Paris  to  Metz ;  the  divisions  Boudet  and  Molitor  from 
Lj'Ons  to  Strasburg.  To  the  commanders  of  the  various 
corps  in  Italy,  he  also  sent  instructions  so  to  dispose  their 
troops  as  to  be  ready  to  meet  any  demonstration  on  the 
part  of  Austria.  To  obtain,  likewise,  accurate  informa- 
tion as  to  the  location  of  the  several  Austrian  corps,  he 
directed  his  ambassador  at  Vienna,  General  Andreossy, 
to  apply  for  permission  to  visit  Paris,  and,  on  his  journey 
thither,  to  take  the  route  of  the  centres  where,  it  was 
probable,  he  would  have  the  opportunity  of  obtaining 
information  on  that  head. 

But  Austria  had  gone  too  far  to  retire  now,  and  the 
movements  of  French  troops,  far  from  frightening  her, 
only  roused  in  her  the  conviction  that  she  must  strike 
immediately  if  she  would  win.  Her  agents  had  been 
busy  in  Tirol,  which  had  been  transferred  to  Bavaria  by 
the  Peace  of  Pressburg,  and  Tirol  was  ready  to  rise. 
Delay  in  that  quarter  was  impossible.  The  army  had 
been  thoroughly  reorganised,  and  was  on  a  war  footing. 
The  Landwehr  had  been  created  to  serve  as  a  reserve, 
and  was  thoroughly  organised.  Enns  had  been  strongly 
fortified  to  guard  against  a  hostile  advance  from  the  side 
of  Bavaria;  Briick-on-the-Mur,  to  protect  Vienna  on  the 
side  of  Italy;  and  Komorn,  to  serve  as  a  point  of  retreat 
and  rallying  in  Hungary.  The  Archduke  Charles  had 
ready  in  hand  for  immediate  hostilities  an  army  300,000 
strong,  with  reserves  numbering  200,000. 

Meanwhile  Mctternich  remained  at  Paris.    He  received, 


TEE  EMBASSY  TO  PABIS.  43 

he  says,  "  no  instructions  from  Vienna,"  probably  because 
the  Emperor  Francis,  knowing  that  he  was  secretly 
aware  of  the  intentions  of  his  Court,  considered  that  he 
would  be  better  able  to  play  his  part  if  he  were  left 
perfectly  untrammelled.  Naturally  enough,  he  records 
in  his  Autobiography,  he  regarded  war  as  certain.  He 
knew  it  because  his  Court  had,  on  his  reports,  finally 
resolved  upon  it.  He  gathered  much,  too,  there  can  be 
no  doubt,  from  the  studied  reserve  of  Napoleon.  Whilst 
he  was  cordially  received  in  the  Imperial  circle,  the 
Emperor  and  the  members  of  his  family  never  broached 
to  him  the  subject  of  the  political  situation.  The  Em- 
peror was,  it  would  seem,  deceived  to  the  very  last  in 
the  character  of  Metternich.  Fatally  for  himself,  as  was 
proved  in  1813,  he  never  realised  the  intense  personal  ^^i:^/ 
and  political  hatred  w^hich  Metternich  felt  for  his  system,  ^"^^ 
and  for  himself  as  the  corner-stone  and  sole  support  of  it. 
To  crush  that  system,  or  rather  to  accumulate  means 
whereby  it  might  be  crushed,  had  been  the  one  object  of 
Metternich's  embassy,  and  was  to  continue  the  one  object 
of  his  life  till  it  had  been  accomplished.  Napoleon  failed 
to  read  that  inscrutable  face.  He  was  deceived  to  the 
last  by  that  courtly  and  impressive  manner. 

Matters  were  still  unsettled  w^hen  the  answer  of 
Alexander  to  the  pro})osal  of  a  joint  guarantee  reached 
Paris.  He  preferred,  he  said,  to  deal  with  Austria  direct. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  but  that  Alexander  was  most 
desirous  to  prevent  the  outbreak  of  a  war  between  France 
and  Austria.  He  preferred,  he  said,  to  act  alone,  be- 
cause an  Emperor  could  be  more  yielding,  more  able  to 
yield  with  a  good  grace,  than  two  ambassadors.  "  Let 
me  act  and  speak,"  he  said  to  Caulaincourt,  "  if  war  can 
be  avoided,  I  will  avoid  it."  Napoleon  agreed  at  once 
to  this  proposal,   and  despatched  to   the  Czar  a  secret 


44  LIFE  OF  FUINGE  METTERNICE. 

authority  to  promise,  not  only  the  double  guarantee,  but 
the  complete  evacuation  of  the  territory  of  the  Confedera- 
tion of  the  Rhine,  that  is  to  say,  the  withdrawal  of  the 
French  troops  from  Germany.* 

Alexander  made,  then,  the  proposal  to  the  Austrian 
ambassador  at  his  Court,  Prince  Schwarzenbero-.  He 
told  him  frankly  that  peace  was  a  necessity  to  him  to 
carry  out  certain  plans  which  he  had  at  heart,  and  that  he 
would  employ  all  his  forces  against  that  power,  whichever 
it  might  be,  which  should  embroil  Europe  in  w^ir.  The 
report  of  this  conversation  had  the  effect  the  exact  opposite 
of  that  it  was  intended  to  produce.  Austria  had,  I  have 
already  said,  gone  too  far,  and,  still  hoping  that  a  first 
success  would  change  the  dispositions  of  Alexander,  she 
sent  orders  to  her  troops  to  march,  and  to  Metternich  to 
inform  the  Foreign  Minister  at  Paris  that,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  demonstrations  made  by  Napoleon  since 
his  return  to  Paris,  she  had  been  obliged  to  place  her 
forces  on  a  war  footing.  Champagny  replied  in  a  sar- 
castic tone,  stating  that  to  bring  an  army  from  a  peace 
to  a  war  footing  was  the  work  of  six  months  ;  that  the 
Emperor  had  not  been  deceived  ;  that  he  had  long  known 
of  Austria's  preparations ;  that  he  was  prepared ;  and 
that  if  the  war  were  to  result  disastrously  for  Austria,  it 
would  not  be  his  fault.  After  some  further  conversation 
the  two  ministers  separated,  each  convinced  that  war  was 
inevitable. 

Napoleon  would  have  preferred  peace  for  many  reasons. 
If  there  had  been  no  other,  there  was  this  all-im])ortant 
one,  that  all  his  best  troops  were  in  Spain.  Seeing, 
however,  that  Austria  was  bent  on  war,  he  pushed 
forward  his  preparations  to  w^age  it  with  effect.  What 
these  were  it  does  not  come  within  the  scope  of  this  book 
*  Histoire  du  Consulat  et  de  lEmpire,  tome  x.,  pp.  78,  79. 


THE  E3IBASSY  TO  PABIS.  45 

to  relate.  It  must  suffice  to  record  that,  In  the  first  week 
of  April,  the  Austriaus  seized,  at  Braunau,  a  French 
officer,  the  bearer  of  despatches  from  the  French  leo-a- 
tion  in  \Ienna  to  their  legation  in  Munich.  Furious  at 
this  breach  of  the  law  of  nations,  Napoleon  ordered,  as 
a  reprisal,  the  immediate  arrest  of  all  Austrian  couriers 
within  reach.  On  the  10th  April  the  Archduke  Charles 
crossed  the  Inn — at  the  time,  his  Rubicon.  On  the 
night  of  the  14th  Napoleon  quitted  Paris  to  join  his 
army.  On  the  morning  of  the  15th  Metternich  received 
a  message  from  Champagny  telling  him  that  he  had 
orders  to  give  him  his  passports,  but  that,  until  an 
exchange  of  the  personnel  of  the  embassy  should  have 
been  effected,  he  would  not  be  allowed  to  leave  Paris. 
He  remained  there  for  about  six  weeks,  enjoying  the 
pleasures  of  society  just  as  though  there  had  been  no 
rupture  between  the  two  countries.  On  the  16th  May, 
Fouche  wrote  to  him  that,  in  consequence  of  the  orders  of 
the  Emperor,  he  had  to  request  him  to  go  to  Vienna, 
there  to  be  exchanged  for  the  personnel  of  the  French 
embassy.  He  quitted  Paris  the  26th,  and,  travelling  by 
LuneviUe,  where  he  heard  that  the  French  had  lost  a 
decisive  battle,  referring  to  Aspern;  and  by  Strasburg — 
where  he  saw  the  Empress  Josephine,  who,  he  found, 
fully  believed  in  the  report  as  to  the  issue  of  the  battle, 
and  went  so  far  as  to  express  her  belief  that  Metternich 
might  possibly  meet  Napoleon  returning  to  France — he 
reached  Vienna  the  5th  -Jmie. 


46  LIFE  OF  FBINCE  METTEBNIGR. 


CHAPTER  III. 

FEOM  THE  WAR  OF  1809  TO  THE  RETREAT  FROM 

MOSCOW. 

1809-1812. 

Vienna  was  occupied  by  the  French.  The  bulk  of  their 
army  was  massed  in  the  Isle  of  Lobau,  whence  it  was  to 
issue  just  one  month  later  to  fight  the  battle  of  VVagram. 
It  could  not  be  expected  that  Napoleon,  smarting  under 
the  repulse  of  Aspern,  or,  as  the  French  call  it,  of 
Esslinsj — a  battle  which  mi^^ht  have  cost  him  half  his 
army,  if,  in  the  very  crisis  of  it,  the  Archduke  Charles, 
who  commanded  the  Austrians,  had  not  been  paralysed 
by  a  nervous  attack,  which,  for  three  hours,  deprived  him 
of  the  use  of  his  faculties — would  grant  any  favour  to  an 
Austrian  minister  whilst  the  French  diplomatic  agent, 
seized  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  should  remain  a 
prisoner.  Accordingly,  on  the  morning  of  the  7th,  Met- 
ternich  was  invited  to  take  up  his  quarters  in  a  country- 
house  belonging  to  his  mother,  at  Griinberg,  a  mile  and 
a  half  from  Vienna,  and  close  to  the  garden  of  Sclion- 
brunn.  He  proceeded  thither,  with  his  effects,  the  fol- 
lowinsr  morninor.  In  the  interval  he  had  had  time  and 
opportunity  to  notice,  he  says,  that  public  spirit  had  been 
aroused  in  Vienna  by  the  result  of  the  two  days'  battle  of 


TEE  WAU  OF  1809.  47 

Essling,  and  that  the  French  had  lost  confidence.  Cham- 
pagny,  indeed,  with  whom  he  dined  the  evening  of  the 
6th,  told  him  that  the  Emperor  was  '*  in  a  good  humour  " 
as  to  the  result  of  the  campaign.  It  was  but  natural, 
nevertheless,  that  the  real  author  of  the  war  should, 
after  the  battle  already  fought,  indulge  in  hope  as  to  the 
issue  of  the  campaign,  and  it  is  certain  that  at  this  period 
that  supreme  consoler  in  times  of  difficulty  and  danger 
was  the  constant  companion  of  the  ex-ambassador. 

A  few  days  after  he  had  installed  himself  at  Griinberg, 
Metternich  received  a  visit  from  General  Savary,  a  man 
whom  he  knew  to  be  in  the  confidence  of  Napoleon,  and 
employed  when  the  Emperor  particularly  desired  to  brino- 
about  a  given  result.  It  soon  appeared  that  the  aim  of 
Savary  was  to  persuade  the  Austrian  statesman  to  enter, 
as  it  were  casually,  the  garden  of  Schonbrunn,  which  was 
but  a  step  from  his  own,  for  the  purpose  of  encountering 
Napoleon.  Savary  added  that  the  Emperor  was  in  the  most 
peaceful  dispositi(m,  and  that  a  meeting  between  the  two 
might  result  in  his  being  commissioned  to  convey  an  im- 
portant message  to  the  Emperor  Francis.  It  would  appear 
from  Metternich's  version  of  this  incident  that  he  repulsed 
the  proposal  of  his  visitor,  somewhat  haughtily,  "  with  a  stiff 
upper  lip."  It  was  a  salve  to  his  pride  to  regard  himself 
as  a  prisoner  at  Griinberg.  He  concluded,  then,  his 
conversation  with  Savary  with  this  repelling  remark  : 
*'  I  have  nothing  to  say  to  your  master,  and  nothing  to 
hear  from  him.  I  am  practically  a  prisoner,  and  prisoners 
of  my  kind  consider  themselves,  if  they  do  their  duty, 
as  dead."  It  was  clear  that  hope  was  strong  within  him, 
for  he  similarly  refused  an  overture  of  the  same  charac- 
ter made  to  him  by  Champagny,  because,  we  gather 
from  his  Autobiography,  he  saw  that  Napoleon  shrank 
from  the  risk  of  another  battle,  whilst  he  himself  hoped 


48  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICH. 

everything  from  a  second  meeting  of  the  two  armies,  and 
•would  do  nothing  which  might  prevent  it. 

Metternich,  tlien,  did  not  see  NapoU^on  at  Vienna. 
On  the  26th  June  he  left  Griinberg  under  an  escort  to 
be  exchanged  against  the  French  officer  who  had  been 
seized  and  detained  by  the  Austrian  Government.  The 
exchange  was  to  take  place  at  Acs,  in  Hungary^  beyond 
Pressburg,  a  little  place  which  had  been  declared  neutral 
for  the  purpose.  Metternich  relates  an  incident  of  the 
journey  thither,  which,  for  the  moment,  he  did  not  pro- 
bably find  amusing.  "Opposite  the  place  where,  near  to 
Gonyo,"  he  writes,  "  the  high  road  runs  along  the  banks 
of  the  Danube,  an  Austrian  battery  had  been  erected. 
The  officer  in  command  of  it,  when  he  saw  a  train  of 
carriages  coming  forward,  guarded  by  a  strong  escort, 
thought  it  must  be  the  retinue  of  the  Viceroy  of  Italy, 
and  fired  a  volley  at  once.  Although  the  zeal  was 
misplaced,  I  could  not  but  do  justice  to  the  skill  of  our 
artillerymen.  Of  the  first  two  shots  one  went  through 
the  wheel  of  my  carriage,  the  other  passed  two  feet  above 
the  roof  of  it.  Upon  this,  my  escort  left  the  high  road, 
and  took  me  as  quickly  as  might  be  across  the  fields." 

Metternich  was  exchanged  at  Acs  on  the  2nd  July, 
three  days  before  the  battle  of  Wagram  began.  He  is 
not  sufficiently  candid  to  admit  that  his  detention,  such  as 
it  was,  was  due  entirely  to  the  action  of  his  own  Govern- 
ment in  seizing  the  French  officer  with  despatches  before 
the  declaration  of  war,  and  keeping  him  a  prisoner  until 
he  could  be  exchanged.  In  the  minds  of  the  authors 
of  the  Holy  Alliance  a  deed,  good  or  bad,  changed  its 
character  according  as  whether  the  perpetrator  was 
Napoleon  or  one  of  themselves.  The  one  could  do  no 
good,  the  others  could  do  no  wrong. 

On  the  evening  of  the  ord  (July),  he  reached  Wolkers- 


TUE  WAB  OF  1809.  49 

dorf,  a  little  village  some  fifteen  miles  from  Vienna,  on 
the  road  to  Biiinn,  and  the  headquarters  of  the  Emperor 
Francis.  He  saw  the  Emperor  the  same  evening,  found 
him  *•' quiet  and  firm  as  ever,  penetrated  with  the 
difficulty  of  the  situation,"  daily  expecting  an  event 
decisive  of  the  *'war."  PVancis,  who  had  been  eagerly 
expecting  Metternich,  Informed  him  that  he  intended  to 
keep  him  with  him  during  the  remainder  of  the  campaign. 
Metternich  then  visited  (Jount  Stadion,  whom  he  found 
in  the  depths  of  despondency. 

The  day  of  July  the  4th  was  spent  by  both  sides  in 
preparations  for  the  impending  battle.  The  following 
day  it  began.  *'  On  the  morning  of  July  5,"  writes 
Metternich,  "  I  joined  the  Emperor  on  the  battlefield  on 
which  the  fate  of  the  Empire  was  to  be  decided.  The 
battle  was  soon  general,  and  we  did  not  return  to 
Wolkersdorf  till  nightfall,  amid  the  blazing  buildings 
which  covered  the  Marchfeld.  AVhen  we  repaired  to 
our  post  of  observation  in  the  grey  of  the  early  morning 
of  the  next  day,  we  witnessed  the  apparently  decisive 
result  of  the  right  wing  of  our  army.  About  one  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon,  however.  Count  CoUoredo,  a  general- 
adjutant  of  the  Archduke,  came  with  the  information  to 
the  Emperor,  that  his  Imperial  Highness  had  ordered 
the  retreat  of  the  army.  Without  losing  his  self-posses- 
sion, the  Enqieror  asked  the  messenger  whether  the 
Archduke  had  only  determined  on  the  retreat,  or  whether 
it  had  already  connnenced.  When  the  Emperor  heard 
that  the  army  was  in  full  retreat,  he  said  to  the  adju- 
tant, *  Very  well,'  and,  turning  to  me,  added,  *  We  shall 
have  much  to  retrieve.'  His  Majesty  gave  immediate 
orders  to  remove  his  headquarters  to  Znaim." 

The  battle  of  Wagram,  won  by  Napoleon  chiefly  be- 
cause the  Viceroy  of  Italy,  Eugene  de  Peauharnais,  obeyed 

£ 


50     LIFE  OF  PRINCE  METTERNICR. 

his  orders  and  joined  him  with  the  army  which  had  hecn 
operating  in  Italy,  whereas  the  commander  of  the  Austrian 
forces  opposed  to  him,  the  Archduke  John,  did  not  obey 
liis  brother's  orders  to  join  him,  but  remained  idle  at 
Pressburg  while  the  battle  was  raging,  was,  in  no  sense, 
a  decisive  battle.  The  Austrians  were  forced  to  retreat, 
but  the  retreat  never  became  a  rout ;  they  lost  no  cannon, 
and  their  army,  if  it  had  fallen  back  upon  Hungary  or 
Moravia,  and  taken  up  that  of  the  Archduke  John,  would 
have  been  very  capable  of  prolonging  the  war,  and  of 
making  its  opponent,  compelled  to  move  further  and 
further  from  his  base,  feel  more  and  more  strongly  every 
day  the  insecurity  of  his  position.  Of  this  no  one  was 
more  sensible  than  Na})oleon.  Spain  was  engulfing  his 
best  troops  ;  he  had  in  front  of  him  an  army  which,  though 
beaten,  was  equal  in  numbers  to  his  own  ;  whilst  around 
him  he  had  a  seething  Germany,  ready,  as  the  events  of 
1813  proved,  to  rise  en  masse  against  him,  should  it 
appear  that  Fortune  had  abandoned  him.  His  clear, 
penetrating,  mind  read  the  situation  in  all  its  bearings, 
and  he  determined,  by  the  means  at  his  disposal,  to  force 
peace  on  the  Emperor  Francis. 

That  sovereign,  on  the  other  hand,  ought,  in  his  own 
interest  and  in  the  interest  of  his  people,  to  have  insisted, 
as,  in  similar  circumstances,  Alexander  insisted  in  1812, 
on  the  continuance  of  the  war.  It  is  due  to  the  Austrian 
Emperor  to  admit  that  he  recognised  the  wisdom  of 
such  a  course  ;  but  he  was  liable  to  be  despondent,  to 
act  upon  impulse.  He  had,  however,  by  his  side,  a  man 
who  recognised  the  situation  almost  as  clearly  as  did 
Napoleon,  and  who,  at  the  moment,  occupied  the  position 
which  would  enable  him  to  give  effect  to  his  convictions. 
For,  on  the  morrow  at  \Vagram,  Count  Stadion,  the 
Foreign  Minister  who  had  prematurely  begun  the  war, 


THE  WAR  OF  1809.  51 

resigned  his  office.  He  was  actually,  though  not  at  the 
moment  nominally,  succeeded  in  it  by  Metternich,  who  had 
gained  the  confidence  of  his  master  by  his  services  at 
Paris,  and  who  kept  it  to  the  last  hour  of  the  Emperor's 
life.  The  selection,  under  the  circumstances,  was  a 
specially  happy  one,  for  Metternich  had  made  of  the 
character  of  Napoleon  a  study,  and  his  keen,  cold,  and 
unimpassioned  intellect  had  recoo^nised  its  strong  and  its 
weak  points  alike,  lie  was  resolved  that,  so  far  as  he 
could  influence  events,  there  should  be  no  humiliating- 
peace — that  is,  no  peace  which  should  weaken  Austria  as 
Prussia  had  been  weakened  ;  that,  rather,  the  war  should 
be  continued  until,  from  alarm  at  his  isolated  position  and 
the  events  surging  around  him,  the  French  Emperor 
should  be  forced  to  retreat.  Then,  when  he  should  have 
evacuated  Austrian  territory,  Metternich  would  treat  for 
a  peace  which  should  be  solid. 

But  events  were  too  strong  for  Metternich.  He  could 
not  command  the  army,  and  the  Archduke  Charles,  who 
did  command  it,  committed  at  this  period  one  of  those 
mistakes  which,  in  war,  is  almost  always  irretrievable. 
Instead  of  retreating,  after  Wagram,  upon  Hungary — a 
retreat  which  would  have  drawn  to  him  the  army  of  his 
brother  John,  assured  to  him  all  the  resources  of  that 
fertile  country,  and  drawn  the  French  dangerously  far 
from  their  base — or  upon  Moravia,  he  chose  to  fall  back 
into  Bohemia,  the  very  line  which  Napoleon  himself  would 
have  prescribed  to  him  had  he  had  a  voice  in  the  matter. 
For  a  short  interval  the  French  generals,  sent  to  pursue 
the  Austrian  army,  were  puzzled  as  to  the  line  the  enemy 
had  taken,  there  being  some  indications  that  a  portion 
of  their  troops  were  trending  towards  Moravia.  The 
sagacity  or  the  happy  inspiration  of  Marmont  solved  the 
doubt.     Certain  indications  produced  in  the  mind  of  that 

E  2 


52  LIFE  OF  PPJNCE  METTERNICE. 

general  the  conviction  that  Znaim  would  prove  the 
covering  angle  of  the  retreat.  Upon  Znaim,  then,  despite 
every  temptation  to  pursue  another  route — and  these  were 
not  wanting — Marmont  unhesitatingly  pressed  ;  estab- 
lished himself  in  front  of  the  Austrian  corps  occupying 
the  place  the  afternoon  of  the  10th  (July)  ;  was  joined  in 
the  morning  by  Massena.  That  famous  general,  the 
greatest  in  the  French  army  after  Napoleon,  at  once 
attacked  the  Austrian  position,  reinforced  during  the 
night  by  the  Archduke  in  person,  and  carried  it.  The 
cavalry  not  having  arrived,  the  enemy  could  not  be 
pursued. 

Meanwhile  Napoleon  arrived  on  the  ground.  Almost 
simultaneously  there  came  Prince  John  of  Liechtenstein 
to  demand  a  suspension  of  arms,  and  to  promise  the 
opening  of  a  negotiation  for  the  conclusion  of  immediate 
peace.  After  a  short  consultation  with  his  marshals, 
Napoleon  consented,  simply  requiring  from  Prince  John 
a  promise  that  plenipotentiaries  should  be  at  once  ap- 
pointed to  negotiate  the  conditions  of  a  truce.  This 
demand  was  conceded,  and  Prince  John  nominated  Baron 
Wimpffen  as  negotiator  on  behalf  of  Austria.  Napoleon 
named  Bertliier. 

The  men  to  negotiate  a  permanent  ])eace  were, 
naturally,  the  statesmen  of  the  two  countries.  The  day 
after  the  truce  had  been  arranged.  Napoleon  sent 
Champafrny  to  Komorn,  where  Francis  and  Metternich, 
hearing  the  title  of  Minister  of  State,  had  taken  up  their 
abode,  to  propose  the  carrying  into  effect  the  arrangement 
he  had  come  to  with  Prince  John  of  Liechtenstein. 
Francis  being  inclined  to  agree,  Metternich  arranged 
with  Chamjjagny  that  the  negotiations  should  be  carried 
on  at  the  town  of  Altenburg,  in  Hungary,  by  the  two 
Foreign  Ministers  in  person.     Meanwhile  Prince  John  of 


0- 


THE  WAB  OF  1809.  53 

Liechtenstein  took  command  of  the  Austrian  army,  in 
place  of  the  Archduke  Charles  who  resigned,  and,  a  few 
days  later,  Francis  moved  to  Totls,  the  headquarters  of 
the  new  Conmiander-in-chief.  It  is  necessary  to  add 
tlu\t  Count  Bubna  was  appointed  military  commissary  for 
the  Emperor  with  Napoleon,  and  that  Count  Nugent  was 
nominated  to  act  as  second  negotiator  under  Metternich. 

The  real  thoughts  of  the  Austrian  plenipotentiary  at 
this  period  may  be  gathered  from  a  letter  written  to  his 
mother  from  Altenburg,  dated  August  1,  1809  : 

"  It  is  true  it  is  not  we  who  hang  back,  it  is  true  it  is  we  who  desira 
peace,  but  it  must  be  a  peace  which  shall  rid  us  of  the  necessity  of 
watching  our  safety  every  hour  of  the  day  and  uiglit,  which  sliall 
allow  us  to  enjoy  the  blessings  of  peace — to  disarm,  to  flatter  our.-elves 
with  the  poijsiljility  of  remaining  quiet  for  a  time.  Again,  if  we  do 
not  wish  to  undergo  certain  death  in  six  months,  if  we  do  not  wisli  to 
throw  the  monarchy  out  of  the  window,  and  that  window  one  from 
which  the  leap  would  be  equivalent  to  the  Emperor's  last  resource  we 

must  not  (lesir^)  it.     If  Napoleon  desire  the  destruction  of  Austria at 

any  rate  it  is  better  to  fight  him  with  300,000  men,  than  with  50,000." 

The  meaning  of  these  words  is  too  clear  to  be  mis- 
understood. "  We  want  peace,  but  not  a  Napoleonic 
peace — a  peace  which  will  cripple  our  resources,  and 
reduce  our  army  to  the  level  to  which  the  Prussian  army 
has  been  reduced.  Better  to  fight  now  when  we  still  have 
300,000  men,  than  to  make  a  humiliating  peace,  only  to 
fight  a  few  years  later,  when  our  army  shall  have  been 
reduced  to  50,000." 

No  doubt  this  was  a  true  and  a  patriotic  view.  But  on 
this  occasion  Metternich  was  neither  so  cool  nor  so  clear 
in  his  purpose  as  we  shall  see  him  at  a  later  epoch.  It  is 
impossible  to  read  his  letters  to  his  mother  without  bein<r 
driveii^to  the  conclusion  that  despair  was  bei^inninfT  to 
lessen  his  self-confidence.  Certainly  in  one  important 
respect,  the  basis  of  his  action  was  wrong :  for,   if  his 


54  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTFBNICH. 

Autobiography  is  to  be  trusted,  he  did  not  correctly  read 
the  motives  of  the  French  Emperor  in  assenting  to  a 
truce.  He  says  that  he  did  not  believe  that  the  Emperor 
was  serious  in  his  negotiations  for  peace  ;  that  he  regarded 
his  treating  as  a  mode  of  gaining  time  to  recruit  his 
forces  to  renew  the  war,  unless,  by  this  demonstration, 
he  could  terrify  Austria  into  accepting  a  peace  which 
should  so  cripple  her  resources  as  to  render  her  powerless 
to  resist  further  aggressions  on  the  part  of  the  conqueror. 
Now  it  is  abundantly  evident  that  at  this  time — and 
Metternich  learnt  it  at  a  later  period — Napoleon  was 
resolved  to  make  peace  with  Austria,  peace  on  his  own 
terms  if  he  could,  but  almost  any  peace  rather  than 
continue  the  war.  Matters  were  not  progressing  well  in 
Spain.  The  jealousy — that  bane  of  French  commanders 
in  the  Peninsula — of  Marshal  Victor  had  not  only 
extricated  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley  from  a  false  position  at 
Talavera:  it  had  caused  the  loss  of  a  battle.  Then  a 
formidable  English  army  was  approaching  the  shores  of 
Holland.  The  continuance  of  the  war  with  Austria  would 
involve  Napoleon  in  a  campaign  which  might,  if  the 
Austrians  should  be  led  by  a  man  who  understood  the 
situation,  be  long  and  tedious.  Already  Napoleon  had 
been  surprised  at  the  solidity  of  the  resistance  which  he 
had  encountered.  In  1806,  Prussia  had  fallen  before 
him  like  a  house  of  cards.  Austria,  on  the  contrary,  had 
beaten  him  at  Essling,  and  though  he  claimed,  and  justly 
claimed,  Wagram  as  a  victory,  it  was  a  victory  by  which 
he  gained  merely  the  ground  on  which  the  battle  had 
been  fought.  If,  then,  he  coull  obtain,  as  he  believed  he 
could  obtain,  by  the  prestige  of  his  position  as  occupying 
the  enemy's  ca{)ital,  and  as  supporting  his  army  on  the 
enemy's  country,  terms  of  peace  which,  while  satisfying 
his  vanity  as  victor,  should  yet  somewhat,  though  not  to 


TEE  WAB  OF  1809.  65 

the  extent  he  had  originally  determined,  diminish  the 
resources  of  Austria,  he  would  hold  his  hand,  and  divert 
to  Spain  the  resources  which  would  be  no  longer  required 
in  Southern  Germany. 

At  the  outset  of  the  negotiations  it  seemed  as  though 
the  distance  between  the  pretensions  of  the  two  Powers 
was  so  vast  that  it  would  be  very  difficult  to  find  a  middle 
way.  If  we  are  to  believe  the  historian  of  the  Consulate 
and  the  Empire,  Mettermch  demanded  that  Austria 
should  be  dealt  with  in  a  large  and  generous  spirit ;  that 
she  should  not  be  required  to  make  any  cession  of  territory. 
Treated  thus,  he  added,  Austria  would  become  to  France 
a  firmer  and  more  constant  ally  than  Russia ;  less  given 
to  change,  and  at  least  as  powerful ;  that  such  a  procedure 
would  be  far  more  advantageous  to  Napoleon  than  would 
be  the  despoiling  of  the  Austrian  Empire  for  the  benefit 
of  ungrateful  Powers  such  as  Bavaria,  Wiirtemberg,  and 
Saxony.  A  peace  of  that  character,  he  added,  would  of 
all  solutions  be  the  solution  most  favourable  to  French 
interests,  but  if  such  a  basis  were  inadmissible,  it  only 
remained  to  barfjain  how  much  Austria  should  resign : 
that  such  a  method  would  be  cruel  for  Austria,  and  really 
disadvantageous  for  France  ;  further,  that  if  that  method 
were  adopted,  it  would  not  be  for  him,  but  for  the  French 
negotiator,  to  take  the  first  step.* 

Champagny  replied  that  the  first  system  had  been  tried 
after  Austerlitz,  and  had  failed  ;  that,  after  such  an  experi- 
ence, it  was  no  longer  possible  to  be  generous  ;  that  it  was 
necessary  that  war  should  be  made  .costly  to  those  who 
entered  upon  it  so  lightly,  and  with  so  little  scruple. 
After  some  further  conversation  he  presented  the  proposal 
of  treating  on  the  basis  of  the  lUi  possidetis.  To  this 
claim,    which,   it    will    be   readily    understood,    was    not 

*  Thiers :  tome  xi.,  pp.  255-8. 


56  LIFE  OF  PBTNCE  METTEBNICH. 

seriously  put  forward,  Metternlch  replied  that  rather 
than  discuss  it  Austria  would  fiaht  so  long'  as  there  was  a 
man  left  to  bear  a  sword. 

Of  this  conversation  there  Wiis  no  written  record. 
Napoleon  had  objected  to  the  use  of  protocols,  and 
though  he  subsequently  withdrew  his  objection,  it  was 
only,  according  to  Metternich,  when  he  had  resolved  to 
carry  out  the  negotiation  in  a  manner  peculiarly  his  own. 
After  the  conversations  1  have  recorded  the  two  negotiators 
remained  for  a  time  inactive,  waiting,  it  would  seem,  for 
instructions.  At  length  the  French  Minister,  acting  on 
his  master's  orders,  made  the  first  move.  The  Emperor, 
said  Champagny,  reserving  the  question  of  Italy,  will  be 
content  with  the  cession  of,  on  the  Danube,  the  line  of 
the  Enns,  to  form  there  the  frontier  of  Bavaria.  As  this 
cession  would  transfer  to  Bavaria  800,000  souls,  and  bring 
her  frontier  to  within  about  a  hundred  miles  of  Vienna, 
it  was  clear  that  Austria  could  not  accept  it ;  but,  before 
replying,  Metternich  insisted  on  learning  the  French 
propositions  regarding  Italy.  These  proved  to  be  at  least 
as  startling.  Napoleon,  forced  to  reply,  demanded  through 
his  Minister,  Carinthia,  Carniola,  and  the  right  bank  of 
the  River  Save,  from  its  source  at  Wochein  in  Carniola 
to  the  frontiers  of  Bosnia.  Such  terms  were  impossible, 
and  it  is  certain  that  Napoleon  knew  that  they  would  be 
so  considered.  But  they  produced  the  effect  he  intended, 
that  is,  they  produced  on  Metternich  and  on  the  Austrian 
Emperor  a  feeling  of  profound  discouragement ;  the  belief 
that  Napoleon,  who  was  in  his  heart  not  only  eager  but 
nervously  anxious  for  peace,  was  determined  to  reduce 
Austria  to  nothing,  or  to  continue  the  war.  For  the 
moment,  then,  Metternich  gave  an  evasive  reply,  asking 
whether  this  demand  included  all  the  sacrifices  required 
by  the  French  Emperor. 


TBE  WAR  OF  1809.  67 

It  did  not.  Oil  the  4th  September,  Napoleon  completed 
his  demand.  lie  required,  he  said,  three  circles  of 
Bohemia  to  be  given  to  his  ally,  the  King  of  Saxony,  and 
about  one  half  of  Galicia,  to  add  to  the  Grand  Duchy  of 
Warsaw.  If  all  these  demands  should  be  granted  the 
population  of  Austria  would  be  diminished  by  five  millions. 
*'  The  Austrian  legation,"  writes  M.  Thiers,  "  still  made 
no  reply,  but  M.  de  Metternich  continued  in  his  private 
conversations  to  deplore  the  system  of  peace  adopted  by 
Napoleon,  calling  it  narrow,  cruel,  bargained  (marche), 
instead  of  a  generous  peace  which  would  have  assured  a 
long  period  of  repose,  and  a  definitive  pacification." 

The  silence  of  Austria,  a  silence  which  was  the  result 
of  the  profound  discouragement  created  by  the  demands 
made  upon  her  and  by  the  fear  lest  the  negotiations  should 
be  broken  off  and  hostilities  renewed,  was  so  little  satis* 
factory  to  Napoleon  that  he  determined,  more  suo,  to  finish 
with  the  matter  On  the  7th  September,  he  directed 
Count  Bubna,  who,  I  have  stated,  had  been  appointed 
Austrian  Military  Commissary  at  the  head(juarters  of 
the  French  Emperor,  to  request  the  Emperor  Francis  to 
send  Prince  John  of  Liechtenstein  to  Vienna.  *'  The 
di})lomatists,"  added  Napoleon,  "  do  not  know  how  to 
manage  an  affair  like  the  present ;  we  soldiers  understand 
each  other  better,"  and  more  of  the  same  sort.  Bubna 
presented  the  intentions  of  Napoleon  with  respect  to  the 
conditions  of  peace  as  more  favourable  than  had  appeared 
previously ;  but  as  he  brought  with  him  no  guarantee, 
nothing  but  empty  words,  Francis,  who  was  not  under  the 
spell  of  the  fascination  exercised  by  Napoleon  upon  his 
Commissary,  declined  for  the  moment  to  accede  to  the 
request;  but  sent  back  Bubna  with  a  letter  stating  that 
the  conditions  indicated  by  Napoleon  in  his  conversation 
with  that  official  were  not  such  as  Austria  could  accept — 


68  LIFE  OF  PRINCE  METTEBNICR. 

that  further  concessions  were  necessary,  if  the  French 
Emperor  desh'ed  a  peace  which  should  be  stable. 

This  reply  responded  so  little  to  the  wishes  of  Napoleon 
that  he  resolved  to  take  measures  such  as  he  thought 
would  intimidate  Austria  into  compliance.  Making  it 
clear  to  Count  Bubna  that  his  army  had  beeu  reinforced, 
that  he  was  ready  to  recommence  hostilities,  he  sent  him 
back  to  Francis  to  declare  that  the  message  of  which  the 
Count  had  been  the  bearer  on  his  previous  journey  was  his 
idtimatum,  and  that  if  that  were  rejected,  hostilities  would 
be  at  once  renewed. 

If  Metternich  had  been  the  Emperor  Francis,  it  is 
almost  certain  that  the  proposal  would  have  been  rejected 
and  the  war  been  renewed,  unless,  at  the  last  moment, 
Napoleon  should  himself  have  given  way.  But  Metternich 
was  not  even  by  the  side  of  his  master  ;  and  Francis,  afraid 
to  take  upon  himself  the  responsibility  of  renewing 
hostilities,  the  result  of  which,  if  adverse,  would  be  the 
breaking  up  of  his  Empire,  and  hoping  something  from 
compliance,  despatched  Prince  John  of  Liechtenstein  with 
Count  Bubna  to  Vienna. 

Of  the  nature  of  the  mission  entrusted  to  Prince  John 
there  are  two  versions.  M.  Thiers  asserts  that  the  Prince 
went  to  Vienna  with  power  to  consent  to  the  principal 
bases  posed  by  Napoleon  at  his  first  interview  with  Count 
Bubna,  but  instructed  to  endeavour  to  obtain  concessions 
with  respect  to  the  sacrifices  demanded  in  Upper  Austria ; 
to  the  contributions  required  tor  the  expenses  of  the  war, 
and,  generally,  to  the  details.  Metternich,  on  the  other 
hand,  declares  that  Prince  John,  who  stopped  at  Altenburg 
to  see  him  on  his  way  to  Vienna,  brought  him  a  letter 
from  the  Emperor  Francis  telling  him  that  the  mission 
had  no  other  object  but  to  arrive  at  a  knowledge  of 
Napoleon's  iritentions  ;    that  the  Field  Marshal   (Prince 


TEE  WAB  OF  1809.  69 

John)  had  orders  to  listen  to  everything,  but  not  to  enter 
into  any  discussion.  It  is  clear,  however,  that  Prince 
John  showed  him  his  more  extended  powers  ;  for,  he  adds, 
that  he  informed  the  Prince  of  the  mistake  he  was  com- 
mitting in  proceeding  on  such  an  errand. 

"When  the  Prince,"  be  writes,  "  had  infomied  me  of  the  instructions 
lie  had  received,  I  said  to  him :  '  If  I  had  been  aware  of  your  mission, 
rather  than  you  should  have  passed  the  outpusts  of  the  French  army, 
I  would  have  taken  upou  myself  to  request  you  to  wait,  till  I  had 
spoken  to  the  Emperor.  We  are  no  longer  in  Altenburg;  you  are 
within  leach  of  the  hostile  army,  and  must  go  on.  But  I  tell  you 
beforehand,  that  of  two  things  one  will  happen  :  either  Napoleon 
will  lead  you  to  do  something  which  will  compromise  our  cause,  or  he 
will  prevent  you  from  returning  to  your  post.  The  army  must  have 
its  commanders ;  this  Napoleon  knows,  and  has  drawn  you  away  from 
it.  He  will  either  constrain  the  Emperor  to  conclude  a  peace  which 
lie  ought  not  to  conclude,  or  he  will  deprive  him  of  the  means  of 
carrying  on  the  war.*  The  Prince,  who  was  much  agitated  by  what 
I  said,  declared  he  was  ready  to  go  back  to  Totis.  I  showed  him  that 
he  must  perform  the  commission  he  had  undertaken,  but  must  make 
every  eflbrt  not  to  depart  from  it." 

When  the  AutoMograpJnj  of  Prince  Metiernich  first 
appeared,  the  passage  I  have  just  quoted  was  one  of  the 
passages  which  especially  attracted  attention.  To  me, 
after  close  examination,  it  appears  to  bear,  as  so  many 
passages  in  the  Autobiography  appear  to  bear,  the  signs 
of  having  been  "edited."  The  reader  will  not  fail  to 
notice  that  the  action  of  Francis  in  sendinof  Prince  John 
to  Vienna,  even  as  Metternich  asserts,  that  he  might  play 
there  only  the  part  of  a  listener,  was  to  take  the  negotiation 
out  of  the  hands  of  Metternich  and  Cham pagny.  Then 
again,  is  it  reasonable  to  believe  that  Prince  John  was 
sent  merely  as  a  listener,  when  Count  Bubna  had  already 
twice  fulfilled  that  function  ?  Why  should  the  Com- 
mander-in-chief of  the  Austrian  army  accept  a  position, 
the  duties  of  which  had  been  ably  performed  by  the  sub- 


60  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICE. 

ordinate  to  whom  they  properly  belonged,  and  in  which 
he  could  do  little  more  than  act  the  part  of  a  mute.  "The 
Field- Marshal  had  orders  to  listen  to  every th in  (t,  but  not 
to  enter  into  discussion  on  any  subject,"  writes  Metternich. 
It  seems  the  height  of  absurdity  to  suppose  that  the  Field- 
Marshal  would  accept  such  a  mission.  Scarcely  less 
absurd  is  the  plea  put  forward  by  Metternich  as  to  wliy 
he  refrained  from  accepting  Prince  John's  offer  to  return 
to  his  post,  after  he  had  enlightened  that  Prince  as  to  the 
alternative  which  lay  before  him.  "  We  are  no  longer  in 
Altenburg,"  says  Prince  Metternich.  But  they  were  in 
Altenburg.  "  The  Prince  stopped  to  see  me  at  Alten- 
burg ; "  then  followed  the  conversation  on  which  I  am 
commenting.  If  he  would  not  take  upon  himself  the  re- 
sponsibility of  stopping  and  sending  back  Prince  John 
before  passing  the  cordon  of  French  troops  round  Altenburg 
there  seems  no  reason  why,  if  he  considered  the  danger 
so  great,  he  should  not  have  detained  him  for  at  least  a 
few  hours  until  he  could  communicate  with  his  master. 
Equally  fanciful,  it  seems  tome,  is  the  notion,  prominently 
set  forth,  that  Napoleon  had  invited  Prince  John  to 
Vienna,  in  order  to  deprive  the  Austrian  army  of  its 
Commander-in-Chief.  Such  a  policy  \^ould  have  been  in- 
telligible if  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Austrian  army 
had  been  a  Hannibal,  a  Prince  Eugene,  a  Villars,  a 
Frederick,  or  a  JMassena  ;  but  to  deprive  an  army  of  a 
Prince  John  of  Liechtenstein  was  surely  not  very  much. 
The  Prince  had  assumed  the  command  but  a  few  days 
before ;  distinguished  as  a  fighting  soldier,  he  had  never 
held  a  separate  command.  On  the  other  hand,  the  reason 
why  Napoleon  wanted  Prince  John  at  Vienna  is  clear. 
He  had  had  previous  relations  with  him  of  a  very  friendly 
character  ;  it  was  Prince  John  who  had  negotiated  the  con- 
ditions of  the  armistice  after  Austerlitz,  and  who  had  signed 


TEE  PEACE  OF  VIENNA.  61 

tlie  Peace  of  Pressburg.  Napoleon  knew  the  generous 
nature  of  the  man,  and  felt  sure  he  could  attain  his  ends 
more  surely  by  working  upon  that  nature,  than  by  con- 
tinuing to  negotiate  with  Metternich.  For  these  reasons 
I  cannot  regard  the  account  given  by  Metternich  of  the 
origin  and  progress  of  the  negotiations  of  Prince  John  of 
Liechtenstein  with  Napoleon  as  other  than  an  ebullition 
of  spleen,  produced  by  the  feeling  that  the  matter  had 
been,  without  warning  and  somewhat  cavalierly,  taken  out 
of  his  hands. 

What  followed  may  be  compressed  within  a  few  words. 
Prince  John  and  Count  Bubna  proceeded  to  Vienna  tlie 
27th  of  September,  and,  on  the  30th,  a<i^reed  with 
Napoleon  as  to  the  conditions  of  peace.  The  only  point 
left  unsettled  was  that  which  referred  to  the  payment  of 
an  indemnity.  To  obtain  definite  instructions  on  this 
point,  Bubna  proceeded  to  Totis,  to  take  there  the  orders 
of  his  master.  Bubna  found  great  uncertainty  at  the 
Austrian  headquarters  as  to  whether  a  continuance  of 
the  war  was  not  preferable  to  a  peace  which  would  enor- 
mously reduce  the  resources  of  the  Empire.  But  if  we  may 
believe  M.  Thiers,  a  well-timed  intimation  from  Russia 
that  if  Austria  were  to  continue  the  war,  she,  Russia,  would 
be  compelled  to  assist  Napoleon  in  the  field,  almost 
decided  the  Emperor  Francis.  Prince  John  then  took 
upon  himself  to  take  a  step  beyond  his  instructions,  and, 
on  the  1 4th  October,  signed  the  Peace  of  Vienna. 

To  that  peace,  and  to  its  terms,  Metternich  was  an 
absolute  stranger.  He  goes  so  far  as  to  assert  that 
Napoleon  obtained  it  by  unworthy  artifices,  and,  having 
procured  the  signature  of  the  Austrian  Commissioners, 
announced  the  fact  to  the  citizens  of  Vienna  by  the  firing 
of  a  cannon  so  as  to  render  it  imjwssible  for  Francis  to 
disavow  it.     Here  again,  I  think  his  Autobiography  is  not 


62  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICH, 

a  safe  guide.  He  says  that  the  treaty,  which  Prince  John 
believed  to  be  only  "  the  project  of  a  treaty  to  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  Emperor  of  Austria,"  was  signed  the  night 
of  the  IHth,  and  communicated  by  the  firing  of  cannon  to 
the  Viennese  on  the  morning  of  the  14th  ;  that  he  himself 
was  aware  of  it  from  the  mouth  of  Prince  John  himself 
on  the  evening  of  the  same  day : 

"  Yet,"  he  continues,  "  without  compromising  himself  and  liis 
Empire  in  a  most  dangerous  manner,  the  Emperor  could  not  reject  the 
conclusion  of  a  peace  which  liad  been  already  announced,  amid  the 
rejoicings  of  Ihe  people  in  the  capital,  and  in  more  than  a  third  part 
of  the  country  still  remaining  to  him.  The  Emperor  ratified  the 
treaty." 

Surely,  what  is  this  but  to  declare  that  it  was  at  any 
moment  in  the  power  of  an  unscrupulous  man  such  as 
Metternich  believed  Napoleon  to  be,  to  fire  cannon  and 
to  send  out  couriers  to  announce  peace  which  had  not  been 
concluded,  in  order  thus  to  obtain  thereto  the  consent  of 
his  antagonist  If  this  treaty  was,  as  Metternich  asserts, 
no  treaty,  but  only  the  project  of  a  treaty,  how  was  it  that 
Prince  John  did  not  at  once  denounce  it  ? 

The  treaty  having  been  ratified,  Metternich  became,  by 
title  as  well  as  in  fact,  Chancellor  of  the  Empire  and 
Minister  for  Eoreiirn  Affairs.  In  that  capacity  he  returned 
with  Francis  to  Vienna  at  the  end  of  November,  and 
devoted  himself  to  the  task  of  seeing  that  the  conditions 
of  the  treaty  were  loyally  carried  out.  He  could  not  but 
recoofnise  that  the  war  of  1809  had  resulted  most  di&- 
astrously  for  his  country,  in  that  the  peace  which  was  the 
consequence  of  it  had  bound  it  with  a  circle  of  iron ;  de- 
prived it  of  its  communication  with  the  Adriatic ;  and,  by 
a  secret  clause,  had  limited  the  maximum  of  the  Austrian 
forces  to  150,000  men.  Still,  he  maintained  his  lofty 
attitude — still   he  hoped.     The   success  of  Napoleon  in 


TEE  MABRIAGR  63 

this  campaign  would,  he  believed,  still   more  inflate  his 
pride. 

"  I  foresaw,"  he  wrote,  "  that  neither  he  nor  his  undertaltings  would 
escape  the  consequence  of  rashness  and  extravagance.  The  when  and 
the  /to  10  I  coukl  not  pretend  to  dttermine.  Thus  my  reason  pointed 
out  to  me  the  direction  I  had  to  take  in  order  not  to  interfere  with  the 
natural  development  of  the  situation,  and  to  keep  open  for  Austria  the 
chances  which  the  greatest  of  all  powers — the  power  of  circumstances — 
might  oiFer,  sooner  or  later,  under  the  strong  government  of  its 
monarch,  for  the  much-threatened  prosperity  of  the  Empire." 


We  find  him  agahi  tracing  all  the  misfortunes  of 
.  Europe  back  to  the  Revolution,  '*  which,"  he  says, 
\' found  its  highest  expression  in  Napoleon."  T^     -.  .^""— 

At  Vieima,  then,  Metternich  resumed THe  role  he  had 
played  at  Paris — the  role  of  master-conspirator  against 
Napoleon,  j  The  fact  that  the  secret  combinations  made 
between  180(5  and  1809  had  resulted  in  a  further 
dismemberment  of  the  Austrian  Empire  and  a  large 
diminution  of  its  resources,  in  no  way  abated  his  pride  or 
lowered  his  confidence.  He  still  remained  the  centre,  the 
soul,  the  hope,  of  those  to  whom  the  name  of  Napoleon 
was  abomination.  He  was  that  centre,  that  soul,  and 
that  hope,  when  an  event  occurred  which  caused  him,  for 
a  brief  moment,  to  reconsider  his  position. 

At  a  masked  bail  at  Paris,  given  by  the  Arch-Chancellor, 
Cambaceres,  Napoleon  sounded  Madame  Metternich  as 
to  whether  she  thought  that  the  Archduchess,  Marie 
Lou'se,  would  accept  his  hand,  and  whether  her  father 
would  agree  to  the  alliance.  Madame  Metternich  replied 
that  that  was  a  matter  on  which-  the  then  Austrian 
ambassador,  Prince  Schwarzenberg,  not  she,  should  be 
consulted ;  and,  the  same  evening  she  mentioned  the 
conversation  to  that  Prince.  The  following-  mornino". 
Prince  Eugene,  Viceroy  of  Italy,  called  on  the  Austrian 
ambassador,  and  "  in  the  name  of  the  Emperor  and  with 


64  LIFE  OF  PBINCF  METTERNICH. 

the  knowledge  of  his  mother,  the  Empress  Josephine," 
made  the  same  offer.  Prhice  Schwarzenberg  at  once 
referred  the  matter  to  Vienna. 

We  are  bound,  it  seems  tu  me,  to  accept  Mctternich's 
version  of  what  ha])pened  at  Vienna  when  the  courier 
arrived  there  with  the  despatch  containing  the  offer,  for, 
in  it,  he  and  the  Emperor  Francis  were  alone  concerned. 
'•  As  soon  as  the  courier  brought  me  this  news,"  he 
writes,  "I  repaired  to  the  Emperor.  Your  Majesty," 
said  I,  "  is  here  placed  in  a  situation  in  which  the  ruler 
and  the  father  can  alone  say  yes  or  no.  One  or  other 
must  be  spoken  by  you,  for  a  doubtful  or  hesitating 
answer  is  not  possible."  On  tlie  Emperor  asking  Metter- 
nich  what  he  w^ould  do  in  his  place,  the  cautious  states- 
man replied  that  there  were  cases  in  which  it  was  im- 
possible for  one  man  to  put  himself  in  the  place  of  another, 
and  that  this  was  one  of  them.  Finally  Francis  resolved 
to  leave  the  decision  entirely  to  his  daughter,  and  Metter- 
nich  at  once  waited  upon  Marie  Louise.  The  interview- 
was  short  but  decisive.  The  Archduchess  placed  herself 
absolutely  in  the  hands  of  her  father,  to  be  disposed  of  as 
high  policy,  that  is,  the  interests  of  Austria,  might  dictate. 
The  Emperor  Francis,  believing  that  the  marriage  would 
secure  to  Europe  some  years  of  political  peace,  despatched 
a  courier  to  Paris  to  accept  the  offer,  with  the  sole 
reservation  that  on  neither  side  should  any  condition  be 
attached  to  it.*     This  was  the  event  which,  I  stated  in 

*  In  his  Autobiography  Mctternich  repeateilly  brings  into  prominent 
notice  the  manner  in  which  he  was  guided  by  his  conscience.  In  the 
luatter  of  the  marriage  of  Marie  Lonise  it  has  often  been  wondoed 
how  the  consciences  of  the  high  dignitaries  of  the  Roman  Catholic 
Church,  as  well  as  the  Emperor  of  Austria  and  his  family,  should  have 
sanctioned  a  divorce,  when  divorce  is  contrary  to  the  law  of  the 
Church.  Metternicli,  with  a  strange  forgetfnlness  of  facts,  denies  that 
there  was  any  difficulty.     He  says:  "One  que.>tion  wliich  naturally 


THE  MABBIAGE.  65 

a  preceding  page,  caused  IMetternich  for  a  brief  moment 
to  reconsider  the  situation.  "  That  this  event,"  he  wrote, 
"  drew  a  line  between  the  past  and  present  is  quite 
evident." 

Was  that  line  a  line  of  effacement  ?  Would  the 
conqueror,  admitted  within  the  pale  of  the  ancient  regimes, 
put  his  sword  in  its  sheath,  and  build  up  the  future  of 
France  ?  Or,  would  he,  with  the  help  of  Austria,  found 
a  dynasty,  and  yet  continue  his  system  of  conquest? 
Tiiese  were  the  questions  which  occurred  to  Metternich, 
and  which  he  felt  he  could  not  solve  at  Vienna.  He 
therefore  requested  his  master  to  allow  him  to  proceed  to 
Paris  at  the  same  time  as  the  new  Empress,  and  to  remain 
there  until  he  could  satisfy  his  mind.  Francis  assented  ; 
whereupon,  after  the  marriage  had  been  celebrated,  by 
proxy  on  the  part  of  Napoleon,  at  Vienna  (March  11, 
1810),  j\retternich  set  out  for  Paris,  though  not  by  the 
same  road  as  that  taken  by  Marie  Louise  and  her  suite. 


had  a  great  interest  for  the  public  was  the  divorce  of  Nupolcon  and 
Josephine.  For  the  Church  the  question  did  not  exist,  and  therefore 
not  for  the  Empenn*.  Napoleon  had  contracted  a  civil  marriage  with 
the  express  understanding  that  the  union  could  be  dissolved;  in  the 
eyes  of  the  Church,  therefore,  it  was  not  a  valid  marriage.  Indeed, 
had  it  been  othericise,  the  scheme  could  not  have  been  entertained  for 
a  moment.  The  dissolution  of  the  first  marriage,  so  called,  had  only, 
therefore,  the  value  of  a  mere  formality  such  as  the  French  civil  law 
required."  Thus  Metternich.  The  truth,  however,  is  that  Napoleon 
and  Josepliine,  who  had,  indeed,  been  only  civilly  married  under  the 
Directory,  were  religiously  united,  two  days  before  the  Coronation,  by 
Cardinal  Fesch,  before  an  altar  which  had  been  erected  in  the 
Emperor's  cabinet.  This  fact,  which  the  historians  of  the  time  do 
not  fail  to  mention,  is  placed  beyond  all  doubt  by  the  memoirs  of 
Madame  de  Re'iuusat.  Did  Metternich  and  the  Austrian  Court, 
then,  voluntarily  shut  their  eyes  to  a  fact,  which,  according  to 
Metternich,  xcoidd  have  ■prevented  the  entertaining  for  a  moment  of  the 
idea  of  the  marriage?  It  is  very  difficult  to  believe  that  ihey  did 
not. 

F 


66  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICE. 

He  did  not,  thus,  meet  Napoleon  until  after  the  latter  had 
seen  his  bride. 

Napoleon  welcomed  Metternich  "  with  visible  signs  of 
satisfaction."  He  spoke  to  him,  amongst  other  pleasant 
matters,  of  "an  entire  forgetfulness  of  the  past,  of  a 
happy  and  peaceful  epoch,  of  the  impossibility  that  any- 
thing" should  disturb  the  natural  relations  between  us." 
Regarding  the  war  of  1809,  the  Emperor  admitted,  for  a 
moment,  that  if  in  the  month  of  September,  Austria  had 
recommenced  hostilities,  "  I  should  have  been  lost ;  "  but 
noting  the  effect  of  the  word  "  lost "  on  his  listener, 
he  withdrew  it,  and  substituted  the  phrase,  "  in  great 
difficulties."  But  Metternich  insisted  on  the  first 
expression,  held  to  it  in  his  argument ;  and,  there  can  be 
very  little  doubt,  so  used  it  as  to  inspire  those  with  whom 
he  conversed  with  the  conviction  of  its  truth.  The  time 
was  to  come  when  Alexander  would  be,  after  the  battle  of 
La  Moskowa  (Borodino),  in  a  position  almost  analogous 
to  that  of  Francis  after  Wagram.  Rendered  wise  by  the 
experience  of  others,  he  declined  to  treat. 

Metternich  enjoyed  many  confidential  conversations  with 
the  Emperor  at  Compiegne,  and  these  were  continued 
when  he  returned  to  Paris.  There,  he  tells  us,  Napoleon 
placed  at  his  disposal  the  Hotel  of  Marshal  Ney  with  a 
complete  household.  It  would  seem  that  Napoleon's 
remarks  on  political  matters  were  characterised  by  great 
frankness  and  sincerity.  Talking  of  Russia  he  expatiated 
at  length  on  his  relations  with  that  Power,  convincing  his 
listener  that  Austria  would  require  to  exercise  prudence 
and  wisdom  to  avoid  a  rupture  with  her.  He  displayed  a 
strong  desire  to  render  himself  useful  and  agreeable  to 
Austria  ;  and  in  these  first  moments  left  upon  the  mind 
of  Metternich  the  belief  that  the  Emperor  was  animated 
by  a  very  decided  conviction  that  the  existence  of  Austria, 


THE  MABRIAGE.  67 

far  from  being  incompatible  with  that  of  aggrandised 
France,  "would  serve  him  as  a  shield."  Everything 
seemed  to  show  that  the  impressions  of  the  Austrian 
Chancellor  were  correct.  There  existed  at  this  period  a 
very  strong  feeling  of  antagonism  between  Napoleon  and 
Pope  Pius  VII.  By  a  decree,  dated  17th  May,  1809, 
issued  from  Vienna,  the  Emperor  had  incorporated  with 
the  French  Empire  all  the  estates  of  the  Church,  and 
had  declared  Rome  an  imperial  and  free  city.  The  Pope 
had  replied,  10th  June,  by  a  bull  of  excommunication. 
Whereupon,  Napoleon  had  caused  the  Quirinal  to  be 
surrounded,  and  the  Pope  conveyed  to  Savona,  where  he 
was  detained  a  prisoner.  He  was  still  a  virtual  prisoner  at 
Savona  when  Metternich  visited  Paris,  and  Napoleon  was 
desirous  to  avail  himself  of  the  mediation  of  his  guest  to  in- 
duce Pius  VII.  to  return  to  Rome.  Metternich  undertook 
the  task,  and  despatched  an  envoy  upon  whom  he  could  rely, 
the  Chevalier  Lebzeltern,  to  Savona  with  propositions  for  a 
compromise,  on  the  understanding,  however,  that  the  Pope 
was  to  return  to  Rome,  and  accept  the  disposal  of  the  States 
of  the  Church  made  by  Napoleon  at  Vienna.  Lebzeltern 
saw  the  Pope,  and  seemed  for  an  instant  to  have  thought 
that  the  matter  might  be  arranged  if  Napoleon  would 
make  only  a  few  more  concessions  ;  but  a  letter  from 
Pius  VII.  to  Metternich,  dated  the  21st  May,  dissipated 
this  illusion.  The  Pope  declined  "  to  make  conditions  not 
suitable  to  the  dignity  of  the  Holy  See,  and  to  the  Vicar 
of  Jesus  Christ "  ;  and  the  mediation  failed. 

These  and  other  confidences  which,  passed  between  the 
Emperor  and  his  guest  went  far,  if  not  to  remove,  at  least 
to  weaken,  some  of  the  prejudices  against  Napoleon 
which  up  to  that  time  had  formed  a  part  and  parcel  of 
Metternich's  moral  being.  It  is  just  possible  that  if  he 
had  left  Paris  then,  when  he  had   been    there  but  two 

F  2 


68  LIFE  OF  PPJNCE  MFTTEItNICH. 

montlis,  ho  would  liavo  modified  liis  ])rovious  views,  and 
possibly  his  policy,  l^iit  ho  was  but  half  coiiviiicod  that 
the  "  Incarnation  of  the  Revolution  "  had  been  so  meta- 
morphosed by  his  marriage  as  to  have  become,  in  all  his 
ideas  and  sympathies,  as  one  of  the  family  with  which  he 
was  now  allied.  When,  then,  in  May,  he  broached  to  the 
iMnperor  the  question  of  the  prolongation  of  his  stay  in 
France,  and  the  Emperor  warndy  ies})ondod,  Metternich, 
who  was  less  anxious  to  talk  of  the  past  than  to  obtain 
a  glimpse  of  the  future,  clutched  eagerly  at  the  suggestion. 
The  conversation  on  the  subject  illustrates  the  extreme 
cordiality  which  existed  at  this  period  between  the  two 
men,  one  of  whom  was,  in  spite  of  himself,  at  lieart,  the 
irreconcilable  opponent  of  the  other.  IMetternich  having 
told  the  Emperor  of  the  duties  w  hich  required  his  presence 
at  Vienna,  had  added  : 

"The  Emperor  Francis  wished  me  to  accompany  his  daughter  into 
France;  I  liave  come  by  his  orders,  hut  it  must  be  evident  to  you  tliat 
my  wish  goes  beyond  this,  and  I  wouhl  gladly  find  a  guiding  i)rinciplc 
for  my  political  action  in  a  more  remote  future,"  "I  understand 
you,"  answered  Naptdeon ;  "your  wish  corresponds  with  my  own. 
Stay  with  us  a  few  weeks,  and  you  will  leave  us  with  satisfaction."  * 

*  "  According  to  my  conviction,  Napoleon  never  knew  me,  never 
divined  me.  The  cause  is  veiy  siniple.  Napoleon  was  the  man  in  alV 
the  world  who  most  despised  the  human  race.  He  had  a  striine^o 
aptitude  for  discoveiing  the  weak  sides  of  men,  and  all  j)assions  are 
weak  sides,  or  produce  them.  He  loved  only  nun  with  strong 
passions,  or  great  weaknesses  ;  ho  judged  the  mo.st  opposite  qualities 
in  men  by  these  defects.  In  me  he  encountered  a  calmness  which 
must  cause  desi)air  to  one  who  founded  his  calculations  <m  pas-ions. 
Hence  he  denied  the  exislenee  in  me  of  every  quality  bearing  on  pure 
reas(m,  or  which  is  reason  itself  I  have  often  involimtarily  laughed 
in  Nap  deon's  presence,  when  I  remarked  that  he  judged  me  falsely. 
Therefore  I  knew  Nai)oleon  much  better  tiian  he  ki:ew  me.  Seviu 
years  of  resolute  sJtudy  suflice  to  know  a  man,  especially  a  man 
whose  nature  and  acti(ms  are  all  external — that  is,  for  a  calm  observer 
who  is  not  led  astray  by  any  feeling  of  fear  and  awe." — Auiuhioijmphij 
of  Prince  Metternich,  vol.  iii. 


METTEIINICII  IN  PAHIS,  60 

Metteriiich  thus  staycl  to  find  "a  fruldiiifr  principle" 
fur  the  })()licy  of  Austria  towards  France ;  to  satisfy 
hiinst«lf  whether  the  liusband  of  Marie  Louise  had  become 
a  (litferent  man  to  the  husband  of  Josephine.  He  enjoyed 
many  opportunities  of  forminfr-  an  opinion.  He  accom- 
panied the  newly-married  pair  to  Cambrai,  on  their  way 
to  Brussels,  and  was  an  eye-witness  to  the  enthusiasm 
with  which  the  ycuno^  Empress  was  everywhere  received 
by  the  people.  On  his  and  their  return  to  Paris,  he 
continued  his  cordial  relations  with  Napoleon.  He 
mentions  more  than  once  that  the  Emperor  seemed  to  be 
anxious  to  convince  him  of  the  many-sidedness  of  his 
character  ;  that  he  Wcis  as  clear-headel  and  capable  as  an 
administrator  as  he  had  proved  himself  to  be  as  a  warrior. 
Still  he  watched,  and  watched  in  vain,  for  the  upliftino-  of 
the  veil  which  hid  from  him  the  secret  dispositions  of  his 
host.  To  no  purpose  did  Napoleon  j^ive  him  every 
opportunity  to  see  and  converse  with  jMarie  Louise  alone 
that  he  might  hear  from  her  all  that  she  might  choose  to 
Sfiy  to  her  father's  friend  and  confidant ;  it  was  without  the 
result  he  desired  that  he  was  asked  to  act  as  the  friend  of 
her  childhood  had  a  right  to  act,  that  is,  to  o-ive  her 
advice  whenever  he  might  think  advice  necessary  ;"  that 
Napoleon  showered  upon  him  attention  after  attention. 
He  remained  unsatisfied  ;  calculating  ;  suspicious  ;  waitin^j" 
tie  hour  when  Napoleon  should  make  the  siof-n  which 
bhould  enligliten  him.  That  the  closer  intercourse  into 
which  he  was  now  drawn  increased  his  intellectual 
appreciation  of  Xapolcon  as  a  man  0/  genius  is  evident 
from  the  expressions  which  appear  so  constantly  in  his 
journal  of  this  period ;  but,  though  he  listened  with 
admiration,  he  always  listened  with  the  hope  of  hearin<r 
more.  At  last  his  patience  was  rewarded.  In  September, 
after  six  months'  careful  watching,  the  veil  was  lifted. 


70  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICH. 

The  occasion  was  the  election  of  Marshal  Bernadotte  to 
the  vacnted  throne  of  Sweden.  In  a  conversation  on  this 
event  Napoleon  showed,  in  a  manner  to  convince  his 
guest,  that  he  had  prompted  this  with  the  view  of  giving 
a  check  to  Russia,  careless  if  it  should  lead  to  a  EVanco- 
Russian  complication.  Russia  could  not  fail  to  see,  in  the 
selection  of  a  French  Marshal  for  such  a  throne,  a  pledge 
between  the  new  sovereign  and  his  people  for  the  re-con- 
quest of  the  territories  which  she  herself  had  but  just 
conquered,  and  the  conquest  of  which  had  been  one  of  the 
stipulations  of  Tilsit.  Referring  to  this  subject,  Napoleon 
let  fall  the  mask,  and  showed  himself,  in  the  eyes  of 
Metternich,  as  the  untamed  and  untameable  Incarnation  of 
the  Revolution. 

" I  consider,"'  lie  said,  "the  Swedish  aiFair  as  a  more  or  less  distant 
motive  for  a  war  witli  Kussia.  .  .  .  The  time  will  soon  approach — and 
I  am  very  far  from  hiistening  it  either  by  my  wislics  or  my  deeds — 
when  1  ostilitiea  will  be  inevitable.     What  part  will  you  play  ?" 

Then,  telling  IMetternich  how,  he  was  confident,  the 
possession  by  France  of  the  Illyrian  provinces  must  be 
iraUinof  to  Austria,  he  added  : 

DO  ' 

"Will  you  one  day  refuse  to  coufer  witli  me  for  the  exchange  of  an 
equal  portion  of  Galicia  for  these  provinces?  Whenever  1  find  it 
necessary  to  make  war  with  Russia,  I  should  have  a  great  and  poweiful 
ally  in  a  King  of  Poliind.  I  shall  not  need  your  provinces,  and  you 
too  will  find  this  combination  not  less  useful  to  you."  * 

The  conversation  continued  in  the  same  strain,  Napoleon 
telling  his  guest  that  it  was  confidential,  that  he  had  not 
spoken  on  the  subject  to  Champagny,  and  that  he  did  not 

*  Of  the  genuineness  of  this  conversation  there  can,  I  think,  be  no 
doubt.  The  editor  of  the  Autobiography  writes  that  the  sketch  of  it 
was  written  in  German  for  the  Emperor  Fr.mois  under  the  fresh 
impression  of  the  occurrtnce ;  and  that  the  sketch  follows  exactly  the 
text  of  the  Autobiography. 


METTEBNICR  IN  VIENNA,  71    T 

wish  that  anyone  should  know  of  it  except  the  Emperor 
Francis  and  himself.  After  listening  to  it,  Metternich 
left  St.  Cloud,  conscious  that  he  had  at  last  obtained 
light ;  that  the  object  of  his  stay  in  Paris  had  been  { 
attained.  On  the  24th  of  the  same  month  he  had  his 
farewell  audience  with  the  Emperor,  obtained  from  him 
the  revocation  of  the  secret  article  by  which  Austria  had 
been  limited  to  the  maintenance  of  an  army  of  only 
150,000  men,  and  proceeded,  by  way  of  Vienna,  to  join 
the  Emperor  Francis  at  Gratz.  There,  having  had 
ample  time  for  reflection,  he  laid  before  his  master  the 
result  of  his  more  than  six  months'  stay  in  Paris.  They 
were,  if  we  can  trust  his  Autobiography,*  that,  in  the 
spring  of  1812,  Napoleon  would  range  his  own  forces, 
greatly  strengthened,  and  those  of  his  allies,  to  strike  a 
great  blow  at  Eussia  ;  that,  in  such  a  case,  it  would 
behove  Austria  to  take  a  neutral  part,  and  to  take  such  a 
position  as  would  ensure  to  her  the  power  to  take  decisive 
action  during  the  war  and  at  the  end  of  it ;  that,  mean- 
while, she  must  prepare  for  that  eventuality. 

A  curious  circumstance  connected  with  this  affair  is 
that  at  the  very  time  that  Napoleon  was  confiding  to 
Metternich  his  conviction  that  war  with  Russia  was, 
sooner  or  later,  inevitable,  the  xVdjutant  of  the  Emperor 
of  Kussia,  Count  Schuvalotf,  arrived  at  Vienna,  with  a 
plan,  cut  and  dried,  for  an  alliance  in  case  of  a  new  war 
with  France.  It  was  clear  that  the  Swedish  aflfair  had 
directed  the  thoughts  of  Napoleon  and  the  Czar  simul- 

*  The  editor  states  that  this  report  was  merely  verbal,  and  that  no 
record  of  it  exists.  It  corresponds  so  closely  with  the  events  which 
did  actually  happen,  that  it  is  not  absolutely  free  from  suspic  on.  On 
Ihe  other  hand,  knowing  as  we  do,  that  the  conversation  with 
Napoleon  was  genuine,  we  are  bound  to  admit  tliat  the  advice 
Mttternich  gave  to  his  master  is  just  the  advice  which  a  man 
possessing  his  cold,  calculating  character  would  have  given. 


72  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICH. 

taneously  to  the  same  conclusion.     Austria  rejected  the 
project. 

The  real  hopes  which  Metternich  entertained  were 
displayed  in  the  communications  which  he  made,  at  this 
period,  to  the  Prussian  Cabinet.  Confident  that  w^ar 
between  France  and  Russia  would  ensue,  and  hoping  that 
snch  a  war  would  or  might  ensure  the  deliverance  of  the 
sovereigns  and  the  aristocracies  of  Europe,  he  placed 
before  King  Frederick  William  III.  the  true  position  of 
Austria  and  Prussia  with  respect  to  Napoleon,  showed 
him  that  those  positions  were  identical,  and  that  their 
only  hope  lay  in  time  and  the  vicissitudes  of  Fortune. 
This  advice,  backed  up  by  the  promise  that  when  that 
time  should  arrive,  Austria  would  stand  by  Prussia  as  a 
firm  friend,  was,  it  will  be  well  to  recollect  when  we  come 
to  the  professed  mediation  of  Austria  in  1813,  given  in 
1810. 

When,  then,  in  October  of  that  year,  Metternich 
resumed  at  Vienna  the  portfolio  of  the  Foreign  Office, 
his  line  of  policy  was  fixed.  It  was  to  nurse  the  finances 
of  Austria,  to  strengthen  her  army,  and  to  prepare  her 
for  the  opportunity  which  was  to  come  in  two  years.  For 
the  financial  operations  he  had  at  his  side  a  minister, 
Count  Wallis,  who  allowed  himself  to  be  guided  by  the 
firmer  will  and  more  extended  views  of  the  Chancellor  of 
tlie  Empire.  But  in  the  War  Minister,  Count  Bellegarde, 
Metternich  possessed  a  friend  who  was  able  to  enter  into 
all  his  plans,  and  whom  he  trusted  implicitly.  Regarding 
this  statesman  ^letternich  uses  a  phrase  which  explains 
very  neatly  and  very  curtly  the  principle  he  himself  had 
adopted  in  his  intercourse  with  Napoleon.  He  says :  "  He 
understood  as  well  as  I  did  the  value  of  letting  men  talk." 

One  defect  which  almost  at  once  forced  itself  upon  his 
attention  at  this   epoch  was  the  weakness  of  the  central 


METTEBNICE  IN  VIENNA.  73 

power  in  Austria.  To  obtain  that  unity  of  action  which, 
he  had  seen,  constituted  one  of  the  great  forces  of 
Napoleon,  it  was  necessary  to  organise  a  body  which, 
without  restricting  the  exercise  of  the  separate  rights  of 
the  provinces,  should  secure  to  the  common  head  of  the 
Empire  the  disposal  of  supreme  sovereign  power.  Such  a 
body,  organised  by  Kaunitz  under  the  title  of  Council  of 
State,  had  to  a  certain  extent  exercised  such  functions  in 
the  time  of  Maria  Theresa,  but,  originally  somewhat 
faulty  in  construction,  it  had  fallen  into  decay.  Metter- 
nich  proceeded  then  to  revive  it  on  an  improved  system. 
His  idea  was  to  make  of  the  Council  of  State  a  deliberating- 
body,  selected  by  and  associated  with  the  Emperor,  and 
procuring  for  him,  by  its  manngement  of  details,  greater 
leisure  and  facility  for  carrying  on  his  own  work. 
Whilst  thus  the  Council  would  constitute  a  deliberating 

CD 

and  advising  body,  the  entire  executive  power  would  still 
remain  vested  in  the  Emperor  alone.  It  was  a  plan 
which,  from  time  immemorial,  has  been  the  delight  of 
despots ;  to  place  by  the  side  of  the  sovereign  a  body,  not 
elected  but  selected,  which  sliould  nominally  advise  him 
but  really  take  his  ideas,  and  impart  to  them  the  form  of 
legality.  The  same  principle,  put  in  action  in  England, 
formed  the  Star  Chamber  under  Charles  I. ;  and,  in 
France,  constituted  the  Council  of  State  under  Napoleon. 
It  secured,  in  tact,  a  firmer  concentration  of  power  in  the 
hands  of  the  sovereign.  Such,  disguised  under  a  few'*'?^ 
specious  phrases,*  was  the  Metternich  system,  to  force    ^ 

*  For  instance  :  "  There  lies  in  the  existence  of  a  well  organised 
council,  filleJ  with  able  men,  ready  to  advise  the  mouurch  on  every 
occasion  with  enlightened  and  impartial  counsel,  so  high  a  degree  of 
security  for  the  whole  body  politic,  that  this  feeling  will  soon  become 
general,  and  secure  to  the  Government  strength  and  repose  in  equal 
measure."  (Minute  by  Metternich  on  the  organisation  of  an  Imperial 
Council.) 


74  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTERXICH. 

which   upon    Europe    in    the   name   of  freedom   it   was 
essential  first  to  beat  down  Xapoleon. 

1  have  stated  in  an  earlier  portion  of  this  sketch  how, 
at  a  certain  period  of  his  career,  Metternich  had  taken 
refuge  from  the  strife  of  politics  in  the  congenial  study  of 
literature  and  science.*  From  that  most  charming  ana 
en^rossiufj  of  all  studies  he  had  divorced  himself,  some- 
what  unwillingly,  at  the  bidding  of  the  Emperor  Francis  ; 
and,  once  divorced,  he  had  not  returned  to  the  society  of 
the  siren.  But  there  were  at  Vienna  those  who  re- 
membered the  delightful  days  when  he  who  had  become 
Chancellor  of  the  Empire  had  been  their  cherished 
companion.  They  showed  their  appreciation  of  him  and 
of  his  merits  at  this  period  by  suggesting  that  he  should 
be  nominated  Curator  of  the  Academy  of  Fine  Arts. 
The  idea  was  carried  out,  to  the  surprise — for  it  was  quite 
unexpected — and  gratification  of  the  recipient  of  the 
honour.  He  calls  it,  in  his  Autobiography,  "an  unexpected 
and  honourable  appointment,  which  opened  up  to  me  an 
unfamiliar  but  congenial  sphere  of  activity,  in  which  there 
was  full  scope  for  my  strong  consciousness  of  duty, 
heightened  as  it  was  in  this  case  by  my  inclination." 

Not  for  a  moment,  however,  did  he  lose  sight  of  his 
main  object.  The  year  1811  passed,  he  tells  us,  as  he 
had  foreseen.  Napoleon  advanced  his  forces  as  far  as  the 
Grand  Duchy  of  Warsaw,  and  made  Dantzig  a  point 
d^appui  for  the  supplies  necessary  for  a  great  campaign. 
The  armies  of  the  States  belonging  to  the  Confederation 
of  the  Rhine  were  preparing  to  join  the  Grande  Armee, 
already  strengthened  by  the  Spanish,  Portuguese,  and 
Italian  contingents.  Prussia,  depressed  and  suffering, 
was  endeavouring,  as  much  as  she  dared,  to  stir  up  a 
patriotic  feeling  in  North  Germany  by  means  of  the 
*  Paxes  7-8. 


THE  WAB  OF  1812.  75 

Tugenhund.  Austria  alone  seemed  quiescent  and  pacific, 
'*  supposed,"  as  the  director  of  her  policy  writes,  "  to  be 
exclusively  occupied  In  healing  the  wounds  which  the  last 
war  had  inflicted  on  the  Empire."  The  aspect  of  Europe 
appeared  to  the  Austrian  Minister,  than  whom  no  one 
was  better  qualified  to  judge,  not  as  that  of  the  calmness 
which,  in  nature,  precedes  the  storm,  "  but  the  sad  aspect 
of  a  general  humiliation  of  princes  and  people  under  the 
verdict  of  an  inexorable  fate." 

At  length  the  dreaded  year  arrived,  and   Napoleon, 

notifying  to  the  Courts  of  Berlin  and  Vienna  his  intention 

of  invading  Russia,  demanded  the  active  support  of  the 

sovereigns  they  represented.     Prussia  could  only  reply  in 

the   affirmative.      Austria,   guided    by   Metternich,   was 

more  reserved.     Metternich  had  devised  a  plan  whereby 

he  might,  while  yielding  to  the  demands  of  the  French 

Emperor,   maintain    still    his   relations  with   Alexander. 

Napoleon,  he  saw,  did  not  require  an  Austrian  contingent 

so  much  for  fighting  purposes  as  for  a  material  guarantee 

that  the  rest  of  the  Austrian  army  should   be  retained 

within   the    limits  of  the   Austrian  dominions.     Whilst, 

then,  he  raised  no  difl[iculty  to  the  signing  with  France, 

the   14th  March,   1812,  of  a  treaty  by  which   Austria 

agreed  to  furnish  an  auxiliary   corps  of  30,000  'troops 

for    the    invasion,    receiving    in   exchange,    besides    the 

guarantee  of  her  integrity,  a  promise  that,  in  the  event  of 

the  reconstitution  of  the  Kingdom  of  Poland,  she  should 

recover  Illyria,  or,  that  portion  of  it  the  loss  of  which,  as 

it  included  Trieste,  she  lamented  the   most,  Metternich 

stipulated    that    the    treaty   should   be   kept   secret   as 

long  as  possible  in  order  that  he  might  take  credit  with 

Russia,  and  pose  before  her  as  a  neutral.     The  Czar,  it 

would  seem,  thoroughly  understood  the  powerlessness  of 

Austria  to  act   other  than   she   did   act,  and,  notwith- 


76  LIFE  OF  FJdINCE  METTEBNICB. 

standing  the  presence  in  the  line  of  Napoleon's  army  oi 
the  corps  of  30,000  men,  he  never,  throughout  the 
campaign,  regarded  her  other  than  as  neutral  or  friendly. 
Metternich  goes  so  far  as  to  state  that  Alexander  con- 
sidered the  closing  of  the  Austrian  territory  as  a  useful 
defence  for  the  southern  provinces  of  the  Russian  Empire. 
On  the  21st  April  Alexander  quitted  St.  Petersburg 
for  Wilna,  having  renounced  all  hope  of  staving  off  the 
war.  As  soon  as  he  heard  of  this  departure  Napoleon 
resolved  to  hasten  to  Dj-esden,  to  receive  there  the  vassal 
sovereigns  of  the  several  States  of  the  Continent  of  whose 
contingents  he  was  about  to  dispose,  and  to  communicate 
to  them  his  final  hopes  and  his  final  intentions.  Amongst 
those  who  received  invitations  to  proceed  to  Dresden  were 
the  Emperor  and  Empress  of  Austria.  They  accordingly 
quitted  Vienna  for  that  purpose,  accompanied  by 
Metternich,  timing  their  departure  so  as  to  arrive  the 
day  after  Napoleon,  that  is,  on  the  17th  of  May.  For 
the  twelve  days  that  followed,  Dresden  presented  a 
spectacle  such  as  has  rarely  been  equalled.  The 
Emperor  of  Austria,  the  King  of  Prussia,  the  Kings 
of  Bavaria  and  Saxony,  and  other  lesser  stars,  paid  their 
homages  to  the  great  conqueror  whom,  in  a  few  short 
months,  they  were  to  attack  with  all  the  bitterness  of 
stored-up  hatred.  At  Dresden,  in  that  month  of  May,  no 
one  doubted  the  triumph  of  Napoleon.  The  proudest 
spirits  bent  before  him.  Even  Metternich,  coldly  calcu- 
lating, and  in  his  heart  desiring  the  triumph  of  Alexander, 
did  not  believe  in  it.  He  resumed  here,  he  tells  us,  his 
old  confidential  intercourse  with  Napoleon — the  inter- 
course of  1810.  The  conclusion  he  drew  was  that 
Napoleon  did  not  deceive  himself  as  to  the  greatness  of 
the  undertaking  upon  which  he  was  entering;  that  he 
looked  upon  his  success  as  "the  keystone  of  an  edifice 


TEE  WAB  OF  1812.  77 

which  hovered  before  his  mind  as  a  Carlovingian  Empire 
under  a  Bonapartist  dynasty."  It  is  quite  possible  that  if 
he  had  followed  tfie  plan  of  campaign  which  he  unfolded 
to  Metternich,  he  would  have  realised  this  idea.  He 
spoke  to  the  Austrian  Minister  the  words  T  am  about  to 
quote,  and  which,  that  Minister  most  truly  says,  subse- 
quent events  have  made  for  ever  memorable  : 

"  My  enterprise  is  one  of  tliose  tlie  solution  of  which  is  to  be  found 
in  patience.  Victory  will  attend  the  most  patient.  I  shall  open  the 
campaign  by  crossing  the  Niemen.  It  will  be  concluded  at  Smolensk 
and  IMinsk.  There  I  shall  stop.  I  shall  fortify  tliese  two  points,  and 
occupy  myself,  at  Wilna,  where  the  chief  headquarters  will  be  during 
the  next  winter,  with  the  organisation  of  Lithuania,  which  burns  with 
impatience  to  be  delivered  from  the  yoke  of  Russia.  I  shall  wait  and 
see  which  of  us  tires  first :  I,  of  Teeding  my  army  at  the  expense  of 
Russia ;  or  Alexander,  of  sustaining  my  army  at  the  expense  of  his 
country.  Perhaps  I  myself  may  pass  the  most  inclement  months  of 
the  winter  at  Paris." 

Metternich  continues  :  '*  To  my  question  what  he  would 
do  in  case  the  Emperor  Alexander  did  not  vouchsafe  to 
make  peace  because  of  the  occupation  of  Lithuania,'* 
Napoleon  answered : 

"  In  that  case  I  should  in  the  following  year  advance  quite  to  the 
centre  of  the  Empire,  and  I  shall  be  as  patient  in  1813  as  I  shall  have 
been  in  1812.     The  aifair,  as  I  told  you,  is  a  question  of  time." 

It  was  difficult  for  Metternich,  thus  confidentially 
informed  of  his  plan  by  the  greatest  captain  of  the  age — 
a  captain  who,  he  had  seen,  had  beaten  this  same  enemy, 
when  he  was  allied,  as  in  1805  with  Austria,  and,  as  in 
1806-7  with  Prussia,  and  who  now  wielded  against  him 
all  the  resources  of  Continental  Europe,  to  doubt  the 
result  of  a  campaign  based  upon  a  plan  so  prudent  and 
apparently  so  certain.  Metternich  did  not  doubt.  Yet, 
true  to  his  nature,  writhing  under  the  domination  exer- 
cised by  the  jparvenu — as  he  always  regarded  Napoleon — 


78  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICR. 

who  controlled  the  destinies  of  every  nation  on  the  Con- 
tinent, he  never  for^-ot  that  althouerh  the  chances  miofht  he 
fifty  to  one  in  favour  of  France,  yet  the  possib'.lity  always 
existed  that  Eussia  might  prevail.  That  chance  was, 
indeed,  too  remote  to  be  counted  upon.  It  was  haidly  to 
be  seriously  thought  of.  Nevertheless  it  was  a  chance, 
and,  as  a  chance  which  would  bring  him  his  heart's  desire, 
he  deemed  it  prudent  to  regulate  his  conduct,  secretly,  as 
though  it  might  happen.  Thus  we  find  him,  from  the 
very  outset  of  the  campaign,  renewing,  endeavouring  to 
knit  together  more  closely,  the  ties  between  Vienna  and 
Berlin.  There  exists,  in  the  handwriting  of  Metternich, 
written  in  1851,  a  note  on  a  letter  received  by  him  from 
Frederick  Gentz,  dated  July  24, 1812,  which  fully  explains 
the  aims  of  the  Austrian  Minister,  not  only  at  this  period, 
but  throughout  the  period  of  the  Napoleonic  sway. 
Gentz  had  detected,  at  his  epoch,  symptoms  of  what 
Metternich  calls  "  the  Providential  beginning  of  Napoleon's 
end."  Metternich  writes  on  this ;  "  That  I  have  helped 
this  forward  as  much  as  lay  in  my  power — history  will 
testify."  He  was  right.  History  will  testify  to  that  fact, 
but,  in  testifying  to  it,  she  will  also  demand  an  account 
of  the  use  he  made  of  the  power  he  acquired  through  the 
accomplishment  of  that  task  ;  how  he  treated  the  generous 
spirits,  who,  in  fighting  against  Napoleon,  believed,  as 
they  had  been  led  to  believe,  that  they  were  fighting  for 
their  emancipation  from  political  thraldom. 

Meanwhile  he  followed  the  movements  of  the  Napoleonic 
army  with  the  keenest  interest.  When  he  saw  that 
Napoleon,  tempted  by  the  constant  retreat  of  the  Russians, 
was  abandoning  the  safe  programme  he  had  revealed  at 
Dresden,  his  hopes  that  the  one  chance  might  become  a 
certainty  increased.  For  the  French  army  to  winter  at 
Moscow   instead   of  at  Smolensk  would,   he  saw,  be   a 


THE  BETREAT  FBOM  3I0SC0W.  79 

mistake  which  a  determined  enemy  might,  without  much 
difficulty,  turn  into  a  misfortune.  Not  foreseeing  yet  the 
retreat  with  all  its  horrors,  he  might  reasonably  argue  that 
the  position  of  Napoleon  at  Moscow  after  Borodino  was 
much  less  favourable  than  the  position  of  the  same  leader 
at  Vienna  after  Wagram ;  and  he  had  Napoleon's  own 
admission,  made  to  him  in  1810,  that  if  Austria  had  then 
refused  peace  he  would  have  been  lost.  Day  by  day  his 
hopes  grew  stronger.  At  last  the  catastrophe  came.  Then 
he  felt  that  upou  him  would  probably  devolve  the  mastery 
of  the  situation — and  to  accomplish  that  end  he  began  at 
once  to  act.  How,  and  with  what  effect  he  acted,  must  be 
considered  in  the  next  chapter. 


so  LIFE  OF  rniXCE  METTEPiNICH. 


CnAPTER  W. 

PROM   THE    AVTXTER    OF    1812   TO    THE    AE^MISTICE   OF 
PLEISWITZ,  JUNE— AUGUST,  1813. 

1812-1813. 

The  army-corps,  contributed  by  Austria  to  the  grand 
invading  army  of  Napoleon,  amounting  to  30,0(.'0  men,  had 
done  little,  and  bad  sutlered  little,  rractically,  it  Wiis 
intact.  When  ^Ictternicb  tirst  realised  the  full  extent  of 
the  disaster  which  had  befallen  the  French  Emperor,  he 
was  unwilling  that  this  corps,  which  had  been  joined  by 
the  Saxon  contingent,  should  be  ntilised  to  cover  the 
French  retreat,  lie  did  not  at  once,  it  is  true,  direct  it 
against  Napoleon,  as  Prussia  did  as  soon  as  she  safely 
could,  with  the  troops  she  had  contributed,  but  wishing,  as 
he  states,  to  pre})are  to  strike  a  decisive  blow  at  a  decisive 
moment,  in  18  io,  he  transmitted  oiders  to  the  Commander 
of  the  corps  Prince  Schwarzenbcn*g,  to  fall  back  upon 
Galicia.  Then,  by  no  means  certain  that  the  power  of 
Napoleon  had  been  destroyed  ;  thinking  it  quite  possible 
that,  if  he  would  but  moderate  his  demands,  lie  might  yet 
preserve  a  position  which  might  be  preponderating  if  not 
predominating  ;  nnwilling  to  run  once  more  the  chance  of 
being  on  the  losing  side;  yet  resolved,  iis  resolved  as  was 
Prussia,  to  break  the  despotic  chain  with  which  the  French 
Emperor  bound  Continental  Europe ;  to  restore  the  equili- 


THE  WINTER  OF  1812-13.  81 

briurn  of  1803  or  1805,  according  as  might  bo  decided  in 
consultation  with  Prussia,  ]\Ietternich,  carefully  reviewing 
the  situation,  and   calculating  how  it  might  be    possible 
to  constitute  a  new  German  Confederation  on  the  ruins 
of  the  Confederation  of  the  lihine,  aime  to  the  conclusion 
that,  for  the  moment,   Austria  should  temporise,  in  the 
meanwhile  increasing  her  army,  until  the  moment  should 
arrive  when    she    could    strike  with    effect.     liussia  and 
Prussia  were  confident  that  they  had  only  to  push  forward 
to  bring  to  a  decisive  issue  the  advantages  which   the 
terrible    Itussian   winter   had   in  part  secured   for  them. 
]\letternich  was  not  nearly  so  confident.     On  the  contrary, 
he  was  convinced  that,  even   after  so  great  a  disaster, 
those  two  powers   would  not  be  a  match  for  Napoleon. 
The  Machiavellian   policy,   then,  would  be,  to  arm  and 
wait    until    the    allies,    feeling   their    impotence    without 
Austria,  should  demand,  nay,  implore,  Austria's  aid  ;  that, 
mancjeuvring   meanwhile    so    as    to    hoodwink   Najxjleon, 
already  too  confiding  on  the  strength  of  his  marriage  with 
a  daughter  of  the  Habsburgs,  he  would  intervene  forcibly 
at  the  critical  mom.ent.     This  is  the  policy  which  he  says 
he  thoujrht  out  at  the  time,  and  which  he  actually  adopted. 
It  is  as  well  that  the  reader  should  bear  this  in  mind  when 
he  comes  to  study  the  period  of  the  armistice  of  1813. 
All  the  calculations  of  the  Austrian  Minister  in  the  winter 
of  1812-13  were  based  Uyjon  the  conviction  that  it  would 
become  necessary   that   Austria  should  join   Kussia  and 
Prussia  to  effect  the  overthrow  of  Napoleon.     Upon  that 
overthrow  he  was  throughout  bent.     Every  line  he  has 
written  proves  that  he  never  dreamt  it  would  be  possible 
for    Austria,   under   any   circumstances,    to    unite    with 
Napoleon.      "The  Emperors  of  Austria  and  of  Rassia, 
the  Kinfr  of  Prussia,  and  their  three  cabinets,"  he  says, 
writing  of  this  period,  "  were  never  really  separated/' 

a 

NS 


82  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICH. 

The  first  necessity  for  the  successful  carrying  out  of  this 
policy  was    to    impose   upon    Napoleon.     "  All  that  re- 
mained," he  wrote  to  his  father,  "  was  to  find  the  oppor- 
tunity of  carrying  out  my  intentions  without  running  any 
serious  risks."     So,  in  January,  1813,   he  commissioned 
Count  Bubna  to  proceed  to  Paris  to  assure  the  Emperor 
of  the  fidelity  of  Austria,  but  to  urge  upon  him  the  advisa- 
bility of  securing  peace,  and,  to  attain  such  a  result,  to 
propose  the  mediation  of  Austria.     Count  Bubna  had  a 
certain  success.     Napoleon,  unfortunately  for  himself,  was 
under  the  delusion  that  the  Emperor  Francis  would  not 
turn  against  his  son-in-law,  and  though  he  could  not  fail 
to  recognise  the  bad  faith  of  Austria  in  the  instructions 
sent  to  Prince  Schwarzenberg,  he  had  still  the  conviction 
that  he  was  strong  enough  to  defeat  combined  Russia  and 
Prussia,   and  that,  once  triumphant  over  them,  Austria 
would  declare  herself  in  his  favour,  in  the  hope  to  profit 
by   his    victory.       When    Count    Bubna    arrived,    then, 
Napoleon  called  together   an  extraordinary  Council    to 
consider  the  course  to  be  pursued.     This  Council  com- 
prised the  most  eminent  statesmen  of  the  Empire.     There 
were    present,    Talleyrand,    Caulaincourt,    Cambaceres, 
Champagny,    Maret    (Duke   of  Bassano),    MM.    de    la 
Besnadiere  and  d'Hauterive.     To  them  Napoleon  gave  a 
summary  of  the  situation  ;  then  posed  the  question  whether 
France   should   wait  to  receive   proposals   of  peace,   or 
whether  she  shouM  make  them  ;  in  the  latter  case,  whether 
she  should  address  herself  directly  to  Eussia,  or  avail  her- 
self of  the  mediation  of  friendly  Austria.     Caulaincourt, 
Cambaceres,  and  Talleyrand,  gave  their  voices  in  favour 
of  direct  negotiation  with  Russia  :  the  Duke  of  Bassano, 
who  was  supposed  to  express  the  inner  thought  of  Napoleon, 
expressed  the  same  confidence — I  should  rather  write — 
the  same  false  confidence  his  master  felt  in  the  sincerity 


TBE  WINTER  OF  1812-13.  83 

of  Austria,  and  urged  theadvisability  of  taking  advantage 
of  her  mediaiion.     He  was  supported  by  the  other  three 
members.     Napoleon  was  of  the  same  opinion,  for,  totally 
misled  as  to  the  real  views  of  the  guiding  spirit  of  xVustria's 
policy,  he  believed  that  the  offer  to  restore  to  her  Illyria, 
without  conditions,  would  range  her  at  once  secretly  on 
his  side.     After  seeing,  then,  Count  Bubna,  he  addressed 
a  letter  to  his  father-in-law,  in  which,  beginning  by  an 
account  of  the  campaign  of  1812  painted  in  colours  dis- 
tinctly French,  he  stated  that  he  would  very  shortly  be  in 
a  position  to  throw  back  the  Eussians  on  the  Vistula  and 
from  the  Vistula  on  the  Niemen  ;  but  that,  in  spite  of  thnt 
certainty,  he  desired  peace,  and  that  to  obtain  peace,  he 
was  ready  and  willing  to  avail  himself  of  the  intervention 
of  Austria.     He  added,  however,  a  proviso  which,  at  the 
moment,  he  could  have  scarcely  believed  would  be  accept- 
able.    He  would  not,  he  said,  accept  conditions  of  peace, 
he  would  impose  them  ! 

To  this  letter,  which  M.  Thiers,  arguing  that  it  might 
have  been  possible  at  that  critical  moment  by  liberal  con- 
cessions to  have  gained  Austria,  calls  "  a  fatal  letter,"  the 
Duke  of  Bassano  added  another,  addressed  to  iMetternich 
in  terms  even  less  conciliatory.  At  the  moment  when  all 
Europe  was  rising  in  arms  against  the  French  Em.pire  he 
warned  Metternich  that  the  several  nations  of  Europe 
might  have  to  repent  bitterly  their  conduct  if  they  were  to 
choose  such  a  period  to  wound  the  just  susceptibilities  of 
the  French  nation.  He  added,  that  whilst  France  was 
willing  to  accept  the  intervention  of , Austria,  that  Power 
must  remember  that  France  would  accord  to  Russia  the 
conditions  only  which  she  had  granted  at  Tilsit ;  to 
Austria  the  conditions  she  had  granted  after  AYagram. 
As  a  counterpoise,  and  a  counterpoise  which  he  thought 
would  attach  Austria,  he  added  that  the  King  of  Rome, 

G  2 


84  LIFE  OF  FRINGE  3IETTERNICR. 

the  grandson  of  the  Emperor  Francis,  was  about  to  be 
crowned,  and  that  the  Kegency  of  France,  in  the  event  of 
iiny  accident  to  the  Emperor,  would  be  secured  to  Marie 
Louise.  Nothinor  is  more  clear  to  the  student  of  the 
despatches  of  this  period  than  the  fact  that  the  Austrian 
matrimonial  alliance  blinded  the  usually  clear  intellect  of 
the  Emperor;  it  was  the  lure  which  led  him  to  his 
destruction. 

The  replies  of  Napoleon  and  his  Minister  to  the 
proposal  of  the  Austrian  Court  ma  !e  through  Count  Bubna 
could  not  but  confirm  Metternlch  in  his  secret  policy  ;  the 
policy  of  arming  and  waiting  the  opportune  moment  to 
strike.  His  main  difficulty  at  this  period  and  later  was  to 
restrain  the  enthusiasm  of  the  German  population  of 
Austria.  Prussia,  through  the  defection  of  the  contingent 
she  had  supplied  to  the  Grand  Army  had  greatly 
augmented  the  difficulties,  the  dansfcrs,  and  the  losses  of 
the  retreat,  only  declared  herself  openly  as  the  ally  of 
Russia  and  the  enemy  of  France  in  March  ;  the  King  of 
Saxony,  so  long  the  ally  of  Napoleon,  had  not  been  able 
to  withstand  the  enthusiasm  caused  throughout  Germany 
by  this  event,  and  had  retired  into  Bavaria,  there  to  await 
the  possibilities  of  the  future.  These  events  had  roused  tre- 
mendous excitement  in  German  Austria.  But  neither  the 
Emperor  Francis  nor  his  Minister  had  been  so  brought 
under  the  personal  influence  of  the  Czar,  animated  as  he 
was  by  a  desire  to  pose  as  the  saviour  of  Europe,  as  had 
been  the  King  of  Prussia.  They  both  regarded  the  action 
of  that  sovereign,  in  declaring  against  Napoleon  whilst 
Napoleon  could  yet  wield  against  them  considerable  re- 
sources, as  dangerous  and  premature.  They  were  equally 
determined  to  fall  neither  under  the  spell  of  Eussia  nor 
under  the  yoke  of  popular  clamour,  but  to  act,  as  became 
statesmen  in  their  position,  so  as  to  secure  the  interests  of 


TEE  WINTEU  OF  1812-13.  85 

Austria.  They  were  far  from  believing  that  Napoleon 
was  destrcjyed.  A  premature  declaration  against  him 
might  ensure,  they  felt,  the  destruction  of  Austria.  For 
these  reasons  Metternlch  resolved  to  allow  nothing  to 
cause  him  to  deviate  from  the  line  he  had  marked  out  — 
to  arm  and  to  wait. 

Meanwhile  he  held  many  conferences  with  the  French 
Minister  at  Vienna,  M.  Otto,  with  the  view  of  discovering, 
if  possible,  the  advantages  which  it  might  be  possible  for 
Austria  to  secure  in  the  event  of  a  general  peace.  When 
he  found  that  Otto  was  unable  to  speak  authoritatively  on 
this  subject,  he  communicated  to  him,  with  the  view 
doubtless  of  the  report  of  the  conversation  reaching 
Napoleon,  the  views  held  by  himself.  As,  he  urged,  it 
was  no  longer  possible  for  France  to  maintain  against 
England  the  continental  blockade,  Russia  and  Prussia 
having  renounced  it,  it  would  certainly  be  for  the  interest 
of  France  to  resign  those  places  which  were  useful  to  her 
solely  for  the  enforcing  of  that  blockade.  In  this  view 
the  Hanseatic  towns  and  their  dependencies  had  become 
rather  a  burden  to  France,  and  might  well  be  abandoned. 
Similarly,  as,  after  the  campaign  of  1812,  It  would  be 
impossible  to  dream  of  the  reconstltutlon  of  Poland,  It 
would  be  advantageous  to  France  to  see  a  strong  Prussia, 
as  the  barrier  of  the  rest  of  Europe  against  Russian 
barbarism  :  then,  whilst  England  might  possibly  admit 
the  union  of  Holland  with  France,  she  would  always  be 
firm  on  the  subject  of  Spain.  That  point  Napoleon  would 
have  to  yield.  Again,  with  regard  Jto  the  Confederation 
of  the  Rhine,  already  doomed  by  the  opinion  of  Germany 
and  useless  to  France,  France  must  be  content  with  the 
boundary  afforded  by  that  river,  and  must  leave  Germany 
beyond  it  to  herself.  Finally  Metternlch  allowed  the 
French  Minister  to  divine  that  if  Napoleon  would  lower 


86  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  3IETTEBNICH, 

his  pretensions  sufficiently  to  accept  a  general  peace  on 
the  terms  about  to  be  indicated,  then  it  might  be  possible 
for  Austria  to  support  him.  The  terms  were  :  the  resti- 
tution of  Spain  to  the  Bourbons  ;  of  the  Hanscatic  towns 
to  Germany  ;  the  suppression  of  the  Confederation  of  the 
Rhine  ;  the  partition  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Warsaw 
between  Russia,  Prussia,  and  Austria  ;  and,  as  to  the 
latter  power  herself,  the  restoration  to  her  of  Illyria,  and 
the  rectification  of  her  frontier  on  the  Inn.  But,  whilst 
indicatinof  these  conditions  as  constitutinor  a  fair  basis, 
Metternich  was  careful  to  commit  himself  to  nothing.  He 
had  sketched  an  outline  to  which  he  would  not  bind  him- 
self, and  which  events  might  modify  any  day. 

Meanwhile,  in  pursuance  of  the  reply  of  Napoleon  to 
the  mission  of  Count  Bubna,  he  proceeded  to  use  Austria 
as  a  mediator  between  the  contending  parties.  From 
every  quarter  he  met  rebuffs.  England,  by  the  voice  of 
Lord  Castlereagh,  declared,  whilst  courteously  acknow- 
ledging the  reception  of  the  message,  that  the  language 
of  Napoleon  proved  that  he  would  accept  no  reasonable 
terms.  Russia  not  only  gave  a  similar  reply,  but  added 
that  Austria  herself  would  soon  recognise  the  impossibility 
of  coming  to  an  understanding  with  a  man  so  insatiably 
ambitious  as  Napoleon ;  that  when  that  time  should  arrive, 
when  she,  Austria,  should  resume  her  natural  position  js 
ally  of  the  rest  of  Europe,  she  would  be  recognised  as 
arbitress  of  the  situation,  as  dictator  of  the  conditions  of 
peace.  These  replies  Metternich  transmitted  at  once  to 
Paris,  addino-,  in  the  despatch  communicating  them,  that 
he  had  requested  Prince  Schwarzenberg,  who  had  com- 
manded the  Austrian  corps  in  the  campaign  of  1812,  to 
proceed  to  that  city,  to  endeavour  to  obtain  from  the 
Emperor  explanations  more  frank  than  those  of  which 
Count  Bubna  had  been  the  recipient ;  that  he  the  more 


TEE  WINTEB  OF  1812-13.  87 

confidently  reckoned  on  the  realisation  of  his  hope  in  this 
particular,  inasmuch  as  the  Prince  had  been  the  negotiator 
of  the  marriage ;  the  lieutenant  of  Napoleon  during  the 
last  war ;  and  had  remained  his  constant  and  sincere 
admirer. 

Unfortunately  for  Napoleon  he  remained,  in  spite  of 
the  tone  of  the  despatches  of  the  Austrian  Foreign 
Minister,  still  under  the  delusion  engendered  by  his 
marriage  with  a  Princess  of  the  Imperial  House.  This 
delusion  prevented  him  from  reading  the  set  purpose  of 
Metternich  ;  concealed  from  his  usually  clear  vision  the 
fact  that  at  this  period  as  I  have  already  quoted,  "  the 
Emperors  of  Austria  and  Russia  and  the  King  of 
Prussia  and  their  cabinets  were  never  really  separated." 
Not  in  vain  had  the  Austrian  Minister  studied,  in  the 
intimacy  of  private  intercourse,  in  diplomatic  controversy, 
in  the  confidential  conversations  covering  the  period  of  the 
s  X  months  immediately  subsequent  to  the  marriage,  the 
character  and  habits  of  thought  of  the  man  who  to  him 
was  always,  and  never  more  than  in  1^13,  the  incarnation 
of  the  hated  Revolution.  Great  as  was  Napoleon  on  the 
battlefield,  he  was,  at  this  moment,  on  this  diplomatic 
tiltiug-ground,  an  infant  in  the  hands  of  Metternich. 
The  situation  may  be  described  in  a  sentence  :  Napoleon 
trusted  Metternich — a  man  whom  he  liked,  whom  he  had 
admitted  to  the  closest  intimacy,  whom  he  cherished  as 
one  of  the  main  supporters  of  his  marriage,  and  whom  he 
believed  he  could  dazzle  by  holding  before  him  the  prospect 
of  possessing  not  only  Illyria,  but  that  Silesia  for  which 
Maria  Theresa  had  shed  tears  of  blood.  Metternich,  on  the 
other  hand,  knowing  that  he  had  made  an  impression  of 
this  nature  on  the  mind  of  Napolpmij^s^^d  it  deliberately 
to  destroy  him.  \The  nearel*  we  approach  the  date  of 
the  famous  interview  at  Dresden,  the  more  clearly  are 


88  LIFE  OF  PJUINCE  METTEBNICE. 

disclosed  the  methods  employed  by  Metternich  to  hood- 
whik,  to  lead  on,  his  victim.  At  that  meeting,  the 
reader  will  see,  the  mask  is  dropped  altogether.  We 
might  draw  the  same  conclusion  from  his  own  testimony. 
"  History,"  he  wrote  in  his  Autobiography,  referring  to 
the  negotiations  and  events  of  1812-3,  ''will  bear 
V  itness  to  my  having  made  use  of  all  the  means  in  my 
power  to  second  the  hands  of  God." 

Napoleon,  then,  still   influenced    by    the   opinion   re- 
garding  Metternich   and   the  views  of  Austrian  policy- 
mentioned  in  the  preceding  paragraph,  confident  that  he 
could  beat  combined  Russia  and  Prussia,  and  almost  as 
confident  that  he  could   tempt   Austria  to  share  with  him 
the  inevitable  despoiling  of  the  latter,  had  not  only  made 
no  attempt  to  dissuade  Austria  from   arming,  but  had 
even  pressed  her  to  arm.      Informed  at  the   period  at 
which  we  have  arrived,  March   1813,  of  the  mission   of 
Prince  Schwarzenberg,  he  went  a  step  further ;  replaced 
M.   Otto   at   Vienna   by    M.    de   Narbonne,    and   com- 
missioned  the   new    ambassador    to    urge    Austria    to 
debouch  with  100,000  men  from  Bohemia  into  Silesia, 
taking  the  allies  in  flank  whilst  he  should  attack  them  in 
front,  and  thus  finish  the  war  in  one  short  campaign. 
The  share  of  Austria   in    the   spoil   should   be    Silesia, 
Illyria,  and  a  part  of  the    Grand    Duchy   of  Warsaw, 
whilst  Prussia  should  be  hurled  back  beyond  the  Oder. 
Anxious  above  all  things  to  join  his  army,  he  had  given 
these  instructions  to   M.  de  Narbonne,   had   made  dis- 
positions  regarding    the    regency   and    other   pressing 
matters,    and   was   on  the    point   of  setting   out,  when 
Prince    Schwarzenberg   arrived    (5th   April).     For   any 
result  from  his  mission  he   might  as  well   have  remained 
at   Vienna.      He  'found   Napoleon  determined  to  fight, 
confident  of  victory,  not  at  all  mistrustful  of  Austria,  or 


THE  SPBING  OF  1813.  89 

doubting  her  ultimate  co-operation.  These  thoughts  he 
expressed  in  the  rapid  and  decided  manner  habitual  with 
him.  Schwarzenberg  was  not  at  Paris  to  contradict  him. 
Either  obeying  the  instructions  he  had  received  to  listen 
rather  than  talk,  or  overpowered  by  the  confident  asser- 
tions of  Napoleon,  he  made  no  attempt  to  disclose  the 
secret  thoughts  of  his  master,  or  of  his  master's  foreign 
minister.  He  preferred,  according  to  M.  Thiers,  to 
mutter  a  few  inconsequent  words  ("  il  profera  quelques 
mots  sans  force  et  sans  suite  "),  and  went  so  far  as  to 
allow  the  Emperor  to  believe  that  Austria  would  be  true 
to  the  treaty  of  the  14th  March,  1812,  and  to  declare  that 
the  corps  which  he  had  commmanded  should  march  with 
the  corps  of  Prince  Poniatowski  into  Upper  Silesia.*  A 
few  days  later,  13th  April,  Napoleon  set  out  for  his  army. 
The  campaign  of  1813  had  begun. 

Whilst  Prince  Schwarzenberg  was  thus,  as  it  were, 
effacing  himself  at  Paris,  and  M.  de  Narbonne  was 
journeying  to  Vienna,  Metternich  was  steadily  working- 
for  the  issue  he  had  at  heart.  To  pass  gradually  from 
the  position  of  ally  of  France  to  that  of  ally  of  Russia 
and  England,  by  assuming  the  intermediary  position  of 
mediator,  to  retain  that  intermediary  position  as  lono-  as 
it  could  be  held  with  safety,  or  until  events  should  force 
Austria  to  declare  herself,  and  then — unless  Napoleon 
should  have  gained  a  success  so  striking  as  to  make  him 
irresistible — to  join  the  allies  with  all  the  troops  she  was, 
at  the  express  wish  of  Napoleon,   engaged  in  armino-  • 

*  "Napoleon  dit  done  au  Prince  de  ^ScI^wal•zenberg  qu'il  allait 
expe'dier  a  ce  corps  des  ordres,  pour  qu'il  s'avan9at  avec  le  Prince 
Pouiatowbki  vers  la  haute  Sile'sie,  et  qu'il  esperait  que  ces  ordiea 
seraient  executes.  Le  Prince  de  Schwarzenberg,  qui  savait  bieu  que 
son  gouvcrtiement  ne  voulait  plus  tirer  un  coup  de  fusil,  craignit  de 
I'avouer  a  Napoleon,  et  eut  la  faiblesse  de  lui  repoudre  que  le  corps 
Autrichien  obeirait." —  liners,  tome  xv.,  p.  390. 


90  LIFE  OF  PBINOE  3IETTEBNICE. 

such  was  his  policy.  In  the  presence  of  a  man  so  Imperious 
and  so  searching  as  was  Napoleon,  the  task  was  attended 
with  some  risk,  though  not  with  so  great  a  risk  as  some 
historians  have  represented,  for,  in  point  of  fact,  Napoleon, 
with  the  English  and  Spaniards  on  his  hands  at  one 
extremity,  and  the  allies  in  front  of  him,  had  all  his  work 
cut  out  for  him ;  and,  besides,  it  cannot  be  too  often 
repeated,  he  was  specially  at  this  period  under  the  glamour 
of  his  marriage.*  So  strongly  did  Metternich  realise  this, 
that  he  even  ventured  to  carry  his  intrigues  further,  and 
to  endeavour  to  detach  the  King  of  Saxony  completely 
from  the  French  alliance.  That  prince  had,  during  the 
excitement  caused  in  Germany  by  the  disasters  of  the 
Moscow  retreat  and  the  declarations  of  Prussia,  sought 
a  refuo-e  from  the  solicitations  of  his  countrymen,  first 
at  Ratisbon,  afterwards  at  Prague.  There  Metternich 
entered  into  secret  negotiations  with  him,  urging  him  to 
renounce  his  claims  to  the  Grand  Dukedom  of  Warsaw, 
and  to  promise  to  act  as  Austria  should  act,  and  at  the 
same  time.  There  remained  yet  another  arrangement 
which  could  only  be  furthered  by  the  diplomatic  dexterity 
of  which  Metternich  was  a  master.  The  reader  will  re- 
collect that  at  Paris  Prince  Schwarzenberg  had  promised 
Napoleon  that  the  Austrian  corps  he  had  commanded 
should  accompany  the  Franco-Polish  corps  under  Prince 

*  After  Napoleon  had  quitted  Paris  for  the  army,  Prince  Schwarzen- 
berg, who  remained  behind,  was  more  open  in  his  conversations  with 
M.  de  Bassano  than  he  had  ventured  to  be  with  the  Emperor.  One 
dav,  when  he  had  given  Bassano  many  reasons  why  Austria  should  not 
put  her  troops  in  line  with  those  of  Fra  .ce,  Bassano  urged  the 
marriage  as  a  decisive  reason  why  she  should.  Schwarzenberg, 
transported  by  sudden  impulse,  exclaimed :  "  The  mariiaa,e,  tiie 
marriage!  .  .  .  Policy  made  it,  and  policy  may  unmake  it."  Ba.ssano, 
according  to  Thiers,  did  not  report  these  words  to  Napoleon,  "  lest," 
he  adds,  "he  should  irritate  him  againat  Austria."  Such  coiKluct  was 
not  faithful  service. 


TEE  SPBING  OF  1813.  91 

Poniatowski  into  Upper  Silesia.  The  two  corps  were 
cantoned,  side  by  side,  in  Polish  and  Austro-Polish 
territory,  and  Poniatowski  had  received  instructions  not 
to  let  the  Austrians  out  of  his  sicrht.  Findinof  the 
presence  of  Poniatowski  dangerous  to  the  scheme  he  was 
meditating,  Metternich  had  recourse  to  an  expedient, 
extremely  hazardous  in  itself,  but  one  which,  under  the 
circumstance  of  Napoleon  being  at  the  moment  actually 
engaged  on  the  field  of  battle,  he  thought  he  would  be 
able  to  excuse.  He  made  a  secret  convention  with  the 
Russians,  whereby  the  latter,  by  a  pretended  display  of 
superior  forces,  should  appear  to  compel  the  Austrians  to 
repass  the  Vistula,  and  to  fall  back  into  Galicia,  taking 
with  them  the  corps  of  Poniatowski.  That  corps,  then,  by 
the  orders  of  the  King  of  Saxony,  who,  as  Grand  Duke 
of  Warsaw,  was  its  sovereign,  and  who  had  agreed  to  the 
design,  might  be  disarmed.  This  convention,  which  was 
made  at  Kalisch  towards  the  end  of  April,  was  but 
another  web  in  the  net  which  Metternich  was  weavinof 
round  Napoleon. 

Metternich  virtually  "gained  for  the  moment,  the  Kino- 
of  Saxony.  Having  by  this  means  arranged  to  rid  himself 
of  the  Franco-Polish  troops  on  the  Austrian  borders,  he 
turned  his  attention  to  Bavaria.  To  treat  of  defection 
from  Napoleon  to  the  King  of  that  country  was  a  business 
requiring  special  delicacy  of  touch,  for  Bavaria  had  been 
something  more  than  the  immemorial  ally  of  France. 
She  was  the  country  in  Europe  which  had  the  most 
benefited  from  that  alliance,  and  b^efited,  moreover,  at 
the  expense  of  Austria.  To  her  the  triumph  of  the 
allies,  if  Austria  were  to  join  the  alliance,  would 
mean  the  renunciation  of  Tirol,  the  Salzkammero-ut, 
and  portions  of  the  valley  of  the  Danube.  Yet,  notwith- 
standing the  diflliculty  of  the  task,  Metternich  attempted 


92  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICR. 

it,  and   made  an  Impression  which  revealed  itself  after 
Leipsig.* 

Meanwhile,  M.  de  Narbonne  arrived  in  Vienna,  and 
was  received  there,  with  the  greatest  distinction.  Metter- 
nich  talked  to  him  in  the  same  sense  as  regarded  the 
conditions  of  a  general  peace  in  which  he  had  talked  to 
his  predecessor.  The  French  ambassador  soon,  in  a 
manner  presently  to  be  stated,  recognised  the  fact  to 
which  all  his  countrymen  had  been  blind,  which  Napoleon 
himself,  duped  by  the  marriage,  had  never  admitted,  that 
Austria  not  only  would  not  lend  herself  to  the  designs  of 
his  Emperor  ;  she  would  do  her  utmost  to  thwart  them.t 
He  discovered  the  truth  in  this  wise.  Shortly  after  his 
arrival  he  received  from  the  Duke  of  Bassano  instructions 
to  propose  to  Austria  to  constitute  herself  a  mediator 
between  the  contending  powers  in  the  sense  of  a  supporter 
of  the  views  of  France  ;  that  is,  to  notify  to  the  allies 
that  unless  they  would  agree  to  the  terms  proposed  by 
France  and  Austria  conjointly,  terms  really  dictated  by 
France,  she  would  launch  an  army  of  100,000  men  into 
Silesia.  Metternich  listened  to  the  proposal  with  his 
usual   calmness;    then   quietly   inquired    what   were   the 

*  On  the  8th  October,  eight  days  before  the  beginning  of  the 
battle  of  Leipsig,  Count  Wrede,  who  commanded  tlie  Bavarian  forces, 
persuaded  his  sovereign  to  sign  a  convention  with  the  allies  by 
virtue  of  which  Bavaria  joined  the  alliance.  AVrede,  then,  with 
an  army  60,000  strong,  proceeded  to  occupy  a  position  at  Hanau, 
between  Leipzig  and  France,  in  order  to  cut  off  Napoleon.  The  French 
Emperor,  retreating  fiom  the  fatal  field,  and  having  in  hand  only 
]  7,000  men  at  the  moment,  came  upon  the  position  occupied  by 
Wrede,  barring  his  further  progress.  He  at  once  proceeded  to  recon- 
noitre, then,  turning  to  his  genei  als  and  exclaiming,  "  Poor  Wrede  !  I 
made  him  a  Count,  but  I  never  succeeded  in  making  him  a  General," 
attacked  and  dispersed  his  army. 

t  Napoleon  at  St.  Hehnia  used  these  words  :  "  Until  the  arrival  of 
M.  de  Narbonne  at  Vienna,  we  had  been  the  dupes  of  Austria:  he  had 
Dot  been  there  fifteen  days  before  he  discovered  everything." 


THE  SPBING  OF  1813.  93 

conditions  which  would  be  proposed  to  the  allies  in  the 
event  of  their  preferring,  under  the  circuuistaiices,  peace 
to  war.  On  that  point  Narbonne  was  only  expecting  in- 
structions. Metternich  then  retired  to  consider  what 
profit  he  could  derive  from  the  proposal  made  to  him. 

It  seemed  to  him  that  the  profit  might  be  very  great 
indeed — greater,  far  greater,  than  he  had  dared  to  hope 
for.  By  accepting  the  role  of  mediator,  proposed  by 
Napoleon — by  accepting  that  role,  that  is  to  say,  not  as 
Napoleon  understood  it,  but  as  Austria  might  choose  to 
understand  it — Austria  would,  without  any  announcement, 
abandon  the  perplexing  position  of  ally  then  held  under 
the  provisions  of  the  treaty  of  March,  1812.  Then, 
again,  the  acceptance  of  that  role  would  necessitate 
further  arming  to  make  it  a  role  which  could  be  re- 
spected. Such  acceptance  would,  besides,  sufl^iciently 
explain  the  action  of  Prince  Schwarzenberg's  corps  in 
retreating  behind  the  Galician  frontier.  After  tiikino-, 
for  appearance'  sake,  some  time  for  reflection,  thouo-h  in 
point  of  fact,  his  mind  had  been  made  up  on  the  instant, 
Metternich  saw  again  M.  de  Narbonne,  and  told  him  that 
on  all  the  important  parts  of  his  recent  communication  he 
was  happy  to  find  himself  in  perfect  agreement  with  the 
French  Emperor  ;  that  the  Emperor  Francis  thought,  and 
he  also  recognised,  that  it  was  no  longer  possible  for 
Austria  to  confine  herself  to  the  secondary  role  she  had 
occupied  in  1812 ;  that  the  circumstances  being  very 
different,  her  action  should  be  different  also  ;  that  Austria 
had  foreseen  this,  and  was  prepared  for  it ;  that  it  was 
because  she  had  perceived  it  that  she  had  armed 
and  was  now  ready,  including  the  corps  she  had  with- 
drawn into  Galicia,  to  concentrate  100,000  men  in 
Bohemia.  As  to  the  mode  of  presenting  herself  to  the 
allies,  Austria  again  had  the  happiness  to  be  in  perfect 


94  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTFBNICH. 

accord  with  Napoleon  ;  there  was  but  one  way,  and  that 
was  to  pose  as  an  armed  mediator.  She  would  propose 
to  the  Powers  to  cease  hostilities,  to  agree  to  an  armistice, 
to  appoint  plenipotentiaries.  If  they  would  consent  to  it, 
then  would  be  the  time  to  produce  the  conditions,  and  he 
would  await  with  impatience  those  promised  from  France. 
If,  on  the  contrary,  they  should  refuse  to  agree  to  peace 
on  any  terms,  then  would  be  the  time  to  act,  and  to 
arrange  how  the  armies  of  France  and  Austria  could  best 
work  for  a  common  end.  Metternich  concluded  by  again 
alluding  to  the  necessity  which  had  arisen  for  the  with- 
drawal of  the  Austrian  auxiliary  corps  from  Poland,  and 
by  repeating  the  intense  pleasure  he  felt  at  being  in 
perfect  agreement  with  Napoleon. 

"Never,"  writes  M.  Thiers,  "in  this  formidable  and  complicated 
game  of  diplomacy,  has  one  played  better  and  gained  more  than  did 
M.  de  Metternicli  on  this  occasion.  With  one  blow,  in  fact,  he  had 
solved  all  his  difficulties.  From  being  an  enslaved  ally  he  had  boldly 
made  himself  not  only  mediator,  but  armed  med  ator.  He  had  dared 
to  declare  that  the  treaty  of  alliance  of  March  1812  was  no  longer 
applicable  to  exifting  circumstimces  ;  he  had  given  reasons  for  his 
armaments  to  wli'ch  France  could  not  ofter  a  single  objection  :  he  had 
solved  in  advance  a  great  difficulty,  fast  approacliing  him,  that  of  how 
to  employ  the  auxiliary  Austrian  corps.  As  to  the  offer  to  enter  into 
the  views  of  France,  to  act  with  her  to  finish  the  overthiow  of  Ger- 
many, to  displace  Prussia,  that  is,  to  destroy  her,  to  take  Silesia,  &c., 
it  is  not  necessary  to  add  that  Austria  would  not  have  it  at  any  price, 
not  indeed  from  love  for  Prussia,  but  for  love  for  the  common  inde- 
pendence. She  eluded  then  this  offer,  by  proft  ssing  to  regard  the  case 
as  a  case  of  war,  with  which  she  would  occupy  herself  later  on,  when 
the  belligerent  Powers  should  have  refused  every  overture  for  peace,  a 
result  in  the  highest  degree  improbable.  M.de  Metternich  terminated 
his  declaration  by  announcing  that  a  courier  extraordinary  would  at 
once  start  for  Paris  to  convey  a  copy  of  it  to  Prince  Schwarzeubcrg." 

This  is  quite  true.  Metternich  carried  his  powers  of 
deception  so  far  as  to  make  it  appear  that  he  accepted 
the  French  scheme,  whereas  he  simply  intended  to  use  it 


THE  SPBING  OF  1813.  95 

to  concert  measures  with  the  allies  against  Napoleon. 
It  was  another  and  a  very  important  mesh  in  his  web. 
Yet  his  success  was  not  quite  so  great  as  the  reader 
might  gather  from  the  perusal  of  the  commentary  of 
M.  Thiers.  He  ray^jtitied,  but  he  did  not  take  in  M.  de 
Narbonne.  The  French  ambassador  was  too  clear- 
headed a  man  to  fail  to  be  struck  by  the  facility  with 
which  the  Minister  agreed  to  all  his  pro})osals.  Kot  so 
readily,  he  thought  to  himself,  would  Austria,  in  the 
circumstances  then  existing,  assent  to  a  proposition  which 
would  place,  according  to  his  view  of  it,  in  the  hands  of 
Napoleon,  the  direction  of  the  forces  she  had  raised  and 
armed  with  so  much  haste.  For  granting,  as  one  could 
not  fail  to  grant,  that  the  allies  would  refuse  the  pro- 
posals of  Napoleon,  though  presented  by  the  hand  of 
Austria,  that  was  the  logical  alternative,  the  only  alter- 
native, of  his  proposals,  as  he  intended  them  to  be 
understood.  If  Metternich  had  understood  him  in  a 
different  sense,  then  there  must  be  a  further  explanation. 
Yet  he  had  seemed  to  understand  him — and  had  not 
raised  one  objection.  Puzzled,  convinced  that,  all  was 
not  right,  Narbonne  endeavoured,  by  further  questioning, 
to  get  behind  the  real  meaning  of  the  Minister.  To 
accomplish  this,  he  asked  him  what  would  happen  if 
France  and  Austria  could  not  agree  on  the  terms  of 
peace  to  be  offered  to  the  allies.  This  was  to  beg  the 
whole  question.  Metternich,  recognising  this  on  the 
instant,  conscious  that  a  direct  answer  would  show  the 
Frenchman  that  he  was  being  played  with,  hastened  to 
elude  a  reply  by  an  adroit  interruption.  "  The  question 
of  conditions  does  not  disturb  me,"  he  hastened  to 
interpose. 

"  Your  master  will  be  reasonable — it  is  impossible!  be  sbould  not  be. 
WliOt !  ho  would  not  risk  ever)  thiug  for  that  ridiculous  cbimera  of  the 


96  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICE. 

Grand  Dnchy  of  Warsaw,  for  that  not  less  ridiculous  protectorate  of 
the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  for  tliose  Hanseatic  towns  which  will 
be  of  no  further  use  to  him  on  the  day  when,  signing  a  general  peace, 
he  shall  renounce  the  Continental  blockade — no,  no,  it  is  not  possible." 

Still  Narbonue  was  not  satisfied.  He  pushed  Metternich 
more  closely,  until  finally  he  posed  the  home  question  as 
to  what  Austria  would  do  in  case  Napoleon  should  not  be 
reasonable.  Thus  pressed,  Metternich,  impatient,  anxious 
to  finish,  had  to  declare  that  Austria,  as  mediator,  and  as 
armed  mediator,  would  be  an  arbiter  who  had  in  her 
hands  the  means  of  compelling  respect  for  right  and 
justice.  As  though  he  had  in  this  said  too  much,  he 
added,  that  all  the  prepossessions  of  the  arbiter  were  in 
favour  of  France.  "  But,"  replied  the  persistent  French- 
man, resolved  to  probe  the  question  to  the  bottom,  "  in 
certain  eventualities  you  would  side  against  us  ?  "  "  No, 
no,"  answered  Metternich,  anxious  by  any  subterfuge 
to  be  rid  of  further  interrogation,  "  we  should  not  do 
that,  because  you  would  be  reasonable."  This  reply, 
which  practically  finished  the  conversation,  left  no  doubt 
in  the  mind  of  the  ambassador  as  to  the  real  object 
of  Metternich,  and  he  reported  his  opinion  to  his  master. 
From  that  moment  he  watched  all  the  movements  of 
the  Austrian  statesman,  demanding  explanations  on  every 
doubtful  point,  and  subjecting  him  to  a  cross-examination 
which  Metternich  found  most  embarrassing. 

Napoleon  received  the  reports  of  his  ambassador  at 
Mayence  on  his  way  to  join  the  army.  Believing  that  a 
decisive  victory  over  the  allies  would  solve  every  difficulty, 
he  wrote  to  M.  de  Narbonne  telling  him  that  whilst  he 
understood  the  double  game  Austria  was  playing,  it  was 
not  advisable  to  push  her  to  an  immediate  declaration ; 
that  it  was  as  well  to  soothe  her  till  he  should  have  cut 
the  Gordian  knot  at  Dresden.     He  quitted  Mayence  the 


LVTZEN  AND  BAUTZEN.  97 

26th  April;  met  and  defeated  the  allies  at  Liitzen  the  3rd 
May  ;  followed  them,  and  again  encountered  and  defeated 
them  at  Bautzen  the  20th  and  21st  of  the  same  month. 
This  last  defeat  decided  Metternich  to  throw  off  the 
mask.  Before  I  proceed  to  describe  how,  and  with  what 
determination  to  prevent  peace,  to  push  matters  to  ex- 
tremities against  Napoleon,  he  carried  out  this  operation, 
it  is  necessary  to  say  a  few  words  as  to  the  line  he  had 
followed  with  the  French  ambassador  at  Vienna  since  we 
left  him  in  the  middle  of  April. 

The  reader  will  recollect  the  manoeuvre  by  which 
Metternich  had  enticed  the  Austrian  auxiliary  corps 
which  had  been  stationed  in  Poland,  with  the  corps  of 
Prince  Poniatowski  accompanying  it  into  Bohemia. 
Once  in  that  country  he  had  experienced  no  difficulty  in 
persuading  the  King  of  Saxony  to  direct  that  it  should 
be  disarmed.  Napoleon  heard  of  this  extraordinary 
interference  with  the  Polish  troops  at  Mayence,  and  not 
quite  understanding  it,  despatched  thence  a  courier 
to  Poniatowski  to  forbid  him  to  deliver  up  his  arms  on 
any  pretext  whatever. 

Narbonne,  to  whom  these  instructions  had  also  been 
communicated,  was  very  uneasy  as  to  what  might  happen 
if  the  Austrian  Government  should  persist  in  its  intention, 
and,  whilst  Napoleon  was  fighting  at  Lutzen,  he  was 
engaged  at  Vienna  in  endeavouring  to  procure  from 
Metternich  a  satisfactory  assurance  with  respect  alike  to 
Poniatowski's  corps  and  to  the  auxiliary  Austrian  corps, 
both  of  which,  he  contended,  were  stilt  by  treaty  under  the 
orders  of  the  French  Emperor.  Metternich,  bound  by  his 
secret  convention  with  Russia  to  keep  these  troops  out  of 
the  fighting  line,  strove  first  to  elude  the  demand,  sayino- 
that  it  was  impossible  to  be  at  the  same  time  mediator 
and    combatant.      Pressed,    however,   by   Narbonne    to 

H 


98  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICS. 

explain    his    intentions    categorically ;    to    say    directly 
whether  Austria  was,  or  was  not,  bound  by  the  treaty  of 
the  14th  March,  1812,  Metternich,  greatly  embarrassed, 
replied,  with  all  the  suavity  he  could  command,  that  it 
was  true  that  Austria  was  still  the  ally  of  France  and 
wished  to  remain  so ;  but  she  was   mediator  also,  and, 
in   that   capacity,    her   role   as   belligerent  was  for  the 
moment  suspended.     He  begged,  then,  the  French  am- 
bassador not  to  push  him  further ;  not  to  insist  on  the 
recommencement  of  hostilities   with  Kussia,   for,    as   he 
could  not  accede  to  that  demand,  to  persist  in  it  would 
be  to  place  him  in  a  false  position.     Then  he  added  the 
words   with    which    he   felt  confident  he    could  win  his 
interlocutor — words  of  specious  appearance,  but  as  false 
in  their  real  significance  as  any  words  ever  spoken  by 
a  minister.     Resolved,  thoroughly   resolved,  as   he   was 
at  the  moment  he  uttered  them,  to  make  common  cause 
with  the  allies  ;  waiting  only  for  the  time  when  he  could 
make  the  interference  of  Austria  most  decisive   against 
Napoleon ;    he   added,    "  if  I   refuse   you   30,000   men 
to-day,  it  is  only  that  I  may  give  you  150,000  later  on, 
when  we  shall  have  agreed  upon  a  peace  which  will  be 
acceptable  to  all  Europe."     But  Narbonne  was  not  under 
the  spell  of  the  minister.      His  early  doubts  regarding 
him  had  now   become    absolute    distrust.     Unconvinced, 
then,  by  the  reply  of  Metternich,  he  transmitted  to  him 
a  formal  note  requiring  the  Court  of  Vienna  either  to 
execute  the  treaty  of  March   14,  or  to   say  that  it  no 
longer  existed.     At  the  time  that  he  gave  in  that  note 
he  demanded  a  personal  interview  with  the  Emperor,  in 
order  that,  before  a  reply  to  the  note  should  be  sanctioned, 
he  might  have  the  opportunity  of  putting  before  Francis 
the  grave  results  which  mus'   follow  the  rejection  of  his 
demand.     The  interview  was  at  once  granted.     Francis, 


L  tJTZEN  AND  BA  TIT  ZEN.  9  9 

who  had  learned  his  lesson,  replied  to  Narbonne's  in- 
sistance  in  terms  almost  identical  with  those  used  by 
Metternich.  He  even  went  so  far  as  to  express  a  fear 
lest  the  ambassador  was  not  overstepping  the  spirit  of 
his  instructions  in  demanding  a  categorical  reply  to  his 
note.  The  latter,  then,  could  only  repeat  the  grave 
apprehensions  he  felt  on  the  subject,  and  declined  to 
withdraw  his  note. 

Forced  to  reply  to  that  note,  driven  also  to  dissemble 
and  deceive  till  the  time  for  action  should  arrive,  Metter- 
nich could  only  fall  back  upon  the  verbal  assurance  he 
had  already  given,  to  the  effect  that  Austria,  beino- 
mediator  as  well  as  ally,  the  role  of  the  latter  must  be 
suspended  till  the  duties  of  the  former  should  have  been 
accomplished.  To  soften  the  practical  refusal  contained 
in  this  answer,  he  added  to  it  an  engagement  that  no 
attempt  should  be  made  to  disarm  Poniatowski's  corps 
during  its  march  through  Austrian  territory. 

Matters  were  in  this  condition  at  Vienna  when  the 
news  of  the  result  of  the  battle  of  Liitzen  arrived  there. 
At  first,  as  often  hapj)ens,  rumours  prevailed,  and,  bei no- 
conformable  to  the  wishes  of  the  Court,  were  believed 
that  the  advantage  had  been  with  the  allies.  Soon, 
however,  the  information  that  \\hilst  the  French  were  at 
the  gates  of  Dresden,  the  allies  had  been  compelled  to 
cross  the  Elbe,  reveahid  the  truth.  The  moment  there 
could  be  no  longer  any  doubt  on  this  point  Metternich 
hastened  to  the  French  ambassador,  and,  tellino-  him 
that  he  was  not  surprised  at  Napoleon's  success,  inasmuch 
as  he  had  based  all  his  pacific  calculations  upon  his 
victories,  added  that  the  result  of  the  success  at  Liitzen 
would  be  that  the  pretensions  of  the  allies  would  be 
diminished  by  two-thirds ;  that  he  had  counted  on  such  a 
result ;  that  he  had  felt  that  the  one-third  w  hich  remained 

H  2 


100  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICH. 

of  the  allied  propositions  embodied  the  principle  upon 
which  a  lasting  peace  could  be  secured  ;  that  Austria  could 
now  seriously  take  up  her  role  of  mediator ;  that,  to 
carry  it  to  a  successful  issue,  he  proposed  to  send  Count 
Bubna  to  the  headquarters  of  Napoleon,  and  Count 
Stadion  to  the  headquarters  of  Alexander.  He  went  on 
to  express  himself  more  decidedly  than  he  had  ventured 
to  do  before  regarding  the  conditions  which  commended 
themselves  to  the  C^ourt  of  Vienna  as  reasonable.  They 
comprised — the  sacrifice  by  France  of  the  Grand  Duchy 
of  Warsaw  to  be  restored  mainly  to  Prussia ;  the  disso- 
lution of  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine  ;  the  giving-up 
of  the  Hanseatic  towns ;  and  the  restoration  to  Austria 
of  the  Illyrian  provinces.  Nothing  was  said  of  Holland, 
or  of  Spain,  or  of  Italy. 

Napoleon,  informed  during  the  interval  between  Liit- 
zen  and  Bautzen  of  what  had  been  passing  at  Vienna, 
was  fast  repenting  the  confidence  engendered  by  the 
marriage  which  had  impelled  him  to  propose  to  Austria 
the  role  of  mediator.  He  realised  now,  to  a  certain 
extent,  though  not  yet  completely,  the  use,  or  rather  the 
misuse,  she  would  make  of  that  role,  and  he  was  inclined 
to  find  fault  with  his  ambassador  for  having  pushed  her 
so  closely  as  to  force  her  to  make  the  declaration  that  in 
the  presence  of  her  duties  as  mediator,  her  role  as  active 
ally  had  ceased.*  An  accident,  a  chance,  came  at  this 
period    to   confirm   his   suspicions   of   the    bad    faith    of 

*  At  St.  Helena,  Napoleon  wrote :  "  The  penetration  of  M.  de 
Narbonne  was  more  injurious  than  serviceable  to  my  interests. 
Austria,  recognising  that  he  had  divined  her  intentions,  tlirew  off  the 
mask,  and  hastened  her  action.  Had  there  been  less  penetration  on 
our  part,  she  would  liave  been  more  reserved,  more  slow.  She  would 
have  prolonged  her  natural  indecision,  and,  during  that  time,  we  should 
have  had  other  chances." — Memorial  de  St.  lieUne,  by  Count  de 
Las-Cases,  tome  iii.  p.  95. 


LUTZEN  AND  BAUTZEN.  101 

Austria.  At  Dresden  the  French  captured  a  courier 
conveying  despatches  from  the  Russian  ^linister  at 
Vienna  to  the  Russian  Chancellor  with  the  (Jzar.  These 
despatches  gave  abundant  evidence  of  the  double  game 
Metternich  was  playing.  They  were  full  of  excuses  for  the 
delay  of  Austria  in  making  common  cause  with  the  allies. 
The  Minister  reported  in  them  that  Metternich  had  pleaded 
the  manner  in  which  he  was  fettered  by  the  treaty  of  the 
14th  March,  1812  ;  by  the  marriage  ;  by  the  danger  of 
declaring  prematurely  ;  by  the  backwardness  of  Austria's 
preparations.  The  despatches  contained,  besides,  ex- 
pressions which  went  far  to  show  that  the  heart  of  the 
Austrian  statesman  was  with  the  enemies  of  France. 
M.  Thiers  argues  that  this  revelation  should  have  made 
Napoleon  more  willing  to  accept  the  conditions  which 
Metternich  had  proposed  to  M.  de  Narbonne  as  the 
conditions  which  Austria  would  impose  on  the  allies. 
But  we,  to  whom  Metternich  has  revealed  himself  in  his 
Autobiography,  may  well  doubt  whether  he  would  have 
been  true  to  those  conditions.  Certainly,  during  the 
armistice  after  Bauteen,  he  went  far  beyond  them.  I  am 
inclined  to  think  that  the  instinct  of  Napoleon  was  more 
true  when,  on  discovering  this  double-dealing  on  the  part 
of  Metternich,  he  decided  to  recur  to  the  policy  of 
Caulaincourt  and  Talleyrand,  that  is,  to  treat  directly 
with  Russia,  passing  by  the  mediation  of  Austria.  Suc- 
ceeding in  that,  that  is,  in  making  peace  with  Russia,  he 
was  prepared  to  agree  to  the  terms  imposed  by  England 
regarding  Spain,  in  order  that  he  might  be  free  the  more 
eftectually  to  punish  the  two  German  powers  which  had 
betrayed  him.  He  instructed,  then,  his  ambassador  at 
Vienna  to  press  Metternich  no  more ;  to  recognise,  even, 
that  the  treaty  of  March  11th  was  not  applicable  to 
existing  circumstances ;  to  let  him  plainly  see  the  extent 


102  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  3IETTEBNICE. 

of  the  resources  of  the  Emperor  in  Italy,  in  Bavaria,  and 
in  France.  At  the  same  time  he  despatched  Prince 
Eugene  into  Italy,  to  raise  there  an  army  of  100,000 
men  ;  made  fresh  arrangements  regarding  his  reserves  ; 
and  effected  a  reconciliation  with  the  King  of  Saxony, 
who  had  come  to  Dresden  for  the  purpose.  He  was  in 
these  dispositions  regarding  Metternich  and  Austria  w^hen 
the  plenipotentiary  despatched  by  the  former  to  nego- 
tiate the  mediation.  Count  Bubna,  arrived  at  Dresden. 

At  that  moment  Napoleon  was  on  the  eve  of  setting 
out  to  deal  to  the  allies  a  blow  which  he  hoped  might 
finish  everything.  He  gave  the  Auatrian  envoy  a  very 
cold  reception,  but  this  latter,  a  man  of  resource,  had  the 
happy  inspiration  to  draw  from  his  portfolio  a  letter 
addressed  to  Napoleon  by  his  father-in-law.  This  letter 
revived  the  false  hopes  based  on  the  matrimonial  alliance 
between  the  two  crowns,  and  induced  Napoleon  to  listen 
with  patience,  and  something  more  than  patience,  to  the 
proposals  of  mediation  of  which  Bubna  was  the  bearer. 

Napoleon  was  prepared  to  yield  something,  though  not 
all  that  Austria  asked  for.  As  his  armaments  were  not 
completed,  he  caught  rather  too  readily,  in  the  course  of 
conversation,  at  the  idea,  suggested  by  Bubna,  of  an 
armistice,  and  concerted  with  that  envoy  a  letter  which 
the  latter  should  write  in  his  own  name  to  Stadion,  then 
at  the  headquarters  of  the  Czar,  in  which  should  be 
suggested  the  proposal  for  the  meeting  at  Prague  of  a 
congress  to  arrange  conditions  of  a  general  peace. 
Bubna,  having  written  this  letter  under  the  eye  of 
Napoleon,  and  despatched  it,  returned  to  Vienna,  very 
satisfied  with  his  mission,  the  bearer  of  a  letter  from 
Napoleon  to  his  father-in  law.  In  view  of  the  negotia- 
tions which  took  place  in  consequence  of  Bubna's  mission, 
and  to  enable  the  reader  thoroughly  to  understand  and 


THE  ARMISTICE  OF  PLEISWITZ.  103 

appreciate  the  conduct  of  Metternich,  it  is  necessary  to 
add  that  this  letter  contained  an  earnest,  even  an  affec- 
tionate appeal  to  Francis,  to  protect,  in  the  negotiations, 
the  honour  of  his  son-in-law.  Napoleon  said,  in  fact, 
that  whilst  earnestly  desirous  of  peace,  he  valued  his 
honour  more;  that,  son-in-law  of  the  Emperor  Francis, 
he  confided  his  honour  to  his  care  ;  that  he  preferred  it 
to  the  exercise  of  power ;  that  he  would  rather  die  than 
accept  humiliating  terms. 

Having  despatched  Bubna  to  Vienna,  and  Caulaincourt 
to  the  headquarters  of  the  allies  to  open  negotiations  with 
the  Czar,  Napoleon  quitted  Dresden,  18th  j\Iay,  to  join 
his  army,  and  attack  the  allies.  I  have  already  recorded 
that  he  attacked  and  defeated  them  at  Bautzen  on  the  20th 
and  21st  May.  If  Marshal  Ney,  after  having  carried  the 
village  of  Preititz  on  the  second  day,  had  at  once  marched 
upon  Hochkirch,  the  war  would  have  been  then  and  there 
ended,  for,  in  all  probability,  the  Czar  and  the  King  of 
Prussia  would  have  been  captured.  But  though  this  mis- 
take prevented  tlie  victory  from  being  absolutely  decisive, 
it  was  nevertheless  a  victory,  which,  but  for  Metternich  and 
the  lingering  trust  placed  by  Napoleon  on  his  matrimonial 
alliance  with  the  House  of  Habsburg,  might  have  been 
used  with  decisive  effect.  The  enemy  were  driven  beyond 
the  Oder;  their  commander-in-chief,  Barclay  de  Tolly, 
stronMy  urged  a  further  retreat  into  Poland;  had  Napoleon 
followed  them  without  intermission,  the  coalition  must 
have  been  dissolved.  At  this  decisive  moment,  by  one  of 
those  fatalities  which  come  to  mar  fortune,  Napoleon,  half 
trusting,  half  distrusting,  Austria;  believing,  too,  that 
time  would  work  more  for  him  than  for  the  enemy  ;  agreed, 
at  Pleiswitz,  to  an  armistice.  That  armistice  became,  by 
the  intervention  and  careful  plotting  of  Metternich,  the 
most  fatal  act,  up  to  that  time,  of  his  career. 


104  LIFE  OF  FBINCE  METTEBNICS, 


CHAPTER  V. 

FROM  THE  AEMISTICE  OF  PLEISWITZ  TO  THE 
RENEWAL  OF  HOSTILITIES. 

June-August,  1813. 

Metternich  was  at  Yienna  when,  at  four  o'clock  on 
the  29th,  he  received  news  of  the  loss  of  the  battle  of 
Bautzen.  He  proceeded  at  once  to  report  the  fact  to  the 
Emperor.  His  mind  was  made  up  as  to  the  course  to  be 
pursued.     He  writes : 

"I  had  made  my  choice.  The  point  was  this— to  prevent  Napoleon's 
onward  march,  and  to  remove  all  uncertainty  as  to  the  decision  of 
the  Emperor  from  the  minds  of  the  Emperor  Alexander  and  King 
Frederick  William.  Tho  x.  u&aiun  army  was  much  demoralised  ;  it  had 
but  one  wish — to  get  back  into  its  own  territory.  The  Emperor 
Alexander  had  indeed  resolved  to  carry  on  the  war;  but  the  will  of 
the  army  might  at  last  have  got  the  better  of  his  intentions.  The 
allied  armies  had  decided  to  retreat  towards  Silesia.  This  manoeuvre, 
well-planned  from  a  military  point  of  view,  clearly  showed  the 
intention  of  the  Emperor  Alexander,  who  desired  to  drive  Austria  into 
a  corner  and  oblige  her  to  join  the  alliance.  If  Austria  were  to  show 
that  she  was  not  inclined  to  take  part  in  the  war  against  Napoleon, 
this  would  give  the  Russian  monarch  the  excuse  to  cross  the  Wurta, 
and  conclude  the  war." 

Thus  resolved  to  put  Austria  in  the  line  with  Prussia 
and  Russia  against  France,  yet  conscious  that  Austria  was 
not  quite  ready  to  play  her  part : — conscious,  too,  that  it 


THE  ARMISTICE  OF  PLEISWITZ.  105 

was  yet  in  the  power  of  Napoleon  to  decide  the  retreat 
of  Russia  before  Austria  could  make  an  efl'ective  demon- 
stration, Metternich,  to  be  near  enough  to  the  allies  to 
carry  on  his  intrigues  successfully,  persuaded  his  master 
to  accompany  him  to  a  locality  midway,  or  nearly  midway, 
between  Dresden  and  the  headquarters  of  the  Czar.  The 
village  of  Gitschin  appeared  to  them,  from  its  position  on 
the  map.  to  be  such  a  locality.  They  accordingly  at  once 
proceeded  thither,  arriving  there  the  ord  June. 

On  their  way  to  that  village,  the  illustrious  travellers 
had,  on  the  2nd,  met  Count  Nesselrode,  sent  by  Alexander 
to  urge  Austria  to  a  rapid  decision.  After  giving  a  reply  of 
an  eminently  encouraging  character,  they  continued  their 
journey,  and  arrived  at  Gitschin,  as  I  said,  on  the  3rd. 
The  next  day  3retternich  sent  to  the  French  headquarters 
to  demand  a  personal  interview  with  the  Duke  of  Rassano, 
and  to  inform  him  that  Francis  had  quite  determined  to 
give  the  necessary  authority  to  the  proposals  for  mediation. 
But,  on  the  proposition  of  Count  Bubna,  the  armistice  of 
Pleiswitz  had  been  signed  that  very  day.  Metternich 
states  that  he  expected  the  answer  of  the  Frencii  minister 
to  be  evasive  ;  that  he  wanted  it  to  be  evasive,  in  order  to 
furnish  him  with  a  pretext  for  concerting  measures 
personally  with  the  Czar.  The  reply  was  not,  in  point  of 
fact,  evasive,  though  Metternich  calls  it  so.  The  date  of 
it  was  the  4th  of  June,  and  Napoleon,  busy  with  his 
troops,  only  reached  Dresden  on  the  10th,  and  the  time 
of  his  arrival  was  then  uncertain.  Takinsf  advantao-e. 
then,  of  the  fact  that  the  reply  of  B^issano  mentioned  the 
absence  of  Napoleon,  and  did  not,  because  it  could  not, 
fix  a  date  for  an  interview,  l\rettcrnich  hurried  off  to 
Opocno,  the  place  appointed  by  Alexander  to  meet  him. 
The  Czar,  accompanied  by  his  sister,  the  Grand  Duchess 
Katharine  ;  by  Count  Nesselrode ;  by  Count  Stadion,  the 


106  LIFE  OF  PBINOE  3IETTEBNICR. 

bead  of  the  anti-French  party  in  Austria ;  and  by 
Lebzeltern,  the  envoy  employed  by  Metternich  in  1810 
to  negotiate  between  Napoleon  and  the  Pope,  had  been 
there  some  hours  when  Metternich  arrived. 

The  first  interview,  which  took  place  at  once,  lasted 
two  hours.  It  was  decisive  as  to  the  question  of  the 
co-operation  of  Austria.  Metternich  treated  it  as  an 
arrangement  absolutely  resolved  upon.  When  Alexander 
expressed  some  fear  lest  Napoleon  should  accept  the 
meditation  of  Austria,  and  that  this  acceptance  might 
derange  the  plans  of  the  allies,  the  reply  of  Metternich 
rang  clear  and  unalterable.  The  meditation,  he  was 
determined,  should  lead  to  nothing. 

*'If/'  he  said,  "  Napoleou  decline  the  mediation,  the  armistice 
lapfics ;  if  he  accept,  the  negotiations  will  prove  that  he  does  not  wish 
to  be  wise  or  just,  and  the  result  will  be  the  same.  In  any  case,  we 
shall  have  gained  tlie  time  necessary  to  bring  our  troops  into  such  a 
jiosition  that  we  need  not  fear  a  separate  attack  made  either  upon  them 
or  you,  and  we  shall  be  able,  in  our  turn,  to  assume  the  oifensive."  * 

In  subsequent  interviews,  Metternich  succeeded  in 
regaining  entirely  the  confidence  of  Alexander.  We  have 
the  testimony  of  Frederick  Gentz,  who  was  at  Opocno  at 
the  time,  that  the  ruling  desire  of  Alexander,  the  idea 
which  had  taken  possession  of  his  somewhat  narrow  mind, 
was  to  pose  as  the  saviour  of  Europe. 

*  This  admission  on  the  pait  of  Metternich  proves  the  enormous 
mistake  Napoleon  male  in  consenting  to  an  armistice.  Before  the 
armistice  he  had  scattered  Kussia  and  Prussia,  and  he  was  in  a  posi- 
tion to  turn  round  and  rend  unprepared  Austria.  Prince  Napoleon 
{Napoleon  and  Ms  Detractors)  writes  on  this  point :  "  Napoleon  has 
been  reproached  with  that  armistice  as  a  fault.  It  would,  doubtless, 
have  been  a  military  mistake  had  Napoleon  been  certain  of  Austria's 
treachery."  Why  was  he  not  certain  of  a  treachery  which  was  so 
evidently  predetermined?  It  was  simply  because  lie  never  believed 
tliat  the  Emperor  of  Austria  would  proceed  to  extremities  against  the 
husband  of  his  daughter.     Alas  !  that  fatal  marriage  ! 


THE  ABMISTICE  OF  PLEISWITZ.  107 

"  I  could  see,"  wrote  Geutz,  June  22n(l,  '•  th:it  the  idea  of  with- 
drawing from  the  war,  without  tlie  attainment  of  the  groiit  end  with 
wliich  he  ha-l  been  flattered,  pierced  his  very  soul,  and  that  he  (such 
is  his  lecling)  would  give  a  kingdom  if  he  conld  slir  up  Austria  without 
any  attempt  at  peace.  Yet  he  seems  to  see  that  it  is  utter  insanity  to 
continue  the  war  without  Austria's  concurrence." 

Five  days  after  Gentz  bad  penned  these  words,  the 
Austrian  envoy  with  the  Czar,  Count  Stadion,  signed  at 
Eeichenbach,  in  Silesia,  with  the  full  concurrence  of 
Metternich,  a  treaty  with  Russia  and  Prussia  for  the 
overthrow  of  Napoleon.  The  reader  will  remember  that 
this  took  place  whilst  Austria  was  acting  as  mediator 
between  Napoleon  and  the  allies,  and  after  she  had  freed 
herself  from  the  obligations  of  the  treaty  of  March  14, 
1812,  on  the  plea  that  she  could  not  be  at  the  same  time 
ally  and  meditator.* 

The  salient  points  of  this  treaty  were,  (1)  that  Austria 
bound  herself  to  Russia  and  Prussia  to  declare  war  on 
France,  unless,  before  the  I'Oth  of  July  of  that  year 
(changed  afterwards  to  the  10th  Auirust),  France  should 
have  accepted  the  conditions  laid  down  by  the  Emperor 
of  Austria  as  "  indispensable  to  a  state  of  equili- 
brium  and  durable  tranquillity  in   Europe :  "    (2)    con- 

*  The  treaty  of  Reichenbach  was  kept  a  profound  secret,  so  secret 
that  it  never  even  came  to  Ihe  knov,le(lge  of  INI.  Tliiers,  and  is  never 
referred  to  by  him  in  liis  history  of  the  events  of  the  period.  This  may 
be  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  Thier.s  acc<pted  too  blindly  the 
assurances  of  Metternich,  whom  he  gresitly  admired,  and  with  whom 
he  was  in  constant  comniuuication.  It  would  have  lifted  tlie  veil  from 
the  impression  which  Mttternich  desired  to  produce  on  the  French 
politicians  of  the  period  if  he  had  allowed  M.  Thiers  to  read  a 
document  which  proved  that  it  was  not  Napoleon,  but  Austria,  which 
was  bent  on  the  rupture  of  the  armistice.  Of  the  authenticity  of  the 
treaty  there  can  be  no  doubt.  Metternich  alludes  to  it  in  the 
documents  appended  to  his  Memoirs  (Vol.  ii.,  p.  4{J.5,  French  edition). 
The  full  text  of  it  is  given  by  Prince  Napoleon  in  his  admirable  work, 
Napoleon  and  Ids  Detractors,  Appendix,  p.  373,  English  tditlon. 


108  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICS. 

tains  the  conditions,  which  were  the  same  as  those  pre- 
viously formulated:  (3)  contains  a  promise  on  the  part 
of  Austria  that  should  those  conditions  not  be  accepted, 
she  will  employ  all  her  available  forces  to  secure  their 
adoption :   (4)  *'  reciprocally,  the   two   Courts  of  Kussia 
and  Prussia  eno-age  to   act   henceforth   in  concert  with 
Austria  in  the  capacity  of  allies,  and  each  with  those  of 
her   forces   available   at   the   time : "    (5)  regulates  the 
number  of  troops  to  be  employed :  (6)  "  as  soon  as  war 
shall  have  begun,  the  three  allied  Courts  shall  regard,  as 
the  aim  of  their  simultaneous  eftbrts,  the  execution  of  the 
articles  expressed  by  the  Russian  and  Prussian  cabinets 
in  their  notes  of  May  16,  which  shall  be  construed  in  the 
widest  acceptation."     (These  articles  included  :  the  retro- 
cession of  Hanover   to    England ;  the   renunciatiom    by 
France  of  all  the  territories  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Rhine-,    the   independence    of    the   intermediate   States 
between  the  Rhine  and  the  Alps  ;  the  reconstitution  of 
the  frontiers  of  Austria  and  Prussia,  on  the  basis  of  1805) : 
(7)  the  three  Courts  to  agree  to  nothing  except  by  mutual 
consent :  (8)  each  Court  to  appoint  officers  to  arrange 
the  plan  of  campaign  with  the  Commander-in-chief  of  the 
Austrian    army  :    (9)    the   allied  Courts   most  solemnly 
bind  themselves  not  to  enter  into  any  separate  agreement 
with  France:  (10)  a  similar  engagement  on  the  part  of 
Austria  alone :   (11)  the  convention  to  be  kept  secret ; 
the  consent  of  Austria  being  required  to  its  disclosure : 
(12)  the  convention  fo  be  ratified  within  six  days. 

Metternich  quitted  Opocno  seven  days  before  this  con- 
vention had  been  actually  signed.  He  had,  however, 
arrano-ed  all  its  provisions,  and  he  could  return  with  a 
liirht  heart  to  GItschin.  This  he  did  on  the  20th,  and 
there  he  found  a  pressing  invitation  from  Bassano  to  come 
to  Dresden.     Before  he  accepted  the  invitation  he  com- 


THE  ABMISTICE  OF  PLEISWITZ.  109 

mimlcated  with  the  Russo-Prussian  cabinet  sitting  at 
Reichenbach,  and  assured  them  that  they  could  depend 
on  him.  On  their  side,  he  writes,  "there  was  much 
dejection."  Evidently  they  did  not  quite  trust  him. 
They  had  not  realised,  they  could  not  realise,  that 
Metternich,  having  carefully  studied  the  three  sovereigns, 
was  really  aiming  at  the  domination  of  the  Continent ;  the 
first  essential  step  to  which  was  the  fall  of  Napoleon. 
They  might  have  safely  trusted  him.  Ah'eady,  whilst  on 
his  road  to  Dresden,  to  treat  nominally  with  Napoleon  for 
peace,  he  was  hurrying  the  levy  of  troops;  establishing 
magazines  ;  removing  supplies  from  places  likely  to  be 
occupied  by  the  French  ;  laying  tetes-de-pont  on  the  Elbe 
and  the  Moldau.  He  tells  us  plainly  that  these  pre- 
parations were  being  made,  not  that  they  might  aid 
Austria  to  pose  effectually  as  a  mediator,  but  to  serve 
Austria  and  the  Allies,  when  war  should  have  succeeded 
to  the  armistice. 

IMetternich  reached  Dresden  the  24th  June.  Napoleon 
was,  at  the  moment,  absent,  and  did  not  return  till  the 
following  day.  On  that  day  occurred  the  historical 
interview  between  the  Emperor  and  the  Austrian 
Minister. 

Of  that  interview  there  are  two  versions,  differinor  from 
each  other  in  all  essential  points.  And  yet,  one  of  the 
two  is  the  only  possible  version.  There  were  only  two 
men  present  at  the  interview.  Only  those  two,  therefore, 
could  have  certainly  known  what  passed  on  the  occasion. 
All  other  versions  must  be  imaginary  and  fictitious.  We 
are,  then,  in  this  predicament  for  historic  truth  ;  that  each 
of  the  two  principals  has  left  a  record  of  what  passed  at 
an  interview  which  was  to  decide  the  question  of  peace 
or  war,  and  the  two  records  are  irreconcilable.  Which 
is  the  true  one  ? 


no  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICH. 

To  help  us  to  answer  that  question  it  is  well  that  we 
should  ascertain  the  spirit  which  animated  the  two  actors 
immediately  prior  to  the  interview.  This  has  been  done 
with  great  eiiect  and  with  perfect  impartiality  by  Prince 
Napoleon  in  the  book*  to  which  I  have  more  than  once 
referred.  The  Prince,  at  all  events,  may  be  accepted  as 
MU  authority  for  the  frame  of  mind  which  he  has  discerned 
in  his  uncle.  That  which  animated  Metternich  is  told  too 
plainly  in  his  Autobiography. 

To  begin  with  the  Emperor.  "  With  his  shrewd 
mind,"  writes  the  Prince,  "  Napoleon  wanted  a  longer 
armistice  ;  he  admitted  the  neutrality  and  mediation  of 
Austria,  but  looked  for  some  prospective  basis  of  a 
durable  peace."  He  concludes,  then,  thit  Napoleon  went 
to  the  interview  really  wishing  for  a  pence  which  should 
be  based  on  durable  principles,  but  determined  not  to 
accept  terms  for  ever  shifting  and  expanding  according 
to  the  accident  of  the  hour. 

Metternich,  on  the  contrary,  went  to  the  interview  in  a 
frame  of  mind  absolutely  hostile  to  Napoleon  and  his 
cause.  He  records  one  or  two  little  incidents  or  im- 
pressions at  this  particular  moment  which  tend  to  give 
evidence  of  his  bitterness  against  the  Emperor,  of  his 
conviction  that  the  time  for  striking  had  come.  On  the 
first  head  he  uses  this  expression :  "  Napoleon's  head- 
quarters were  at  the  Marcolini  Garden,  near  the  Elster 
meadows.  He  had  not  the  courage  to  hve  in  the  town." 
This  remark,  directly  impugning  the  courage  of  the  man 
who  never  spared  himself  on  the  battlefield,  besides  being 
an  imputation  reflecting  on  the  mind  of  the  man  who 
made  it,  shows  a  bitterness  of  soul,  an  aggravation  of 
vindictiveness,  which  would  ill  prepare  the  utterer  for 
friendly  intercourse  with  the  man  against  whom  it  was 
*  Napoleon  and  his  Detractors,  pp.  176-8. 


THE  ABMISTIGE  OF  PLEISWITZ.  Ill 

directed.  There  was  a  very  good  reason  why  Napoleon 
should  have  his  headquarters  in  the  Marcolini  palace. 
First,  it  had  attached  to  it  a  large  garden ;  secondly,  it 
was  near  his  troops.  The  Marcolini  palace  and  garden, 
now  used  as  an  hospital,  are  situated  in  a  suburb  of 
Dresden  called  Friedrichstadt.  They  had  the  reputation 
of  being  healthy,  and  the  garden  was  beautifully  laid 
out.  When  Napoleon  had  occupied  Vienna  he  had  taken 
up  his  residence  at  the  Schonbriinn  palace,  because  it  was 
a  palace  with  a  garden,  in  which  he  could  walk  and 
meditate  without  attracting  attention.  He  did  the  same 
for  the  same  reason  at  Dresden.  Yet  Metternich,  on  the 
eve  of  an  interview  which  was  to  decide  the  fate  of 
Europe,  writes  down  his  antagonist  as  a  coward  because 
he  preferred  a  palace  with  a  gar 'en  to  the  crowd  el 
streets  of  a  large  city.  The  remark  may  be  triflino-  in 
itself,  but  few  will  dispute  that  it  betrays  a  concentrated 
bitterness  of  soul  and  a  prejudice  sufficient  to  render 
dispassionate  judgment  impossible. 

Then,  again,  Metternich  states  that  he  had  discerned 
a  great  and  rising  feeling  against  Napoleon  amongst  a 
large  section  of  Frenchmen  ;  that  the  army  sio-hed  for 
peace,  and  had  little  confidence  in  the  issue  of  the  war. 
Surely,  the  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  such  feelino-s 
among  the  subjects  of  his  enemy  could  not  but  steel  the 
heart  of  the  Austri  m  against  peace,  when  he  was  con- 
fident that  in  continuing  the  w^ar  he  would  be  fi'ditino- 
Napoleon  with  two  forces:  with  the  enthusiasm  of 
oppressed  and  revolting  Germany ;  and  the  disillusion 
and  weariness  of  the  French  people. 

But  these  are  not  the  only  indications  which  Metternich 
gave  of  his  determination  to  prolong  the  war  at  all 
hazards.  First,  we  have  the  convention  of  Reichenbach, 
arranged  before  he  quitted   Opocno,  and  signed  the  27th 


112  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICE. 

June.  Then  we  have  this  pregnant  sentence,  already 
given  in  nearly  the  same  words,  but  which  will  bear 
repetition. 

"  What  will  become  of  our  cause,"  asked  Alexander  at  Opocno,  "  if 
Napoleon  accepts  the  mediation."  "If  he  should  decline  it,"  I 
answered,  "  the  armistice  will  cease  as  a  matter  of  course,  and  you  will 
find  us  among  the  number  of  your  allies.  If  he  should  accept  it,  the 
negotiations  will  prove  Napoleon  to  be  neither  wise  nor  just,  and 
the  result  will  be  the  same.  lu  any  case,  we  shall  have  gained  the 
time  we  required,  and  we  shall  be  able  to  take  the  offensive." 

Constrained,  then,  to  accept  only  one  of  the  two 
versions,  we  are  bound  to  reject  that  of  the  man  who 
went  to  the  interview  with  his  mind  fully  bent  on  a 
continuance  of  the  war,  who  had  a  bitter  personal  spite 
against  Napoleon,  and  whose  memoirs  have  been  so 
touched  and  re-touched  as  to  be  only  reliable  when  the 
events  they  record  are  supported  by  concurrent  testimony. 
The  version  dictated  by  Napoleon  is,  on  the  other  hand, 
borne  out  by  the  knowledge  we  have  of  the  views  and 
hopes  and  plans  he  entertained  at  the  period.  We  accept 
it,  therefore,  in  its  entirety. 

"  So  you  have  come,  Metternieh,"  said  Napoleon  to  the  Austrian 
statesman  on  his  entering  the  room.  "  You  are  welcome.  But,  if  you 
wish  for  peace,  why  come  so  late  ?  We  have  alrea<ly  lost  a  month,  and 
your  metliation  grows  almost  hostile  by  reason  of  its  inactivity.  It 
appears  that  it  suits  you  no  longer  to  guarantee  the  integrity  of  the 
French  Empire.  Let  it  be  so.  But  why  did  you  not  say  so  before? 
Why  did  you  not  frankly  inform  me  of  it  on  my  return  frum  Eussia, 
by  Bubna,  or,  more  recently,  by  Schwarzenbca-g?  I  might,  perhaps, 
have  been  in  time  to  modify  my  plans ;  I  mi^ht  not  even  have  entered 
the  field. 

"  By  allowing  me  to  get  exhausted  by  new  efforts,  you  doubtless 
relied  on  less  rapid  events.  Victory  crowned  those  bold  effoits.  I  win 
two  battles.  JNIy  enemies,  weakened,  are  on  the  point  of  recovering 
from  their  illusions.  You  sudlenly  glide  in  between  us.  You  speak 
to  me  of  armistice  and  mediation;  to  them  of  alliance.  You  embroil 
everything.  But  for  your  fatal  intervention,  peace  would  now  be 
signed  with  the  Allies. 


TEE  ABMISTICE  OF  PLEISWITZ.  113 

"  What  have  hitherto  been  the  results  of  the  armistice  ?  I  am  not 
acquainted  with  any  other  than  the  two  treaties  of  Rt- ichenbach,  which 
England  has  just  wrung  from  Prussia  and  Russia.  Another  treaty 
with  a  third  Power  is  also  mentioned.  But  M.  de  Stadion  is  on  the 
spot,  Metternich,  and  you  ought  to  be  better  informed  than  I  on  that 
subject. 

"  Admit,  that  since  Austria  assumed  the  title  of  mediator,  she  no 
longer  sides  with  me,  that  she  is  no  longer  impartial ;  she  is  hostile. 
You  were  on  the  point  of  declaring  against  us,  when  the  victory  of 
Liitzen  startled  you.  Seeing  me  still  so  powerful,  you  felt  it  necessary 
to  develop  your  strength,  and  were  anxious  to  gain  time. 

"  To-day,  your  200,000  men  are  ready.  iSchwarzenberg  commands 
them.  He  assembles  them,  near  by,  behind  the  curtain  formed  by  the 
mountains  of  Bohemia.  And,  because  you  believe  yourselves  to  be  in 
a  position  to  dictate  the  law,  you  come  to  me.  The  law,  indeed  I  And 
why,  pray,  do  you  wish  to  dictate  it  only  to  me  ?  Am  I  no  longer  the 
same  man  whom  you  defended  yesterday  ?  If  you  are  really  a 
mediator,  why  not,  at  least,  hold  the  balance  even? 

"  I  have  divined  your  intentions,  Metternich :  your  Cabinet  wishes 
to  take  advantage  of  my  difficulties,  and  increase  them  as  much  as 
possible,  in  order  to  recover  the  whole  or  part  of  what  has  been  lost. 
The  main  point  for  you  to  ascertain  is  whether  you  can  obtain  a 
ransom  from  me  without  fighting,  or  whether  you  will  have  to  rank 
openly  with  my  enemies.  You  are  not  yet  quite  sure  which  alternative 
will  be  most  advantageous,  and,  perhaps,  you  only  come  here  to 
ascertain  it.  Well !  I  do  not  refuse  to  come  to  terms.  Wliat  do  you 
want?" 

This  was  a  sharp  attack.  M.  de  Metternich  met  it 
with  a  complete  array  of  diplomatic  phrases.  The  only 
advantage  the  Emperor,  his  master,  was  jealous  of 
acquiring  was  the  influence  which  would  impart  to  the 
Cabinets  of  Europe  the  spirit  of  moderation,  and  respect 
for  the  rights  and  possessions  of  independent  States,  with 
which  he  himself  was  animated.  Austria  was  desirous  of 
establishing  a  state  of  things  which,  hy  a  wise  re-partition 
of  power,  would  place  the  guarantee  of  peace  under  the 
protection  of  a  confederation  of  independent  States. 

"  Explain  yourself,"  interrupted  the  Emperor,  "  and  let  ijs  corae  to 
the  point.  But  remember  that  I  am  a  soldier  who  understands  better 
how  to  break  than  how  to  bind.     I  oflercd  yuu.Illyria  as  the  piice  of 

I 


114  LIFE  OF  FRINCE  METTEBNICE. 

your  neutrality.  Are  you  satisfied?  My  army  is  quite  sufficient  to 
bring  the  Russians  and  the  Prussians  to  terms,  and  your  neutrality  is 
all  I  ask." 

"  Why,  Sire,"  replied  quickly  M.  de  Metternich, "  should  your  INIajesty 
remain  unsupported  in  the  contest  ?  Why  should  you  not  double  your 
forces?  You  can  do  so.  Sire,  for  it  rests  entirely  with  you  to  make  use 
of  them.  Indeed,  things  liave  reached  a  climax,  and  we  can  no  longer 
remain  neutral ;  we  must  declare  either  for  or  against  you." 

Then  the  conversation  became  almost  inaudible,  and 
the  Emperor  led  M.  de  Metternich  to  the  map-room. 
After  a  rather  long  interval,  the  Emperor  again  raised 
his  voice,  and  said : 

"  What !  not  only  Illyria,  but  half  Italy,  and  the  return  of  the  Pope 
to  Eome !  the  giving  up  of  Spain,  Holland,  the  Confederation  of  the 
Rhine,  and  Switzerland!  That  is  what  you  call  the  spirit  of  mode- 
ration with  which  you  are  animated !  You  only  think  of  taking 
advantage  of  every  opportunity.  Your  sole  preoccupation  is  to  transfer 
your  alliance  from  one  camp  to  the  other,  in  order  to  be  always  iu  that 
in  which  a  sharo  of  plunder  is  to  be  had,  and  you  speak  of  your 
respect  for  the  rights  of  independent  States  !  In  fact,  you  want  Italy, 
Russia  wants  Poland,  Sweden  wants  Norway,  Prussia  wants  Saxony, 
and  England  iusi-sts  on  the  possession  of  Holland  and  Belgium.  In 
short,  peace  is  only  a  pretext;  you  are  all  longing  for  the  dismember- 
ment of  the  French  Empire  !  And,  to  realise  such  a  scheme,  Austria 
thinks  it  sufficient  for  her  to  declare  herself!  You  expect  here,  by  a 
stroke  of  the  pen,  to  bring  down  the  ramparts  of  Dantzig,  Kiistrin, 
Glogau,  Magdeburg,  Wesel,  Mayence,  Antwerp,  Alessandria,  Mantua, 
and  of  all  th  ^  strongest  fortresses  of  Europe,  the  keys  of  which  I  only 
obtained  after  numerous  victories  !  As  for  me,  docile  to  your  policy,  I 
should  have  to  evacuate  Europe,  half  of  which  I  still  occupy,  to  bring 
back  my  legions  behind  the  Rhine,  the  Alps,  and  the  Pyrenees,  as 
though  I  had  been  vanquished;  and  subscribing  to  a  tre:ity  which 
wouUl  only  amount  to  a  vast  capitulation,  I  should  thus  surrender  to 
my  enemies,  and  rely,  for  a  doubtful  future,  upon  the  generosity  of  the 
very  men  whom  I  have  now  crushed !  At  a  time  when  my  colours 
are  still  flying  over  the  mouths  of  the  Vistula  and  the  banks  of  the 
Oder,  when  a  victorious  army  is  threatening  Berlin  and  Bre^lau,  when 
I  am  myself  here  at  the  head  of  300,000  men,  Austria,  without  striking 
a  blow,  with  Hit  even  drawing  the  sword,  presumes  to  compel  me  to 
subscribe  to  such  teriijs !  Without  drawing  the  sword !  Such 
pretension  is  indeed  outrageous!    And  it  is  my  father-in-law  who 


THE  ABMISTICE  OF  FLEISWITZ.  115 

entertains  such  a  design  !  It  is  lie  who  sends  you  !  In  what  position, 
then,  does  he  wish  to  place  me  towards  the  French  people?  He  is 
strangely  mistaken  if  he  believes  that  in  France  a  mutilated  throne 
can  shelter  his  daughter  and  his  grandson !  Ah  !  Metternich,  how 
much  did  England  give  )  ou  to  decide  you  to  act  thus  towards  me  ?  " 

On  hearino"  these  words,  which  Napoleon  was  unable 
to  control,  Metternich  changed  colour.  Deep  silence 
followed,  as,  with  long  strides,  they  continued  pacing 
across  the  room.  The  Emperor's  hat  fell  on  the  floor. 
They  repeatedly  passed  it.  On  any  other  occasion  M.  de 
Metternich  would  have  hastened  to  pick  it  up.  In  this 
instance,  he  allowed  the  Emperor  to  do  so  himself. 

Some  time  elapsed  before  they  both  recovered. 

Napoleon,  having  calmed  himself,  resumed  the  con- 
versation. He  declared  that  peace  would  not  yet  be 
despaired  of  by  him,  if  Austria  would  consent  to  listen  to 
her  own  interests.  He  further  insisted  on  the  summoninff 
of  the  Congress,  and  formally  requested  that,  in  the 
event  of  the  re-commencement  of  hostilities,  negotiations 
should  still  be  continued,  in  order  that  an  opportunity 
might  yet  be  left  open  for  the  reconciliation  of  nations. 

When  parting  with  M.  de  Metternich,  the  Emperor 
expressly  informed  him  that  the  cession  of  Illyria  was  not 
his  last  word.* 

The  day  following  the  interview  Metternich  saw  the 
Duke  of  Bassano,  and  told  him  he  was  about  to  send  him 
a  note  containing  the  proposal  for  the  Austrian  mediation. 
More  than  ever  resolved  now  to  strike,  but  anxious  to 
avoid  the  error  of  striking  too  soon,  Metternich  sent  that 
night  to  the  Commander-in-chief  of  ^  the  Austrian  army. 
Prince  Schwarzenberg,  to  inquire,  1st,  whether  a  prolonga- 
tion of  the  armistice  would  be  useful  for  the   purposes  of 

*  The  account  of  this  interview  is  taken  from  Prince  Napoleon's 
work,  Napoleon  and  his  Detractors,  Appendix,  Part  II. 

I  2 


116  LIFE  OF  PBINGE  METTERNICK 

the  crowned  conspirators ;  2nd,  to  ask  "  the  most  useful, 
and  consequently  the  only  allowable,  extreme  length  of 
such  a  prolongation."  Within  thirty-two  hours  he 
received  the  following  reply  :  "  My  army  would,  in  twenty 
days,  add  to  its  strength  75,000  men.  I  should  consider 
the  possibility  of  obtaining  this  extension  a  happy  circum- 
stance ;  the  twenty-first  day  would  be  a  burden  to  me." 
Naturally  enough,  under  the  circumstances,  Metternich 
used  all  his  efforts  to  obtain  that  extension  of  twenty  days. 
The  only  means  by  which  such  an  arrangement  could  be 
arrived  at  was  to  again  practise  deception  on  Napoleon. 
I  shall  now  proceed  to  state  the  means  Metternich  em- 
ployed to  accomplish  this  purpose. 

Four  days  after  the  historical  interview  I  have  recorded, 
Metternich  was  on  the  point  of  leaving  Dresden  when  he 
received  a  message  from  Napoleon  requesting  to  see  him 
before  he  should  leave.  The  interview  between  them 
took  place  the  same  day  (June  30th).  Napoleon  had 
resolved  to  put  to  the  test  the  professions  of  Austria. 
Accordingly  he  took  Metternich  with  him  into  a  private 
room,  saying:  "  Perhaps  we  shall  understand  each  other 
better — you  and  I.  Come  into  my  private  room,  and  let 
us  come  to  some  agreement." 

Seated  in  the  private  room,  Bassano  being  also  present, 
Napoleon  asked  Metternich  to  formulate  his  conditions  of 
the  mediation.  Metternich  then  and  there  formulated 
them,  and  Napoleon  then  and  there  accepted  them. 

The  conditions  drafted  by  Metternich  and  accepted  by 
Napoleon  were  as  follows  :  (1)  the  acceptance  by  Napoleon 
of  the  armed  mediation  of  Austria;  (2)  the  arrangement 
for  the  plenipotentiaries  of  the  Powers  to  meet  at  Prague 
the  10th  July  ;  (3)  the  10th  August  to  be  the  last  da^  of 
the  negotiations ;  (4)  hostilities  to  cease  till  that  date. 

Now,  the  reader  will  recollect  that  the  armistice  would 


THE  ABMISTICE  OF  PLEISWITZ.  117 

expire  the  20th  July.  Let  hhn  add  the  twenty  days 
requh'ed  by  Prince  Schwarzenberg  to  that  date,  and  we 
come  to  the  9th  August,  but  one  day  short  of  the 
period  inserted  by  Metternich  in  the  document  he  drew 
up  for  Napoleon  to  sign !  He  did  more.  When 
Napoleon,  unsuspicious  of  double  dealing,  noticed  the 
date,  and  suggested  that  to  arrange  it  it  would  be 
necessary  to  prolong  the  armistice  to  the  10th  August, 
Metternich,  whilst  professing  his  personal  inability  to  pro- 
long the  truce,  agreed  to  give  a  guarantee  on  behalf  of  the 
two  allied  monarchs,  that  it  should  be  prolonged.  Nay, 
more.  Finding  Napoleon  in  a  facile  humour,  he  persuaded 
him  to  sanction  the  transport  from  Austrian  territory,  of 
provisions  for  the  allied  armies  to  enable  them  to  subsist 
for  the  twenty  days  necessary  to  enable  tlie  Austrian  army 
to  be  increased  to  an  efficient  strengtii. 

The  precise  views  indulged  in  by  Metternich  at  this 
period  may  be  gathered  from  a  report  he  addressed  from 
Brandeis,  in  Bohemia — whither  he  had  gone  to  be  near 
the  place  where  the  negotiations  were  to  be  carried  on — 
to  his  master.  This  report,  dated  12th  of  July,  and  the 
Emperor's  reply  to  it,  dated  18th  idem,  prove  that  whilst 
Austria  was  prepared,  in  the  event  of  Napoleon  refusing 
her  minimum,  to  throw  her  whole  weight  on  behalf  of  the 
Allies,  she  was  not  ready  to  act  similarly  towards  Napoleon 
in  the  case  of  the  Allies  refusing  the  same  conditions. 
Metternich  had  asked  his  master  if  he  could  rely  upon  his 
firmness  in  case  Napoleon  should  not  accept  the  pre- 
liminaries demanded  by  Austria  ;  whether,  in  the  event  of 
such  non-acceptance  his  Majesty  was  "  unalterably  deter- 
mined "  to  cast  in  his  lot  with  the  Allies.  The  reply  to 
this,  he  said,  would  be  the  corner-stone  of  his  instructions, 
the  basis  of  his  future  policy.  Francis  answered  in  the 
sense  I  have  indicated.     He   gave   to   his   minister  the 


118  LIFE  OF  FBINGE  METTEHNICH. 

assurances  he  required,  but,  like  him,  he  provided  only  for 
the  event  of  a  refusal  coming  from  one  only  of  the  con- 
tracting parties ;  in  the  meanwhile  military  preparations 
were  made  as  though  that  refusal  had  been  already 
pronounced. 

To  Metternich,  in  fact,  the  circumstances  bore  a  strong 
resemblance  to  the  position  of  affairs  after  VVagram.  Then, 
he  had  complained.  Napoleon  had  negotiated  over  his 
head,  and  obtained  a  peace  which  he  would  not  have 
granted.  He  could  not  but  remember,  now,  the  ex- 
pression on  this  subject  which  Napoleon  used  to  him  at 
Paris,  to  the  effect  that  if  he  had  not  obtained  that  peace, 
he  would  have  been  *'  lost."  The  position  of  the  Allies,  if 
Austria  were  to  join  them,  would  now  be  infinitely  better 
than  the  position  of  isolated  Austria  after  Wagram  ;  whils^t 
that  of  Napoleon  was  less  favourable  than  at  that  period. 
If  Napoleon  would  have  been  "  lost  "  then,  if  peace  had 
not  been  made,  what  would  happen  to  him  now  ? 
According  to  all  rule  he  was  doomed. 

The  phrase  used  by  Napoleon  in  1810  was  never  at 
this  period  absent  from  the  thoughts  of  the  Austrian 
minister.  He  displayed  then  no  earnestness  regarding 
the  assembling  of  the  Congress  at  Prague.  He  caused 
its  meetings  to  be  postponed  from  the  10th  to  the 
12th  of  July.  In  consequence  of  a  misunderstanding 
on  the  part  of  the  allied  generals  as  to  the  date  on 
which  hostilities  were  to  recommence  in  the  event  of 
the  proceedings  at  the  Congress  proving  abortive,  a 
further  delay  occurred.  Meanwhile  Napoleon  had  pro- 
ceeded on  a  tour  of  military  inspection.  The  delays 
initiated  by  the  Allies  caused  delays  also  on  the  side  of 
the  French.  When  the  negotiators  at  last  met,  Metter- 
nich raised  objections  to  the  presence  at  the  Congress  of 
the  first   French   plenipotentiary,  the  Duke  of  Vicenza, 


BENEWAL  OF  HOSTILITIES.  119 

because  his  credentials  had  not  arrived.  It  was  in  vain 
that  the  Duke  declared  that  it  was  a  mere  formality,  that 
the  credentials  were  on  their  way.  The  consequence  of 
all  these  delays  was  that  the  10th  of  August  came  and 
went  before  any  serious  business  had  even  been  attempted. 
As  the  clock  struck  twelve  that  night  Metternich  caused 
to  be  lighted  the  beacons  which  were  to  announce  to  the 
allied  sovereicrns  that  Austria  had  declared  war  ajrainst 
Napoleon,  and  that  the  allied  troops  were  free  to  cross 
the  Silesian  frontier. 

The  war  which  those  beacons  heralded  was  not,  though 
its  authors  were  careful  to  declare  it  to  be  so  whilst  it 
lasted,  a  war  for  the  enfranchisement  of  the  nations.^  So  ' 
far  as  it  related  to  the  Continent,  it  was  a  life  and  death 
struggle  for  supremacy  between  Metternich  and  Napoleon. 


120  LIFE  OF  FBINCE  METTEBNICH. 


CHAPTER  YI. 

FROM  THE  RUPTURE  OF  THE  ARMISTICE  OF  PLEISWITZ 
TO  THE  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON. 

August,  1813,  to  March,  1814. 

The  alliance  had  scarcely  been  formed  when  it  became 
apparent  that,  unless  the  allied  sovereigns  would  submit 
to  their  new  master,  it  might  break  up  at  any  moment. 
Metternich  tells  us  that  a  few  days  after  the  armies, 
obedient  to  his  signal,  had  crossed  the  Silesian  frontier, 
Alexander  sent  for  him,  and  announced  his  intention  of 
conferring  the  command-in-chief  of  the  allied  forces  upon 
Moreau,  who  had  just  returned  from  America  to  bear 
arms  against  the  French  Emperor.  Metternich  at  once 
declared  that  if  such  an  intention  were  persisted  in,  Austria 
would  withdraw  from  the  alliance.  Alexander,  after  some 
conversation,  agreed  to  defer  the  question.  The  gunners 
of  the  French  army,  some  indeed  say,  Napoleon  himself, 
decided  it  lor  him,  two  days  later,  at  the  battle  of 
Dresden. 

It  was  on  the  26th  of  August  that  the  Allies,  now  com- 
manded by  the  Schwarzenberg  whom  we  have  seen  am- 
bassador at  Paris,  attacked  Napoleon  at  Dresden.  The 
result  of  that  and  of  the  following  day's  fighting  has  thus 
been  described  by  a  great  poet : 


THE  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON,  121 

"Dresden  surveys  three  despots  fly  once  more 
Before  their  sovereign — sovereign  as  before." 

Alas  !  that  we  must  add : 

"But  there  exhausted  Fortune  quits  the  field, 
And  Leipsig's  treason  bids  the  unvanquished  yield ; 
The  Saxon  jackal  leaves  the  lion's  side 
To  turn  the  bear's,  and  wolf's,  and  fox's  guide  j 
And  backward  to  tlie  den  of  his  despair 
The  forest  monarch  shrinks,  but  finds  no  lair."  * 

The  doctrine  ot  Juvenal,  **  Nullum  numen  ahest,  si  sit 
prudentia ;  nos  te,  nos  facimus,  Fortuna,  deam"  was 
never  better  illustrated  than  at  the  battle  of  Dresden. 
The  battle  was  won.  Napoleon,  had  he  personally  directed 
the  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  would  have  made  it  the  decisive 
battle  of  the  century.  The  schemes  and  intrigues  oi 
Metternich  would  have  vanished  into  thin  air ;  but,  at  the 
critical  moment,  Napoleon  was  summoned  back  to  Dresden 
by  news  which  he  had  received  from  the  armies  of  Oudinot 
and  Macdonald.  His  mngic  touch  was  thus  withdrawn 
from  the  pursuit.  The  Allies  were  on  the  point  of  being 
destroyed  ;  Vandamme  blocked  up  the  way  of  exit ;  other 
marshals  were  on  their  track.  Just  at  the  critical  moment 
St.  Cyr  failed  to  give  to  Vandanmie  the  support  that  was 
essential ;  and  the  latter  was  overwhelmed  by  the  whole 
army  of  the  Allies.  By  this  accident — for  it  was  an 
accident — the  results  of  the  victory  of  Dresden  were  lost, 
and  more  than  lost. 

Metternich  passes  over  this  event,  contenting  himself 
with  the  simple  record  that  it  led  to  the  battle  of  Leipsig. 

"The  mysterious  attitude  of  Napoleon,"  he  writes,  "after  the  defeat 
at  Kulm.of  the  corps  under  the  command  of  Vandamme,  which  had 
forced  its  w\ay  into  Bohemia,  reversed  the  position  of  things,  and 
Prince  Schwarzenbeig  availed  liimself  of  that  favourable  moment  to 


*  Byron's  The  Age  of  Bronze,  v. 


122  LIFE  OF  PBINGE  METTEBNICH, 

carry  out  liis  first  plan  of  operation,  which  culminaterl  in  the  battle  of 
Leipsig.  By  that  event,  the  power  of  Napoleon  beyond  the  front'ers 
of  his  own  empire  was  crushed,  and  in  ortler  to  terminate  the  first 
campaign  of  the  Allied  Powers,  nothing  more  was  now  required  but  to 
cleur  the  German  provinces  between  the  Pleiss  and  the  Ehine  of  the 
French  forces." 

He  makes  no  allusion  to  the  incident  which  Lord  Byron 
truly  styled  the  ''  Saxon  treason "  *  which  decided  the 
day,  although  he  had  prepared  it  in  the  long  winter  and 
spring  of  1(S13. 

The  battle  of  Leipsig  accomplished,  and  more  than 
accomplished,  the  aims  which  the  Austrian  Minister  had 
propounded  in  his  intercourse  with  the  allied  sovereigns 
and  with  Napoleon  prior  to  the  assumption  of  arms  by 
Austria.  Practically,  it  had  driven  the  French  across 
the  Rhine.  Would  he,  would  the  Allies,  be  satisfied 
with  that  result?  We  will  let  Metternich  answer  the 
question. 

*'  The  object  of  the  war  of  1813,"  he  writes,  "  was  obtained — 
Napoleon  was  repulSvjd  and  driven  back  over  the  Rhine.  What  wus 
to  be  done  next  year?     This  was  what  we  had  to  decide. 

"  On  the  following  points  we  were  all  agreed  :  (1)  to  carry  the  war 
beyond  the  Rhine  into  the  interior  of  France;  (2)  by  this  proceeding 
to  strike  a  blow  at  the  very  exstence  of  Napoleon  which  might  be 
decisive  in  its  cons  quences ;  (3)  to  wait  to  see  what  effect  the  mis- 
fortunes of  the  two  last  campaigns  and  the  invasion  of  the  French 
territory  would  have  on  the  mind  of  the  French  nation;  further, 
(4)  it  was  resolvid,  at  my  suggestion,  that  if  once  the  heights  uf  the 
Vosges  and  the  Ardennes  were  occupied,  a  plan  must  be  made  for  the 
military  operations  which  would  amount  to  a  third  campaign,  deciding 
tlie  future  fate  of  France,  and  therefore  also  the  triumph  of  the 
Quadruple  Alliance." 

Metternich  did  well  to  insert  the  words,  "at  my 
suo-o-estion,"  for  at  this  period — from  the  moment,  in  fact, 

*  At  the  critical  moment  of  the  battle  (of  Leipsig)  seventeen  Saxon 
battalions  and  some  regiments  of  cavalry  quitted  the  French  ranks, 
and  turned  their  fire  against  their  former  comrades. 


TEE  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON, 

i 

V 

that  he  had  realised  the  extent  of  the  disasters-of  the 
campaign  of  1812 — he  was  the  soul,  the  guiding  mind, 
the  promoter  from  motives  purely  personal,  of  the  con- 
spiracy against  Napoleon.  Cfhe  Austrian  marriage — that 
fatal  Austrian  marriage — had  been  the  main  snare  with 
which  he  had  lured  the  great  Emperor  into  quiescence 
until  Austria  could  complete  her  preparations,  to  be  used 
against  him.  At  Dresden,  knowing  Napoleon  thoroughly 
— for  Napoleon  liked  him,  and  had  opened  himself  to  him 
more  than  to  any  other  foreign  minister — he  had  so 
manoeuvred  as  to  render  peace  impossible ;  and  now, 
when  all  Europe  was  prepared  to  make  peace  on  the 
conditions  of  leaving  to  France  her  natural  frontiers — the 
Rhine,  the  Alps,  and  the  Pyrenees,  he  was  determined  to 
be  content  with  nothing  less  than  the  dethronement  of 
Napoleon.  He  states  this  in  his  memoii^^^ith  a  frank- 
ness^ which,  considering  that  he  wrote,  or  professed  to 
write,  at  the  time  when  the  Allies  were  declaring  their 
willingness  to  treat  on  the  terms  1  have  stated,  is  almost 
brutal.  -Appended  to  the  quotation  I  have  just  given — 
that  in  which  he  states  the  measures  which  were  decided 
**  at  his  suggestion  " — is  a  reference  to  his  residence  at 
Langres  for  *'  the  important  reasons  which  decided  me  to 
this  course."  Turning  to  an  account  of  that  residence, 
also  given  in  the  first  person,  we  find  him  writing  thus : 

"  Every  peace  with  Napoleon  whiich  would  have  thrown  him  back 
to  the  old  boundaries  of  France,  and  which  would  have  deprived  him 
of  districts  that  had  been  conquered  before  he  came  to  power,  would 
only  have  been  a  ridiculous  armistice,  and  would  have  at  once  been 
repelled  by  him.  There  remained,  therefore,  only  three  possibilities  : 
the  recall  of  the  Bourbons  ;  a  regency  till  the  majority  of  Napoleon's 
son  ;  the  nomination  of  a  third  i  erton  to  the  throne  of  France." 

Such  were  the  thoughts  which  determined  Metternich, 
in  the  autumn  of  1813,  that  is,  after  Leipsig,  to  work  for 


124  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTERNICE. 

the  personal  overthrow  of  Xapoleon,  and  for  nothing  short 
of  that. 

The  task  of  inducing  the  Allies  to  agree  to  a  fixed  plan 
was  not  altogether  easv.  Of  the  three  threat  Continental 
Powers,  Prussia,  which  had  never  forgiven  her  easy 
overthrow  at  Jena — and  its  consequences — was  the  only 
one  thoroughly  in  earnest.  The  Erajieror  Francis  helieved 
in  the  sincerity  of  Napoleon's  advances  after  Leipsig,  and 
would  o-ladly  have  come  to  terms,  had  Metternich  allowed 
him.  But  Metternich  had  already  obtained  the  ascend- 
ency over  his  master  which  he  subsequently  exercised  over 
Alexander  and  the  Court  of  Berlin.  Alexander,  desiring 
above  all  things  to  pose  as  the  arbiter  of  the  situation,  and 
influenced  at  the  moment  by  the  revolutionary  Laharpe, 
the  deserter  Jomini,  and  the  Prussian  organiser  Stein, 
was  willing  to  do  anything  which  should  secure  to  him 
the  lofty  position  to  which  he  aspired.  Metternich,  then, 
availed  himself  of  the  savage  earnestness  of  Bliicher,  bent 
on  the  sack  of  Paris,  to  influence  the  consultations.  The 
result  was  that,  during  that  winter,  a  plan  was  formed  for 
the  march  on  Paris,  which  should  terminate  the  hated 
Revolution,  and  dispose  for  ever  of  the  man  who  was  at 
once  its  life  and  its  incarnation. 
. — Whe  dominant  influence  which  the  Austrian  minister 
exercised  on  the  deliberations  of  the  Allies  was  proved  by 
an  incident  which  occurred  before  the  opening  of  the  cam- 
paign of  1814^  As  was  to  be  expected,  the  generals  of 
the  allied  armies  continued  to  differ  as  to  the  plan  of  the 
campaign.  Alexander,  especially,  strongly  opposed  the 
plan  of  Prince  Schwarzenberg,  who  had  proposed  to 
violate  the  neutrality  of  Switzerland.  The  differences 
became  so  pronounced  that  it  was  finally  resolved  to  choose 
an  arbitrator  whose  decision  should  be  absolute.  For  this 
post  Metternich  was  selected.     It  is  needless  to  add  that 


THE  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON.  125 

he  decided  In  favour  of  the  plan  which  he  had  previously 
settled  with  Schwarzenberg,  or  that  by  the  exercise  of  that 
tact  which  was  one  of  his  chiefest  powers  he  obtained  the 
adhesion  of  the  Czar. 

On  the  20th  December  the  Austrian  army  crossed  the 
Rhine  between  Schaffhausen  and  Basel.  Actual  hostilities 
did  not  begin  till  towards  the  close  of  the  following  month. 
Before  that  period  Metternich  met  at  Basel  one  whose 
desire  for  the  overthrow  of  Napoleon  equalled  his  ov/n — 
the  English  Minister,  Lord  Castlereagh. 

"  A  few  hours'  conversatiou,"  he  writes,  "  sufficed  to  lay  the  fouuda- 
tion  of  a  gond  feeling  between  this  upright  aud  enligiitencd  statesman 
and  myself,  whicli  the  following  years  cemented  and  enlarged." 
Further :  "  I  soon  saw  that  his  ideas  about  the  reconstruction  of 
France  in  a  manner  compatible  with  the  general  interests  of  Europe 
did  not  materially  differ  from  mine." 

.j^They  both  believed  that  by  evicting  Napoleon  they 
would  kill  the  Revolution.  Napoleon  was  evicted — but 
the  Revolution  ?  The  damming  up  of  its  waters  produced 
the  overthrow  which  in  time  was  to  sweep  even  the  astute 
Metternich  into  obscurity.  "^^^ 

From  Basel  Metternich  proceeded  with  the  sovereigns 
and  the  English  minister  to  Langres,  the  25th  of  January, 
there,  he  tells  us,  to  be  occupied  with  negotiations  of  the 
greatest  importance,  and  which,  he  adds,  would  remain 
unknown  it"  he  had  not  recorded  them.  The  nature  of 
those  negotiations  may  be  su aimed  up  in  a  single  phrase. 
They  were  to  decide  upon  the  most  suitable  successor  to 
the  doomed  Napoleon.  Alexander  wanted  to  appeal  to 
the  French  nation.  This  view  Metternich  combated  with 
all  his  force.  To  him  it  meant  the  unchaining  anew  of 
the  Revolution.  He  went  so  far  with  Alexander  as  to 
threaten  that  Austria  would  then  and  there  v.'ithdraw  her 
forces  if  the  idea  were  persisted  in. 


126  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNTCff. 

"  Napoleon's  power  is  broken,  never  to  rise  ngain  .  .  .  there  onlj 
remain  the  Bourbons  to  take  poss(  ssion  of  the  ir  undying  rights  .  .  : 
The  Emperor  Francis  will  never  favour  any  other  dynasty.'' 

The  campaign— the  marvellous  campaign  in  which 
Genius  had  to  combat  numbers,  and,  in  the  last  decisive 
moment,  treachery — began.  Almost  simultaneously  a 
Congress  opened  (February  4)  at  Chatillon.  Metternich 
leaves  us  in  no  doubt  as  to  the  feelings  which  induced  him 
to  assent  to  such  a  meeting.  "  I  saw  only  great  advan- 
tages from  these  attempts  at  negotiation,  without  any  fear 
that  an  untimely  settlement  would  delay  the  return  to  a 
better  order  of  things ; "  that  is,  he  was  resolved  that  no 
peace  with  Napoleon  should  prevent  the  return  of  the 
Bourbons.  He  naturally  appointed,  then,  Count  Stadion, 
the  leader  of  the  anti-Napoleonic  party  at  Vienna,  to 
represent  Austria.  Needless  to  add  that  the  Congress 
broke  up  the  19th  of  March  following,  having  accomplished 
nothing" — the  result  foreseen  and  aimed  at. 

One  moment  before  the  final  catastrophe  doubt  fell  upon 
the  Allies.  It  was  when  they  heard  of  Napoleon's  masterly 
movement  from  St  Dizier  to  act  upon  their  communications 
— a  movement  which,  if  Paris  could  have  but  held  out  for 
three  days,  would  have  been  fatal  to  them.  But  treason, 
*'  still  his  only  master,"  stepped  in  to  save  them.  The  de- 
fection of  Marmont  compelled  the  abdication  of  Napoleon. 

The  arrangement  regarding  the  location  of  the  great 
Emperor  in  the  little  island  of  Elba  had  been  made  before 
Metternich  reached  Paris,  though  the  treaty  had  not  been 
actually  signed.  Astonished  at  a  provision  which  would 
place  the  dethroned  Emperor  so  near  to  the  country  he 
had  governed,  Metternich  protested  against  it,  and  declared 
that  he  would  take  upon  himself  to  refuse  to  sign  on 
behalf  of  Austria  until  he  should  have  obtained  his 
master's  express  orders  to  that  effect. 


TEE  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON.  1^7 


It  would  seem,  as  Prince  Napoleon  asserts,  that,  even 
in  1814,  Metternich  was  contemplating  St.  Helena.  The 
negotiations,  however,  had  proceeded  too  far,  and  Metter- 
nich signed  that  evenino-. 

In  the  great  duel  between  the  two  men  the  astute 
intriguer  had  triumphed  over  the  impetuous  soldier. 
There  waii  to  J^»-ar4)ddLJjateryal^  and  then  the  system  of 
Metternich  was  to  rise  on  the  ashes  of  the  system  of 
Napoleitu.  The  new  Avatar  had,  at  least,  the  advantage 
of  knowing  the  weak  points  of  the  methods  which  his 
predecessor  had  establishecl. 

"Tlie  vast  edifice  Napoleon  had  constructed,"  wrote  M'  ttemich, 
"  was  exclusively  the  work  of  his  hands,  and  he  was  himself  the  key- 
stone of  the  arch.  But  this  gigantic  construction  was  e.xseatinlly 
wanting  in  its  foundation  ;  the  materials  of  which  it  was  composed 
were  no'.hing  but  the  ruins  of  other  buildings;  some  were  rotten  fiom 
decay,  others  liad  never  possessed  any  consistency  from  their  very 
beginning.  Tiie  keystone  of  the  arch  has  been  withdrawn,  and  the 
whole  eilifice  has  lalleu  in. 

"  Such  is,  in  a  few  words,  tlie  history  of  the  French  Empire.  Con- 
ceived and  created  by  Napoleon,  it  only  existed  in  him;  and  with 
him  it  was  extinguished." 

It  was  not  so.  The  events  passing  before  our  eyes 
prove  the  shallowness  of  Mctternich's  judgment  alike 
regarding  the  man  and  his  work.  It  was,  nevertheless, 
his  judgment — the  judgment  of  the  man  who  had  accom- 
plished more  than  any  other  individual  man  to  bring  about 
the  withdrawal  of  the  keystone  from  the  arch.  And  now, 
this  man,  w  ho  finds  so  fatal  a  flaw  in  the  work  of  the 
mason  he  has  caused  to  be  evicted,  is  himself  to  be 
entrusted  with  the  construction  of  an  edifice  on  the 
ground  left  vacant  by  the  disappearance  of  the  old  one. 
Will  his  experience  of  the  faults  of  his  predecessor 
enable  him  to  raise  an  edifice,  of  the  arch  of  which  he 
himself   shall    not   be   the    keystone;    \\hich    shall    not 


128  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICE. 

be  wanting  in  its  foundation ;  which  shall  be  composed 
of  something  else  than  the  ruins  of  other  buildings; 
and  which  will  not  fall  in  when  the  keystone  shall  be 
withdrawn  ? 

That  is  the  question  which  the  second  part  of  the  career 
of  Metternich  will  answer. 


'> 


1/ 


CHAPTER  YII.  ^ 

THE  CEISIS  BEFOEE  THE  HUNDRED  DAYS— AND  AFTEE. 

March,  1814,  to  November,  1815.  1 

Napoleon  deposed  and  banished,  the  victors  prepared  to      | 
divide  the  spoil.     This  operation  gave  rise  to  many  heart-      ' 
burnings ;  to  so  many,  in  fact,  that  but  for  the  return  at    / 
the  critical  moment  of  the  Emperor  from  Elba,  it  is  more  / 
than  probable  that  the  despoilers  would  have  come  ts3^ 
blows. 

At  first  all  was  rose-colour.  Metternich  believed  that 
the  return  of  the  Bourbons  was  acceptable  to  a  vast 
majority  of  the  French  people,  but  even  he  was  struck  by 
the  attitude  of  the  crowd  in  the  streets  when,  on  the  4th 
of  May,  Louis  XVIIl.  made  his  public  entry  into  Paris. 
"  The  most  opposite  feelings,"  he  wrote,  **  were  depicted 
in  their  faces,  and  found  expression  in  the  cry  '  Vive  le 
roi'  from  the  Eoyalists,  and  the  sullen  silence  of  the 
enemies  of  the  monarchy."  But  he  cared  little  for  that. 
He  had  struck  down  the  lion,  and  he  could  afford  now  to 
exchange  jests  at  the  lion's  expense  with  the  respectable 
mediocrity  who  had  taken  his  place.  , 

With  the  rejoicings  which  followed  at  Paris — the.'/ 
rejoicings,  not  of  the  French  people,  but.  of  the  allied  1 1 
Sovereigns ;  with  the  visit  of  some  of  them  to  England ; 

K 


130  LIFE  OF  FRINGE  MFTTEBNICH. 

this  narrative  has  no  concern.     By  degrees  the  transports 
subsided,  as  joy  at  deliverance  gave  place  to  greediness 
for  spoil.     There  was  scarcely  a  Power  that  did  not  want 
something.     France,  indeed,  by  the  convention  of  Paris 
(23rd  April,  1814)  had  secured  the  boundaries  she  pos- 
sessed on  the  1st  January.   1792.     But  Sweden  claimed 
Norway,  though  Norway  was  united  to,  and  wished  to 
remain  united  to,  Denmark.     Other  claims  were  hinted 
at,  if  they  ^^ere  not  at  the  moment  urged.     In  the  first 
impulse    it   had   been   resolved    that   all   these  weighty 
questions    should    be   debated    at   a    Congress    of  the 
European  Powers,  to  be  held  at  Vienna,  and  the  opening 
of  which  had  been  fixed  for  the  29th  of  July.     But  the 
visit  of  the  allied  Sovereigns  to  England  had  rendered  a 
postponement  necessary,  and  it  was  not  till  the  very  end 
of  September  that  the  Congress  commenced  its  sittings. 
Even  then   there   remained  certain  preliminaries  to  be 
adjusted,  such  as  the  relative  rank  of  the  great  contracting 
parties.     When  this  had  been  amicably  settled,  the  real 
business  began. 

Frederick  Gentz,  the  alter  ego  of  Metternich,  his 
protege,  his  intimate  friend,  his  confidant,  has  left  on 
record  a  memorandum  indicating  very  clearly  the  aspira- 
tions of  the  several  Powers,  and  the  characters  of  the 
men  who  represented  them  at  the  Congress.  In  this 
memorandum  Gentz  does  not  beat  about  the  bush  ;  he  goes 
straight  to  the  point. 

"The  grand  phrases  of  'reconstruction  of  social  ord^r,'  "  he  wrote, 
" '  regeneiation  of  the  political  system  of  Europe,'  ' a  lasting  peace 
founded  on  a  just  division  of  strength,'  &c.  &c.,  were  uttered  to 
tranquillise  tlie  people,  and  to  give  an  air  of  dignity  and  grandeur  to 
ihis  solemn  assembly;  but  the  real  purpose  of  the  Congress  was  to 
divide  amongst  the  conquerors  the  spoils  taken  from  the  vanquished. 

It  soon  appeared  that  the  Czar,  who  had  up  to  that 


TEE  DIVISION  OF  THE  SPOIL.  131 

time  posed  as  the  disinterested  chcimpion  of  humanity, 
wanted  the  whole  of  Poland  ;  that  Prussia,  who,  but  a 
year  before,  had  risen  against  Napoleon  because  he  had 
annexed  the  territories  of  other  States,  was  resolved,  if 
she  could,  manage  it,  to  incorporate  Saxony  with  her 
dominions ;  and  that,  in  this  resolution,  she  was  supported 
by  Alexander,  to  whose  plans  regarding  Poland  she,  in 
return,  gave  her  countenance.  I  have  already  spoken 
about  the  claim  preferred  by  Sweden  to  rob  Denmark  of 
Norway.  Austria  was  more  moderate.  She  desired  from 
Bavaria  the  retrocession  only  of  Tirol  and  the  Voralberfj-, 
proposing  to  take  large  territorial  indemnities  in  Italy. 
As  Italy  was  practically  unrepresented  at  the  Congress, 
there  was  little  chance  that  the  cl  »ims  of  Austria,  with 
respect  to  the  country  which  to  Metternich  never  repre- 
sented by  its  name  aught  but  "  a  geographical  term," 
would  be  contested. 

It  can  easily  be  understood  that  the  claims  \Ahich  most 
disturbed,  the  equanimity  of  the  Congress  were  the  claims 
of  Uussia  and  Prussia.  Again  was  Metternich  the  leadiiio- 
spirit,  the  soul,  of  the  opposition  to  the  pretensions  of  the 
t  AG  Powers  u  hich,  but  for  him,  would  never  have  recovered 
from  the  defeat  of  Bautzen.  Between  Alexander  and 
himself  there  had  already  been  some  friction.  Alike  with 
respoct  to  the  neutrality  of  Switzerland,  the  plan  of  the 
campaign,  the  treatment  of  Napoleon  after  his  abdication, 
the  two  men  had  had  serious  differences.  Alexander, 
wrote  Gentz,  had  accustomed  himself  to  look  on  Met- 
ternich as  a  permanent  obstacle  to^  his  designs,  as  a  man 
eternally  occupied  in  opposing  and  thwarting  him;  at 
last,  as  a  sworn  enemy.     Gentz  continues : 

"  The  calmness  and  serenity  with  which  M.  de  Metternich  always 
opposed  to  these  prejudices,  instead  of  softening  the  Emperor, 
appeared  only  to  embitter  him  the  more  ;  private  feelings,  above  all  u 

K    2 


132  LIFE  OF  PRINCE  3IETTEBNICH. 

strong  jealousy  of  M.  de  Metternioh's  success,  both  in  politics  and 
S'^ciety,  increased  this  irritation.  At  last  it  reached  the  point  of  an 
implacable  liatred,  and  during  his  stay  in  Vienna,  his  daily  explosions 
of  rage  and  frenzy  afforded  an  inexhaustible  fund  of  curiosity  and 
amusement  to  frivolous  minds  at  the  court,  whilst  sensible  men 
deplored  them  as  a  great  calamity.  This  hatred  is  the  key  to  most  of 
the  events  of  the  Congress." 

The  feelings  entertained  by  Alexander  towards  the 
English  Minister,  Lord  Castlereagh,  were  only  a  shade 
less  hostile  than  those  which  he  felt  towards  Metternich. 
He  called  him  "  cold  and  pedantic," 

"  and  there  were  moments,'*  co:itinued  Gentz,  "  when  he  would  have 
treated  him  as  he  did  M.  de  Metternich,  if  extreme  fear  of  openly 
compromising  liimself  with  the  British  Government  (the  only  one 
before  which  he  trembled)  had  not  foiced  him  to  dissimulate.'' 

He  bad  little  more  regard  for  Talleyrand,  the  representa- 
tive of  France,  whose  then  master,  Louis  XVIII. ,  he  had 
never  forgiven  for  having  adopted  a  system  of  Government 
different  from  that  which  he  had  advised  ;  for  Maximilian- 
Joseph,  King  of  Bavaria,  controlled  by  Metternich  ;  or  for 
the  King  of  Denmark.  Prussia  was  his  sole  ally,  and 
Prussia  was  his  ally  mainly  because  its  King,  Frederick 
William  III.,  described  by  Napoleon  to  Admiral  Cock- 
burn  during  the  voyage  to  St.  Helena  as  "  une  pauvre 
hete"  had  subordinated  his  will  to  the  stronger  will  of 
the  Czar  ;  partly,  also,  because,  equally  bent  on  rounding 
their  borders  at  the  expense  of  their  neighbours,  they  had 
come  to  an  arrangement  whereby  the  pretensions  of  the 
one  should  dovetail  with  the  ambition  of  the  other. 

It  gradually  came  about,  then,  that  whilst  the  union 
between  Russia  and  Prussia  became  every  day  more 
accentuated,  there  grew  the  tendency  on  the  part  of 
Austria,  France,  and  England,  to  unite  to  oppose  preten- 
sions which  they  regarded  as  unjust  and  unreasonable. 


THE  DIVISION  OF  TEE  SPOIL.  133 

Metternich  was,  I  repeat,  the  soul  of  this  opposition.  In  a 
very  able  paper,  dated  the  10th  December,  he  pointed 
out  that  whilst  it  was  the  interest  of  Austria  tliat  Prussia 
should  be  strong  and  consolidated,  he  could  not  agree  to 
the  entire  incorporation  of  Saxony  by  the  latter  power. 

"  Germany,"  he  wrcte,  "  must  coustitute  herself  a  political  body  ; 
tlie  frontiers  between  the  great  intermediary  Powers  should  not 
remain  undecided ;  the  union  between  Austria  and  Prussia  must,  in  a 
wortl,  be  perfect,  fur  this  great  work  to  be  consummated." 

Now,  the  annexation  of  Saxoriy  would  be  an  impedi- 
ment to  that  work  ;  it  would  preve.it  the  arrangement 
of  the  Germanic  Federal  agreement,  inasmuch  as  the 
principal  German  powers  had  declared  that  they  would 
not  join  a  Federal  agreement  on  a  basis  so  menacing  to 
their  own  safety  as  tliat  of  the  incorporation  of  one  of  the 
principal  German  States  by  one  of  the  Powers  called  on 
to  protect  the  common  country.  Metternich  was  able  to 
speak  with  the  greater  force,  inasmuch  as  he,  acting  for 
Austria,  had  behaved  with  the  greatest  liberality  towards 
Bavaria,  the  incorporation  of  which  with  xVustria  had 
been  the  dream  of  the  Court  of  Vienna  from  the  time  of 
Maria  Theresa,  and  preferring — short- sigh tedly,  I  venture 
to  think — to  indenuiify  Austria  in  Italy,  had  only  required 
the  restitution  of  Tirol  and  the  Voralberg. 

Matters  at  last  proceeded  to  a  condition  so  critical 
that,  as  I  wrote  in  the  tirst  sentence  of  this  chapter,  the 
conquerors  seemed  to  be  on  the  verge  of  coming  to  blows 
over  the  spoil.  In  fact,  Russia  and  Prussia  on  the  one 
side,  and  England,  France,  and  Austria  on  the  other, 
prepared  for  war.  Alexander  despatched  a  messenger  to 
halt  his  armies  in  Poland ;  the  Cabinet  of  Berlin  called 
out  its  contingents,  declaring  that  1  russia  had  conquered 
Saxony,  and  would  keep  it ;  Austria  put  her  armies  in 
(jlalicia  on  a  war  footing  ;  France  was  invited  to  suspend 


134  LIFE  OF  PItlNCE  METTEBNICH. 

the  disarming  of  that  army  which  "  had  made  the  tour  of 
Europe*,"  British  troops  were  despatched  to  Belgium. 
More  than  tiiat,  on  the  3rd  February,  England,  Austrici, 
and  France  signed  a  secret  treaty,  offensive  and  defensive, 
whereby  they  contracted  mutually  to  support  each  other 
if  one  should  be  attacked ;  to  maintain,  each  of  them,  an 
army  of  150,000  men  for  that  purpose ;  and  to  regulate 
their  views  by  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  Paris. 

This  treaty  was  not  so  secret  but  that  the  terms  of  it 
leaked  out.  Several  notes  were  interchanged,  and  finally 
the  northern  robbers  abated  their  pretensions.  Russia 
ao-reed  to  limit  her  aspirations  with  regard  to  Poland,  and 
Prussia  to  be  content  with  a  part,  instead  of  the  whole,  of 
Saxony.  Still,  considerable  friction  remained,  and  there 
is  no  saying  how  tbe  negotiations  might  have  resulted  when^ 
on  the  7th  March,  on  the  eve  of  a  great  ball,  Metternich 
received  information  that  Napoleon  had  left  Elba. 

The  position  of  Napoleon  on  that  little  island  had  been 
more  than  once  discussed  at  the  Congress.  Early  in 
February  the  advisability  of  removing  him  from  so  close 
a  vicinity  to  Italy  had  been  mooted.  The  Portuguese 
Minister  had  suggested  the  Canary  Islands,  Lord  Castle- 
reao-h  St.  Helena  or  St.  Lucia,  as  a  more  fitting,  because, 
as  far  as  related  to  the  interests  of  the  Allies,  a  safer  place 
of  residence.  But  again  on  this  point  Alexander  and 
Metternich  were  at  variance.  The  former  took  his  stand  on 
the  treaty  of  Fontainebleau,  to  which  he  said  he  had  pledged 
his  ])ersonal  honour.  Metternich  shook  his  head.  Always 
doubtino-  the  policy  of  the  provision  of  that  treaty  which 
allowed  Napoleon  to  locate  himself  so  near  to  the  shores 
of  France,  knowing  the  inner  mind  of  the  Emperor  better 
than  any  man  in  Europe,  he  could  not  resist  the  conviction 
that  the  soaring  genius  which  had  so  long  swayed  the 
destinies  of  Europe  would  never  become  reconciled  to  the 


NAPOLEON  AT  ELBA.  135 

confined  limits  to  which  the  Allies  had  restricted  it ;  that, 
if  a  fair  opportunity  to  break  loose  should  offer,  Napoleon 
would  be  impelled  to  seize  it.  So  strongly  did  the 
Austrian  Minister  become  impressed  with  the  possibility 
of  such  a  contmgency,  that  he  wrote,  at  this  period,  to  the 
1  )uke  of  Otranto,  begging  him  to  give  him  his  opinion, 
confidentially,  as  to  what  would  happen  in  France  (1)  if 
Napoleon  were  suddenly  to  return  ;  (2)  what,  if  the  Kino- 
or  Rome,  with  a  squadron  of  horse,  were  to  appear  on  the 
frontier ;  (3)  what  France  would  do  if  left  to  her  own 
spontaneous  action.  Fouche  replied  with  perfect  frank- 
ness. If,  he  said,  Napoleon  were  to  land,  and  one 
regiment  sent  against  him  were  to  range  its»df  on  his  side, 
ihe  wnoie  army  would  follow  its  example  ;  if  the  Kino-  of 
Rome  were  to  be  escorted  to  the  frontier  by  an  Austrian 
regiment,  the  whole  nation  would  instantly  hoist  his 
colours ;  left  to  her  own  spontaneous  action,  France  would 
seek  refuge  in  the  Orleans  dynasty.  This  reply  served 
only  to  confirm  Metternich  in  his  ideas,  and  to  increase 
his  caution. 

It  was  the  misfortune,  not  the  fault,  of  Napoleon,  that 
the  return  from  Elba  took  place  just  a  fortnight  too  soon. 
By  means  of  a  confidential  agent,  M.  Meneval,  he  had 
heard  in  February  that  the  question  of  deporting  liim  to 
an  island  in  tiie  Atlantic  was  being  seriously  discussed  at 
Vienna.  Through  the  same  agency  he  learned  that  the 
sovereigns  present  in  that  capital  would  separate  on  the 
20th  of  February  at  the  latest  Whilst  his  mind  was 
under  the  influence  of  ideas  produced  by  this  information 
he  received  from  France  a  batch  of  newspapers,  the 
perusal  of  which  convinced  him  not  only  of  the  extreme 
unpopularity  of  the  Bourbons,  but  that  the  army  and  the 
nation  were  alike  ripe  for  revolution.  This  conviction 
decided   him.      Just   then   a   visit   from   M.    Fleuiy  de 


136  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICH. 

Chaboulon,  an  emissary  of  the  devoted  Maret,  Duke  of 
Bassano,  coufirnied  the  impressions  which  the  newspapers 
had  made.  Resolved  then  to  act,  he  was  forced  to  act 
at  once.  To  evade  the  vigilance  of  British  cruisers  it 
was  necessary  to  sail  whilst  the  nights  were  long,  and  he 
was  approaching  the  season  when  they  would  become 
short.  Then,  he  believed  that  the  sovereigns  had 
separated.  Once  separated,  it  would  be  difficult  for 
them  to  agree  upon  a  united  action.  Another  reason, 
too,  weighed  with  him.  The  question  of  deporting  him 
had,  he  knew,  been  discussed :  if  the  sovereigns  had 
separated — and  his  information  led  him  to  believe  that 
they  had  separated — that  question  had  been  decided. 
But  which  way  ?  That  he  could  not  know  until,  if 
aofainst  him,  an  English  man-of-war  should  anchor  in  the 
roadstead  of  Porto  Ferrajo  to  carry  him  oif.  All  these 
circumstances  combining  to  advise  an  immediate  de- 
parture. Napoleon  made  his  preparations  accordingly ; 
sailed  from  Porto  Ferrajo  at  seven  o'clock  of  the  evening 
of  the  26th  of  February ;  and  landed  near  Frejus  the  1st 
of  March. 

Such  was  the  intelligence  which  reached  Metternich 
on  the  evening  of  the  7th  of  the  same  month.  Upon 
the  allied  sovereigns,  and  the  ministers  of  the  allied 
sovereigns,  it  came  like  a  thunderbolt.  Immediately 
their  minor  differences  were  forgotten  or  deferred. 
Prussia  dissembled  her  rapacious  greed ;  Eussia  her 
insatiable  appetite  for  spoil ;  Austria  her  hypocritical  pro- 
fessions of  disinterestedness;  the  one  question  they  all 
had  to  consider  was  what,  in  the  presence  of  this  new  and 
great  danger,  they  should  do.  Here,  for  five  months,  had 
they  been  debating,  quarrelling,  recriminating,  almost 
coming  to  blows,  as  to  the  division  of  the  spoils  they  had 
reft  from   Napoleonic  France ;   and,  now,  this  one  man 


THE  HUNDRED  DAYS.  137 

had  landed,  who  might  not  only  drive  them  from  the  yet 
undevoured  carcase,  but  reduce  them  to  their  previous 
state  of  vassalage.  At  this  crisis  it  was  union  alone  thai 
could  assure  them  strength.  Had  the  information  on 
which  Napoleon  had  acted  been  correct ;  had  the  sover- 
eigns separated,  as  they  had  intended  to  separate,  before 
the  end  of  February;  the  chances  of  the  Emperor  would 
have  been  enormously  increased.  After  the  bickerings 
and  the  recriminations  which  had  ensued ;  after  the  ex- 
posure of  their  naked  selfishness,  of  the  secret  aspirations 
of  each  member  of  the  crowned  confederates ;  separation 
would  have  meant  distrust :  distrust  might  have  led  to  the 
union  of  one  or  more,  always  for  selfish  ends,  probably  for 
the  spoliation  of  a  friend,  with  the  returned  Napoleon. 
But,  still  in  each  other's  presence,  reading  in  familiar 
glances  familiar  fears,  every  despot  deriving  comfort  from 
the  close  propinquity  of  another  despot,  there  was  no  room 
for  any  feeling  but  an  intense  desire  to  combine  ;  to  crush 
this  man  who  had  risen  from  a  living  tomb  to  stand 
between  them  and  their  prey ;  whose  very  name  had 
dried,  to  the  point  of  cracking,  tlie  lips  wet  with  eager 
longing ;  and  the  tone  of  whose  proclamations  drove  the 
blood  from  faces  inflamed  by  the  long-delayed  enjoyment 
of  prospective  spoil. 

But  a  resolution  must  be  takea  Every  day's  post 
brought  tidings  more  and  more  alarming.  First  that  the 
landing  had  been  successfully  accomplished ;  then  that 
the  conqueror  had  taken  the  road  for  Paris  by  way  of 
Gap  ;  then  that  the  garrison  of  Grenoble  had  joined  him  ; 
then,  that  he  was  making  a  triumphant  progress  towards 
Lyons.  As  they  stared  grimly  into  one  another's  faces 
the  despots  could  no  longer  doubt  that  the  house  of  cards 
they  had  erected  with  so  much  care  at  Paris  had  fallen 
with  the  first  push. 


138  LIFE  OF  PRINCE  METTEMNIGE, 

A  resolution  must,  therefore,  be  taken.  And  the  man 
was  there  who  was  ready  to  formulate  one  in  all  respects 
consonant  to  the  feelings  which  pervaded  the  breasts  of 
the  allied  sovereigns.  The  occasion  was  one  peculiarly 
adapted,  in  fact,  to  the  pre-eminently  cool,  unimpassioned, 
calculating  intellect  of  Metternich.  At  the  first  formal 
meeting  held  to  deliberate  on  the  course  the  Allies  should 
adopt  (March  12),  he,  then,  took  the  lead.  His  object 
being  to  encourage,  to  unite,  he  took  advantage  of  a 
proclamation  issued  by  Napoleon  on  his  victorious  march 
in  which  he  declared  that  he  had  returned  to  France  with 
the  concurrence  of  Austria,  and  that  he  would  soon  be 
supported  by  that  power  with  100,000  men,  to  urge  upon 
the  assembled  sovereigns  the  expediency  of  announcing 
to  all  Europe  and  to  the  world  that  they  would  make  no 
terms  with  Napoleon  ;  that  they  would  support  the  King 
of  France  with  their  whole  forces.  Resolutions  to  this 
effect  were  passed,  and  measures  were  promptly  taken  to 
carry  those  resolutions  into  effect. 

It  forms  no  part  of  my  plan  to  tell  the  history  of  the 
Hundred  Days.  I  shall  confine  myself  to  narrating,  as 
clearly  as  I  have  been  able  to  ascertain  it,  the  part  which 
Metternich  took  in  deciding  the  issue.  Practically,  his 
part  was  accomplished  when  he  had  determined  the 
Allies  to  appeal  to  the  God  of  battles,  and  to  make  no 
terms  with  Napoleon.  It  would  seem,  however,  that  he 
was  not  altogether  confident  of  the  issue  of  that  appeal, 
for  we  find  him  writing  on  the  9th  April  to  Fouche,  to 
express  the  desire  of  xiustria  to  make  peace  with  France 
provided  Napoleon  were  eliminated.  "  The  Powers  will 
not  have  Napoleon  Bonaparte.  They  will  make  war 
with  him  to  the  last,  but  do  not  wish  to  fight  with  France." 
He  beo-o'ed  Fouche  to  despatch  a  man  in  whom  he  had 
confidence  to  Basel  to  confer  there  with  a  person  whom 


TEE  EUNBBEB  DAYS.  139 

lie  would  send,  and  who  would  make  himself  known  by 
certain  signs.  To  this  confidential  person  (a  certain 
Ottenfels)  Metternich  gave  instructions  that  he  might 
discuss  with  Fouche's  envoy  as  to  the  prince  who  might 
occupy  the  throne  of  France,  limiting  the  choice,  however, 
to,  (1)  Louis  XYIII.  ;  (2)  to  the  Duke  of  Orleans ;  (3) 
to  the  regency  of  Marie  Louise.  Of  the  three,  he  added, 
the  choice  of  the  last  would  be  least  agreeable  to  Austria. 
Nothing  came  of  this ;  and,  a  little  later,  the  event  of 
the  18th  June  decided  the  fate  of  Napoleon.  Metternich 
had  gone  to  Heidelberg  to  watch  events.  Thence  he 
wrote,  22nd  June,  to  his  daughter,  an  account,  as  he  had 
received  it,  of  the  battle  of  Waterloo.  From  Heidelberg 
he  proceeded  to  Paris  to  take  part  in  the  arrangements 
which  would  naturally  follow  the  triumph  of  the  Allies. 
Arrived  in  Paris,  he  was  once  more  in  his  element, 
rejoicing  over  the  defeat  of  Napoleon,  exchanging  con- 
gratulations with  the  Sovereigns,  and  helping  so  to 
arrange  that  there  should  be  no  possibility  of  future 
disturbance  on  the  part  of  any  one  bearing  the  name  of 
Bonaparte.  It  is  curious,  as  one  reads  his  memoirs,  to 
notice  how  the  recollection  of  his  old  intercourse  with 
Napoleon  haunted  him.  He  tells  his  daughter  how  he 
dined  with  Bliicher  "  in  the  room  1  have  conversed  for 
hours  and  hours  with  Napoleon."  As  the  savage  hussar 
crossed  the  gallery  of  St.  Cloud,  Metternich  records  how 
he  remarked:  "That  man  must  have  been  a  regular 
fool  to  have  all  this,  and  go  running  after  Moscow." 
Moralising  to  himself  after  listening  to  this  classic  obser- 
vation, Metternich  congratulates  himself,  in  so  many 
words,  that  he  is  not  as  other  men  are,  least  of  all  like 
Napoleon.  His  precise  words  are :  "  Let  us  at  least 
carry  away  the  remembrance  of  having  done  some  good — 
and  in  this  respect  1  would  not  exchange  with  Napoleon  " 


UO  LIFE  OF  FBINCE  METTERNICE. 

— with  Napoleon,  of  whom  he  had  written  in  the  same 
letter  ;  "  he  is  still  at  Rochefort,  and  that  place,  including 
the  port,  is  so  completely  blockaded  that  we  have  every 
hope  of  being  able  to  capture  him." 

For  that  '^  greatest  of  all  captains,"  the  end  had  come 
at  last.  Rather  than  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  Sovereigns 
of  the  Continent,  Napoleon,  appealing  to  the  magnanimity 
of  the  Prince  Regent  of  Great  Britain,  had  voluntarily 
surrendered  to  the  captain  of  the  Bellerophon  (loth  July). 
In  announcing  this  action  to  Marie  Louise,  Metternich 
assured  her  that  "  according  to  an  arrangement  made 
between  the  Powers  he  (Napoleon)  will  be  sent  as  a 
prisoner  to  Fort  George,  in  the  north  of  Scotland,  and 
placed  under  the  surveillance  of  Austrian,  Russian,  French 
and  Prussian  commissioners.  He  will  be  well  treated 
there,  and  will  have  as  much  liberty  as  is  compatible  with 
the  certainty  that  he  cannot  escape."  On  the  13th 
August  following  he  writes  to  her  again,  to  tell  her  that 
Napoleon  "  is  on  board  the  Northumberland,  and  en  route 
for  St.  Helena."  He  gave  her,  apparently,  no  explana- 
tion as  to  why  St.  Helena  had  been  substituted  for  Fort 
George. 

As  for  France,  the  Allies  made  her  pay,  and  pay 
dearly,  for  her  complicity  with  Napoleon.  On  the  20th 
November  she  had  to  agree  to  restore  certain  territories* 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  which  had  been  guaranteed 
by  the  treaty  of  1814  ;  she  had  to  pay  £28,000,000,  for 
the  expenses  of  the  war,  as  well  as  other  indemnities, 
making  a  total  of  £61,400,000  ;  to  allow  the  fortresses 
on  her  northern  borders  to  be  occupied  for  five  years, 
she  defraying  the  cost ;  and  to  restore  the  works  of  art 

♦  These  were,  the  fortresses  of  Landau,  Sarre-Louis,  Philipville, 
aiul  Marienburg,  with  the  territory  appertaining  to  each :  and  VersoLs, 
ceded  to  Geneva. 


TJIE  EUNDBED  DAYS.  141 

captured  during  the   wars   of  the    Revohition   and   the 
Empire. 

But  before  that  treaty  was  signed  Metternich  had  put 
his  hand  to  a  work  which  was  to  influence  his  subsequent 
career.  The  consideration  of  this  demands  a  new  chapter  ; 
for,  with  the  adhesion  of  the  Continental  Powers  to  the 
Holy  Alliance  begins  the  planning  out  of  the  new  edifice 
which  was  to  take  the  place  of  the  destroyed  Walhalla  of 
Napoleon, 


142  LIFE  OF  FHINCE  METTEUNICII. 


^ 


N 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  CONTINENTAL  SYSTEM  OF  METTEKNICH:   ITS 
RISE  AND  PEOGEESS. 

1815-1830. 

Metteenich  relates  that  during  the  negotiations  for 
the  second  Peace  of  Paris,  the  Emperor  Alexander  sent 
for  him,  and  informed  him  that  he  was  occupied  with 
a  great  undertaking  about  which  he  desired  especially  to 
consult  the  Emperor  Francis.  The  matter,  he  added,  was 
not  one  of  business,  or  he  would  have  asked  the  advice  of 
Metternich :  it  was  a  matter  purely  of  sentiment  and 
feeling,  and,  as  such,  was  a  matter  which  monarchs  alone 
were  capable  of  deciding.  Metternich  at  once  reported 
the  conversation  to  his  master,  and  the  two  sovereigns 
saw  each  other  a  few  days  later. 

After  the  interview  between  them  Francis  handed  to 
Metternich  a  document  which  Alexander  had  left  with 
him,  and  on  which  he  had  desired  his  opinion.  Francis, 
to  whom  Metternich  had  become  indispensable,  and  who, 
since  the  end  of  the  year  1810,  had  seen  only  with  his 
eyes,  and  heard  only  with  his  ears,  desired  to  have 
the  opinion  of  his  minister,  to  enable  him  then  to  declare 
his  own. 

Metternich,  perusing  the  document,  found  it,  he  tells  us, 
to  be  nothing  more  than. 


GOVERNMENT  BY  BEPBESSION.  143 

"a  pliilanthropic  aspiration  clothed  in  a  religious  garb,  which 
supplied  no  material  for  a  treaty  between  the  nionarchs,  and  which 
contitiiied  many  phrases  that  might  even  have  given  occasion  to 
religious  misconstructions." 

His  master,  he  found,  had  Imbibed  the  same  impression. 
The  King  of  Prussia,  to  whom  the  document  was  then 
shown,  agreed  with  Francis  and  his  minister  in  the  main, 
*'  but  hesitated  to  reject  entirely  the  views  of  the  Czar." 
Metternich  was  consequently  commissioned  to  suggest 
to  Alexander  certain  alterations  to  make  the  document 
acceptable  to  his  brother  sovereigns.  In  this  Metternich 
succeeded,  though  "  not  without  great  difficulty ;  "  and 
the  Austrian  Emperor,  *'  although  he  did  not  approve 
the  project  even  when  modified,  agreed  to  sign  it,  for 
reasons  which  I,  for  my  part,  could  not  oppose." 

"  This,"  adds  ]\Ietternich,  "  is  the  history  of  the  Holy 
Alliance." 

Such  as  the  document  was,  it  was  worthy  of  the  narrow 
and  fanatical  brain  of  the  Czar,  from  which  it  emanated. 
In  it  the  contracting  parties  declared  their  intention 
to  conduct  their  domestic  administration  and  foreio^n 
relations  according  to  the  precepts  of  Christianity,  and 
bound  themselves  to  observe  three  points:  (1)  to  give 
mutual  assistance  for  the  protection  of  religion,  peace, 
and  justice ;  (2)  to  regard  themselves  as  delegated  by 
Providence  to  govern  three  branches  of  one  Christian 
nation  ;  (3 )  to  admit  any  other  Powers  which  should 
declare  their  adherence  to  the  same  principles. 

Metternich  takes  some  pains  to  declare  that  this 
document  was  simply  "  a  loud-sounding  nothing  "  ;  that 
it  was  "  an  overflow  of  the  pietistic  feelings  of  the  Emperor 
Alexander  "  ;  thcit  it  "  was  not  an  institution  to  keep  down 
the  rights  of  the  people,  to  promote  absolutism  or  any 
other  tyranny "  ;  that  after  it  had  been  signed,  it  was 


144  J     LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNIGE. 

never  mentioned  between  the  Cabinets.  We  may  admit 
a  great  part  of  this,  but  the  fact  still  remains  that  the 
principles  embodied  in  the  Holy  Alliance  were  the 
principles  upon  which  the  three  sovereigns  who  signed  It 
proceeded  to  base  their  internal  administration.  Trans- 
lated into  plain  language,  it  was  a  league  of  three  despots, 
each  guaranteeing  the  other  against  his  subjects.  The 
name,  likely  enough,  was  not  bandied  between  them  in 
correspondence,  but  its  principle  was  thoroughly  well 
understood  and  acted  upon.  The  proof  is  that  the  control 
of  the  policy  of  the  three  signatories  gradually  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  statesman  who  managed  most  skilfully  to  put 
in  action  the  principles  of  this  league  of  sovereigns,  by  the 
repression  of  free  thought,  of  free  speech,  of  free  aspira- 
tions, throughout  his  master's  dominions.  This  statesman 
was  Metternlch. 

^^The  Holy  Alliance  was  signed  in  September,  1815.  It 
was  the  keystone  of  the  arch  which  Metternlch  was 
building  to  replace  the  fallen  temple  of  Napoleon. 
England,  by  the  mouth  of  Lord  Castlereagh,  refused, 
naturally  enough,  to  accede  to  it. 

The  state  of  the  Continent,  at  the  close  of  1815, 
offered  a  great  opportunity  to  a  real  statesman.  Twenty- 
three  years  of  almost  incessant  warfare  had  produced  a 
longing  for  peace,  for  an  era  of  definite  tranquillity,  such 
as  has  rarely  been  equalled.  But  the  French  Revolution 
had,  in  spite  of  its  excesses,  widely  disseminated  its 
principles  throughout  Europe.  Peace,  that  is  to  say, 
security  against  invasion,  might  Indeed  be  attained ;  but 
no  peace  could  be  real  which  did  not  concede  to  the 
people  some  share  in  the  gains  of  the  victory  which  the 
people  had  achieved.  The  uprising  of  Germany  in  1813 
had  done  much  to  assure  the  fall  of  Napoleon.  The  men 
who  had  fought,  and  bled,  and  vanquished,  in  that  great 


G0VEBN3IENT  BY  REPRESSION.  145 


cause,  had  earned  the  right  to  be  treated  as  free  men. 
They  did  not  want  much.  Some  small  recognition  would 
for  the  moment  have  satisfied  them.  But  they  wanted 
something,  and  a  clear  observer  would  have  detected  that 
unless  they  should  obtain  that  something,  an  era  of 
universal  peace,  accompanied,  as  it  would  be,  by  material 
prosperity,  would  be  a  period  fruitful  of  opportunities  for 
the  exchange  of  ideas,  for  the  birth  of  discontent ;  and 
that  such  ideas  and  such  discontent  would  end  probably 
in  a  resolve  to  obtain  by  force  the  rights  which  had  been 
denied  to  abstract  justice.  The  opportunity  for  statesman- 
like action  was,  then,  such  as  might  rarely  recur.  The  fall 
of  Napoleon  had  left  a  tabula  rasa  upon  which  to  write  the 
principles  of  a  new  departure.  A  little,  I  repeat,  would 
have  sufficed.  If  Metternich  had  given  that  little,  or  had 
allowed  that  little  to  be  given,  he  would  at  all  events 
have  laid  the  foundation  of  a  structure  which  might  have 
become  durable. 

It  seems  stran<Te  that  he  did  not.  He  had  condemned 
Napoleon's  system  because  he  himself  had  been  the 
keystone  of  the  arch,  which,  on  his  removal,  had  fallen, 
leaving  only  ruins.  Yet,  hajjn^^.thal.,,e-Xperieiicej^Jjff 
proceeded  to  erect  a  structure. on  the  same  principle; 
that  is,  a  structure  of  the  arck_jQf_which  he  him- 
self should  be  the  keystone.  Such  a  structure  had 
even  less  cbance  of  durability  than  that  of  Napoleon. 
Napoleon's  arch  had  at  least  been  cemented  by  glory. 
He  had  made  France  the  dominant  factor  in  the 
continentaOyste'm ;  and  he  was  continually  gratifying 
tlie  pride,  and  appealing  to  the  generous  instincts,  of  a 
peculiarly  imaginative  people.  Metternich  had  no  such 
veneer  with  which  to  smear  his  structure.  He  had 
nothing  to  gratify  the  tastes  of  the  various  races  under 
the   sway   of  his   master,   some   as   imaginative   as   the 

L 


146  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICE. 

French,  haters  of  German  rule,  and  who,  cnougn  they 
might  be  long-suffering,  were  dangerous  wh^n  roused. 
He  might  have  recollected  that  Italy  had  been  made 
something  more  than  a  geographical  expression  by 
Napoleon ;  that  lllyria  had  enjoyed  the  benefits  of  the 
Code  Napoleon  ;  and  that  both  might  feel  something  like 
repulsion — the  one  at  being  degraded  to  the  position  of  a 
conquered  province,  the  other  at  being  brought  again 
under  the  hard  measure  of  Austrian  law.*  It  is  probable 
that  under  no  circumstances  would  Metternich  have 
played  a  liberal  part.  In  his  mind  liberalism  was  closely 
connected  with  revolution,  and,  above  ^G,  with  the  French 
revolution,  and  he  hated  it.  He  had  hated  Napoleon 
simply  because  he  was  the  child,  the  embodiment, "the 
living  presence  of  revolution.  Therefore  it  is,  I  repeat, 
probable,  that  under  no  circumstances  would  he  have 
consented  to  give  liberal  institutions  to  the  countries 
which  he  controlled.  But  there  is  a  curious  passage  in 
his  memoirs  which  shows  that  even  if  he  had,  at  any  time, 
been  so  inclined,  he  would  have  abandoned  the  idea  after 
the  experience  of  Napoleon  in  1815.  Referring  to  the 
battle  of  Waterloo,  he  wrote  ; 

•'Even  if  this  battle  had  not  resulted  in  the  success  due  to  tie 
iron  resolution  of  the  English  general,  and  the  courageous  assistance 
of  Field-Marshal  Bliicher,  the  cause  of  Napohon  would  have  been 
irretrieval'ly  lost.  The  Auslrian  and  Eu>sian  armies  together,  with 
the  contingent  of  the  German  Confederation,  moving  towards  the 
Rhine,  would  have  spread  over  France.  The  'power  xoliich  she 
possessed  before  under  the  Empire  was  complttely  broken  in  consequence 


*  When  I  first  visited  Carniola,  in  1871,  I  found  the  semi-Italian 
people  of  that  province  full  of  traditionary  love  for  tiie  period  wh.  n 
their  province  was  undi  r  Freich  r  le.  Administration  Avas  better  in 
Austrii  then,  it  is  still  better  now,  but  more  thnn  half  a  century  after 
the  re-trnnsfer  to  Austria  the  French  period  had  a  warm  place  in  the 
hearts  of  the  people. 


GOVEBNMENT  BY  BEPBESSION.  147 

of  the  destructive  concessions  icJiich  Napoleon  was  constrained  to  malce 
during  the  Hundred  Days." 

With  such  an  example  of  the  result  of  concessions  to 
popular  clamour  it  could  not  be  expected  that  Metternich 
would  make  any.    In  his  eyes  all  concession  was  destructive. 

Metternich,  then,  havinor  a  free  hand,  beins:  Jn  a 
position^  which  he  could  dictate  a  policy  and  inaugui'ate 
a  system  which  would  be  supported  by  the  armed  force 
of  continental  Europe,  cast  to  the  winds  the  generous 
ideas  which  the  sovereigns  had  enunciated  in  the  hours 
of  their  distress,  and  went  in  fox. repression  and  one-man 
rule.  In  an  admirable  work  dealing  with  this  subject,* 
Mr.  C.  Edmund  Maurice  has  put  his  position  so  clearly 
and  forcibly  that  I  shall  be  excused  for  quoting  it  in  this 
place.  After  indicating  the  leading  position  which 
Metternich  occupied  in  the  councils  of  Europe  on  the  fall 
of  Napoleon,  Mr.  Maurice  adds : 

"  The  system  of  the  new  ruler  resembled  that  of  Napoleon  in  its 
contempt  for  the  rights  of  men  and  nations;  but  it  was  to  be  varnished 
ovw  with  an  appearance  uf  legality,  a  seeming  respect  for  tlie  rights  of 
kings,  and  a  determination  to  preserve  peace  and  avoid  dramatic 
rensations,  whi.'h  made  it  welcome  to  Europe  after  eighteen  years  of 
almost  inctssa.it  wars  Dr  rumours  of  wars." 

Describing,  then,  how  Metternich  had  persuaded 
England — the  England  of  Lord  Castlereagh — to  look  on 
calmly  at  the  despoiling  of  Italy  ;  how  greed  for  territory 
had  dis})laced  eagerness  for  popular  rights  in  the  feeble 
mind  of  the  King  of  Prussia  ;  Mr.  Maurice  proceeds 
thus  to  deal  with  the  Emperor  Alexander : 

"  There  were  two  difficulties,"  he  writes,  "  which  seemed  likely  to 
hinder  the  prosperity  of  Metternich's  reign.  These  were  the  character 
of  Alexander  I.  of  Kussia,  and  the  aspirations  of  the  German  nation. 


*  The  Bevolutionary  Movement  of  1848-9  in  Italy,  Austria-Hungary 
and  Germany,  trith  some  Examination  of  the  previous  Thirty-three 
Years"  bv  C.  Edmund  Maarice,  1887. 

L    2 


148  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICH. 

*'  Alexander,  indeed,  if  occasionally  irritating  Metternich,  evidently 
afforded  him  considerable  amusement,  and  the  sort  of  pleasure  which 
every  man  finds  in  a  suitable  subject  for  the  exercise  of  his  peculiar 
talents.  For  Alexander  was  eminently  a  man  to  be  manage<l. 
Enthusiastic,  dreamy,  and  vain  ;  now  bent  on  schemes  of  conquest, 
now  on  the  development  of  some  ideal  of  liberty,  now  filled  with  some 
confused  religious  mysticism  ;  at  one  time  eager  to  divide  the  world 
with  Napoleon,  then  anxious  to  restore  Poland  to  its  independence ; 
now.li  tening  to  the  appeal  of  Metternich  to  liis  fears,  at  another  time 
to  the  nubler  and  more  liberal  suggestions  of  Stein  and  Pozzo  di 
Boigo ;  only  consistent  in  the  one  desire  to  play  an  impressive  and 
melodramatic  part  in  European  affairs." 

Such  a  character  was  capahle  of  passing'  from  one 
extreme  to  another,  from  the  extreme  of  friendship  to  the 
extreme  of  hatred,  and,  therefore,  eminently  required 
management.  The  danger  for  Metternich  was  that  the 
Czar,  who,  during  1814-15,  had  been  constantly  asserting 
liberal  senthnents,  and  had  chosen  as  his  confidants  men 
of  the  Revolution,  should  be  swayed  to  antagonism  by 
the  aspirations  for  liberty  which  the  rising  against  Napo- 
leon had  awakened  in  all  the  countries  of  Europe  except 
his  own,  in  Spain,  in  Italy,  and  in  Germany.  But 
Metternich  had  studied  Alexander  as  he  had  studied 
Napoleon,  and,  having  read  him  thoroughly,  knew  how 
to  direct  his  enthusiasm  into  channels  so  craftily  contrived 
that  whilst  his  liberalism  exhausted  itself  in  words,  the 
strength  it  embodied  v.as  need  to  support  the  despotic 
system.  Thus  it  happened,  that  in  spite  cf  occasional 
outbursts,  that  system  had  no  surer  supporter  than 
Alexander. 

He  had  more  trouble  with  Germany.  The  King  of 
Prussia,  indeed,  he  had  to  a  great  extent  enlisted  in  his 
cause.  Frederick  William  was  weak  and  selfish,  but 
there  was  the  fact  that  to  no  people  in  Europe  had 
promises  been  so  freely  made,  in  the  last  three  years  of 
the    great    struggle,    as    to    the    people    of   Northern 


GOVERNMENT  BY  REPRESSION.  149 

Germany.  In  the  early  hours  succeeding  victory  these 
promises  had  been  remembered  by  the  monarch  who  had 
made  them.  They  were  remembered,  however,  only  to 
be  deliberately  broken  when  the  time  for  their  fulfilment 
arrived :  to  be  broken,  indeed,  with  so  little  regard  for 
the  rights  of  the  human  race,  that  within  two  years  of  the 
triumph  which  the  devotion  and  valour  of  his  people  had 
gained  for  him,  the  King  of  Prussia  had  become  the  most 
unpopular  sovereign  in  Europe.  Indications,  in  rapid 
succession,  were  given  of  the  rising  feeling,  but  it  was  not 
until  Kotzebue,  the  friend  of  the  (.zar  and  the  apostle  of 
absolutism,  had  been  murdered  by  Ludwig  Sandt,  and  the 
Universities  of  Germany,  encouraged  by  the  Duke  of 
Weimar,  had  made  a  determined  effort  to  secure  the 
teaching  of  freedom  of  opinion,  that  ^Fettenuch  resolved 
to  interfere.  He  had  been  waiting  fur  .^onie  such  revolt 
against  the  system  of  repression  on  which  he  was  bent,  to 
inaugurate  an  iron  rule  against  which  there  CQuld  be 
no  appeal.  Acting,  then,  on  the  fears  of  Frederick 
William,  he  persuaded  him  to  dismiss  one  professor,  to 
arrest  another,  and  to  force  a  third  into  flight.  A  little 
later,  in  the  manner  about  to  be  described,  he  procured 
the  assembly  of  a  Conference  at  Carlsbad  to  crush_  the 
revolutionary_spirii  displayed  by-  the — yery  moderate 
demands  of  the  Universities^ 

Prior  to  the  meeting  of  this  Conference,  Metternich 
had  had,  at  Teplitz,  an  interview  with  the  King  of 
Prussia  (July,  1819).  He  found  that  monarch  hesitating 
as  to  whether  he  should,  or  should  not,  grant  his  people  a 
Constitution.  Nothing  could  be  more  frank  than  the 
language  used  by  Metternich  on  this  point.  He  told  the 
King,  in  so  many  words,  that  Prussia  was  the  focus  of 
revolution  ;  that  help  to  him  would  be  forthcoming  only 
on  the  condition  tliat  he  did  not  introduce  representation 


LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICB. 

of  the  people  into  his  kingdom,  "which,"  he  added,  "is 
less  fitted  for  it  than  any  other,"  and  he  succeeded  in 
bringing  Frederick  William  to  his  views  In  a  con- 
versation a  few  days  later  with  the  Prussian  ministers,  he 
convinced  them  likewise  of  the  necessity  for  the  repression 
of  free  thought  and  free  opinion.  And,  in  agreement 
with  them,  he  summoned  a  Conference,  in  which  the 
several  Germanic  States  should  be  represented,  to  meet 
at  Carlsbad,  to  formulate  the  action  which  should  be 
necessary  to  carry  out  his  views. 
r-;^  Xhemode  in  which  Metternich  proposed  to  combat  the 
revolutionary  feeling  is  thus  formulated  by  him  in  a  memo- 
randum drawn  up  for  the  Emperor  Francis,  and  dated 
the  1st  of  Auo^ust.  In  this,  he  states  that  the  measures 
to  be  adopted  at  the  coming_Conference  must  be  (1)  the 
suspension  of  the  licence  of  the  press;  (2)  the  appoint- 
ment of  commissions  for  the  investigation  of  the  German 
Universities,  and  the  removal  of  notoriously  bad  pro- 
fessors ;  (3)  the  formation  of  a  special  judicial  commission 
acting  in  the  name  of  the  whole  Bund,  to  investigate  the 
conspiracy  discovered  against  the  Bund. 

The  (Conference  met  the  same  month,  carried  out  the 
views  of  Metternich  under  his  own  personal  auspices,  and 
nominated  a  Central  Investigation  Commission  "  for  the 
protection  of  social  order  and  the  calming  of  all  the  well- 
disposed  in  Germany." 

There  remained  but  one  thing  necessary  to  complete 
the  work  ;  to  give  the  death-blow  to  aspirations  for  con- 
stitutional government.  When  the  allied  sovereigns  were 
still  under  the  influence  of  the  gratitude  engendered  by 
the  exertions  which  had  recovered  for  them  freedom  and 
power,  they  had  inserted  a  clause  in  the  Treaty  of  Vienna 
which  suggested  the  granting  of  Constitutions  by  the 
several  rulers  of  Germany.     The  existence  of  this  clause 


GOVERNMENT  BY  BEPBESSIOK  151 

had  now  become  a  danger.  To  the  men  fresh  from  a 
crusade  against  the  teachuigs  of  the  Universities  it  was 
an  abomination.  Metternich,  then,  again  called  the 
representatives  of  the  German  States  to  Vienna  to  discuss 
the  obnoxious  clause.  He  met,  indeed,  with  some  opposi- 
tion. The  King  of  Bavaria  wrote  through  his  minister 
that  he  declined  to  perjure  himself.  The  Kino-  of 
Wiirtemberg  also  protested.  But  the  Conference  never- 
theless opened  on  the  20th  of  November,  and  carried  out 
all  Metternich's  wishes.  Thenceforth  there  was  an  ao-ree- 
ment  that  the  Princes  of  Germany  should  not  be  hindered 
in  the  exercise  of  their  power,  nor  in  their  duty  as 
members  of  the  Bund,  by  any  constitutions. 

To  understand  a  man  thoroughly  it  is  necessary  to  dive 
into  his  inmost  thoughts.  This  is  not  always  possible 
even  when  a  man  writes  his  own  memoirs,  because  memoirs 
may  be  subsequently  altered  to  suit  circumstances.  When, 
however,  a  conceited  and  successful  man  praises  himself, 
such  an  understanding  may  be  arrived  at ;  for  then,  we 
know,  he  does  not  lie.  The  passage  I  am  about  to  quote 
will  give  a  better  and  clearer  idea  of  the  opinion  of 
Metternich  regarding  himself,  and  of  his  absolute 
supremacy  in  Germany,  at  this  period,  than  it  would  be 
possible  to  draw  from  official  correspondence.  When  he 
had  mastered  the  initial  difficulties  at  the  Conference,  and 
liad  seen  clearly  that  he  was  about  to  have  an  easy  victory, 
he  made  this  entry  in  his  journal  : 

"  I  have  found  a  moment's  quiet.  The  bjisiness  of  the  Conference 
proceeds  very  well.  I  liave  gone  to  the  root  of  this  matter — a  rare 
thing  in  moral  and  political  discussions.  I  told  my  five-and-twenty 
friends  in  an  upright  and  decided  manner  what  we  w^mt  nud  what 
we  do  not  want.  On  this  avowal  there  was  a  general  declaration  of 
approval,  and  each  one  asserted  that  he  had  never  waiited  more  or 
less,  or,  indeed,  hardly  anything  different.  Now,  I  am  surrounded 
by  people  who  are  quite  enchanted  with  their  own  force  of  will,  and 


]52  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTERNICK 

yet  there  is  not  one  amongst  them  who  a  few  days  ago  knew  what  he 
wants  or  will  want.  This  is  the  universal  fate  of  such  an  assembly. 
It  has  been  evident  to  me  for  a  long  time  that  among  a  certain 
number  of  persons  cnly  one  is  ever  found  who  has  clearly  made  out 
for  himself  what  is  the  questiun  in  hand.  I  shall  be  victorious  here 
as  at  Carlsbad:  that  is  to  say,  all  will  wish  what  I  wish,  and  since  I 
only  wish  what  is  just,  I  believe  I  shall  gain  my  victory.  But  what  is 
most  remarkable  is  that  tliese  men  will  go  home  with  the  firm 
persuasion  that  they  have  left  Vienna  with  the  same  views  with  which 
they  came." 

Can  we  wonder  that  with  the  conviction  of  his  own 
superiority  expressed  in  the  words  I  have  quoted  ;  carrying 
with  him  the  whole  strength  of  Austria ;  having  moulded 
Frederick  William  to  his  will,  and  secure  in  the  support 
of  the  Czar,  Metternich  should  be  supreme  in  Germany  ? 
The  words  he  himself  recorded  prove  that  he  was  not  only 
supreme,  but  that  he  felt  that  he,  and  he  alone,  possessed 
the  genius  necessary  to  direct  the  course  of  all  the  rulers 
of  the  States  composing  Germany.  It  is  melancholy  to 
have  to  record  that,  disposing  of  this  absolute  power,  he 
wielded  it  in  a  manner  which  gained  for  him  the  hatred 
of  the  races  over  whom  he  ruled  :  he  used  it  to  repress 
liberty,  to  crush  thought,  opinion,  action  ;  he  used  it,  In 
a  word,  to  enslave  the  people  to  whose  valour  and  pa- 
triotism Germany  owed  her  deliverance  from  Napoleon. 

So  much  for  his  treatment  of  Germany  up  to  the  year 
1820.     Turn  we  now  to  Italy. 

Under  the  Napoleonic  system  Italy  had  ceased,  or  had 
almost  ceased,  to  be  only  a  geographical  expression.  But 
after  the  catastrophe  of  Waterloo  she  was  again  parcelled 
out  into  appanages  for  princes  who  were  not  always 
Italians.  Naples  was  restored  to  the  Bourbons ;  the 
Lombardo-Venetian  kingdom  was  established  for  Austria ; 
Piedmont  was  given  back,  with  hard  conditions,  to  the 
King  of  Sardinia  ;  and  various  others  Dukedoms  and 
Principalities    were   allotted   to  dispossessed   princes   or 


GOVERNMENT  BY  BEPRESSION.  153 

princesses.  One  fact  remained  clear ;  Austria  was  pre- 
ponderant in  Italy.  It  was  to  her  that  Ferdinand  I.  of 
Naples,  and  Victor  Emanuel  of  Sardinia,  alike  looked  to 
support  them  against  their  own  people. 

Metternich  did  not  possess  in  Italy  the  same  power 
for  repression  which  he  had  accumulated  to  himself  in 
Germany.  The  Lombardo-Venetian  kingdom  was 
governed  by  an  Archduke  of  the  Imperial  House,  and 
not  all  the  Habsburgs  were  so  submissive  to  the  Chan- 
cellor as  was  the  easy-going  Francis.  Still,  he  could 
urge,  could  advise,  and,  in  a  sense,  could  command  ; 
that  is,  he  could  command  in  the  name  of  his  master. 
And  he  did  watch  and  supervise  the  Imperial  interests  in 
Italy  as  jealously  as  it  was  possible  for  a  man  whose 
duties  kept  him  in  the  German  provinces  of  the  Empire 
to  watch  and  supervise  them. 

He  had  but  just  completed  the  measures  for  the  poli- 
tical enslavement  of  Germany  which  I  have  narrated, 
when  information  reached  him  that,  in  sympathy  with 
those_Spaniards  who  had  been  driven  to  revolt  by  the 
bad  faith  of  the  Bourbon  sovereign  whom  the  alUes  had 
restored  to  rule  over  the  peninsula,  the  Neapolitans  had 
forced  their  Bourbon  king  to  consent  to  the  jippointment 
6t  a  provisional  Tunta,  and  to  swear  to  aecept  a  constitu- 
tion on  the  basis  of  that  to  which  the  Spanish  Bourbon 
had  with  equal  sincerity  promised  to  adhere. 

Metternich  was  at  Baden,  sixteen  miles  from  Vienna, 
when  (1  'th  July,  1820)  the  news  of  this  attack  on  his 
system  reached  him.  He  started  for  Vienna  the  same 
day,  and  proceeded,  tlie  following  morning,  to  see  the 
Emperor,  who  was  at  the  Imperial  castle  of  Weinzierl. 
On  his  way  thither  he  had  leisure  to  calculate  the  effect 
on  his  general  policy  wliich  such  a  revolt  would  produce. 
He  records  that  it  was  an  event,  "  beyond  all  calculation  ; 


154  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEENIOH. 

the  consequences  will  be  quickly  seen,  the  remedies  must 
not  be  long  waited  for."  Believing  that  the  movement 
had  been  caused  by  Russians,  anxious  to  please  their 
sovereign  ;  believing,  also,  that  it  would  cause  blood  "  to 
flow  in  streams,"  he  addressed  himself  to  the  Czar,  and 
persuaded  him  to  agree  to  a  Conference  of  the  Powers  at 
Troppau,  in  Austrian  Silesia,  to  arrange  the  best  mode  of 
suppressing  the  ebulHtion.  The  Conference  was  fixed  for 
October  20th.  On  that  day  Alexander  arrived.  Metter- 
nich  had  preceded  him  by  twenty-four  hours. 

Before  we  proceed  to  consider  the  deliberations  at 
Troppau  I  would  ask  the  reader  to  spare  a  moment  to 
consider  one  or  two  entries  in  the  diary  of  the  powerful 
minister  the  sketch  of  whose  career  I  am  endeavouring 
to  set  before  them.  In  those  entries  we  see  the  inner 
soul  of  the  man,  his  conceit,  his  narrowness,  his  hatred 
for  all  who  had  opposed  him  or  whom  he  had  opposed  ; 
his  intense  self-appreciation.  On  the  15th  of  August, 
the  birthday  of  Napoleon,  for  instance,  we  come  upon  this 
entry : 

"August  15th  (Napoleonstag), 

"  This  is  the  day  of  the  great  accursed !  If  he  were  still  on  the 
throne,  and  he  were  alone  in  the  world,  1  should  be  happy." 

Then,  regarding  his  master,  the  Emperor  Francis : 

*'  Heaven  has  placed  me  near  a  man  who  seems  as  if  he  had  been 
made  for  me." 

Again : 

"  Tlie  Emperor  and  I  will  give  the  world  a  great  example  ;  we  will 
not  leave  our  posts.  If  we  are  deslroyed,  many  will  have  to  smart  for 
tlieir  crimes  and  their  folly  first.  The  high  character  of  the  Carbonari, 
the  party  which  has  led  all  the  others,  is  the  anxiety." 

In  another  place,  commenting  on  a  declaration  said  to 
have  been  made  by  the  Czar,  that  he  was  conscious  that 
he  had,  since  1814,  been  mistaken  as  to  the  mind  of  the 
public,   Metternich  makes  this  remark:  '*The  man  who 


GOVERNMENT  BY  BEPBESSION.  155 

allows  errors  to  be  seen  is  no  statesman  ;  "  adding,  how- 
ever, that  the  admission  of  a  mistake  proves  that  the  man 
is  honourable,  and  that  Alexander  was  that.     Ao'ain : 

*'  My  liead  is  tired  ami  my  heart  dried  up.*  and  in  this  state  I  feel 
the  world  rebtiug  on  niy  shoulders.  If  I  should  deceive  myself  for  a 
moment  I  am  brcmght  to  recollection  by  the  ariival  of  some  courier 
with  the  declaration,  'What  will  you  do?'  They  say,  'We  have 
confidence  only  in  you.  Our  fate  is  in  your  hands;  what  shall  we 
do  ? '  That  is  the  substance  of  all  the  despatches  which  arrive,  and 
two-thirds  of  the  que-stioiieis  are  always  ready  to  perpetrate  some 
folly,  because  they  have  neither  spirit  nor  courage." 

To  return  to  Troppau.  There  Metternich  found  that 
Alexander  had  come  entirely  round  to  his  views.  The 
Emperor  admitted,  witli  many  expressions  of  penitence, 
that  in  1813-14  he  had  sinned,  but  that  he  was  now  more 
than  ever  convinced  of  the  correctness  of  the  doctrines  on 
which  Metternich  had  acted.  "  You  are  not  altered,'* 
said  the  Czar  to  him,  "I  am.  You  have  nothing  to 
regret,  but  I  have."  Commenting  upon  this,  and  upon 
other  conversations  with  the  same  high  personage, 
Metternich  writes:  "People  might  think  that  the 
Emperor  had  only  just  come  into  the  m  orld  and  opened 
his  eyes.  He  is  now  at  the  point  w^here  I  was  thirty  years 
ago."  A  day  or  two  later  the  Conference  f  opened. 
There  Metternich  was  successful,  though  not  quite  so 
successful,  as  he  had  been  at  Teplitz  and  Vienna.  He 
scored,  he  tells  us,  only  eighty-five  per  cent,  of  the 
victories.     But,  whilst  he  was  scoring  these  the  party  of 

*  An  allusion  to  the  loss  of  his  married  daughter  wbo  had  then 
recently  died. 

t  There  were  present  at  it,  besides  the  Emperors  of  Austria  and 
Kussia.  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  of  Kussia;  the  King  and  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Prussia ;  the  Austrian  diplomatists,  Metternich,  Gentz, 
Zichy,  and  Mercy;  those  of  Russia,  Nesselrode,  Capo  d'Istria, 
Golowkin,  Alopaus ;  those  of  Prussia,  Hardenberg  and  Bernstoff;  of 
England,  Stewart ;  of  France,  de  la  Fenonays. 


156  LIFE  OF  PBINCF  METTEBNICH. 

freedom  was  not  idle.  The  cry  of  "  The  Constitution  of 
1812  "  was  raised  likewise  in  Sicily.  Then  the  King  of 
Naples,  impatient  alike  of  his  concessions  and  of  his 
position,  announced  his  intention  of  attending  the 
Conference,  now  become  a  Congress.  The  sovereigns 
and  ministers  present  heard  of  this  resolution  on  the  24th 
December.  It  was  at  once  resolved  to  make  a  move  to  the 
milder  climate  and  more  convenient  situation  of  Laibach. 
The  Congress  did  not  adjourn,  however,  without  having 
arrived  at  conclusions  common  to  Austria,  Russia,  and 
Prussia,  which  were  to  constitute  the  basis  for  further 
action.  These  conclusions  were  formulated  in  a  despatch, 
dated  8th  December,  which  the  three  Powers  transmitted 
to  their  agents  at  the  German  and  Northern  Courts.  The 
purport  of  this  despatch  was  the  enforcement  and  develop- 
ment of  the  principles  the  germ  of  which  was  contained  in 
the  Holy  Alliance,  viz.,  the  agreement  of  the  sovereigns  to 
put  down  what  they  called  "  rebellion  "  in  the  dominions 
of  any  one  of  them.  To  this  England  and  France  were 
invited  to  agree ;  they  were  further  asked  to  send 
representatives  to  Laibach. 
.  /  Metternich  reached  Laibach  early  in  January,  and  the 
■"^^^^vereigns  and  diplomatists  quickly  followed  him.  Again 
were  they  obedient  to  the  will  of  their  master.  By 
the  advice  of  Metternich  it  was  arranged  to  despatch 
60,000  Austrian  troops  to  "restore  order" — that  is, 
the  despotic  rule  of  the  Bourbon,  with  all  its  repressions 
— in  the  south  of  Italy.  On  the  6th  February  an  army 
composed  of  that  number  of  men  crossed  the  Po  for  that 
purpose.  A  campaign  of  thirteen  days  sufficed  to  put 
down  the  insurrection,  and,  although,  in  the  meantime, 
Piedmont  had  risen,  and  demonstrations  had  been  made 
even  in  the  Lombardo- Venetian  kingdom,  the  faith  of 
Metternich   in   the    power  of  bayonets    never   wavered. 


GOVEBNMENT  BY  BEPBESSION.  157 

Writing  to  Count  Rechberg  from  Laibacli,  under  date 
the  31st  March,  he  says  : 

"  We  shall  finish  the  Piedraontese  affair  as  we  did  the  Neapolitan. 
Another  French  Eevolution  could  alone  interpose  grave — perhaps 
insurmountable — obstacles  to  this  second  enterprise. 

"  All  the  venom  is  at  present  on  the  surface.  The  cure  will  be  so 
much  the  more  radical;  and  what  we  began  together  in  July,  1819, 
can  be  finished  with  the  help  of  God  and  for  the  salvation  of  the 
world  in  1821.  It  is  therefore  from  Carlsbad  that  the  Era  of 
Salvation  must  be  dated." 

The  Czar  was  not  only  an  accomplice  in  the  movement 
of  the  Austrian  troops :  he  was  even  eager  that  his  own 
should  be  employed.  Finally  it  was  arranged  that 
he  should  despatch  120,000  men  to  his  frontier  with 
orders  to  move  at  the  first  sign  Metternich  should  give. 
Metternich  never  gave  that  sign.  He  was  anxious  that 
the  work  of  repression  should  be  carried  out  by  Austria 
alone — by  that  Austria  which,  he  claims  in  his  memoirs,  * 
had  contributed  two-thirds  of  the  main  force  which  won,  at 
Leipsig,  the  "  battle  of  the  nations."  She  had  won  that 
battle  to  fight,  eight  years  later,  against  the  victors,  the 
battles  of  the  despots. 

The  conclusions  arrived  at  at  the  Congress  of  Laibach 
were  but  a  confirmation  of  the  agreement  of  Troppau. 
They  were  contained  in  a  declaration  signed  by  the 
representatives  of  the  three  Powers,  and  communicated  by 
Metternich  to  the  Austrian  agents  at  Foreign  Courts  in 
an  explanatory  circular  despatch  dated  the  I2th  May. 
For  the  moment  the  policy  was  successful.  Austrian 
soldiers  repressed  the  rising  in  Piedmont  as  easily  a= 
they  had  put  down  that  in  Naples.  Metternich  then 
applied  his  energies  to  restore  order,  somewhat  dis- 
arranged by  sympathetic  demonstrations,  in  Lorabardy. 

*  Vol.  iii.,  p.  390  (English  translation). 


158  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICE. 

In  the  work  from  which  I  have  aheady  quoted,*  Mr. 
Maurice  states  that  Metternich  estahlished  an  Aulic 
Council  at  Vienna  to  superintend  the  affairs  in  the 
Lorn  bar  do- Venetian  kingdom,  and  to  crush  out  any  local 
independence  ;  that  Count  Federigo  Confalonieri,  who  had 
founded  the  literary  movement  which  was  to  instruct  his 
countrymen,  was  arrested  and  condemned  to  death.  Mr. 
Maurice  continue^ :  "  His  case  excited  sympathy,  even  in 
Vienna,  where  the  Empress  interceded  for  his  life  ;  and 
at  last,  after  long  entreaty,  his  sentence  was  commuted  to 
imprisonment  for  life  in  the  fortress  of  Spielberg.  There 
Metternich  tried  in  vain  to  extort  from  him  the  betrayal 
of  his  fellow-conspirators."  The  imprisonment  of  such  a 
man,  and  the  ignominious  treatment  in  his  prison  fortress, 
roused  a  feeling  throughout  Italy  which,  at  a  later  period, 
bore  abundant  fruit  for  the  cause  on  behalf  of  which 
Confalonieri  suffered. 

In  1821  and  the  following  year  the  affairs  of  Moldavia 
and  Wallachia  and  Greece  came  before  the  Congress. 
Metternich,  who  recognised  the  necessity  of  maintaining  the 
Sultan,  found  it  very  difficult  to  give  to  the  mind  of  the  Czar 
the  impression  he  desired.  But  he  knew  the  weak  points 
of  that  impressionable  mind,  and  he  played  his  game  with 
so  much  art  that  he  believed  he  had  won  it.  On  the  3rd 
June,  1822,  he  wrote  to  the  Emperor  Francis  to  tell  him 
that  the  work  of  Peter  the  Great  was  destroyed ;  that 

'•  what  Russia  loses  in  moial  strength  the  Porte  gains.  We  have 
clone  them  here  a  service  which  they  can  never  sufficiently  reward,  and 
it  will  maintain  our  influence  as  well  as  that  of  England." 

A  few  days  later  he  again  congratulates  himself  on  the 
result  of  his  influence.     He  writes  : 

"  My  position  again  is  very  remarkable ;  I  am  at  the  centre  as  the 


Bevohttions  of  1848-9  in  Italy,  Austria- Hungary,  and  Germany. 


GOVEBNMENT  BY  BEPBESSION.  159 

cl)ief  motive  power  in  an  affair  which  is  quite  simple,  but  Lns  for 
months  been  embiiriassecl  by  unreason  and  unjustifiable  measures. ' 

He  was  expecting  and  hoping  that  Lord  Londonderry 
would  come  to  Vienna  when  he  heard  of  his  suicide.  His 
exclamation  on  hearing  it  is  characteristic.  "AVhat  a 
blow  !  I  am  armed  ajrainst  all  contingencies  ;  my  cause 
will  only  be  lost  if  I  fall  myself ! "  Yes ;  but  what  a 
commentary  on  his  condemnation  of  Napoleon's  system,  a 
condemnation  based  on  the  ground  that  Napoleon  was  the 
keystone  of  the  arch,  which  would  fall  when  the  keystone 
was  removed  I 

Tlie  Powers  had  resolved  to  hold  a  Congress  at  Verona, 
and  it  was  at  that  Congress  that  Metternich  had  hoped  to 
have  the  support  of  Lord  Londonderry. 

"  I  awaited  him  here,"  he  writes  from  Vienna,  "  as  my  second 
self.  .  .  .  He  was  devoted  to  me  in  heart  and  spirit,  not  only  from 
personal  inclination,  but  also  from  conviction.  My  work  would  have 
been  reduced  by  one  linlf,  because  I  should  have  had  him  to  share  it 
with  me ;  now  I  am  left  to  my  own  strength.  I  am  not  alarmed  at 
that ;  but  I  feel  myself  overburdened.  1  have  just  requested  the 
presence  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  the  only  man  who  cun  in  a 
measure  replace  him." 

On  the  22nd  October  following,  Metternich  writes  from 
Verona  that  he  had  just  begun  his  greatest  work  ;  that 
the  Congress  was  composed  of  honest  men,  who  had 
confidence  in  him ;  that  his  personal  reLitions  with  the 
Czar  were 

« the  most  intimate  possible,  as,  for  the  peace  of  the  world,  they  ought 
to  be.  He  believes  in  me  just  as  ray  Emperor  does,  and  the  business 
thereby  gains  as  it  would  by  no  other  combination." 

But  Metternich  soon  found  that  his  forecast  had  been 
a  little  premature.  In  England  Canning  had  succeeded 
Lord  Londonderry  at  the  Foreign  Office,  and  although 
the   Duke  of  Wellington   came  to  Verona  to  rep  esent 


160  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICH. 

England,  he  came  not  to  register  the  decrees  of  Metter- 
nich,  but  to  support  the  views  of  tlie  British  Cabinet. 
The  main  object  of  the  assembling  of  the  sovereigns  and 
the  representatives  of  the  powers  at  Verona*  was  to  restore 
the  perjured  Ferdinand  of  Spain  to  the  throne  he  had 
disgraced,  and  to  secure  which  for  him  the  blood  of 
England  had  been  from  1809  to  1814  poured  out  like  water. 
The  influence  of  jMetternich  and  the  despotic  desires  of 
the  sovereinrns  did  indeed  ensure  an  ao-reement  to 
authorise  France  to  intervene  in  Spain,  but  England  was 
no  party  to  it.  All  that  the  Duke  of  Wellington  could 
be  persuaded  to  undertake  was  to  communicate  to  the 
four  Powers  his  views  on  their  application  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  Holy  Alliance  to  Spain,  in  a  confidential 
note,  and  that  note  plainly  showed  that  England  was 
averse  to  all  aof^ressive  interference  of  one  nation  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  another. 

The  substitution  of  Canning  for  Londonderry  in 
Enijland  had  then  the  result  of  throwins^  Metternich 
more  completely  into  the  arms  of  Russia.  The  change 
was  congenial  to  him,  for  the  Eastern  question  and  the 
question  of  Greece,  which  was  then  an  important  part 
of  that  question,  seemed  to  demand  a  prompt  settlement. 
It  is  true  that  an  agreement  of  a  nature  which  he  hoped 
would  settle  all  differences  had  been  arrived  at  at  Verona. 
But  it  soon  became  clear  that  the  main  provision  of  this 
agreement — the  provision  namely,  that  thePorte  should  her- 
self pacify  Greece — was  unworkable.  Upon  that  question, 
then,  he  would  have  to  come  to   a  complete  understand- 

*  There  were  pre&ent  at  the  Congress  of  Verona,  the  Emperors  of 
Austria  and  of  Eussia,  the  Kings  of  Prussia,  of  the  two  Sicilies  and  of 
Sardinia,  several  minor  princelets  of  Italy;  the  Duke  of  Wellington, 
representing  England;  the  Duke  of  Montmorency  and  Chateaubriand 
representing  France ;  Metternich,  Pozzo  di  Borgo,  Bernstorff  and 
Hardeuberg. 


GOVERNMENT  BY  BEPBESSION  161 

ing  with  Alexander.  Metternich  never  for  a  momeiit 
doubted  his  ability  to  accomplish  this  result.  He  had, 
he  believed,  the  Czar  in  leadino-  strinfi^s.  It  was  about 
this  time,  December  1822,  that  he  obtained  the  adhesion 
of  that  soverein^n  and  of  the  King  of  Prussia,  equally 
bound  to  his  chariot- wheel,  to  establish  at  Mayence  a 
secret  Committee  of  Inquiry,  composed  of  three  members, 
one  from  each  nation,  to  exercise  espionage  over  the  so- 
called  conspirators  of  Central  Europe. 

The  year  1823  was  inaugurated  by  a  small  occurrence 
which,  nevertheless,  excited  the  anger  of  the  secret  ruler 
of  the  Continent.  The  King-  of  Wurtemberff,  takins: 
offence  at  the  high  dealing  of  Austria  at  Verona,  had 
caused  to  be  addressed  to  the  diplomatic  agents  of  his 
Cabinet  a  circular  despatch  in  which  Austria  was  roundly 
accused  of  appropriating  to  herself  "  the  heritage  of 
influence  in  Europe  arrogated  to  himself  by  Napoleon ;  " 
and  which,  whilst  criticising  the  words  and  actions  of  the 
three  despots,  protested  against  the  consequences  which 
the  political  procedure  of  their  Courts  might  have  on  the 
independence  of  sovereigns  of  the  second  order.  The  sting 
of  this  circular  lay  in  its  absolute  truth.  Its  effect  soon 
passed,  however,  as  events  proceeded  to  develop  themselves 
in  the  order  Metternich  had  arranged.  France  invaded 
Spain  and  abolished  the  Constitution.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Greeks  obtained  several  victories  over  the  Turks, 
and  it  became  necessary  that  Metternich  and  his  master 
should  have  another  personal  interview  with  the  Czar. 
They  met  consequently  at  Czernowitz,the  Emperor  Francis 
posing  as  the  lay  figure,  Metternich  as  the  worker.  At 
the  conference  Metternich  found  that  to  work  in  harmony 
with  Eussia  on  the  Eastern  question  he  would  have  to 
modify  the  ideas  which  had  enabled  him  to  act  in  concert 
with  England  •  and,  England   having  ceased  to  be  the 

M 


162  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTERNICH. 

England  of  Castlereagh,  he  modified  them  accordingly. 
The  result  was  that  in  the  matter  which  affected  the 
occupation  of  the  Principalities  he  supported  the  "just 
views  "  of  Russia,  whilst  the  question  of  Greece  was  left  to 
be  solved  at  a  Conference  of  the  Powers,  which,  Metter- 
iiich  recommended,  should  be  held  at  St.  Petersburg. 

The  following  year  the  internal  condition  of  Germany 
seemed  to  demand  a  reminder  that  the  pilot  who,  in  1819, 
had,  by  the  issue  of  the  Carlsbad  decrees,  repressed  the 
development  of  free  opinion  at  the  Universities,  was  still 
at  the  helm.  Reporting  to  the  Emperor,  in  July,  how 
completely  those  decrees  had  purified  the  Universities, 
crushed  the  Press,  and  searched  out  and  baffled  the  plans 
of  the  demagogues,  Metternich  suggested  that  both 
Bavaria  and  Baden,  in  which  countries  State  Assemblies 
Avould  be  convened  the  following  year,  should  be  re- 
minded that  they  must  carry  into  execution  the  repressive 
system  so  successfully  inaugurated  at  Carlsbad ;  that  no 
publicity  should  be  given  to  their  proceedings,  for  that 
the  nail  must  be  driven  right  up  to  its  head.  The 
Emperor  Francis  approved  of  the  sketch  of  the  Presi- 
dential proposition  prepared  by  his  Minister,  and  the 
Courts  of  Bavaria  and  Baden  accepted  its  principle.  To 
add  to  the  apparent  triumph  of  the  authors  of  this  arbitrary 
action  Prussia  signified  her  adhesion  to  the  same  plan, 
and  Metternich,  replying  to  the  satisfactory  assurance  on 
this  point  which  he  received  in  a  letter  from  Frederick 
William  III.,  was  able  to  assure  his  Royal  correspondent 
that  his  life,  "  for  some  time,  has  had  but  one  aim  — that 
of  assuring,  by  my  feeble  efforts,  the  noble  cause  which 
the  monarchs,  for  the  welfare  of  the  world,  have  sought 
to  maintain." 

The  question  of  Greece  occupied  a  great  part  of  his 
attention  during  the  year  1824.     Naturally  Metternich  had 


GO  VERNMENT  B Y  BEPBESSION.  1 63 

but  little  sympathy  with  the  aspirations  of  the  Greeks — 
per  se.  His  life,  since  1815,  had  been  spent  in  combating 
the  principle  on  which  they  were  acting.  Yet  he  was  too 
closely  associated  with  the  policy  of  the  Czar  to  act  with 
perfect  freedom. 

"Honour  and  duty,"  he  wrote,  addressing  the  Austrian  minister  iu 
London,  Prince  Esterhazy,  "compel  them  (the  Allies)  to  serve  the 
cause  of  the  peace  of  Europe ;  this  cause  is  that  of  the  Emperor 
Alexander." 

He  could  not  or  would  not  believe  that  that  Emperor 
aimed  either  "  at  conquests,  or  at  the  thorough  emancipa- 
tion of  the  Greeks,  or  at  the  establishment  of  a  new  and 
revolutionary  power."  As  Austria  did  not  entertain  such 
a  belief,  and  as  the  Greeks,  certainly,  and  if  not  the 
Emperor  Alexander  personally,  the  secret  directors  of  the 
Eussian  policy,  probably,  did  entertain  it ;  it  is  not  sur- 
prising that  the  question  of  Greek  independence  was 
rather  strengthened  than  otherwise  by  the  reliance  of 
Austria  on  the  moderation  of  Alexander — strengthened, 
that  is  to  say,  by  the  trust  displayed  by  Austria,  in  spite 
of  the  wishes  of  Austria.  This  was  more  especially 
apparent  when,  some  seven  or  eight  years  after  the  death 
of  the  Czar,  the  union  between  his  successor  and  Metternich 
became  even  closer  than  it  had  been  with  Alexander. 

In  September  of  this  year  (1824)  the  sovereign  whom 
the  Allies  had  imposed  upon  France  in  1814,  and  again 
in  1815 — Louis  XVIII. — died,  and  was  succeeded  by  his 
brother,  Charles  X.  The  accession  of  the  new  sovereijrn 
was  specially  agreeable  to  Metternich.^  "  Charles  X.,"  he 
wrote,  "  is  peacefully  seated  on  his  brother's  throne.  This 
quiet  change,  which  marks  an  historical  episode  of  the 
Revolution,  undoubtedly  proves  that  moral  regeneration 
has  made  some  progress  in  France."  He  had  but  one 
fear — whether,  in  his  anxiety  to  obtain  popularity,  the  new 

M  2 


164  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICR. 

Kin<T  had  not  Tyiade  too  many  concessions  to  the  Left ; 
whether  he  would  be  able  "  to  resist  the  Liberal  influence 
which  the  Dauphin  seems  to  exercise  over  his  father." 
The  clear-sightedness  which,  after  patient  study,  had  read 
the  character  of  Napoleon,  was  evidently  beginning  to  fail. 
The  year  following,  the  real  views  of  Russia  on  the 
Greek  question — views  held  not  the  less  strongly  because 
they  were  not  disclosed — produced  a  coolness,  or,  as 
Metternich  describes  it,  a  tension,  in  the  relations  between 
Austria  and  Russia.  Metternich  could  not  get  away  from 
the  point  that  Greece  was  in  insurrection  against  the  Porte  ; 
that  Greece  aimed  at  independence  ;  that  the  Powers 
could  not  support  Greece  in  her  pretensions,  because  they 
were  at  peace  with  the  Sultan.  In  fact,  according  to  the 
principles  of  the  Holy  Alliance — principles  on  which  the 
signatories  to  it  acted  in  Spain,  in  Naples,  in  Northern 
Italy — they  were  bound  rather  to  wish  well  to  the  Sultan. 
As  the  year  went  on  some  dim  consciousness  of  the  views 
of  Russia,  exhibited  by  a  change  of  tone  in  the  despatches, 
and  in  the  silence  of  the  Czar,  stole  over  the  mind  of  the 
Austrian  Minister. 

"At  St.  Petersburg,"  he  writes  in  October,  "  they  seem  to  be  very 
much  offended  with  me." 

Again,  the  same  day  ; 

"  Thick  mists  lie  on  the  Neva,  but  they  will  soon  be  dissipated,  for 
they  begin  again  to  see  that  the  road  they  l)ave  taken  is  not  the  right 
one ;  but  as  this  view  of  things  is  disagreeable,  they  will  for  some  time 
longer  seek  elsewhere  what  they  can  only  find  at  home." 

Still,  no  progress  was  made  towards  a  solution,  and 
in  December,  Metternich  was  startled  by  receiving  a 
despatch  telling  him  that  Alexander  had  died  at  Taganrog. 
"  In  spite  of  my  coldbloodedness,"  he  wrote,  ''  this  unex- 
pected catastrophe  has  touched  me  most  deeply."    Without 


GOVERNMENT  BY  BEPRESSION.  1G5 

hesitation  be  fixed  ujjon  the  Grand-Duke  Constantine  as 
Alexander's  successor,  and  he  proceeded  to  make  a  fore- 
cast as  to  how  he  could  mould  him.  He  recorded  the 
conclusion  at  which  he  had  arrived  in  a  letter  addressed, 
the  18th,  to  Baron  Ottenfels. 

"  His  policy  will  be  entirely  pacific.  The  bent  of  his  mind  has  two 
objects :  in  politics,  the  support  of  the  monarchical  princijilo ;  in  au 
admini^trative  point  of  view,  the  internal  ameliuration  of  the  empire. 
I  deceive  myself,  if  the  History  of  Russia  does  not  begin  where  the 
Bomance  of  Russia  ends." 

This  comparison  between  History  and  Romance  was,  it 
will  be  admitted,  I'ather  severe  on  that  Alexander  whom  the 
writer  had  kept  steadfast  to  the  league  against  Napoleon  ; 
whose  generous  impulses  he  had  ever  exerted  himself  to 
pervert ;  whom  he  had  made  his  accomplice  for  the  repres- 
sion of  the  development  of  those  asp  rations  which  dis- 
tinguish mankind  from  the  brute  creation,  and  who  had 
only  displayed  some  symptoms  of  revolt  from  the  yoke  on 
a  question  with  regard  to  which  a  Czar  of  liussia  is  forced 
to  obey  the  national  feeling.  But  it  serves  to  show  the 
chaiacter,  the  cold,  hard,  unfeeling,  selfish  character  of 
the  man.  Looking  at  him  as  he  was,  the  author  of  the 
policy  of  repression,  with  kings  as  his  accomplices  and 
peoples  as  his  victims,  we  can  see  how  he  felt  that  the 
continuance  of  his  policy  depended  on  a  continuance  of 
accomplices  of  the  same  mould ;  and,  realising,  as  he  must 
have  realised,  that  without  a  central  commanding  figure 
to  sustain  and  put  into  action  the  common  idea,  the 
system  must  collapse,  we  can  understand  how,  reviewing 
in  the  privacy  of  his  chamber  the  situation,  he  must  have 
foreseen  that  when  the  keystone  of  his  arch  should  be 
withdrawn,  the  arch,  too,  would  fall. 

But  Nicholas  succeeded,  not  Constantine.  And  thouirh 
Metternich  had  so  far  conunitted  himself  as  to  write  to 


1()6  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICH. 

the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  to  tell  him 
that  his  spirit  "  was  transported  by  the  new  era  he  saw 
commencing "  under  Constantine's  rule,  he  was  able 
nevertheless,  in  a  later  despatch,  to  express  his  pleasure 
at  "the  calmness  and  rectitude  of  principle"  displayed  by 
Nicholas. 

Shortly  after  the  accession  of  Nicholas,  and  before  any 
decisive  step  in  the  Eastern  question  had  been  taken, 
Metternich  met  Lord  Hertford.  He  was  delighted  with 
this  stern,  unbending  Tory  of  the  old  school. 

! 
"I  had  not  for    years,"   he   writes,    "met   with   so    independent, 

thoughtful,  and  clever  an  EugHshman.     His  words  were  hke  an  echo 

of  the  past." 

In  the  English  peer,  with  regard  to  his  intense  dislike 
of  (canning  and  his  hatred  for  the  very  name  of  "  reform," 
Metternich  found  an  ardent  sympathiser,  and  he  could 
not  help  recording  that  he  felt  that  Lord  Hertford 
liked  him  as  much  as  he  liked  Lord  Hertford.  Yet 
it  is  curious  to  note  how  incorrect  were  the  forecasts 
made  at  this  time  by  this  experienced  statesman  with 
reference  to  the  burning  question  of  the  d.jy,  the  ques- 
tion of  the  attitude  of  Russia  towards  Turkey  and  the 
Greek  revolt,  and  how  correct  by  comparison  were  those 
of  Canning.  In  his  despatch  to  the  Austrian  Ambassador 
in  London  dated  June  8  of  this  yej^r  (18^6),  Metternich 
once  again  expressed  his  conviction  that  Russia  regarded 
a  rupture  with  the  Torte  as  *'  a  very  disastrous  event," 
and  that  by  no  possibility  could  that  Power  desire  to  see 
the  Greeks  freed  from  their  dependence  on  Turkey.  As 
the  year  went  on,  however,  he  began  to  fear  lest  the  sway 
he  had  exercised  over  the  mind  of  Alexander  had  found 
no  place  in  the  sterner  nature  of  his  brother ;  that  "  the 
crafty   and  unscrupulous  mind  of  Mr.   Canning,"  as  he 


GOVEBNMENT  BY  BEPRESSION.  167 

describes  It,  might  exercise  an  influence  over  the  Cztir 
sufficient  to  crush  the  Holy  Alliance,  so  far  as  it  affected 
Russia.  His  alarm  on  this  subject  was  very  real.  "  If," 
he  wrote  to  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburo-, 
*'  the  Continental  courts  fall  into  the  snare  " — that  is  the 
snare  laid  by  Canning — "  the  cause  will  be  lost."  It  was 
a  terrible  moment  for  the  man  who  had  led  Alexander  as 
and  how  he  liked.  In  a  letter  to  the  Prince  of  Hessc- 
Homburg,  then  at  St.  Petersburg,  he  poured  out  the 
anguish  of  his  soul.  He  stated  that  he  was  conscious  that 
the  Czar  had  a  certain  dislike  for  himself;  that — an  I  the 
reader  will  mark  all  the  point  of  the  expression,  considerlno- 
the  relations  which  had  existed  between  the  writer  an  1  the 
late  Czar — "  till  now  he  stands  alone,  not  having  yet  found 
the  man  whom  he  could  regard  as  a  powerful  instrument 
to  perform  his  will." 

This  letter,  evidently  written  to  be  shown  to  Nicholas, 
and  which  was  probably  shown  to   him,  did  not  at  the 
moment  produce  the  desired  effect.     England,  guided  by 
Mr.  Canning,  was  bent  on  securing  the  independence  of 
Greece,  and  Russia  had,  by  her  ambassador  in  London, 
consented  to  this  course.     To  the  mind  of  Metternich  the 
acknowledgment  of  such  independence  was  to  recognise 
the   right  of  rebellion.     Against  such  a  right   he    had 
directed  the  policy  of  Continental  Europe  since  1815,  and 
he  laid   the  blame  of  deviation  from  the  sure  path  the 
Powers  had  trodden,  on  the  misleading  influence  of  that 
Power  which,  even  when   guided    by  Castlereagh,  had 
declined    to    subscribe    to    the    principles    of    the    Holy 
Alliance,  and  which  now,  directed  by  the  "faux  esprit " 
of  Canning,  was   urging  Europe  towards  "  inextricable 
complications."     We  cannot  wonder  that  when  the  year 
ended,  the  mind  of  the  Austrian  Minister  was  still  in  a 
state  of  great  perplexity. 


1G8  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICU. 

Under   the    happier   auspices   of   the   new    year   that 
perplexity  began  to  disappear.     In  February,  Metternich 
recognised  with  delight  that  the  Court  of  8t.  Petersburg 
was  inclined  to  make  approaches  to  Austria.     Although 
he  was  inclined  to  receive  them  in  the  friendliest  spirit, 
he   had  not  yet  realised  that  a  great  Power  which  had 
professed  and  acted  upon  well-detined  anti-revolutionary 
principles  in  the  face  of  Europe,  was  prepared  to  act  in  a 
sense  absolutely   contrary  when  her  own  interests  were 
involved.     Thus  it  happened  that  he  met  in  a  spirit,  not 
intended  to  be  repelling,  but  which  did  repel,  the  advances 
of  Russia.     AVhen  it  had  been  decided  to  hold  a  Con- 
ference  of  the   five  Powers  in  London,  the  instructions 
sent  by  Metternich  to  the  Austrian  Ambassador  were  thus 
directly  oj^posed  to  the  policy  which  Russia  had  resolved 
to  pursue.     So  opposed  indeed  were  they  that  they  drew 
from    the    Russian  Ambassador   a    Declaration  of   "  the 
most   lively    regret    that    the    Court    of  Austria    brings 
forward  proposals  which  differ  from  those  of  his  Imperial 
Majesty,  and  do  not  adhere  to  the  project  of  a  treaty  and 
to    the   measures   which    he    had  communicated  to   that 
Court."     The  reply  of  Metternich  to  this  rebuke  was  full 
of  dignity.     It  expressed  in  so  many  words,  his  regret 
that  Austria  could  not  be  a  party  to  a  step  which  would 
bring  the  whole  power  of  Europe  to  briug  pressure  on 
Turkey    in   an    unrighteous    cause.     In    consequence    of 
Metternich's     attitude,    neither    Austria     nor     Prussia 
acceded   to   the   Treaty   of  London   between    England, 
France  and  Russia  (July  6th,  1827),  an  alliance  which 
resulted,  three  months  later,  in  "  that  untoward  event,"  * 
the  battle  of  Navarino  and  the  consequent  destruction  of 
the   Turkish  fleet,  and,  a  little    later  still,    in   the  war 

*  The  expression  used  in  the  Speech  from  the  Throne  at  the  opening 
of  the  Session  of  18  iS. 


GOVEBNMENT  BY  BEPBESSION,  169 

between  Russia  and  Turkey  which  terminated  in  the 
treaty  of  Adrianople,  and  the  recognition  by  the  latter  of 
the  independence  of  Greece. 

Vainly  had  Metternich  tried,  and  we  are  bound  to 
render  him  the  fullest  justice  for  his  earnest  efforts  in 
this  respect,  to  save  the  Porte  from  her  impending  fate. 
Russia  had  taken  advantage  of  the  generous  desire  of 
England  to  free  the  Greeks  to  make  of  her  a  consenting 
party  to  a  deadly  blow  which  she  sought  to  deal  at  her 
ancient  enemy.  The  warnings  of  Metternich,  then, 
whilst  they  were  accepted  with  expressions  of  fervent 
gratitude  by  the  Sultan,  did  not  affect  the  result. 
Navarino,  whilst  it  pained,  did  not  surprise  Metternich. 
His  expression,  when  he  received  the  news  was :  *'  It  has 
begun  a  new  era  for  Europe." 

The  death  of  Mr.  Canning,  arid  the  accession  to  power 
of  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  gave  Metternich  some  hope 
that  the  old  cordial  relations  which  existed  between  the 
two  countries  in  the  time  of  Castlereagh  might  be 
restored,  and  he  instructed  the  Austrian  Ambassador  to 
make  advances  in  that  sense.  The  result  was  a 
temporary  understanding  between  the  two  cabinets  as  to 
the  policy  to  be  pursued  on  the  Eastern  question.  When, 
in  the  autumn  of  1829,  the  exhausted  army  of  Diebitch 
reached  Adrianople,  Austria,  acting  with  France  and 
England,  was  instrumental  in  procuring  for  the  Porte  the 
peace  which  bears  the  name  of  that  city,  and  which,  in 
the  state  of  the  Russian  army,  she  needed  not.  Well 
advised,  Turkey  might  have  extorted,  unaided,  far  better 
terms.  But  she  possessed  neither  the  moral  courage  nor 
the  man.  Europe  stood  aloof,  indifferent;  and  thus  it 
came  about,  for  the  second  time  in  history,  that,  at  a 
crisis  which  might  have  been  used  to  crush  her  herediatry 
enemy,  the  Ottoman   Empire  was,  to  use  the  emphatic 


170  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICH. 

words  of  the  Austrian  statesman,  "  shaken  to  its  founda- 
tions." 

One  result  of  the  war  betw^een  Russia  and  Turkey  had 
been  the  dissolution  of  the  triple  alliance.  There  had, 
however,  been  no  corresponding  rapprocJwment  between 
Austria  and  the  Czar.  To  obtain  such  an  understanding 
as  had  existed  prior  to  the  death  of  Alexander,  Metternich 
was  directing  his  efforts,  when  he  was  startled  by  the 
overthrow,  in  Paris,  of  the  branch  of  the  family  which  he 
had  been  twice  instrumental  in  forcing  upon  the  French 
people. 


(  I'l  ) 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL  OF  METTERNICH'S  SYSTEM 

m  EUROPE. 

1830-1848. 

The  manner  in  which  the  Revolution  of  1830  would 
affect  the  policy  of  Metternich,  and  the  stability  of  the 
Empire  whose  destinies  he  was  guiding,  would  depend, 
he  saw  at  a  glance,  on  the  use  which  the  French  people 
would  make  of  their  reconquered  freedom  of  action. 
When  it  transpired  that  they  would  be  content  with  the 
transfer,  under  certain  guarantees,  from  the  elder  to  the 
younger  branch  of  the  same  family  ;  when,  moreover,  it 
became  apparent,  as  it  did  very  soon  become  apparent, 
that  the  representative  of  the  younger  branch,  King  Louis 
Philippe,  was  disposed  to  be  conservative,  peaceful,  and, 
as  far  as  he  dared,  autocratic,  the  three  despots  of  Europe 
realised  that  it  might  yet  be  possible  to  enforce  the 
system  of  repression  which  had  been  inaugurated  on  the 
fall  of  Napoleon.  They  took  heart  accordingly,  and  each 
proceeded,  in  his  fashion,  to  crush  \he  ebullitions  which 
the  first  news  from  Paris  had  caused. 

For  the  moment  they  encountered  little  difficulty. 
Nicholas  laid  his  heavy  hand  on  Poland,  and  the  rising 
in  Poland  collapsed.  Metternich,  confronted  by  Italy, 
Germany,  and  Hungary,  had  a  task  less  easy,  because  it 


172  LIFE  OF  PRINCE  METTEBNICR. 

dealt  with  more  than  one  nationality.  But,  resting  on 
liis  prestige,  his  alliances,  and  his  power  to  employ  force, 
he  was  equal  to  the  occasion.  In  Italy,  a  rising  in 
Bologna  was  sternly  repressed  by  Austrian  troops.  In 
Germany,  in  three  kingdoms  Of  which — Bavaria,  Wiirtem- 
berg,  and  Saxony — the  desire  for  freedom  had  taken  the 
form  of  proclaiming  constitutions,  Metternich  caused  an 
enactment  to  be  passed  by  which  every  ruling  prince  of 
Germany  became  bound  to  reject  petitions  tending  to  the 
increase  of  the  power  of  the  Estates  at  the  expense  of  the 
power  of  the  sovereign.  In  Hungary,  the  aspirations  of 
whose  nobles  had  caused  him  some  trouble  prior  to  1830, 
he  succeeded  for  the  moment  in  staving  off  a  solution 
which,  nevertheless,  so  clearsighted  a  statesman  ought  to 
have  regarded  as  simply  adjourned,  but  which  he  believed, 
nevertheless,  would  never  be  brought  up  for  settlement. 
England,  indeed,  had  broken  for  ever  with  absolutism  ; 
but,  since  the  death  of  Castlereagh,  Metternich  had  never 
hoped  much  from  England.  With  a  Russia  forced  by 
events  to  recur  to  the  old  friendship  ;  a  Prussia,  and  there-  ; 
fore  a  Germany,  completely  dominated;  and  a  France  /' 
governed  by  a  pacific  Bourbon  bent  only  on  securing  the 
family  interests  ;  he  thought  he  would  yet  be  more  than  a 
match  for  the  revolutionists  who  were  raising  their  heads 
in  Italy,  and  who  had  begun  to  undermine  Hungary. 

But  the  crushing  of  the  rising  in  Bologna  did  not 
mean  the  permanent  repression  of  the  longings  of  the 
Italian  patriots,  ivlazzini,  who,  on  the  outbreak  of  ,  the 
revolution  of  1830,  had  been  arrested  and  imprisoned  on 
the  ground  that  he  was  fond  of  solitary  w^alks  by  n-ght, 
and  habitually  silent  as  to  the  subject  of  his  meditations, 
had  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  a  stronger  society  than 
that  of  the  Carbonari — a  society  w^hich  should  appeal  to 
the    natural   aspirations   of  the   Italians   for   unity  and 


DECLINE  AND  FALL  OF  HIS  SYSTEM,     173 

liberty — was  required  to  save  Italy.  When,  after  some 
interrogatories,  it  was  recognised  by  the  King  of  Sardinia, 
Charles  Felix,  that  proof  of  absolute  crime  was  absolutely 
M'anting,  that  monarch,  still  regarding  him  as  dangerous, 
gave  him  the  choice  of  remaining  under  surveillance 
in  Italy,  or  of  exile.  Mazzini  chose  the  latter  ;  pro- 
ceeded by  way  of  Geneva  to  Lyons,  where  he  published 
his  first  work  picturing  the  rising  of  Romagna,  called 
"  The  Night  of  Rimini "  ;  thence,  after  a  short  sojourn 
in  Corsica,  to  IMarseilles.  Here,  in  the  early  days  of 
1832,  his  prison  tlioughts  found  expression  in  the  founding 
of  the  "  Society  of  Young  Italy.''  The  avowed  purpose 
of  this  society  was  to  make  Italy  free,  united,  and 
republican.  These  aims  were  avowed  and  preached  in 
a  journal  called  after  the  name  of  the  society,  '*  Giovine 
Italia." 

The  character  of  the  founder,  the  principles  which 
appealed  to  the  reason  and  passions  of  a  highly-gifted 
people,  kept  in  a  state  of  bondage  by  foreign  bayonets, 
soon  obtained  for  the  Society  a  vast  number  of  adherents  : 
amongst  them,  some  of  the  noblest  of  the  sons  of  Italy. 
As  naturally,  the  same  causes  brought  to  the  front  a  number 
of  powerful  enemies.  Prominent  amongst  these — the  first, 
in  liict,  to  take  action — was  the  sovereign  who  owed  his 
throne  to  a  revolution,  Louis  Philippe  of  France.  The 
publication  of  the  paper  was  prohibited,  its  immbers  were 
confiscated  when  they  ap})eared,  and  finally  Mazzini  and  his 
friends  had  to  quit  Marseilles  and  find  a  refuge  in  free 
Switzerland.  Establishing  himself  at  Lugano,  there,  on 
the  very  borders  of  Italy,  Mazzini  received  the  fugitives 
from  the  tyranny  which  overshadowed  his  native  land. 
Thence  in  February  1834,  the  patriots  marched  to  strike  a 
blow  for  freedom.  The  blow  failed,  and  Mazzini  was  forced 
to  flee,  first  to  Paris ;  thence,  a  little  later,  to  London. 


174  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICH, 

Metternich  had  been  neither  bhnd  nor  indifferent  to, 
nor  had  he  underrated  the  importance  of,  Mazzini's 
movement.  The  publication  of  Giovine  Italia  ;  the  lofty 
sentiments  it  inspired;  the  ability  with  which  it  was 
conducted ;  had  roused  the  quick  suspicions  of  his  sensi- 
tive mind.  Early  in  1834  he  had  written  to  his  principal 
agent  in  Northern  Italy  to  w^arn  him  of  the  new  danger, 
and  especially  of  its  author.  Nor  when,  a  year  later,  the 
expedition  from  Lugano  failed,  did  the  astute  Austrian 
statesman  consider  the  danger  at  an  end.  He  had 
Mazzini  tracked  to  his  halting-place  in  Paris,  and  thence 
to  his  lair  in  London.  There  his  every  movement  w^as 
watched,  and  thence  copies  of  all  his  publications  were 
carefully  despatched  to  Vienna.  The  task  of  reading 
these  was  a  long  one,  for,  despite  of  an  occasional  inter- 
ference with  his  correspondence  and  his  privacy,  Mazzini 
stayed  in  London  till  the  overthrow  of  the  throne  of  the 
barricades  indicated  to  the  oppressed  peoples  of  Europe 
the  road  to  unity  and  freedom. 

But  Metternich  had  on  his  hands  at  the  earlier  stage  of 
this  epoch  other  matters  at  least  as  serious  as  the  movements 
and  action  of  Mazzini.     These  I  shall  briefly  indicate. 

No  portion  of  the  territories  which  acknowledged  the 
sway  of  the  House  of  Habsburg  had  made  more  sacrifices 
for  that  House  than  Hungary.  She  had  saved  the 
monarchy  of  Maria  Theresa :  she  had  poured  out  her 
blood  like  water  to  resist  Napoleon.  Hungary  possessed 
a  Constitution,  under  the  operation  of  which  the  laws  were 
administered  by  means  of  county  assemblies,  empowered 
to  raise  ta-xes  and  levy  soldiers ;  to  refuse  obedience  to  all 
orders  save  those  which  bore  the  stamp  of  legality. 
Those  assemblies  had  no  power,  however,  to  alter  the  laws. 
This  power  devolved  on  the  Diet,  composed  of  representa- 
tives from  the  several  counties.     The  maintenance  of  this 


DECLINE  AND  FALL  OF  HIS  SYSTEM.     175 

Constitution  formed  part  of  the  contract  by  virtue  of  which 
the  sovereignty  over  Hungary  had  devolved  on  the  House 
of  Habsburg. 

In  the  hour  of  Austria's  need,  when  Francis,  on  the 
instigation  of  his  Minister,  had  resolved  to  strike  the 
blow  which  should  be  fatal  to  his  son-in-law,  he  had 
convened  the  Hungarian  Diet.  But  from  1813  to  1825, 
the  Minister  who  governed  in  his  name  had  not  once  called 
it  together.  Having,  however,  been  baffled,  in  1823,  in 
an  attempt  to  raise  taxes  unauthorised  by  any  law  passed 
by  the  Diet,  Metternich,  wanting  money,  was  constrained 
to  convene  it  in  1825.  This  Diet  witnessed  the  forma- 
tion of  the  constitutional  opposition,  destined,  in  later 
years,  to  achieve  so  great  results.  The  leader  of  this 
movement  was  Count  Stephen  Szcchenyi,  a  member  of 
one  of  the  great  fomilies  of  Hungary,  and  one  who 
lamented  the  system,  introduced  by  Metternich,  of 
attracting  the  great  nobles  of  Hungary  to  Vienna,  with 
the  view  to  divert  into  other  channels  aspirations  naturally 
Hungarian.  Szechenyi's  main  object  was  to  restore  tlie 
use  of  the  Magyar  language,  and  to  revivify  Hungarian 
social  life.  On  both  these  points  Metternich  opposed 
him,  and  for  the  moment  the  schemes  of  the  patriot 
Hungarian,  though  pushed  with  a  vigour  and  self-sacrifice 
rarely  surpassed,  did  not  ripen. 

Again,  in  1830,  was  the  Diet  summoned,  representing 
alike  Hungary  and  Transylvania.  The  first  demand 
made  by  the  Government  was  one  to  which  no  opposition 
was  anticipated.  It  was  simply  a  demand  for  new 
recruits  for  the  army.  But  the  revolution  of  July  had 
taken  place  :  new  aspirations  had  seized  the  imaginations 
of  thoughtful  n.en  in  the  two  countries,  and  much  opposi- 
tion was  raised  to  the  measure.  Again  were  the 
questions  of  the  use  of  the  Magyar  language,  and  the 


176  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICH. 

employment  of  Hungarian  officers  with  Hungarian 
soldiers  strongly  urged,  but  the  Diet  was  dissolved 
(December,  1830)  before  any  definite  resolution  had  been 
arrived  at. 

Again  was  it  called  together  in  December,  1832.  This 
time  the  Austrian  Government  and  the  advocates  of  the 
rights  of  the  peasants,  represented  by  Francis  Deak,  were 
found  on  the  one  side,  the  nobles  and  privileged  classes  on 
the  other.  Whilst  the  discussions  on  this  subject  were  still 
proceeding,  the  Emperor  Francis  died  (2nd  March, 
1832).  His  son,  Ferdinand,*  who  succeeded  him,  though 
a  prince  of  weak  intellect,  was  good-natured  and  kind- 
hearted,  and  he  insisted  that  some  concessions  should  be 
made  to  the  popular  demands.  Metternich  made  them 
accordingly,  but  so  grudgingly  that  the  effect  which 
might  have  otherwise  been  expected  from  them  was  sadly 
marred.  It  was  in  this  Diet  that  Kossuth  took  the  lead 
as  a  supporter  of  the  popular  feelings. 

During  the  next  three  years  Metternich  made  serious 
attempts  to  allay  the  growing  feeling  against  Austrian 
predominance  in  Hungary.  Full  of  hope  that  he  had 
attained  this  end,  he  summoned  a  new  Diet  in  June, 
1839.  To  test  its  loyalty  he  at  once  demanded  a 
contribution  of  four  million  florins  and  38,000  recruits. 
But,  like  our  own  Charles  I.,  he  found  the  popular 
leaders  still  determined  to  harp  on  the  old  theme. 
Before  the  Diet  had  been  summoned  he  had  caused  the 
most  eminent  of  them,  Kossuth,  Wesselenyi,  and  others,  to 

*  Ferdinand,  eldest  son  of  Francis  by  liis  second  wife,  Maria 
Theresa,  daughter  of  the  King  of  the  Two  Sicilies,  was  born  in  1793. 
From  his  childhood  lie  was  weak  and  delicate,  and  his  education  was 
shamefully  neglected.  The  very  day  his  mother  died,  the  tutor  in 
charge  of  him  was  dismissed ;  the  successor  was  subject  to  a  mental 
malady  which  rendered  him  incapable  as  an  instructor;  the  third  and 
fourth  were  bettei',  but  the  change  came  too  late. 


DECLINE  AND  FALL  OF  EIS  SYSTEM.     Ill 

be  placed  under  arrest.  The  Diet  refused  to  discu,-s  any 
proposition  of  the  Government  until  those  members  should 
be  released.  Metternich  had  to  give  way,  alike  on  that 
point  and  on  another  with  respect  to  the  peasants'  dues 
which  he  had  caused  the  Emperor  to  impose  in  1836. 
The  demands  of  the  Government  were  then  granted,  but 
the  check  which  Metternich  had  received  was  severe,  and 
foreboded  ill  for  the  future.  The  Diet  did  not  separate 
until  the  question  regarding  the  Hungarian  language 
had  been  practically  settled  in  favour  of  the  Magyars. 

In  the  Diet  which  sat  in  1843-4  these  concessions 
were  confirmed  and  enlarged.  The  capability  of  possess- 
ing land  and  of  holding  offices  was  extended  to  classes 
not  born  in  the  ranks  of  the  nobility,  and  by  a  new 
language-law  the  predominance  of  the  Magyars  was 
definitely  established.  The  year  1847,  in  fact,  witnessed 
the  till  then  unheard-of  circumstance  of- the  Emperor- 
King  opening  its  proceedings  by  a  speech  in  the  Magyar 
tongue.  When,  however,  the  Government  brought 
forward  its  propositions  regarding  various  important 
reforms,  the  Opposition,  led  by  Kossuth,  demanded  the 
prior  consideration  of  the  freedom  of  the  Press,  the 
nomination  of  a  responsible  ministry,  the  union  of 
Transylvania  with  Hungary,  the  equal  imposition  of 
taxes,  equality  before  the  law,  reform  of  the  law  enforcing 
compulsory  labour  on  the  peasant,  and  the  question  of 
triennial  elections.  These  questions  were  being  debated 
when  the  revolution  of  February,  1848,  broke  out  in 
Paris. 

The  attitude  of  Metternich  in  the  presence  of  de- 
mands made  by  the  other  nationalities  of  the  Empire 
for  reform,  following  one  another  in  rapid  succession, 
had  been  that  of  a  temporiser  who  thinks  that  by 
skilful  manoeuvring,  he  can,  in  time,  defeat,  by  causing 

N 


178  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICH. 

disunion   among,  his    adversaries.     In   Hungary  he  did 
not   dare   to   play  the   game  with   the   hard,  repressive 
measures   which  he   had   no   hesitition   in  enforcing  in 
Germany  and  in  Italy.     The  Hungarian  Constitution  was 
a  contract  the  validity  of  which  had  been  recognised  by 
the  Habsburgs  even  when  they  had  infringed  its  pro- 
visions.    In  thot  country,  then,  there  wns  a  point  beyond 
which  his  opposition  to  peculiar  demands,  energetically 
urged,   could  not  go.     Although,   then,   no    one   better 
than  he  understood  the  underhand  means,  well-known  to 
tyrants,  the  methods  of  seduction,  of  dividing  by  sowing 
suspicion  in  the   ranks  of  one's  adversaries,  yet,  in  his 
dealings  with  Hungary,  he   not  only  disdained  to  have 
recourse  to  those  methods,  but,  either   from  over-confi- 
dence in  his  own  position,  or  because  he  had  found  that 
yielding   always   incited  fresh  demands,  he   acted   in   a 
manner   which    united  against  him  all   the  elements   of 
opposition.     He   even   went   so   far   as   to   infringe  the 
Constitution    by    directing    Count    Apponyi,    whom    he 
had   made    Chancellor    of    Hungary    in    succession    to 
the  popular  Count  Mailath — removed  for  the  purpose — 
to   supersede  the  County  Assemblies  by  administrators 
appointed  by  himself.     By  this  action,  and  by  obstinately 
refusing  to  concede,  even  slightly,  to  the  demands  of  the 
Diet  of  1847,  he  prepared  the  way  for  that  outburst  of 
national  feeling  which  obeyed  the  signal  to  Europe  given 
by  the  mob  of  Paris  in  February  of  the  following  year. 

But  if  Metternich  made  for  himself  difficulties  in 
Hungary,  others  were  being  prepared  for  him  in  Italy, 
and  even  in  Germany.  In  the  former  country,  for  some 
years  after  the  expulsion  of  Mazzini,  the  surface  had 
been  calm.  Only  the  surface,  however.  The  seeds  dis- 
persed all  over  Europe  by  Mazzini  from  his  sanctuary  in 
London  were  taking  root  everywhere,  and  in  many  places 


DECLINE  AND  FALL  OF  HIS  SYSTEM,     179 

the  hardy  stalk  was  forang  its  way  upwards.     In  1844,  a 
rising  had  been  concerted  in  Calabria.     The  plans  were 
well  considered,  and  it  is  possible,   even   probable,   that 
they  might  have  succeeded,  had  not  Sir  James  Graham, 
the      Postmaster-General     of    Great     Britain,     opened 
Mazzini's  letters  and  communicated  their  contents  to  the 
Austrians.     The  executors  of  the  plot,  then,  marched  into 
a  trap,  and  paid  the  penalty  with    their   lives.     For   a 
moment  the   surface    became   again    calm.     Two   years 
later,  however,  the  seizure  of  Cracow  by  the   democratic 
party  in  Poland,  spread  hope  anew.     But  when  Metter- 
nich    replied  to  this  demonstration    by  boldly   annexino- 
Cracow  to  Austria,  the  under-swell,  which  had   not  then 
in  Italy  broken  the  surface,  subsided.     The  calm,  how- 
ever, lasted  but  for  a  moment.     An  event  occurred  just 
afterwards  in   the  canton  of  Ticino   which    proved    the 
little  cloud  which  was  to  increase  and  burst  forth  into 
storm. 

The  cause  did  not  seem  at  the  outset  to  be  one  of  those 
which  bring  about  great  convulsions.  In  the  early  part 
of  184G,  Ticino,  a  canton  of  Switzerland,  on  the  Italiau 
slope  of  the  Alps,  had  asked  Charles- Albert,  Kino-  o 
Sardinia,  to  allow  it  to  transmit  the  salt  it  manufactured 
through  Piedmont.  It  happened  that  a  predecessor  of 
Charles-Albert  had  made  with  Austria,  in  1751,  a  treaty 
whereby,  in  consideration  of  Austria  granting  to  Piedmont 
the  privilege  of  sending  through  Lombardy  the  salt  it 
was  selling  to  Yenice,  the  latter  agreed  to  renounce  his 
trade  with  the  Swiss  cantons.  .  To  grant  the  request  of 
Ticino  would,  then,  be  to  infringe,  technically,  the  treaty 
of  1751.     Nevertheless,  Charles-Albert  did  grant  it. 

The  information  of  this  action  on  the  part  of  Charles- 
Albert  roused  Metternich  to  a  white  heat.  Of  all  the 
cantons  of  Switzerland  Ticino  was  the  most  hated.     It 

N  2 


180  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  31ETTEBNICE. 

was  Ticino  which  had  been  the  abode  of,  which  had 
given  refuge  to,  Mazzini  and  his  band.  It  was  from 
Ticino  that  they  had  made  their  abortive  attempt  on 
Italy ;  and  now,  Charles- Albert,  himself  always  under 
suspicion,  and  something  more  than  suspicion,  of 
cherishing  designs  little  compatible  with  the  predominance 
of  Austria  in  Italy,  had  conferred  a  favour  on  Ticino. 
Metternich  acted  with  his  accustomed  decision  and  vigour. 
He  declared  to  Charles- Albert  that  Austria  regarded  the 
treaty  of  1751  as  violated.  A  few  days  later,  he  retaliated 
by  increasing  the  custom  duty  on  wines  sent  from 
Piedmont  to  Lombardy,  taking  special  care  at  the  same 
time  to  inform  him  that  this  change  would  apply  only  to 
Piedmont,  and  to  none  of  the  other  States  of  Italy. 
(Jharles-Albert  retorted  by  lowering  the  wine  duties 
between  Piedmont  and  France,  and  when  the  Austrian 
ambassador,  alarmed  at  this  act,  offered  to  recall  his 
Government's  action  if  Charles-Albert  would  withdraw 
the  concession  to  Ticino,  the  latter  absolutely  refused. 
Not  only  did  he  refuse,  but  recognising  tacitly  the  posi- 
tion which  had  been  assigned  to  him  by  the  truest  lovers 
of  Italian  unity,  he  began  to  take  measures  to  prepare  for 
an  event  which,  in  the  excited  condition  of  feeling  in 
Italy,  might  at  any  moment  be  precipitated. 

The  feeling  that  Charles-Albert  might  be  depended 
upon  was  gradually  making  its  way  through  Italy, 
especially  in  the  Papal  States,  when  Pope  Gregory  XVI. 
died  (June  1st,  1846).  Fifteen  days  later,  mainly 
through  the  influence  of  the  reforming  party  to  which  he 
was  supposed  to  belong,  Giovanni  Mastai  Ferretti  was 
elected  his  successor.  The  new  Pope,  who  took  the 
name  of  Pius  JX.,  began  his  papal  career  by  issuing  a 
general  amnesty  to  those  condemned  for  political  offences. 
By  this  act,  though  it  was  hedged  with  conditions ;  and 


DECLINE  AND  FALL  OF  HIS  SYSTE31     181 

by  the  support  accorded  to  him  by  men  who  greatly 
influenced  the  minds  of  young  Italy;  Pius  IX.,  a  few 
months  after  his  installation,  found  himself  regarded 
throughout  the  peninsula  as  the  national  hero.  This,  too, 
in  spite  of  one  or  two  attempts  he  made  to  restrict  the 
operation  of  the  favours  he  had  granted.  Even  in  Milan, 
the  headquarters  of  the  Austrlans,  hymns  to  Pio  Nono 
were  sung  at  the  theatre,  whilst  the  Viceroy  and  his 
family  were  received  there  in  silence.* 

Metternich  had  fairly  taken  the  alarm.  Whether  he 
instigated,  or  was  aware  of,  or  sympathised  with,  a  con- 
spiracy which  was  organised  by  the  Austrian  party  in 
Kome  to  get  rid  of  Pio  Nono  on  the  occasion  of  a 
popular  demonstration  which  took  place,  and  was  foiled, 
on  the  anniversary  of  the  amnesty  of  1816,  may,  indeed, 
never  be  known.  But  the  idea  of  a  revolutionary  Popef 
— and  to  him  reform  and  revolution  were  synonymous — 
was  an  abomination.  His  reply  to  the  Papal  concessions 
was  the  occupation  of  Ferrara  by  Austrian  troops.  This 
action  roused  a  bitter  cry  throughout  Italy.  It  quad- 
rupled, and  more  than  quadrupled,  the  hatred  against 
Austria.  The  impression  spread  rapidly  that  the  time 
had  arrived  when  the  Pope  and  the  King  of  Sardinia 
must  combine  to  expel  the  hated  foreigner.  Before,  how- 
ever, any  movement  could  be  inaugurated.  Lord  Palmer- 
ston,  who  was  then  wisely  directing  the  foreign  policy  of 
England,  had  sent  Lord  Minto  to  Italy  to  encourage  the 
various  princes  to  stand  firm  to  the  cause  of  reform, 
whilst  he  had  urged  upon  Metternich  the  necessity 
of  evacuating  Ferrara.  Most  unwillingly  did  the 
Austrian  Minister  consent,  but  he  did  yield  to  necessity, 

*  Maurice's  Revolutions  of  1848-9  in  Italy,  in  which  those 
occurrences  are  detailed  at  far  greater  length  than  I  am  able  to  devote 
to  them. 


182  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICH. 

and  in  December,  1847,  the  Imperial  troops  evacuated 
Ferrara. 

But  this  was  not   the   only  blow   dealt   to   the   anti- 
revolutionary  policy  of  Metternich  at  this  period.     He 
was  to  experience  the  truth  of  the  saying  that  the  worst 
foes  a  man  can  have  are  those  of  his  own  household.     If 
he   could   have   trusted   any   one,   it   would   have   been 
the  Austrian  prince  who  ruled  in  Tuscany.     But  not  only 
did  Leopold  of  Habsburg,  who  reigned  at  Florence,  refuse 
the  urgent  demand  of  Metternich  to  dispense   with  the 
services  of  his   Liberal  councillor,  Cosimo  Ridolfi,  but, 
as  time  went  on,  he  showed  an  increasing  sympathy  with 
many  of  the  objects  of  the  reformers.     Soon  a  crisis  arose 
which  tried  to  the   utmost  the  patience  of  the  nations. 
Under  pressure,  put  upon  him  by  his  subjects,  a  pressure 
which   he   had   provoked   by  his   unwisdom,   the   Duke 
of  Lucca  had  taken  advantage  of  a  clause  in  the  treaty  of 
Vienna  to  resign  his  territories  to  Leopold  of  Tuscany. 
The  same  clause  which  enabled  Leopold  to  accept  the 
transfer  necessitated  the  surrender  by  him  of  the  district 
of  Fivizzano  to  the  Duke  of  Modena.     The  people  of 
that   district  refused  to   be  transferred ;  whereopon  the 
Duke,    summoning   to   his   aid   the   troops   of   Marshal 
Radetzky,   marched   into   the    town    of    Fivizzano   and 
massacred  the  inhabitants.     Troops  of  the  same  nation 
shortly  afterwards    occupied    Parma,  and  although    the 
Duke  of  Modena  was  forced  to  yield  his  pretensions  to 
the  towns  of  Pontremoli  and  Bagnone,  the  transaction 
reofardins:    Fivizzano    and    the   action    of    the    Austrian 
troops   still   more   embittered    the   Italians   against   the 
foreigner. 

Matters  were  not  progressing  more  favourably  for 
Metternich  in  the  south  of  Italy.  The  ride  of  the  Bourbon 
prince,  who  ruled  at  Naples  under  the  title  of  Ferdinand 


DECLINE  AND  FALL  OF  HIS  SYSTEM.     183 

IT.,  but  who  is  better  known  as  King  Bomba,  had  been 
characterised  by  a  tyranny  of  the  worst  description.  His 
subjects  had  shown  their  sense  of  its  harshness  by 
spasmodic  outbreaks.  They  had  risen  at  Aquila  in  1841 ; 
at  Cosenza  in  1844 ;  and,  as  I  have  previously  recorded, 
at  Calabria,  in  July  of  the  same  year.  In  every  instance 
the  insurgents  had  been  suppressed,  and  the  scaffold  and 
the  prisons  had  restored  momentary  order.  But  the 
S])irit  which  inspired  those  outbreaks  defied  the  tyranny 
of  the  monarch,  and,  as  the  repression  of  all  that  makes 
life  valuable  to  a  man  became  more  severe,  the  resolution 
to  buy  freedom  at  whatever  cost  became  more  fixed. 
This  resolution  developed  into  action  at  Messina,  the  1st 
September,  1847. 

The  rising  at  Messina  was  repressed,  and,  as  usual,  its 
repression  was  sealed  with  blood.  But  failure  had  not 
deprived  the  Italian  and  Sicilian  wooers  of  freedom 
of  their  courage.  Naples  rose,  Palermo  rose,  Ferdinand 
was  driven  from  every  place  in  Sicily  except  the  castle  of 
Messina,  and  he  was  forced,  2i?th  January,  to  grant 
a  C(mstitution  to  Naples.  The  granting  of  this  Constitu- 
tion, poor  as  it  was,  produced  a  marked  effect  on  the 
spirit  and  the  proceedings  of  the  reformers  in  Rome  and 
in  Northern  Italy.  In  the  former,  the  Pope,  who  had 
already  issued  a  decree  assuring  separate  and  independent 
responsibility  to  each  of  his  ministers,  now  promised 
a  secular  ministry  and  an  increase  of  the  army.  In 
Lombardy  the  patriotic  feeling  it  evoked  caused  the 
Archduke  Rainier  and  his  councillors  to  invoke  the  earnest 
attention  of  Marshal  Radetzky.  A  little  later,  and 
Radetzky  established  martial  law  in  Milan.  In  Turin, 
Charles- Albert  was  compelled,  though  with  great  reluct- 
ance, to  gi'ant  a  Statuto,  which  had  the  form,  though  at 
first   not   the  substance,  of  a  Constitution.     In  Venice, 


184  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICH. 

Daniel  Manin  called  upon  the  Venetian  congregation  to 
demand  a  real  representation. 

All  this  time  Metternich  had  been,  as  usual,  endeavouring 
to  devise  schemes  whereby  the  popular  feeling  might  be* 
repressed.  At  first  he  had  sent  a  confidential  agent 
to  strengthen  the  hands  of  Rainier  in  Lorabardy.  The 
agent  had  succeeded  no  better  than  the  Archduke, 
and  both  had  agreed  to  invoke  the  armed  aid  of  Radetzky. 
That  might  suffice  for  Lombardy.  But  Sicily  was  lost: 
Rome,  Tuscany,  Piedmont,  had  accepted  the  constitutional 
principle ;  Venice  had  joined  in  the  cry  for  freedom ; 
Hungary,  we  have  seen,  had  wrung  from  him  many 
concessions.  Everywhere,  in  those  regions,  except  in 
Lombardy  kept  down  by  force  of  arms,  the  cause  of 
absolutism  seemed  lost.  Nor,  whilst  it  was  gliding  from 
his  practised  hand  in  the  countries  more  immediately 
under  his  own  domination,  had  it  prospered  elsewhere.  In 
Switzerland  he  had  supported  the  reactionary  adherents 
of  the  Sonderbund  and  had  been  forced  to  witness  their 
humiliating  defeat.*  With  respect  to  Denmark,  the  King 
of  which  country  had  issued  a  proclamation  declaring  that 
all  the  provinces  under  his  Crown  formed  one  sole 
and  the  same  State,  he  had  been  placed  in  this  dilemma  : 
that  if  he  opposed  the  King,  and  asserted  the  claims 
of  Holstein,  he  would  serve  the  national  party ;  if  he  were 
to  support  him,  he  would  infringe  the  Treaty  of  Vienna. 
Nor,  with  respect  to  Germany,  were  the  prospects  at  all 
reassuring.  Frederick  William  III.,  King  of  Prussia,  his 
ally  against  Napoleon,  had  died  in  1840.     His  successor 

*  Lord  Palmerston  announced  to  the  French  Government,  when 
Guizot  was  he^iitating  whether  he  should,  or  should  not,  throw  the 
influence  of  France  on  the  side  of  the  Sonderbund,  that  any 
demonstration  in  its  favour  would  be  met  by  a  counter-demonstration 
on  the  part  of  England. 


DECLINE  AND  FALL  OF  HIS  SYSTEM.     185 

Frederick  William  IV.,  began  his  reign  by  according 
an  amnesty  to  political  offenders,  by  giving  a  certain 
amount  of  liberty  to  the  press,  and  by  granting  extended 
powers  to  the  Provincial  Estates.  These  acts  were 
accomplished  in  opposition  to  the  warnings  of  the  Austrian 
Minister  who  had  guided  the  policy  of  his  father.  The 
King  did  not  indeed  proceed  so  far  as  to  redeem  the 
promise  made  by  his  father  in  1813-14,  and  broken  on  the 
morrow  of  Kapoleon's  downfall — the  promise  to  grant  his 
people  a  Constitution.  He  excused  himself  on  the  ground 
that  a  written  Constitution  indicated  want  of  confidence. 
He  expressed  himself  clearly  on  this  point,  when,  in 
January,  1847,  he  summoned  to  Berlin  the  representa- 
tives of  all  the  Provincial  Estates  to  discuss  affairs.  ''  1 
do  not  wish,"  said  he,  "  that  a  piece  of  parchment  should 
come  between  me  and  my  subjects."  Even  this  action, 
which  was  not  intended  to  carry  much  weight,  was 
regarded  by  Metternich  as  the  insertion  of  the  thin  end 
of  the  wedge,  and  he  regarded  it  as  fraught  with  evil 
consequences. 

But  if  Metternich  looked  upon  the  small  concessions  of 
the  King  of  Prussia  with  apprehension,  with  far  greater 
indignation  did  he  view  the  movements  in  those  Germanic 
States  which  had  been,  as  he  thought,  completely  brought 
under  his  influence  by  the  decrees  of  Carlsbad  and  the 
Conferences  of  Teplitz  and  Laibach.  Twice  had  he 
crushed  the  national  aspirations  in  Baden  ;  once,  very 
decisively,  in  Bavaria  and  Wiirtemberg.  But  in  1845 
there  had  arisen  in  Baden  a  movement,  which,  though  he 
imprisoned  its  author,  he  could  not  suppress.  In  the 
beginning  of  1848  the  Liberals  of  that  Grand  Duchy  were 
ready  to  place  themselves  at  the  head  of  a  movement  for 
the  unity  of  Germany.  In  Wiirtemberg,  the  progress  had 
been  made   more   gradual ;  but  even  there,  it  had  far 


186  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  3IETTEBNICH. 

passed  beyond  the  limits  allowed  by  Metternich,  for  in 
1847  the  King  had  placed  a  Liberal  Ministry  in  power, 
and  that  Ministry  had  summoned  a  representative 
chamber.  In  Bavaria,  at  the  same  time,  the  Liberals 
had  forced  the  King,  the  lover  of  Lola  Montez,  to 
abdicate.  His  son,  Maximilian,  confirmed  the  decree 
wrung  from  his  father  to  summon  a  parliament.  In  Hesse 
Cassel,  in  Hesse  Darmstadt,  and  in  Nassau,  Liberal 
decrees  were  wrung  from  half-willing,  often  unwilling, 
rulers,  and  the  system  of  Metternich  seemed  everywhere 
tottering  to  its  fall. 

Contemporaneous  with  these  events  came  the  shock,  the 
electric  shock,  of  the  revolution  in  Paris.  That  revolution 
decided  the  Liberals  of  Saxony,  and  drastic  reforms  were 
conceded  by  the  helpless  king.  In  Vienna,  the  arrival  of 
the  news  was  speedily  followed  by  the  posting  of  placards 
announcing  the  approaching  downfall  of  Metternich.  For 
the  first  time  in  the  crisis  of  revolution  through  which  he 
had  been  passing  the  Austrian  autocrat  was  really  alarmed. 
For  the  first  time  in  his  life  he  began  to  admit  the  necessity 
of  making  concessions  to  the  spirit  of  reform.  But  he  did 
nothing.  He  still  hoped  that  the  crisis  might  be  tided 
over.  Vienna  would  not  move  unless  the  impulsion  should 
come  from  without,  and,  taking  a  survey  of  Germany,  he 
did  not  see  whence  it  should  come.  Like  Napoleon  in 
1813,  he  trusted  to  time  to  dissolve  the  alliance  against 
him. 

But,  though  he  had  scanned  Germany,  and  had  even 
glanced  at  Italy,  he  had  omitted  to  take  Hungary  into  his 
calculations,  and  it  was  from  Hungary  that  the  blow  came 
which  was  to  strike  him  dow^n.  The  most  recent  action 
of  Metternich  towards  Hungary,  spoken  of  in  a  previous 
page,  had  convinced  Kossuth  that  there  could  be  no  peace 
with    such   a    man.     As   Metternich    had    felt   towards 


DECLINE  AND  FALL  OF  HIS  SYSTEM.     187 

Napoleon  in  1813-15,  so  Kossuth  felt  regarding  Metter- 
nich  in  1848.  On  the  3rd  of  March  the  Hungarian 
leader  made  a  speech  in  the  Pressburg  assembly,  pointino- 
out  in  glowing  terms  the  hindrances  which  had  prevented 
a  constitutional  union  between  the  two  countries ;  de- 
claring that  the  freedom  of  any  part  of  the  Empire  could 
only  be  assured  by  working  for  the  freedom  of  the  whole, 
and  urging  that  an  address  should  be  submitted  to  the 
Emperor  embodying  the  reforms  actually  essential.  The 
circulation  of  this  speech  in  Vienna  caused  the  greatest 
excitement,  and  a  certain  professor,  Dr.  Lohner,  at  a  meet- 
ing of  the  Reading  and  Debating  Society  of  the  University 
of  that  city,  proposed  that  negotiations  on  the  subject 
should  be  opened  with  the  Estates  of  Lower  Austria^ — 
then  about  to  sit  in  Vienuci.  This  proposal  was  not 
adopted.  In  place  of  it,  a  petition  for  moderate  reform 
received  the  approval  of  the  Professors.  The  students, 
bolder  and  more  enthusiastic,  took  their  stand  on  a  pro- 
gramme far  more  advanced,  but  in  itself  just  and  moderate. 
Still  jMettcrnich  under-rated  the  danger.  Still  he 
showed  himself  opposed  to  such  concession  as  would  have 
calmed  the  rising  feehng.  Still  he  calculated  that  time 
was  with  him.  Time  was  not  with  him.  Every  post 
brought  news  showing  that  the  desire  for  the  unity  of 
Germany  was  universal ;  that  the  committees  of  the  several 
States  of  Germany  had  summoned  a  Constituent  Assembly 
to  meet  at  Frankfort  to  ensure  that  unity.  This  news  so 
greatly  encouraged  the  reformers  that  even  the  Professors 
resolved  to  take  the  advanced  step  of  adding  to  their  pro- 
gramme a  clause  demanding  the  removal  of  Metternich. 
They  presented  their  petition  to  the  Emperor  Ferdinand 
on  the  12th  of  March.  The  Emperor  received  them 
coldly,  and  curtly  replied  that  he  would  consider  the 
matter.     With  this  reply  the  Professors  returned  to  the 


188  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICE. 

students,  whom  they  had  begged  to  await  the  result  of 
their  action.  The  students  heard  the  result  with  a  laugh 
of  defiance,  and  resolved  to  act  for  themselves  on  the 
morrow. 

Accordingly,  on  the  13th,  they  gathered  in  great 
numbers  in  the  large  hall  of  the  University,  and  marched 
thence,  in  serried  ranks,  to  the  Landhaus — the  meeting- 
place  that  day  of  the  Estates  of  Lower  Austria.  As  they 
marched  on,  their  numbers  increased  rapidly.  The 
people  were  evidently  with  them.  At  length  they  arrived 
in  front  of  the  Landhaus.  The  Estates  within  its  walls 
were  sitting,  awaiting  the  prescribed  hour  to  begin  dis- 
cussion. Whilst  many  of  them  were  urging  their  Presi- 
dent to  waive  ceremony  and  to  begin  at  once,  and  the 
President  was  stating  his  reasons  for  refusing,  a  confused 
murmur  of  voices  was  heard  outside  ;  a  few  minutes  later 
the  door  was  burst  open,  and  the  students  rushed  in. 
After  some  discussion  it  was  agreed  that  a  deputation  of 
twelve  of  the  students  should  be  present  at  the  debates 
which  were  about  to  begin,  and  the  crowd  withdrew  to 
elect  these  delegates.  In  their  absence  the  Estates  rapidly 
ao-reed  upon  the  petition  which  they  would  pn  sent  to  the 
Emperor,  and  their  spokesman  went  out  to  read  it  to  the 
crowd.  Its  demands  were  so  totally  inadequate  that  the 
crowd  rejected  it  with  indignation  ;  and,  further  roused 
by  the  reading  of  Kossuth's  great  speech,  forced  their  way 
once  more  into  the  Landhaus,  and  insisted  that  the  terms 
of  it  should  be  enlarged.  Finally  the  President  set  off 
with  the  petition,  and  the  crowd,  now  reinforced  by  many 
who  had  come  on  hearing  that  the  soldiers  were  marching 
to  attack  the  students,  pressed  on  and  forced  their  way 
within  the  city  walls. 

Meanwhile,    Metternich   was   in    the    castle,   bent   on 
resistance.     He  who  had  hated  revolution,  who  had  spent 


DECLINE  AND  FALL  OF  HIS  SYSTEM.     189 

the  best  years  of  his  life  in  reading-,  in  order  to  overthrow 
him,  the  character  of  the  man  who,  in  his  eyes,  was  the 
Incarnation  of  the  Revolution,  was  now  face  to  face  with 
the  Revolution  itself.  Not  for  an  instant  did  he  flinch. 
His  proud  face  was  as  proud,  as  calm,  as  unruffled,  as 
when  it  had  looked  at  Dresden  in  1813,  with  the 
assurance  of  coming  triumph,  on  the  features  of  Napoleon. 
Not  a  single  point  would  he  yield.  Vainly  did  the 
President  of  the  Estates,  warning  him  of  the  danger 
outside,  entreat  him  to  comply  with  the  request  of  which 
he  was  the  bearer.  Noticing  in  the  attitude  and 
language  of  the  commandant  of  the  castle,  Count  Latour, 
some  signs  of  hesitation,  Metternich  desired  him  to  make 
over  his  command  to  Prince  Windischgratz,  a  man,  he 
knew,  of  iron  resolution.  In  this  action  the  Imperial 
Council,  the  members  of  which  were  present,  concurred. 
But  the  majority  of  them  declined,  for  the  moment,  to 
accord  their  sanction  to  a  further  proposal  of  Metternich's, 
that  Windischgratz  should  also  be  appointed  military 
dictator  of  the  city,  with  power  to  use  cannon  against  the 
people. 

Meanwhile,  the  people  were  asserting  themselves  with 
effect  against  the  not  too  willing  soldiers.  It  soon 
appeared,  too,  that  the  sympathies  of  the  great  middle 
class  were  with  them.  As  a  last  resource,  one  of  the 
Archdukes  ordered  the  gunners  to  fire  on  the  crowd. 
The  master-gunner  refused  either  to  obey  his  orders  or  to 
allow  the  gunners  to  obey  them.  A  few  minutes  later, 
and  the  deputations  of  citizens  forced  their  way  into  the 
castle.  Treated  at  first  somewhat  roughly,  they  main- 
tained their  ground  firmly,  demanding  the  immediate 
resignation  of  Metternich.  For  a  short  space  of  time 
their  demand  was  not  listened  to,  but  the  news  that  the 
students   had   obtained    arms    and   were    pressing    on, 


190  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTERNICE. 

changed  the  tone  of  the  courtiers.  At  last,  Metternich, 
yielding  to  the  urgent  pressure  of  the  Archduke  John, 
and,  I  am  convinced,  to  the  general  safety  rather  than  to 
care  for  his  own,  stepped  forward  and  declared  that  as 
they  all  told  him  that  his  resignation  would  restore  peace 
to  Austria,  he  resigned,  and  he  wished  good  luck  to  the 
new  Government.  Of  all  the  Council,  the  only  man  who 
protested  against  his  resignation  was  Windischgratz. 
The  Archdukes  and  the  other  members  seemed  glad  to 
be  rid  of  a  master. 

Thus  fell  the  man  before  whom  Napoleon  had  fallen. 
Thus  fell  with  him,  the  edifice  of  autocratic  absolutism 
which  he  had  constructed.  He  fell,  conscious  of  no  faults, 
believing  himself  a  martyr,  steadfast  in  his  adherence  to 
his  own  system.  "  If,"  he  wrote  four  years  later,  "  I  had 
to  begin  my  career  again,  I  w^ould  follow  again  the  course 
I  took  before,  and  would  not  deviate  from  it  for  an 
instant." 


(  lyi  ) 


CHAPTER  X. 

CONCLUSION— CHARACTER. 

1848-1859. 

So  little  had  Metternich  apprehended  the  real  character 
of  the  crisis  which  overthrew  him  that  he  had  expected  to 
be  able  to  retire  quietly  from  the  Castle  to  his  own  villa. 
He  soon  learned,  however,  that  not  only  had  his  villa 
been  burned,  but  that  his  very  life  was  in  danger.  With 
infinite  difficulty  he  succeeded  in  making  his  way  to 
Dresden.  But  he  was  not  safe  there.  He  pushed  on, 
then,  with  all  possible  despatch  into  Holland,  and  crossed 
thence  to  England.  There  he  remained  secure  from  the 
tempest  still  raging  on  the  Continent,  until  November 
of  the  following  year,  when,  the  storm  having  nearly 
spent  itself,  he  recrossed  the  ciiannel,  and  took  up  his 
residence  at  Brussels.  Nineteen  months  later  (June, 
1851),  he  was  able  to  revisit  and  occupy  his  Castle  of 
Johannisburg,  on  the  Rhine.  There  he  received  a  passing 
visit  from  the  King  of  Prussia.  His  stay  there,  however, 
was  short,  for,  towards  the  close  of  the  same  year,  he 
returned  to  Vienna,  to  reside  there  permanently. 

A  new  Emperor,  Francis  Joseph,  ruled  and  reigned  in 
Austria  ;  and,  from  him,  Metternich  at  an  early  period 
after  he  had  installed  himself  in  his  house,  received  a 
visit.     There  was  no  question  of  his  return  to  office.     It 


192  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  METTEBNICE. 

was  never  offered  to  him,  and,  bad  it  been,  it  is  almost 
certain  be  would  not  bave  accepted  it.  The  policy  of 
the  Austrian  Empire,  though  still  absolutist,  showed 
symptoms  of  diverging  in  a  direction  contrary  to  that 
which  Metternich  had  ever  pursued.  He  loved,  however, 
to  criticise,  to  give  advice,  to  say  how  he  would  have 
acted  in  this  or  that  circumstance  ;  and  the  Emperor,  very 
young,  impressionable,  still  in  very  difficult  position,  was 
glad  to  converse  with  a  statesman  who  had  guided  the 
fortunes  of  the  Austrian  Empire  in  times  still  more 
difficult,  and  when  its  very  existence  was  at  stake.  But 
thouofh  he  listened  with  interest  and  attention  to  the 
advice  Metternich  was  glad  to  offi^r,  Francis  Joseph  was 
too  shrewd,  too  well  advised,  to  follow  it.  Probably  he 
recotrnised  that  the  world  in  which  he  had  been  called 
to  play  so  great  a  part  was  not  the  world  of  which 
Metternich  had  cognizance.  The  old  statesman  soon 
realised  that  his  words  no  longer  carried  the  weight  of 
former  days;  but  even  from  this  he  was  able  to  derive 
consolation.  The  policy  of  regenerated  Austria  was  not 
always  a  wise  policy,  and  when  its  failure  was  conspicuous 
Metternich  was  able  to  comfort  himself  with  the  belief — • 
that  grand  resource  of  retired  statesmen — that  if  he  had 
still  directed  affairs,  a  more  fortunate  issue  would  have 
resulted.  This  thought  must  have  been  an  especial 
support  and  consolation  to  the  unbending  absolutist  when 
he  witnessed  the  undoing,  bit  by  bit,  of  the  work  of  his 
lifetime.  Within  five  years  of  his  fall,  he  saw  a  Napoleon 
seated  on  the  throne  of  France,  acknowledged  as  Emperor 
with  effusion  by  England,  and  recognised  by  all  Europe. 
He  lived  to  \vitness  the  two  Powers,  who  in  his  years 
and  mature  manhood  had  been  persistent  enemies,  France 
and  England,  wage  war  against  his  friend  of  the  same 
period,  the  Russia  which,  for  the  ten  years  between  1815 


CONCLUSION.  193 

and  1825,  he  had  bent  to  his  will.  He  lived  still  to  see 
Napoleon  HI.  repeat,  towards  the  Austrian  ambassador 
in  Paris,  Baron  Hiibner,  the  scene  in  which  he  himself 
had  taken  part  with  the  great  Napoleon  prior  to  the  war 
of  1809 ;  and,  exactly  half  a  century  later,  to  witness 
the  complement  of  that  scene  in  the  breaking  out  of  war 
between  the  two  countries.  As  in  1809  Eckmuhl  and 
Wagram  followed  the  declaration  of  war,  so,  in  1859,  did 
Magenta  and  Sol  ferine. 

Fortunately  for  him  he  was  spared  the  knowledge 
of  the  later  incidents  of  that  war.  He  lived  long  enough 
to  hear  of  the  early  advantages  of  the  French  at  Monte- 
bello  and  Palestro,  but  he  died  the  5th  of  June — the  day 
after  Magenta  had  been  fought.  He  was  thus  spared  the 
pain  of  learning,  not  merely  of  that  defeat,  and  of  the 
defeat  of  Solferino,  but  what  would  have  pained  him  far 
more — of  the  signing  of  that  Peace  of  Villafranca  which 
dealt  a  fatal,  and,  in  its  results,  a  decisive  blow  to  his 
Italian  policy  of  1815. 

Metternich  was  thrice  married.  His  first  wife,  I  have 
stated  in  its  place  in  this  book,  was  the  grand-daughter  of 
the  famous  Kaunitz.  She  bore  him  seven  children,  four 
of  whom  died  in  his  lifetime.  Of  those  who  survived, 
three  daughters,  the  eldest  married  Count  Sandor ;  the 
other  two  remained  single.  The  Countess  dying  in  1825, 
Metternich  married,  the  5th  November,  1827,  the 
Baroness  Maria-Antoinetta  von  Leykham.  She  died  m 
childbirth  the  12th  January,  1829,  after  having  given 
birth,  on  the  7th,  to  a  son,  who,  called  Richard,  was,  in 
later  years,  ambassador  at  Paris.  Metternich  married  for 
the  third  time,  the  30th  January,  1831,  the  Countess 
Melanie  Zichy,  who  bore  him  three  children,  and  died  in 
March,  1854. 

Metternich  was  a  very  accomplished  man.     He  was 

o 


194  LIFE  OF  PRINCE  METTEENICH, 

passionately  attached   to  art,  to  science,  and  to  letters. 

He  was  well-read,  a  good  talker,  an  excellent  listener, 

was  skilled  in  the  use  of  his  pencil  and  paint-brush,  and 

thoroughly  versed  in  those  thousand   and   one   artifices 

which  make  a  man  a  success  in  the  drawing-room.     His 

appearance   was  eminently  spirituel.     Though  he  wrote 

in  later  years  to  Humboldt,  and  though  he  recorded  in 

his  journal  in  his  youth,  that  he  felt  that  his  vocation 

called  him  to  art  and  a  study  of  the  exact  sciences,  he 

was,  in  very  deed,  admirably  adapted  for  the  role  which 

he  filled  between  his  entrance  into  public  life  and  1815. 

His    calm   imperturbability,   his   invincible,   unshakable, 

"  stability  "  (his  own  word  when  describing  himself),  were 

weapons  which   he   used  with   marked   success    against 

Napoleon.     Nor  was  his  patience  a  less  valuable  quality 

in  that  great  encounter.     Brought  into  contact  with  a  man 

whom  he  regarded  as  the  incarnation  of  a  principle  which 

he  detested — a  principle  fraught,  he  believed,  with  ruin  to 

society  and  to  nations — he  set  to  work  to  study,  so  as  at 

the  proper  moment  to  be  able  to  foil,  that  man.     For 

seven  years  he  listened  to  his  every  word,  he  watched  his 

every  gesture.     All  this  time  he  completely  imposed  on 

his    intended   victim.     The    charm   of  his   manner   and 

conversation   completely  deceived  Napoleon.     Even   the 

aristocratic  hauteur,  which  he  knew  so  \n  ell  how  and  w  hen 

to  display,  fascinated  the  parvenu  Emperor.     Napoleon 

believed  in  him :  believed,  that  is  to  say,  that  Metternich 

had  a  personal  regard  for  himself.    Thus  it  happened  that 

the  ambassador  whom  of  all  the  ambassadors  at  his  Court 

he  ought  to  have  trusted  the  least,  he  trusted  the  most. 

But  for   Metternich,   the  Austrian  marriage — that  fatal 

event  in  the  career  of  Napoleon — would  not  have  taken 

place.     The  Austrian  Emperor,  on  receiving  the  proposal, 

consulted  Metternich  before  he  spoke  to  his  daughter. 


CONCLUSION.  195 

One   word   from    Metternich    would    have    stopped   the 
negotiation.     It  is  not  only  probable,  it  is  morally  certain, 
that  Metternich,  knowing  Napoleon  as  he  did,  would  not 
speak  that  word  because  he  saw  that  the  marriage  would 
engender  a  confidence  in  the  friendship  of  Austria  which 
might  lead  Napoleon  into  ventures  from  which  Austria 
would  reap  advantage.     That  happened  in  the  mind  of 
Napoleon  which  Metternich  had   foreseen.     Whilst   he/ 
cold-blooded  and  calculating  in  all  his  political  measures,| 
and  the  Emperor  Francis,  were  firmly  resolved  that  the 
interests  of  Austria  should  count  for  everything,  and  the 
marriage  for  nothing,  in  the  contest  with  Napoleon,  the 
French  Emperor,  misreading  Metternich,  calculating  on 
the  pride,  instead  of  on  the  humiliations  he  had  forced  him 
to  undergo,   of  the  Habsburg   Emperor,   always   looked 
upon  the  marriage  as  a  reserve   which  he  could  employ 
with  effect  when  all  other  resources  should  fail.     He  was 
not  undeceived  even  by  the  language  used  by  ]\[etternich 
at  the  famous  interview  at  Dresden.     Even  after  Leipsig 
he  could   not  believe  that  an  Emperor  of  Austria  would 
allow  a  son-in-law    of  the    Habsburgs  to   be  depose  I. 
All    this  was  the  work  of  Metternich.     He  had  wruno- 
confidences  from  Napoleon  and  had  not  only  given  him 
none  in  return,  but  had  insinuated  false  hopes  which  could 
scarcely  fail  to  lead  him  to  his  ruin.     And  they  did  lead 
him  to  his  ruin.     It  was  his  trust  in  his  father-in-law  that 
induced  Napoleon  to  continue  the  exhausting  war  in  Spain 
whilst  he  armed  all  the  Continent  against  Russia.     It  was 
the   same  trust  that   led  him,   after  the  catastrophe,  to 
refuse  terms  which  would  have  still  left  France  greater 
than  he  had  found  her. 

In  the  events,  then,  which  led  to  the  fall  of  Napoleon 
Metternich  was  the  chief  factor,  the  chief  conspirator, 
the  principal  agent     No  man  contributed  so  largely  to 

0  2 


196  LIFE  OF  PBINCE  3IETTEBNICE, 

that  event  as  he.  It  mifrht  with  truth  be  said  that,  but 
for  him,  it  might  not  have  occurred.  To  say  this  is, 
perhaps,  to  open  a  subject  too  wide  for  discussion  in  the 
last  pages  of  an  historical  sketch.  But  this  at  least  is 
certain:  it  was  the  too  great  confidence  of  Napoleon 
in  Austria  that  sealed  his  overthrovp-.  That  confidence 
was  the  consequence  of  his  marriage  with  Marie  Louise. 
The  marriaofe  with  Marie  Louise  was  the  work  of  Metter- 
nich.  If,  then,  the  overthrow  of  Napoleon  was  an  un- 
mixed advantage  to  Europe,  Metternich  is  entitled  to 
receive  the  chief  praise  for  the  accomplishment  of  a  task 
to  which,  in  my  belief,  I  repeat,  no  individual  man  con- 
tributed so  much  as  he. 

There  are  many,  then,  who  can  regard  his  career  up 
to  1815  with  unmixed  admiration.  But  after  1815? 
He  had  struck  down  Napoleon  because  he  was  the  em- 
bodiment of  the  Revolution  ;  because  he  had  established 
a  system  which  was  unsupportable  to  the  sovereigns  of 
Europe.  Between  1815  and  1820  he  obtained  an  in- 
fluence such  as  would  have  enabled  him  to  lay  the 
foundations  of  a  system  which  might  ensure,  by  gradual 
means,  to  the  suffering  peoples  of  Europe,  to  the  peoples 
who  had  endured  so  much,  who  had  made  sacrifices  with- 
out stint,  to  ensure  the  triumph  of  his  anti- Napoleonic 
policy,  the  realisation  of  those  aspirations  the  desire  for 
which  separates  the  man  from  the  brute.  Did  he  do  this? 
Did  he  take  a  single  step  towards  accomplishing  this  end 
— an  end  which  is  the  goal  of  all  statesmanship  worthy 
of  the  name  ?  Did  he  not,  on  the  contrary,  employ  all  his 
power,  all  his  influence,  all  his  untiring  energy,  to  the  forging 
of  new  fetters  for  the  human  race ;  for  the  development 
of  plans  w  hich  should  keep  the  peoples  slaves  for  ever  ?  If 
Napoleon  rested  on  brute  force — a  hypothesis  which  can 
be  argued — Metternich  rested  on  it  also,  a  truism  which 


CONCLUSION,  197 

cannot  be  denied.  Can  we  wonder  that  when  he  fell 
there  was  no  man  to  pity  him,  no  voice  to  cry  "  God 
save  him  ?  "  The  Napoleonic  Lef^end  survived  the  death 
of  Napoleon,  and  bore  fruits  in  our  own  time.  It  may 
bear  them  yet  again.  The  system  of  Metternich  died  with 
Metternich.     No  power  can  ever  recall  it  from  the  tomb. 

I  am  indeed,  spared  the  trouble  of  writing  the 
epitaph  of  Metternich,  for  he  unconsciously  wrote  it  him- 
self. He  wrote  it  when  he  thought  he  was  writing  the 
epitaph  of  Napoleon.  These  are  his  own  words :  "  The 
vast  edifice  which  he  had  constructed  was  exclusively  the 
work  of  his  hands,  and  he  himself  was  the  keystone  of 
the  arch.  But  this  gigantic  construction  was  essentially 
wanting  in  its  foundation  ;  the  materials  of  which  it  was 
composed  were  nothing  but  the  ruins  of  other  buildings ; 
some  were  rotten  from  decay,  others  had  never  possessed 
consistency  from  the  very  beginning.  The  keystone  of 
the  arch  has  been  withdrawn,  and  the  whole  edifice  has 
fallen  in." 

Such,  in  a  few  words,  is  the  history  of  the  system  which 
Metternich  established  on  the  ruins  of  the  French 
Empire. 


INDEX. 


A. 

Alt:xandek,  Czar  of  Russia,  is 
desirous,  in  1805,  to  induce 
Prussia  to  join  him  against 
Napoleon,  11 ;  visits  Potsdam, 
12;  signs  a  treaty  with  Prussia, 
12 ;  insists  upon  fi;:hting  at 
Austerlitz,  13;  regards  Napoleon 
as  a  Coisican  adventurer,  16; 
signs  the  peace  of  Tilsit,  23 ; 
interview  of,  with  Napoleon,  at 
Erfurt,  31,  32  ;  vainly  attempts 
to  preserve  peace  between  France 
and  Austria,  43,  44 ;  quits  St. 
Peters! >urg  for  Wihia  to  meet  tlie 
prej>arations  of  Napoleon,  76 ; 
rect-ives  Mctternich  at  Opncno, 
105;  gains  confidence  in  him, 
106;  and  signs  the  treaty  of 
Eeichenbach,  107,  108;  strives 
to  have  jMoreau  made  com- 
mander-in-chief of  the  allied 
forces,  120 ;  j  ields  to  Metter- 
iiich's  inlluence,  124;  arranj^es, 
in  Metternich's  absence  and 
against  his  views,  for  the  re- 
moval of  Napoleon  to  a  sovereign 
poition  at  Elba,  126 ;  requires 
the  whole  of  Poland  as  his  share 
of  the  plunder,  129, 130;  regards 
Mfttertiich  as  a  permanent 
obstacle  to  his  designs,  130,  131 ; 
feelinjjs  of,  regarding  Castlerengh 
and  Talleyranrl,  131 ;  confesses 
his  sins  to  Metternich  and  is 
ab.-olved,  154;  divergence  of  the 
policy  of,  and  that  of  Metternich, 
regarding  Greece,  162, 164 ;  death 
of,  at  Taganiog,  164. 


Altenburg,  in  Hungary,  the  Frerch 
and  Austrian  foreign  ministers 
meet  at,  to  negotiate  peace,  52 ; 
negotiations  at,  54-56;  strange 
incident  which  terminated  the 
negotiations  at,  57-62. 

Aspern,  vide  Essling. 

Austerlitz,  Metternich  is  married 
at,  7;  the  Emperor  Alexander  in- 
sists upon  fighting  at,  13;  the 
battle  of,  is  followed  by  the  Peace 
of  Pressburg,  15;  was  fought 
against  the  advice  of  the  Emperor 
Francis,  16,  17. 

Austria,  Ferdinand,  Emperor  of, 
the  concessions  made  by,  dis- 
please Metternich,  176;  intellect 
and  training  of,  note  to  176. 

Austria,  Fiancs  Joseph,  Emperor 
of,  nature  of  intercourse  of,  with 
Metternich,  191-193. 

Austria,  Francis,  Etuperor  of,  suc- 
ceeds his  brother  Leopold,  5; 
notices  Metternich  and  tells  him 
to  hold  himself  in  readiness  tor 
his  order.-=,  8;  sends  Metternich 
to  Dresden  as  minister,  9;  and 
afterwards  to  Berlin,  10;  coniers 
upon  him  the  cross  of  St.  Stephen, 
14 ;  was  opposed  to  fighting  at 
Austerlitz,  16,  17;  encouraijes 
Metternich  to  accept  tlie  embassy 
to  Paris,  17 ;  requests  Metter- 
nich to  examine  and  report  on 
the  Hdvisabiliiy  of  peace  or  war 
with  France,  34 ;  preparations 
for  war,  made  by,  42  ;  authorises 
seizure  of  the  bearer  of  French 
despatches  and  thus  precipitates 
war,  44,  45  ;  is  joined  by  Metter- 


INDEX, 


199 


nich  before  Wagram,  49 ;  wit- 
nesses the  two  days'  battle  of 
Wagram,  49 ;  refuses,  then  con- 
sents, to  send  Prince  John  of 
Liechtenstein  as  ne.Lrotiator  to 
Napoleon,  57,  58 ;  ratifies  peace, 
62;  appoints  Meiteruich  foreign 
minister  and  chancellor,  63  ;  asks 
Metternich  to  spiak  to  Marie 
Louise  on  the  subject  of  a 
marriage  with  Napoleon,  64;  is 
informed  by  Metternich  of 
Napoleon's  intention  to  wage  war 
witli  Russia,  71;  accompanied  by 
his  EtnprefS,  meets  Napoleon  at 
Dresden,  76 ;  is  merely  the 
mouthi)iece  of  Metternich,  98, 
99 ;  etfect  of  the  letter  of,  on 
Napoleon,  103;  proceeds,  witii 
Metternich,  to  Gitscliiii,  to  be 
near  to  Alexander  and  Napoleon, 
106 ;  anti-N  ipoleonic  dealings  of, 
118,  119;  engages  in  war  against 
Napoleon,  120;  is  swayed  by 
Metternich  airainst  Napoleon, 
126 ;  spares  Bavaria  to  indemnify 
Austria  in  Italy,  132  ;  is  regarded 
by  Metternich  as  if  "  made  for 
him,"  154;  meets  the  Czar, 
attended  by  Metternich,  160-1G3 ; 
dies,  176- 

B. 

Baden  follows  Austria's  policy  of 
repression,  162 ;  awakeuiug  of, 
185. 

Barclay  de  Tolly  urges  a  retreat 
behind  the  Oder  after  Bautzen, 
104. 

Bassano,  Duke  of,  the  confidential 
minister  of  Napoleon  in  1813, 
advises  Napoleon  to  choose 
Austria  as  a  mediator,  83 ;  ad- 
dresses "a  fatal  letter"  to  Aus- 
tria, 83,  85  ;  arranges  a  meeting 
of  Metternich  with  Napobon  at 
Dresden,  106,  101);  is  present  at 
the  second  interview  between 
Napoleon  and  Metternich  at 
Dresden,  117. 

Bavaria,  Melti.rnLch  intrigues  with 


the  king  of,  91,  93 ;  incident  re- 
garding the  army  of,  nole  to  93 ; 
generous  treatment  of,  by  Austria, 
131-134 ;  king  of,  writes  to 
Metternicii  that  he  declines  to 
perjure  himself,  151 ;  follows 
Metternich's  policy  of  repression, 
162  ;  awakens,  185. 

Bautzen,  Napoleon  wins  the  battle 
of,  97,  105 ;  mistake  of  Ney  at, 
105  ;  eir.  ct  on  Metternich  of  the 
battle  of,  106. 

Baylen,  eft'ect  of  the  catastrophe  of, 
on  Metternich  and  on  Napoleon, 
23,  24. 

Berlin,  the  state  of  parties  at,  in 
1804-5,  de-ci  ibed,  10,  II. 

Bliicher,  characteristic  remark  of, 
as  he  noticed  the  glories  of  St. 
Cloud,  140. 

Bubna,  Count,  ajipointed  Austrian 
military  commissary  witli  Napo- 
leon, 53  ;  is  sent  to  the  Emperor 
Francis  to  propose  the  despatch 
of  Pr  nee  John  of  Lieehtenstein  to 
Napoleon,  57  ;  again,  58;  issent 
to  Paris  to  negotiate  with 
Napoleon,  82 ;  is  sent  to  treat 
with  Napoleon  at  Dresden,  103; 
happy  inspiration  of,  103 ;  re- 
turns to  Vienna  with  proposals 
for  an  armistice,  104. 


c. 

CambacerIis,  the  Arch-Chancellor, 
advises  Napoleon  to  treat  direct 
with  Russia,  82. 

Canning,  Mr.,  policy  of,  not  agree- 
able to  iNIetternieh,  160,166,  167; 
hopes  entertained  by  Metternicii 
on  the  death  of,  169. 

Carlsbad,  Conference  of,  149,  150. 

Castlereagh,  Lord,  declares  that  the 
language  of  Napoleon  proved 
that  he  would  accept  no  reason- 
able terms,  87 ;  interview  of,  with 
Mettc^rnich,  and  opinion  of  the 
latter  of,  127;  Alexamler  finds 
him  "  cold  and  pedantic,"  133 ; 
suggests     the     deportation     of 


200 


INDEX, 


Napoleon  to  St.  Helena  or  St. 
Lucia,  135  ;  regrets  of  IM  tttniich 
on  hearing  of  the  sucide  of,  lo9. 

Caulaincourt,  Count,  is  ambas- 
sador of  France  at  St.  Peters- 
burg, 34 ;  advises  Napoleon  to 
treat  direct  with  Russia,  83. 

Champagny,  Count,  record  made 
at  the  time  by,'  of  the  scene 
between  Napoleon  and  Metter- 
nich  in  1808,  differs  materially 
from  the  record  made  at  a  later 
period  by  the  latter,  24-29  ;  is  very 
reticent  in  his  communicatious 
to  Mettemicb,  39;  proves  to  Met- 
t(ji nich  that  Fiance  has  not  been 
deceived  by  Austria,  43, 44 ;  sends 
Metternicli  his  passiorts,  45; 
conversation  of,  with  Melternich, 
at  Vienna,  46,  47 ;  is  appointed  to 
negotiate  with  Metternicli  after 
the  combat  of  Zuaim,  52  ;  nej:oti- 
ations  and  pourparlers  of,  with 
Metternich, 55-57;  abrupt  ending 
to  ihe  negotiations  of,  58-63. 

Charles  X.  8uccee<ls  his  b  other 
Louis  on  the  throne  of  France, 
1 63 ;  mistaken  views  of  Metter- 
nicli regarding  the  liberalism  of, 
and  of  the  Dauphin,  163,  164; 
expulsion  of,  from  France,  170. 

Charles  Albert,  King  of  Sardinia, 
concedes  some  advantage  to  the 
canton  of  Ticino,  179;  forces 
Metternich  to  abate  his  preten- 
sions, 179,  181). 

Charles,  Archduke,  plans  of,  for  the 
war  of  1809,  42;  crosses  the 
Kubicon,  44;  a  nervous  attack 
paralyses  the  energies  of,  at  the 
crisis  of  the  battle  of  Essling,  46 ; 
commits  the  mistake  of  retreating 
on  Bohemia  instead  of  on  Hun- 
gary or  Moravia,  51 ;  resigns  the 
command  to  Prince  Jolm  of 
Liechtenstein,  53,  55. 

Charles  Felix,  King  of  Sardinia, 
action  of,  relative  to  Mazzini, 
173. 

Chatillon,  Congress  of,  abortive 
etibris  of  the,! 28. 

Cobenzl,  Count  Philip,  is  designed 


to  suf'ceed  Count  Stadion  at  the 
St.  Petersi^urg  embassy,  but  is 
objected  to  by  Napoleon,  15. 

Col  lo  redo,  Count,  is  replaced  by 
Count  Stadion  at  the  Austrian 
foreign  office  after  the  peace  of 
Prtssi)urg,  15. 

Confab  mieri,  Count  Federigo,  Met- 
ternich's  treatment  of,  158. 

Constantino,  prediction  by  Metter- 
nicli regarding  the  succession  of, 
to  the  ttirone  of  Russia,  164,  165. 


D. 

Deak,  Francis,  begins  to  take  a 
lead  in  the  Hungarian  constitu- 
tional party,  176. 

Dresden,  Metternich  is  appointed 
Minister  at,  9  ;  his  description  of 
the  Court  of,  9 ;  Congress  of 
Emperors  and  Kings  ut,  76; 
remarkable  conversation  of 
Napoleon  with  Metternicli  at, 
77;  Napoleon  at,  105  ;  historical 
interview  between  Napoleon  and 
Metteruich  at,  lu9-116;  battle 
of,  won  by  Napoleon,  122,  123; 
great  results  of,  neutralised  by 
the  accident  of  Kulm,  123; 
Mt'tternich  with  difficulty  (.scapes 
to,  191. 

E. 

Emigres,  French,  influence  of,  on 
the  mind  of  Metternich,  5. 

Erfurt,  proceedings  of  the  famous 
interview  at,  are  a  sealed  baok 
to  all  but  four,  32. 

Esslin;^,  battle  of,  ought  to  have 
been  won  by  the  Austrian  s,  48. 

Europe,  situation  of,  at  the  time 
Metternich  undertook  the  em- 
bassy to  Paris  in  1806,  17,  18; 
situation  of,  in  1848,  185;  in 
1859,  193. 

F. 

Fleury  de  Chabol'lon,  M.,  visits 
Elba,  and  contimis  the  impres- 


INDEX. 


201 


Bion  that  France  is  lonofing  for 
the  return  of  Napoleon,  136, 137. 

France  is  accordi  d,  in  1814,  the 
boundaries  of  1792,  131  ;  price 
demanded  of,  lor  her  complicity 
with  Niipoleon,  141. 

Frankfort  visited  by  Metternich,  4  ; 
again  in  17y2,  5. 


a. 

Gentz,  Frederick,  correspondence 
of,  with  Metternich,  78  ;  opinion 
of,  of  Alexander,  107 ;  exposure 
by,  of  the  plunderinj^  instincts 
of  the  Allies  alter  1814,  131-133 ; 
divines  the  instincts  of  Alex- 
ander, 132,  133. 

Gitschin  selected,  for  reasons  given 
by  the  Emperor  Francis  and 
Metternich,  to  be  their  head- 
quarters during  the  armistice  of 
Pleiswiiz,  107. 

Graham,  Sir  James,  opens  the 
letters  of  Mazzini  at  the  Po.st- 
Office  and  communicates  their 
contents  to  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment, 179. 

Greece,  the  question  of  the  inde- 
pen<lence  of,  puzzles  Metternich, 
1G2-164 ;  the  independence  of, 
acknowledged,  168. 

Griinberg,  villa  of,  assigned  to 
Metternich,  46 ;  adventure  at,  47. 


H. 

Hague,  The,  Metternich  is  ap- 
pointed ambassador  at,  6;  is 
visited  by  Metternich,  7. 

Hardenberg,  Baron,  is  the  partisan 
at  Berlin  of  the  Austrian  Alli- 
ance, 10. 

Haugwitz,  Count,  is  the  partisan 
at  Berlin  of  the  French  Alliance, 
10  ;  is  despatched  to  the  French 
head-quarters,  12;  and  is  fooled 
by  Napoleon,  13. 

Hertford,  Marquis  of,  intimacy  of, 
\sith  Metternich,  166. 


History  and  Eomance,  mistaken 
ideas  of,  regarding  the,  of  Russia, 
165. 

Holy  Alliance,  the,  origin  and 
purpose  of,  142-144. 

Howe,  Lord,  refuses  -to  allow  Met- 
ternich to  join  the  English  fleet 
before  the  iDattle  of  June  1st,  6, 7. 

HuuLrary,  dealing  of  Metternich 
with,  174-177;  relations  of  be- 
tween, and  the  House  of  Habs- 
burg,  174,  175:  mode  of  Met- 
ternich in  his  transactions  with, 
178. 

Hundred  Daj's,  prominent  part 
taken  by  Metternich  in  deciding 
the  action  of  the  Allies  during 
the,  137-140. 


I. 


Italv  is  regarded  by  Metternich 
as  "  a  geographical  expression," 
132  ;  treatment  by  Metternich  of, 
150 ;  resuscitation  of,  172-193. 


J. 


JoH\,  Archduke,  inexplicable  con- 
duct of,  at  the  battle  of  Wagrain, 
49,  50 ;  indicates  to  Metternich 
the  necessity  that  he  resign,  189. 

John,  Prince  of  Liechtenstein,  suc- 
ceeds the  Archduke  Charles  in 
command  of  the  Austrian  army, 
and  negotiates  an  armistice  \Nith 
Napoleon,  52 ;  Napoleon  asks 
that,  be  sent  to  Vienna,  57  •.  two 
versions  of  the  mission  of,  58-61 ; 
previous  negotiations  of,  with 
Napoleon,  60 ;  arranges  terms  of 
peace  with  Napoleon,  61  ;  con- 
clusion that  he  was  empowered 
so  to  act,  and  therefore  so  acted, 
63. 

Joseph'ne,  the  Empress,  entertains 
JMetternifh  on  his  way  to  Vienna, 
45  ;  marriage  and  divorce  c/,  note 
to  QQ. 


202 


INDEX. 


K. 

Kageveck,  Maria  Beatrix  Aloisa, 
marries  the  father  of  Clement 
Metteruich,  4. 

Kossuth,  Ijouis,  begins  to  take  a 
lead  in  Hansjjarian  politics,  175 ; 
is  imprisoned,  175  ;  becomes  con- 
vinced that  there  can  be  no  peace 
with  Metternich,  186 ;  effect  in 
Vienna  of  the  great  speech  of, 
186,  187;  the  reading  of  the 
speech  of,  stimulates  the  couriige 
oftiie  students  and  others,  187; 
and  is  the  active  cause  of  the  fall 
of  Metternich,  188-190. 


L. 

Latbach,  Congress  of,  156,  157. 

Lebzeltern,  tlie  Chevalier,  is  pent 
by  Metternich  to  Savona  to  en- 
deavour to  procure  an  uuder- 
stiuding  between  the  Pope  and 
Napoleon,  67. 

Leipsig,  fatal  results  for  Napoleon 
ot  the  battle  of,  122 ;  treason  of 
the  Saxon  troops  at,  nute  to  122. 

Liechtenstein,  Prince  John  of,  suc- 
ceeds the  Archduke  Charles  in 
command  of  the  Austrian  nrmy, 
and  agrees  to  a  su-p  nsion  of 
arms  with  Napoleon,  52,  53  ;  sets 
out  for  Vienna  to  negotiate  with 
Napoleon,  58 ;  interview  on  the 
■way  with  Metternich.  59,  60; 
proceeds  to  Vienna  and  signs 
pe  ice,  60-62 ;  impiobabdity  of 
Metternich's  version  of  the  eon- 
duet  of,  6t>-62. 

Lombardo- Venetian  Kingdom,  es- 
tablished under  an  Austrian 
prince  after  1814, 151,  153  ;  Met- 
ternich appoints  an  Aulic  coun- 
cil to  superintend  the  affairs  of 
the,  158 :  excitement  in  the, 
towards  the  close  of  Metternich's 
reign,  181,  184. 

Louis  XVIIl.,  opposite  feelings  dis- 


played in  Pari;',  on  the  return  of, 
129  ;  death  of,  163. 

Louis  Philippe,  of  Orleans,  reac- 
tionary policy  of,  171 ;  severe 
measures  taken  by,  against 
Mazzini,  173. 

Liitzen,  battle  of.  Napoleon  gains 
the,  96,  97;  effect  pro  iuced  by, 
on  Metternich,  99,  101. 


M. 

Marie  Lottise  consents  to  become 
Napol(;on's  wife,  64 ;  fatal  ellect 
of  the  mariiiige  with,  on  the 
fortunes  of  Napoleon,  81,  82,  84, 
87,  yO,and  no^e,  102,103,  195, 196. 

Marmont,  Marshal,  prescience  of, 
discovers  the  true  line  of  retreat 
of  the  Austrians  after  Wagrani, 
51,  52  ;  fatal  consequence  of  the 
treason  of,  in  1814,  127. 

Massena,  Marshal,  carries  the 
Austrian  position  at  Zu  dm,  52. 

Maurice,  Mr.  C.  Edmund,  opinion 
of,  regarding  the  system  of 
Mettei-nich,  145,  146;  txcellent 
work  of,  note  to  145;  opinion 
regarding  Alexander,  146, 147 ;  on 
Metteinich's  dealing  with  Ilaly, 
158;  indebte(hiess  of  ti.e  author 
to,  note  to  p.  181. 

Mayence,  Melteinich  proceeds  to 
the  University  of,  5 :  Napoleon 
readies,  96;  quits  it  to  win  the 
battle  of  Liitzen,  96,  97;  a  secret 
police  inquiry  office  establiched 
at,  by  Metternich,  158,  160. 

Mazzini,  treatment  of,  on  the  out- 
break of  the  Revolution  of  1830, 
172,  173  ;  subsequent  moviMueuts 
of,  173,  174;  coirespondtuce  of, 
open  and  contents  shauiefuUy 
communicated  to  Austria  by  Sir 
James  Graham,  177,  179. 

Meneval,  M.,  vi.-its  Elba,  and 
informs  Naptdeon  of  the  design 
of  tlie  Congress  of  Vienna  to 
have  him  deported,  135. 

Metternich,  Clemen^,  charar^ter  of 
antagonism  of,  to  Na^joleon,  1-3; 


INDEX. 


203 


birth  and  training  of,  4 ;  imbibes 
bis  ideas  of  France  from  French 
Emigres,  5 ;  visits  England,  and 
studies  the  F.iglish  constitution, 
6  ;  impressed  by  the  English  tleet, 
6,  7 ;  entry  into  diplomvitic  life 
and  marriage  of,  7 ;  displays  dis- 
taste for  politics  and  a  strong 
love  of  literature  and  art,  7,  8  ; 
is  told  l)y  tile  Emperor  Francis 
to  hold  himself  in  readiness,  8 ; 
becomes  Minister  at  Dresden,  9  ; 
is  transferred  to  Berlin,  10 ; 
conies  ia  contact  with  the  Em- 
peror Alexander,  11 ;  difficult 
position  of,  12;  not  the  fault  of, 
that  his  labours  at  Berlin  are 
fruitless,  18 ;  obtains  the  ap- 
proval of  his  bovcrtign,  14;  is 
nominated  to  succeed  ^tadion  at 
St.  Petersburg,  15  ;  despair  of, 
at  barning  that  he  is  to  be 
"transferred  to  Paris,  16 ;  his 
views  regarding  Napob  on,  16; 
is  eT.cnuiaged  by  the  Emperor 
Francis-,  17  ;  sets  out  for  Paris, 
and  t-ees  Talleyrand,  18;  first 
impressions  of,  18;  the  one  aim 
he  m«  ntally  traced  to  himself, 
19  ;  is  Well  received  in  Paris,  19 ; 
opinion  of,  regiiriing  Napoleon, 
19,  2i);  variation  of  opinion  of, 
regarding  Napol.  on,  2(3,  21 ;  his 
sentiments  those  which  he  had 
in  larly  life  imbibed  from  the 
€inir}re.<,  21;  reasons  why  he 
endeavours  to  stave  otf  war  with 
Prussia,  21,  22;  further  impres- 
sions his  study  of  the  character 
of  Napuleon  make  upon,  22 ; 
deduces  that  France  has  not  one 
friend  in  Europe,  23;  derives 
hopes  from  the  catastrophe  of 
Baylen,  23 ;  rccortl  made  by,  of 
the  manner  in  which  Napoleon 
addresses  him  on  his  return  to 
Palis,  24,  25;  doubts  iis  to  ihe 
correctness  of  1  he  record  of,  25-29; 
views  indulged  ia  by,  rei:ariiiug 
the  chances  of  Austria,  3U  ;  the 
keynote  to  the  policy  of,  31 ; 
erroneous  opinion   of,  regarding 


the  origin  of  the  conferences  at 
Erfurt,  32 ;  Ls  unable  to  find  out 
what  passes  at  Erfurt,  82 ;  in- 
trigues of,  with  Talleyrand,  33; 
proceeds  on  leave  to  Vienna  and 
inspires  the  Emperor  and  the  Aus- 
trian Cahinet  with  his  sanguine 
hopes,  34  ;  writes  a  memoiaudum 
on  the  position,  35-37 ;  proof 
that  his  Autobiography  had  been 
edited,  36,  note;  concurrence  of 
ideas  of,  with  those  of  the  Arch- 
duke Ciiarles,  38  ;  returns  to  Paris, 
and  renews  his  intimacy  with  the 
French  malcontents,  '38-40;  is 
received  with  great  kindness  by 
Napoleon,  40 ;  is  left  "  a  free 
hand  "  by  the  Court  of  Vienna, 
42 ;  is  not  addressed  on  the  sub- 
ject of  politics  by  Napoleon,  43  ; 
is  ordered  to  inform  Napoleon 
that  Austria  has  placed  her  troops 
on  a  war  footing,  44;  receives  his 
passports,  45;  journeys  to  Vienna, 
and  IS  uUoited  a  house  near  the 
capital  as  his  residence,  46; 
receives  a  visit  from  Savary,  47 ; 
haughty  bearing  of,  47  ;  ineideut 
on  the  way  to  Acs  to  be  ex- 
chiinged,  48;  joins  the  Emperor 
Francis,  iind  witnesses  the  b  ttle 
of  Wagram,  49;  succeeds  Count 
Stadion  as  foreign  minister,  51 ; 
is  appointed  to  negotiate  for 
peace  with  the  Frei:ch  Foreign 
JMinister,  Count  Champngny, 
52-57  :  Prince  John  of  Liechten- 
stein is  sent  to  negotiate  over  his 
bead,  57,  58  ;  soreness  of,  :ind  im- 
provable version  of  the  mi.-sion 
given  by,  58-62  ;  b(  comes  Chan- 
cebor  of  the  Empire,  62;  and 
resumes  his  anti-Napoleonic  role, 
63 ;  iiegotiates  the  marriage  of 
Napoleon  with  IMarie  Louise, 
63,  64 ;  untrue  reason  given  by, 
regarding  the  divorce,  64,  note ; 
se's  out  for  Paris  once  m.  re  to 
study  Napoleon,  65;  is  ai  mi  ted 
into  the  confidential  intimacy  of 
Napoleon,  66-69;  discovers  th  .t 
Napoleon     intends     war     with 


204 


INDEX. 


Russia,  70;  makes  his  plans 
accordingly  and  returns  to  tnke  up 
his  post,  71 ;  partly  unveils  him- 
self to  the  King  of  Prussia,  72  ; 
constitutes  a  kind  of  "  Star 
Chamber"  for  the  better  aflmiuis- 
tration  of  internal  aliairs  in 
Austria,  73  ;  dabbles  with  liter- 
ature and  art,  74 ;  signs  the 
treaty  of  March  14,  1812,  with 
Napoleon,  engaging  to  put  30.000 
troops  ill  line  against  Russia,  75  ; 
secret  understanding  of,  witli  the 
Czar,  75,  76;  accompanies  the 
Emperor  and  Empress  of  Austria 
to  Dresden,  76 ;  coutideuces  of 
Nnpoleon  towards,  77 ;  helps 
forward  "the  providential  be- 
ginning ot  Napoleon's  end,"  78; 
sees  the  catastrophe  arrive,  79; 
■withdraws  the  Austrian  con- 
tingent into  Galicia,  80 ;  views 
of,  at  this  period,  81 ;  sends 
Count  Bubna  to  Paris  to  en- 
deavour to  obtain  for  Austria  the 
position  of  mediator,  82 ;  is 
contirmed  by  the  action  of  Na- 
poleon in  his  secret  policy,  84 ; 
negotiations  of,  with  Count  Otto, 
85  ;  sends  Prince  Schwarzenberg 
to  Paris,  86  ;  is  bent  on  destroying 
Napole(m,  87;  endeavours  to 
detach  Saxony  from  Napoleon, 
89-01  ;  negotiates  with  Count 
Narbnnne,  92 ;  his  purp'^se  de- 
tected by  that  ambassador,  93-99  ; 
opens  fresh  ground  on  hearing  of 
Napoleon's  victory  at  Liitzon, 
99,  101;  sends  Count  Bubna  with 
proposals  to  Napoleon,  101 ; 
resolution  arrived  at  by,  on  learn- 
ing the  loss  of  the  battle  of 
B.iutzen,  105 ;  proceeds  with 
the  Emperor  Francis  to  Gitscbin 
to  be  near  to  the  Allies  as  W(  11  as 
to  Napoleon,  106 ;  hunies  otf  to 
see  the  Emperor  Alexander,  106  ; 
result  of  meeting  of,  with  Alex- 
ander, 106, 108;  negotiateo  a  treaty 
of  alliance  and  returns  "  with  a 
light  iieart"  to  Gitschin.  108, 109 ; 
proceeds  to  Dresden  to  have  the 


"  historical "  interview  with  Na- 
poleon, 110;  reasons  for  mis- 
trustuig  version  of  that  interview 
given  by,  111-113;  true  record 
of  interview  of,  with  Napoleon, 
1 13-1 1 6 ;  second  interview  of,  with 
Napoleon,  117;  manoeuvres  of, 
to  prolong  the  armistice  and  yet 
to  prevent  the  success  of  the 
negotiations,  115-119;  gives  the 
signal  for  war,  120;  protests 
against  the  desire  of  Alexander 
to  give  the  command  in  chief 
to  Moreau,  121  ;  suggests,  after 
Leipsig,  a  po  icy  of  extermination 
as  re^^arded  Napoleon,  122,  124  ; 
works  his  way  to  the  position  of 
arbiter  in  the  councils  of  the 
allies,  125;  opinion  of,  of  Lord 
Ca-tlereagh,  125;  again  intrigues 
against  Napoleon  at  Langres, 
125;  disapproves  of  the  deporta- 
tion of  Napoleon  to  Elba  as  in- 
sufficient, 126 ;  his  opinion  of 
Napoleon's  system,  127;  believes 
the  return  of  the  Bourbons  ac- 
ceptable to  the  French  people, 
128 ;  tiikes  the  lead  at  the  Con- 
giess  of  Vienna,  131;  jealousy 
of,  of  Alexandtr,  131,  132;  sides 
with  France  and  Enghind  against 
Russia  and  Prussia,  133, 134;  hears 
of  the  departure  of  Napoleon  from 
Elba,  131;  inspires  the  Congress 
to  come  to  a  formal  resolution 
against  him,  137,  138;  hears  of 
the  battle  of  Waterloo,  138; 
comments  on  Napoleon,  139;  is 
sounded  by  Alexander  on  the  sub- 
ject of  the  "  Holy  Alliance,"  141 ; 
his  account  of,  and  excuse  for  it, 
142,  143;  opportunities  open  to, 
143, 144 ;  builds  up  his  edifice  on  a 
narrow  and  vulgar  basis,  144, 145  ; 
hatred  of  '•liberalism"  of,  145; 
systetn  of,  described  by  Mr. 
iNIaurice,  146 ;  finally  gains 
Alexander,  147;  also  the  King 
of  Prussia,  149;  dissuades  that 
king  from  granting  his  people 
a  constitution,  149,  150;  memo- 
randum   of,   of    the    means    to 


INDEX. 


205 


com>>at  the  revolution,  150; 
exalted  opinion  of  liiuiself  of, 
151,152;  dealiiis^s  of,  witli  Italy, 
152,  153;  conduct  of,  on  heaiing 
of  the  revolt  at  Naples,  153 ; 
entries  in  the  diary  of,  regarding 
Xapoleon,  154  ;  carries  nearly  all 
liis  views  at  the  ConferLUce  of 
Troppau,  154,  156;  and  at 
Laibacli,  157;  establishes  a 
Council  at  Vienna  to  crush  free 
thought  in  Italy,  158 ;  comments 
of,  on  hearing  of  the  suicide  of 
Lord  Castlereagh  (Londonderry) 
159  ;  tries  to  settle  the  P^astern 
question  in  concert  with  the  Czar, 
IGO,  161  ;  forces  repression  of 
opinion  on  Bnden  and  Bavaria, 
162;  his  theory  and  acticu  re- 
garding the  independence  of 
Gre(  ceat  variance,  103  ;  incorr(  ct- 
ne^s  of  the  forecast  of,  regarding 
Claries  X.  and  the  Dauphin,  1G3, 
164;  cooling  of  the  relations  of, 
with  the  Czar,  164  ;  incorieet  fore- 
cast rcL'arding  the  effect  of  the 
deatl)  of  Alexander  on  the  history 
of  Kussia,  164,  165;  meets  Lord 
Hertford,  and  imbibes  a  sincere 
admiration  for  him,  166;  distriK^t 
conceiveil  by,  of  Canning,  166, 167; 
tries  to  gain  the  Czar  Nicholas, 
167  ;  but  cannot  bring  himself  to 
support  the  Russian  policy  in  the 
East,  168 ;  expression  of,  on 
hearing  of  the  battle  of  Navarino, 
169;  hopes  to  derive  advantage 
from  the  accession  to  power  of 
the  Duke  of  Wellington  on  the 
deatii  of  Canning,  169  ;  is  trying 
to  improve  his  relations  with 
Eussia  when  he  is  startled  by  the 
Revolution  of  1830,  170;  op- 
posing attitude  taken  by,  tuwanls 
tiat  Revolution,  171;  represses 
Cermany  and  Italy,  and  stav(  s 
off  opposition  in  Hungary,  172; 
alarmed  at  JMazzini's  effoits, 
tiaces  h'm  to  his  lair  in  London, 
173,  174 ;  dealings  of,  with 
Hungarv,  174  ;  up'to  1830,  175  ; 
up  to~18o9,  176  ;  up  to  1848, 177 ; 


difference  of  mode  of  dealing  of, 
with  Hungary,  compared  with 
the  01  her  states  of  the  Empire, 
178 ;  dealings  of,  with  Italy, 
178, 179  ;  wiih  Cracow,  179  ;  with 
the  King  of  Sardinia.  179,  180  ; 
alarm  of,  at  the  reforming  atti- 
tude of  Pio  Nono,  181 ;  tries  to 
repress  the  popular  feeling  in 
Italy,  182,  183;  defeat  of  the 
Swiss  policy  of,  184  ;  difficulties 
of,  with  respect  to  Hoi  stein,  184  ; 
looks  with  apprehension  on  the 
small  concessions  of  the  new 
King  of  Prus^ia,  185 ;  and  on  the 
rise  of  lil)eialism  in  Germany, 
185.  186  ;  movement  in  Hungaiy 
against  the  policy  of,  ISo,  187  ; 
underrates  the  dang*  r,  187 ;  when 
the  ti.mult  in  Vienna  arises,  is 
bent  on  resistance,  188;  gives 
the  comniand  of  the  castle  to 
Prince  \Vindsci:gratz,  but  is 
restrained  irom  giving  him  per- 
mission to  tiro  on  the  people,  189; 
re.-igns,  189  ;  still  convinced  that 
his  policy  was  right.  190  ;  reaches 
Dresden  with  difficulty,  and 
proceeds  thence  to  England,  191 ; 
returns  to  Au.-tria,  191,192;  con- 
versations of,  with  the  Emperor 
Fiancis  Joseph,  192 ;  lives  to 
witness  the  total  overthrow  of 
his  policy,  192,  ]  93:  death  of,  193; 
domestic  life  of,  193 ;  sunimary 
of  the  first  f)art  of  the  career  (f, 
194,  196;  of  the  second  part,  196, 
197;  self-written  epitaph  of, 
197. 

Mettei-nich,  Francis  George,  father 
of  the  Anstri:in  statesman,  4 ; 
summons  his  son  to  Frankfort  for 
tliC  Emperor's  coronation,  4 ; 
summons  him  to  Vienna,  and 
n«  gotiates  his  marriage,  7 ;  is 
granted  the  abbey-lands  of 
Ochsenhausen,  10. 

Metternich,  IMadame,  is  questioned 
by  Napoleon  as  to  the  possibility 
of  an  Austrian  marriage,  63. 

Moreau.  General,  meets  his  fate  at 
Dresden,  121. 


206 


INDEX, 


N. 

Naples,  the  Bourbons  restored  to, 
15 i  ;  the  people  of,  force  their 
king  to  accept  a  constitution,  J  51  ; 
the  people  of,  rise  against  King 
Bomba,  182,  183;  who  is  forceil 
to  grant  a  constitution,  183 ;  ex- 
citement throughout  the  kingdom 
of,  183,  184. 

Napoleon,  contrast  between  system 
of,  and  that  of  Metternich,  1-3; 
had  the  same  professors  as 
Metternich  for  mathematics  and 
fencing,  4 ;  is  joined  at  Briinn 
by  Count  Haugwitz,  13;  requests 
that  Metternich  may  he  appointed 
to  the  embassy  at  Paris,  15  ;  mis- 
take made  by,  in  so  doing,  19;  ♦ 
gives  Metternich  a  cordial  recep- 
tion, 19;  impression  mude  by, 
upon  Metternich,  19-21;  pro- 
gramme of,  with  respect  to 
Prussia  in  1806,  21 ;  qu  ilities 
of,  as  they  appeared  to  Metter- 
nich, 22,  23  ;  niMkus  the  peace  of 
Tilsit,  23  ;  action  o*',  on  learning 
the  capitulation  ot  B<iylen,  23,  24 ; 
reception  given  by,  t(»  Metternich, 
as  related  by  Metternich,  24,  25  ; 
the  same,  as  related  by  the  French 
minister  for  foreign  atfairs,  26- 
30;  meets  the  Czar  at  Erfurt, 
31  ;  has  only  one  Fr.  nch  and  one 
Ru,->sian  witness,  32  ;  sets  out  for 
Bayoune,  33 ;  returns  to  Paris, 
and  receives  Metternicli  with  his 
customary  kindness,  40 ;  sees 
throu-h  the  designs  of  Austria, 
41 ;  is  deceived  in  the  character 
of  Metternich,  43;  would  have 
preferred  peace,  44  ;  but  Austria 
forces  on  war,  44,  45 ;  wins  the 
battle  of  Wagram,  49,  50  ;  agrees 
to  a  suspension  of  arujs,  and 
sends  Champngny  to  Komoru  to 
negotiate,  52  ;  his  real  ooject  mis- 
understo'd  by  Metternich,  54; 
states  his  demands,  56,  57  ;  im- 
patient of  the  delay  of  the  nego- 
tiators,    opens      communication 


with  the  Emperor  Francis,  57, 
58 ;  and  makes  peace,  58-62 ; 
sounds  Madame  Metternich  re- 
garding the  possibility  of  an 
Austrian  marriage,  63 ;  marries 
Marie  Louise,  65  ;  receives  Met- 
ternich at  Paris,  and  gives  him 
his  confidence,  66-70 ;  lets  out 
tiiat  lie  intends  war  with  Russia, 
70  ;  advances  his  forces  as  far  as 
Dantzig,  74  ;  notifies  to  his  allies 
h's  intention  of  invading  Russia, 
75  ;  obtains,  under  certain  stipu- 
lations, a  corps  of  30,000  men 
from  Austria,  75,  76  ;  receives  the 
vassal  sovereigns  at  Dres  len,  76  ; 
wisdom  of  the  course  traced  by, 
in  confidential  communicatioa 
with  Metternich,  76,  77  ;  asks  i he 
advice  of  his  c»uncillors  after  the 
catastrophe  of  the  retreat,  82 ; 
aiidres-es  the  Emperor  of  Austria 
as  to  his  plans,  83;  delusion 
engendered  in  the  mind  of,  by  his 
marriiige,  87  ;  sends  M.  de  Nar- 
bonne  to  Vienna  to  cope  with 
Metternich,  88 ;  reaches  Mayence 
and  sends  fresh  instructions  to 
Narhonne,  96  :  defeats  the  allies 
at  LUtzen,  97 ;  repents  having 
conferred  upfm  Austria  the  role 
of  mediator,  100 ;  resolves  to 
treat  directly  witii  Ru-sia,  101 ; 
defeats  the  allies  at  Bautzen,  103 ; 
fatal  conduct  of,  in  agreeing  to 
an  armistice,  103  ;  historical  in- 
terview of,  with  Metternich,  109- 
114;  at  the  second  interview 
agrees  to  a  congress,  116;  efttct 
of  a  phr.ise  of,  used  in  1810,  on 
Metternich,  118 ;  Austria  declares 
war  against,  119;  wins  the  battle 
of  Dresden,  120  :  but  the  result 
more  than  neutralised  by  the 
remissness  of  St.  Cvr,  121 ;  is 
beaten  at  Leipsig,  122  ;  campaign 
of  1814  ruined  by  Murmont's 
treachery,  12i.  12iJ;  life  work  of, 
judg.  d  by  Metternich,  127  ;  learns 
that  the  allies  are  proposing  to 
deport  him  to  St.  Helena,  131; 
id   forced   to   act   at  once,   135 ; 


INDEX. 


207 


tr'umphal  march  of,  137;  fate 
of,  decided  at  Waterloo,  139;  is 
gent  to  St.  Helena,  140;  the 
legend  of,  survives,  197. 

Narbf)nne,  M.  de,  replnces  Baron 
Otto  as  French  Ambassador  at 
Vienna,  88.  89 ;  is  well  received, 
92  ;  sets  himself  to  read  Metter- 
nich  througli  and  through,  92- 
99 ;  and  succeeds,  100 ;  a  ques- 
tion whether  the  penetration  of, 
WRS  not  a  misfortune,  100  and  note. 

Nicholas,  succeeds  his  brother 
Alexander  on  ihe  throne  of 
Russia,  165 ;  efforts  made  by 
Mctternich  to  conciliate,  166- 
170;  concludes  the  treaty  of 
Adrianople,  168;  lays  his  heavy 
hand  on  Poland,  171. 

o. 

OcHSENHAUSEX,  abbey  lands  of, 
grauttd  to  the  elder  Metteinich, 
10. 

Opocno,  selected  by  t'le  Czar  for 
his  head-quarters  during  the 
armi.--tice  of  Pleiswitz,  lOo;  he 
is  visited  there  by  Metteruich, 
10.5-107. 

Otranto,  Fouche  Duke  of,  qupstion 
put  to,  by  Metteruich,  and  reply 
(if,  regarding  re>ult  of  pcs-ilde 
return  of  Napoleon  from  Elba, 
135. 

Otto,  Baron,  pourparlers  of,  with 
Metternich  at  "Vienna,  8.5,  86;  is 
replaced  by  M.  de  Narbonue,  88. 

P. 

Palmerston,  Lord,  wise  foreign 
policy  of,  181 ;  note  to  184. 

Pifdmnnt,  is  restored  to  the  king  of 
Sardinia,  151. 

Pius  IX.,  Giovanni  INIastai  Ferotti 
is  el'-cted  Pope  as.  180;  liberal 
tendencies  of,  181 ;  issues  a 
decree  granting  separate  re- 
sponsibility to  his  miiii^t'Ts,  183. 

Plciswitz,  armistice  of,  101,  119. 


Prague,  Napoleon  signs  an  agree- 
ment with  Metternich  for  a  con- 
gress at,  116;  reasons  why  the 
congress  of,  was  abortive,  119. 

Pressburg,  the  peace  of,  Jollows  the 
battle  of  Austerlilz,  15 ;  con- 
ditions of,  15. 

Prussia,  Freder'ck  William  III., 
king  of,  vacillation  of,  m  1804, 
11 ;  opens  liis  frontiers  to  the 
Czar  and  signs  a  treaty  at  Pots- 
dam, 11,12;  despatches  Haug- 
witz  to  Napoleon,  12 ;  accepts 
Hanover  from  Napoleon,  13;  is 
informed  V)y  Metternich,  in  1811, 
of  tlie  secret  designs  of  Austria 
in  his  favour,  72 ;  meets  Napoleon 
at  Dresden,  76 ;  signs  the  treaty 
of  Rei  henbach,  107, 108  ;  desires 
after  1814  to  incorporate  the 
v»  hole  of  Saxony,  130 ;  opinion  of 
Napolecm  regarding,  expressed  to 
Admiral  Cockburu,  132 ;  truly 
contemptible  character  of,  148, 
149  ;  is  like  clay  in  the  hands  of 
the  potter  Metternich,  149,  1.50; 
suj^ports  the  reactionary  policy 
of,  162;  death  of,  184. 

Prussia,  Frederick  William  IV. 
begins  his  reign  by  measures 
which  alarm  Metternich,  185. 


R. 

Eeichenbach,  treaty  of,  107;  why 
the  knowledge  of  the  existence 
of  the,  was  hidden  from  the 
world,  note  to  107  ;  provisions  of 
the,  107,  108. 

Remi'Sat,  Madame  de,  testimony 
ot^  to  the  real  marriage  of  Na- 
poleon and  Josephine,  64, 65,  note. 

Revolution,  after  a  life  spent  in 
combating,  Metternich  is  brought 
face  to  face  with,  and  succumbs, 
187,  188. 

Revolution  of  18-30,  IVfetternich  is 
startl  d  in  his  plans  of  concili- 
ating the  Czar  by  the,  170  ;  how 
the,  affected  generally  the  policy 
of  Metternich,  171. 


208 


INDEX, 


Komanzoff,  Chfincellor  of  the 
Ru!-siau  Empire,  is  one  of  the 
four  adinittod  t'»  the  secret  roun- 
cils  of  Erfurt,  32  :  is,  accordiui^ 
to  Mett.ernich,  "  caught  iu  tlie 
nets  of  Napoleon,"  3h> ;  is  one  of 
the  men  Metteruich  failed  to 
seduce,  40,  41 ;  coinmuTiication  of 
Napoleon  to,  regarding  Austria, 
41. 

s. 

St.  Cyr,  General,  fails  to  support 
Vandamnie  at  the  critical  mo- 
ment, 121. 

Savarv,  General,  visits  Metternich 
at  Giiinberg,  and  makes  a  pro- 
posal to  him,  47. 

Saxon  army,  trea  on  of  the,  causes 
the  loss  ot  the  battle  of  Leipsig, 
121,  122;  and  note  to  122, 

Saxony,  ccweted  by  Prussia  as  a 
reward  for  her  efforts  in  1813-14, 
130 ;  opiuion  of  Metternich  oa 
the  proposed  transfer  of,  132 ; 
awakens  to  the  neces.sities  of 
freedom,  184. 

Saxony,  the  Elector  of,  as  he  ap- 
peared to  Metternich,  9;  King  of, 
dubious  conduct  of,  84  ;  intrigues 
o  Metternich  wi'h,90,  91 ;  orders 
the  d  shanding  of  Poniatowski  s 
ci)rps,  91 ;  returns  to  his  alliance 
with  Niifioleon,  102. 

Scliwarzenberg,  Prince,  Austrian 
auibassador  at  St.  Petersburg, 
34  ;  is  ambassador  at  Pans  aad 
giyes  a  masked  b^dl,  (33 ;  com- 
mands the  auxiliary  Austrian 
corps  in  the  Ilusaian  Campaign, 
72  ;  proceeds  on  a  mission  to 
Pa' is,  88,  89;  under  Napjl  on's 
influence  is  dumb,  89  ;  opiiiion  of, 
regarding  the  political  influence 
ot  the  marriage  of  Marie  Loui.-e, 
note  to  page  90;  questions  put 
to,  as  eomm  mder-in-' hief  of  the 
Au.sirian  army,  by  j\letteriii<h, 
115;  reply  of,  116;  attacks 
N-tpoleon  at  Dresden  and  is  de- 
leated,  120,  121. 


Sonderbund,  the  policy  of  Metter- 
nich and  Louis  Philippe  re- 
garding the,  defeated  by  Lord 
Palinerstoii,  182  and  note. 

Spain,  dealings  of  Napoleon  with, 
23;  policy  of  Napoleon  how 
affected  by  the  turn  of  aff"airs  in, 
50. 

Stadion,  Count,  replaces  Count 
Colloiedo  as  Aiistrian  Foreigu 
Minister  after  the  Peace  of  Pre.-s- 
burg,  15;  informs  Metternich 
that  Austria  is  nearly  ready  for 
war,  35 ;  reckons  on  tiie  sup[)ort  of 
Northern  Germany,  38 ;  re?igas, 
50 ;  is  sent  to  tlie  head-quarters 
of  the  Czar,  100 ;  aceompanies 
the  Czar  to  Opocno,  lO.i ;  siiins 
the  treaty  of  Keichenbach,  107 ; 
represents  Austria  at  Chatillon, 
126. 

Sweden  claims  Norway  as  a  reward 
for  her  services  in  1813-14,  129. 

Szechenyi,  Count,  pa  riotic  eliorts 
of,  iu  Hungary,  175. 


T. 

Talleyrand,  Prince,  courtesy  of, 
to  Metternich  at  ti.eir  fiist  inter- 
view, 18 ;  begins  to  undermine 
Napolion,  33;  speeches  of,  to 
the  Czar,  at  Erfurt.  33.  31 ;  leaves 
on  the  mind  of  Metternich  the 
impretsion  that  he  is  plotting 
against  Napoleon,  39,  40 ;  advises 
Napoleon  to  treat  direct  with 
Ivussia,  82;  lepresents  Fiance  at 
the  Congress  of  Vienna,  131. 

Tep  ifz,  interview  between  Frede- 
rick William  III.  and  Metter- 
nich at,  149. 

Thugut,  Baron,  retires  from  the 
posit  on  of  Austrian  Foreign 
Minster  on  account  of  the  peaCG 
of  Luneville,  8. 

Ticino,  Mazziui  takes  refuge  at 
Lugano  in,  171,  i73;  a'ortive 
attempt  iiade  from,  172,  173; 
becomes  the  bone  of  contention 


INDEX, 


209 


betweou  Sardinia  and  Austria, 
177,  178. 

Tolstoy,  Count,  Russian  Minister 
at  I'aris,  :ippeal  made  to,  at  tlie 
famous  interview  between  Napo- 
leon and  Metternicli  in  1808, 
24-29;  sympathies  of,  allied,  to 
those  of  Mttternicli,  31. 

Troppuii,  Confevence  of,  152-156. 

V. 

Vandamme,  General,  fatal  misfor- 
tune of,  at  Ku  m,  cau-ed  by 
want  of  support  on  the  part  of 
St.  Cyr,  121. 

Vienna,  Congress  of,  heartburnings 
at  covetous  greed  engendered  :it 
the,  129-IH3  ;  it  is  proposed  at,  to 
deport  Napoleon  to  S:.  Helena 
or  the  Canary  Inlands,  133 ;  the 
terror  excited  at  the,  by  the 
return  of  Napoleon,  hushes  up 
all  divisions,  13.5,  137;  good  luck 
of  the  alii  8  in  that  the  members 
of  the,  had  not  dispersed,  187. 

w. 

Wagram,  Battle  of,  is  witnessed 


from  a  hill  by  the  Emperor  Fran- 
cis and  Metternich,49;  causes  of 
thf  loss  of  the,  by  the  Austrians, 
49,  50. 

"Wellington,  Duke  of,  at  th-i  C(m- 
grfss  of  Ver<  na,  157, 159  ;  succes- 
sicn  of,  to  I'anning,  fills  tlie  mind 
of  Metteinich  with  hopes,  169. 

Wesseknyi,  Count,  a  pnjiular  1<  ader 
in  Hungary,  is  inipris  ined  by 
order  of  Metternicli,  176. 

"VVindiscligiatz,  Princ<^is  entrust'  d 
at  tlie  last  moment  with  the  com- 
mand of  the  castle  in  Vienna, 
189. 

Wrede,  Count,  attempts  to  bar  the 
r<^a  1  to  Napole(»n  ;  mot  and  action 
of  the  latter,  note  to  p.  92. 

"VVUrtemberg,  King  of.  protests 
against  the  policy  of  Metlernich, 
150;  denounces  Austria  as  "ap- 
pro])riatiugto  Ik  rsi  U'th^•  heriiage 
of  Napoh  on,"  161 ;  liberal  move- 
ments sanctioned  by  the,  185. 


z. 


Znaim,  the  Austrian  rearguard  nt- 
ta-  ked  and  beaten  by  Maimout 
and  Mascc'ua  at,  52. 


A   LIST  OK  BOOKS 


SELECTED    FROM    THE 


Catalogue 


-OF— 


J.  B.  I^IPPINCOTX   CONIPAKV 


(Complete  Catalogue  Sent  on  Application  ) 


PUBLICATIONS  OF  J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY. 


THE    ONLY    COMPLETE    EDITIONS, 


THE  NEW  REVISED  EDITION 

OF 

'9 


With  the  Author's  Latest  Corrections  and  Additions, 
Edited  by  J.   FOSTER  KIRK. 

History  of  Ferdinand  and  Isabella.     3  Vols, 

History  of  the  Conquest  of  Mexico.     3  Vols, 

History  of  the   Conquest  of  Peru.    2   VoIs« 
History  of  the   Reign  of  Philip  II.     3  Vols, 

History  of  the   Reign  of  Charles   V,     3   Vols. 
Prescott's  Miscellaneous  Essays.     1  Vol. 

FIFTEEN    VOLUMES. 


This  Edition  is  Illustrated  with  Maps,  Plates,  and  Engravings. 

Price  per  volume,  istno,  in  fine  English  cloth,  ivith  black  and  gold  orna' 
vtetiiation,  $2  oo:  library  sheep,  $2.^0:  half  calf  .gilt  back,  ^.JO. 


Tlie  "NEW  POPULAR  EOITIOJV"  of 

PRESCOTT'S    T^ORKS 

Printedfrom  the  plates  of  the  New  Revised  Edition,  as  above,  with  the  author's 
latest  corrections  and  additions.     Edited  by  J.  FOSTER  KIRK. 

Price  per  vohitne,  in  neio  style  of  cloth  binding,  $i.jo.    Per  set,  7j  vols., 

$22  SO.     IVith  Life  of  Prescott.     By  George  Ticknor. 

jb  vols.,  cloth.     Per  set,  $24.00. 

"In  point  of  style  Prescott  ranks  with  the  ablest  English  historians,  and 
paragraphs  may  be  found  in  his  volumes  in  which  the  grace  and  elegance  of 
Addison  are  combined  with  Robertson's  majestic  cadence  and  Gibbon's  brill- 
iancy."— London  Athenceuin. 

"  The  excellence  of  his  prodi.ctions  is  in  part  transparent  to  every  reader. 
Compare  what  he  has  written  v.  ith  the  most  of  what  others  have  left  on  the 
same  subjects,  and  Prescott's  superiority  beams  upon  you  from  the  contrast.'* 
— George  Bancroft,  the  Historian. 

■  <»  ■ 


PRESCOTT    LEAFLETS. 

e  Works  of  W.  H.  Prescotl 
DON. 
isnio,  in  packets,  JO  cents. 


Choice  Passages  from  the  Works  of  W.  H.  Prescott.     Compiled  by  JOSEJ* 
PHINE  D.  HODGDON. 


PUBLICATIONS  OF  J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY. 


Condensations  of  the  Works  and  Lives  of  the  Great  Modern  Writers. 


Foreign  Classics  for  English  Readers. 

Edited  by  Mrs.   OLIPHANT. 

I6mo.    Extra  cioth.    $1.00   per  volume. 

The  purpose  of  this  series  is  to  present  in  a  convenient  and  attractive  form  a 
jynopsis  of  the  lives  and  works  of  the  great  writers  of  Europe — who  they  were 
•  nd  what  they  wrote.  

VOL  UMES  NO  /F  RE  A  D  Y. 
7.  Montaigne.  13.  Corneille  and  Racine. 


Dante. 

Voltaire. 

Pascal. 

Petrarch. 

Goethe. 


6.  Moli&re. 


8. 

9- 
10. 
II. 
12. 


Rabelais. 
Schiller. 
Calderon. 
Cervantes. 
St.  Simon. 


14.  Madame  de  Sdvigne. 

15.  La  Fontaine,  etc 

16.  Tasso. 

17.  Rousseau. 


OTHER    VOLUMES    IN    PREPARATION. 


"  Should  find  a  wide  field  of  circula- 
tion, and  should  not  fail  of  reaching 
young  students  at  least.  No  reailer  of 
taste  can  find  these  anything  but  de- 
lightful works,  and  well  worthy  his 
attention." — Boston  Eve.  Traveller. 

"  The  idea  of  presenting  in  this 
cheap  and  popular  form  the  character- 


istics, the  sketch  of  the  lives,  and 
analysis  of  the  writings  of  the  great 
authors  of  a  past  goneraiion.  so  as  to 
make  the  public  fanuliar  with  their 
best  works,  and  the  leading  events  of 
their  lives,  is  an  excellent  one,  and  has 
so  far  been  well  earned  out." — Chicago 
Advance. 


Ancient  Classics  for  English  Readers. 

A   POPULAR  TRANSLATION  OF   TKE  CLASSICS. 

Edited  by  llev.  W.  LUCA-*  C01.L.INS. 

16mo.    Fine  cloth.    Per  vol.,  50  cents. 

Complete  in  sets  of  28  volumes,  in  cloth  boxes.     $14.00. 

Also  the  28  volumes  bound  in  14  volumes,  cloth  extra.     J12.50. 


I.  Homer's  Iliad. 

a.  Homer's  Odyssey. 

3.  Herodotus. 

4.  Caesar. 
5-  Virgil. 

b.  Horace. 

7.  ^schylus. 

8.  Xenophon. 
9    Cicero. 

10.  Sophocles. 


II.  Pliny. 

13.  Euripides. 

13.  Juvenal. 

14.  Aristophanes. 

15.  Hesiod   and    The 

ognis. 

16.  Plautus  and  Terence.  25   Aristotle 

17.  Tacitus.  26.  Thucydides 

18.  Luciaa.  27    Lucretius. 

19.  Plato.  ■>         28.  Pindar. 


20.  Greek  Anthology 

21.  Livy. 

22.  Ovid. 

23.  Catullus, Tibullus, 
and  Propertius. 

24.  Demosthenes. 


"  Each  successive  issue  only  adds  to 
our  appreciation  of  the  learning  and 
nkill  with  which  this  admirable  enter- 
prise of  bringing  the  best  classics 
•rithin  easy  reach  of  English  readers 


is  conducted." — New  York  Indefery 
dent. 

"  One  of  the  most  ingenious  and 
successful  literary  enterprises  of  tb< 
day." — Every  Saturday. 


PUBLICATIONS  OF  J.    B.   LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY. 

A  VALUABLE  AND  HANDY  REFERENCE  LIBRARY. 


READER'S 
REFERENCE  LIBRARY 

CONTAINS   THE   FOLLOWING   VOLUMES: 

Breijver's   Reader's   Handlbook 

Of  Facts,  Characters,  Plots,  and  References.    $3.50. 

"  One  of  the  most  useful  and  scholarly  books  of  the  century," — Philadelphia 
Times. 

Brei^ver's  Dictionary  of  Plirase  and  Fatsle. 

Giving  the  Derivation,  Source,  or  Origin  of  about  20,000  Common  Phrases,  Illu- 
sions, and  Words  ihat  have  a  Tale  to  Tell.  New  Edition  (^Seventeenth).  Re- 
vised and  Corrected.  In  this  new  edition  has  been  added  a  concise  Bibhog- 
raphy  of  English  IJterature,  based  upon  the  larger  work  of  reference  on  the 
same  subject  by  \V.  Davenport  Adams,  with  additions.     ^2.50. 

Bre^wer's    Dictionary    of  Miracles. 

Imitative,  Realistic,  and  Dogmatic.     With  Illustrations,    i-z.^o. 

"  It  is  a  most  valuable  addition  to  the  library  of  the  student,  and  to  the  clergy 
it  ought  to  be  specially  useful." — New  York  Herald. 

Bdwards's  IJVords,   Facts,   and  Phrases. 

A  Dictionary  of  Curious,  Quaint,  and  Out-of-the-Way  Matters.     I2.50. 

"A  mine  of  curious  and  valuable  information." — New  York  Christian  Advo- 
cate. 

TITorcester's   Comprehensive   Dictionary. 

Revised,  Enlarged,  and  Profusely  Illustrated.     ^2.50. 

"  For  use  in  the  home  or  place  of  business,  the  Comprehensive  Dictionary 
has  no  superior." — Massachusetts  Teacher. 

Roget's   Thesaurus. 

A  Treasury  of  English  Words.  Classified  and  arranged  so  as  to  Facilitate 
the  Expression  of  Ideas  and  Assist  in  Literary  Composition.    ^^2.50. 

Ancient  and  Modern  Familiar  Quotations. 

From  the  Greek,  Latin,  and  Modern  Languages.    $2.50. 

Soule's   Kngflish    Synonymes. 

A  Dictionary  of  Synonymes  and  Synonymous  or  Parallel  Expressions.    ^2.50. 


Eight  Volumes.  Bound  in  Half  Morocco,  Gilt  Top.  Put  up  in  Neat  Pasteboard 
Sox.    Per  Set,  $20.00.    Any  volume  sold  separately. 


PUBLICATIONS   OF  J.    B.    LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY. 

WORKS  OF  REFERENCE 

FOR  THE  LIBRARY,  SCHOOL,  AND  FAMILY. 


GAZETTEER  OF  THE  WORLD. 

A  Complete  Pronouncing  Gazetteer,  cr  Gso^^raphical 
Lictionary  of  the  World. 

COmiMXG  NOTICES  OF  OYER  OXE  EUNDRED  AND  TWENTY-FIVE  TaOUSAXD  PLACES 

With  Recent  and  Authentic  Information  respecting  the  Countries, 

Islands,  Rivers,  Mountains,  Cities,  Towns,  etc.,  of  every 

portion  of  the  (Jlobe  ;    also  the  Census  for  1880. 

NEW  EDITION,  WITH   SUPPLEMENT AEY  TABLES, 

Showing  the  Population,  etc.,  of  the  Principal  Cites  and  Towns  of  the  World,  based 

upon  the  most  recent  Census  Returns,    One  Volume.    Imperial  Oclavo. 

Embracing  2680  Pages.    Library  Sheep.    $12.00. 

'It  is  the  best  work  of  its  kind  extant,  and  is  a  necessary  supplement  to  any 
en  'clopaedia.  'J  he  amount  of  information  it  contains  is  astonishing,  and  while, 
of  jurse,  condensed,  it  is  all  that  is  necessary  for  reference  purposes." — Chicago 
Tr-thune. 

"  It  has  long  stood  fnr  superior  lo  all  .^imilarworks  through  ifs  imiform  accuracy, 
exhaustive  field,  and  evident  purpose  of  the  publishers  to  make  it  as  complete  and 
perfect  as  possible.    It  is  the  standard  of  standards." — Bostott  Evening  Traveller, 


LIPPINCOTT'S  BIOGRAPHICAL  DICTIONARy. 

A  New,  Thoroughly-Revised,  and  Greatly-Enlarged  Edition. 

A  UNIVERSAL  PRONOUNCING  DICTIONARY  OF  BIOGRAPHY  AND  MYTHOLOGY. 

CONTAINING 

Memoirs  of  the  Eminent  Persons  of  all  Ages  and  Countries,  and  Accounts  of  the 

Various  Subjects  of  the  Norse,  Hindoo,  and  Classic  Mythologies,  with  the 

Pronunciation  of  their  Names  in  the  Different  Languages  in  which  they 

occur;  to  which  has  been  added  Several  Thousand  New  Names. 

By    JOSEPH    TII03IA;s,    31. T>.,    IL.lL..r>. 

Complete  in  One  Volume,  Imperial  Svo,  of  2550  Pages.    Sheep,  $12.00. 
Half  Morocco,  $15.00.     Half  Russia,  $15.00. 

"  The  most  comprehensive  and  valuable  work  of  the  kind  that  has  ever  been 
attempted.     An  invaluable  convenience." — Boston  Evening  Traveller. 

"  Ihe  most  valuable  contribution  to  lexicography  in  the  English  tongue."— 
Cincinnati  Gazette. 

"  No  other  work  of  the  kind  will  compare  with  it." — Chicago  Advance. 


PUBLICATIONS   OF  J.   B.   LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY. 
THE    BEST    FOR    HOME    AND    SCHOOL. 


WORCESTER'S 

Unabridged  Qn^arto 

DICTIONARY 


"VVitli  Denison's  Patent  ludex  for  75  cents  additiunal. 

EHDZTIOISr   OIF   1887- 

ENLARGED  BY  THE  ADDITION  OF 

A  New  Pronouncing  Biographical  Dictionary 

of  nearly  12,000  personages; 

A  New  Pronouncing  Gazetteer  of  the  World, 

noting  and  locating  over  20,000  places. 

CONTAINING  ALSO 

OVJSrt.    12,SOO    NS'W    "lATORSS, 

RECENTLY   ADDED, TOGETHER   WITH 

A  Table  of  5000  Words  in   General  Use,  witli  their 

Synonymes. 

ILLUSTRATED  WITH  WOOD-OUTS  AND  PULL-PAGE  PLATES. 


LIBRARY   SHEEP.   MKRBLED    EDGES      -     $10.00. 


T/te  Nation€il  Statidavtl  of  A.uterican  Iiiteratttre. 

Every  edition  of  Longfellow,  Holmes,  Bryant,  Irving,  WhiLtier, 
and  other  eminent  American  authors,  is  according  to  Worcester. 
Almost  w^ithout  exception  the  leading  magazines  and  newspapers  use 
Worcester  as  authority. 

From  Oliver  Wendell  Holmes. — "  Worcester's  Dictionary  has 
constantly  lain  on  my  table  for  daily  use,  and  Webster's  reposed  on 
my  shelves  for  occasional  consultation." 

FOR    sale   by   all   BOOKSELLERS. 

J,  B.  LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY,  PuTilisliers, 

715  and  717  Market  Street,  Philadelphia. 


»-  ■*■  ■iiS!'!^*8F 4  '•ft 


